'A peacekeeping operation is not an army, or a counter-terrorist force […] It is a tool to create the space for a nationally-owned political solution'[1]

A peace to keep?

MINUSMA's proactive stance in a changing world

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies

Religion, Conflict and Globalization

Sharo Koster, s2616319

Master thesis

17 July 2018

Supervisor: Dr J. Tarusarira

2nd assessor: Dr B.E. Bartelink

Wordcount (abstract, footnotes and bibliography excluded): 19.838

Abstract

This master thesis researches the relation between the Malian conflict, which is fuelled by religiously inspired terrorist groups, and the responses of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA. The research question is: *What challenges faces MINUSMA in achieving its goals, in perspective of religiously inspired terrorist groups?* It is a literature based research and based in a Western perspective. The theoretical frame approaches religiously inspired terrorism as a modern and social phenomenon, with a strong focus on the creation of group identities; peace is approached with Galtung's theories on processes of violence and peace. These theoretical concepts are applied to the situation in Mali and MINUSMA. MINUSMA's proactive response creates more radicalised groups, fighting a 'holy war.' MINUSMA and consequently the UN DPKO are in a difficult position: finding a balance between an effective and too proactive approach. This thesis concludes that the UN should review its position towards conflicts with a presence of terrorism and that it is a necessity to keep reviewing this position: conflicts will keep changing, and so will the responses.

Figure 1: Political Map of Mali, https://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/mali-maps.html, on May 31, 2018.

List of abbreviations

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
ASIFU	All Sources Information Fusion Unit
AU	African Union
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CMA	Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad
CMFPR	Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GATIA	Groupe d'autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et allies
GPSC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
HCUA	Haute Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad
ICC	International Criminal Court
JNIM	Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimim
CVJR	Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation
MAA	Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad
MIA	Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MLF	Macina Liberation Front
MNLA	Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
MPSA	Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l'Azawad
UN	United Nations
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN PBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission

Table of contents

1. Introduction

The world we live in today, is characterised by many ongoing conflicts, terrorist attacks and other incidents that affect our feelings of security in a negative way. There is a humanitarian crisis in Yemen,[2] Somalia is threatened by terrorism,[3] and the situation in the Middle-East stays unstable. This development is also found closer to home; on November 24, 2017, the Dutch newspapers were full of stories that an Islamic State terrorist is in the Netherlands, he entered the country with a false identity.[4] A trend is these conflicts is that they all seem to be dealing with the presence of terrorism.

At the same time, or maybe as a reaction to these developments in the world, peacebuilding organisations keep developing. Interpeace and the International Crisis Group are prominent organisations and the UN has several organs operating in fields of peace. The main and most well-known UN organ is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the DPKO. This department was established in 1948, just a few years after the UN originated. Since 1948, the DPKO completed 57 missions[5] and has 14 ongoing missions.[6]

In this thesis, I will focus on the mission that is deployed since July 1, 2013: the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA. Mali was for a long time seen as an example for other African countries.[7] But from January 2012 on, the country was subjected to drastic internal changes. This started with a rebellion in the north by nationalist Tuareg rebels, a nomadic community. They united in Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad, the MNLA. When this group declared the independence in of the northern region Azawad, and cleared out the governmental troops,[8] members of the military launched a coup d'état against the president.[9] Perpetrators of the coup reproached that the government was not doing enough to stop the rebels in the north. Furthermore, the MNLA in the north lost control to radicalised Islamic groups, who were linked to Al Qaeda and

---

[2] https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YEMEN%202017%20HNO_Final.pdf, on November 30, 2017.
[3] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2017-0635&format=XML&language=EN, on November 30, 2017.
[4] https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2204431-is-strijder-verblijft-op-valse-papieren-in-nederland.html, on November 30, 2017.
[5] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations, on May 14, 2018.
[6] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate, on May 14, 2018.
[7] Dool, on January 2, 2018.
[8] Al Jazeera, 'Tuaregs claim 'independence' from Mali' http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124644412359539.html, on January 2, 2018.
[9] Tran, on December 7, 2017.

spread throughout Mali and surrounding countries. This started as three main groups, Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM, but started splintering very fast.

The Malian government could not handle this conflict, with the presence of transnational Islamic terrorist groups anymore. In January 2013, the interim president formally asked France for help. The president of France, François Hollande, offered immediate help and send 3.700 troops.[10] The United Nations researched Mali in April 2013 and concluded that it needed a peacekeeping mission. On July 1, 2013, the UN mission was deployed. MINUSMA has been marked as the most deadliest mission, where UN personnel is targeted.[11]

Structure

In this thesis, I focus on MINUSMA, the possibilities and difficulties in a country that deals with so many obstacles. I address this with the research question: *What challenges faces the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in achieving its goals, in the perspective of religiously framed terrorist groups?*

This research question will be answered with five sub questions. The first and second have a theoretical approach, which will create the basis. The first question is: what is religiously framed terrorism? I address the theoretical backgrounds, with a focus on group identities and new religious communities in chapter two, paragraph one.

In every conflict, a sustainable solution should be found, peace should be durable, instead of a solution that merely focuses on surface of the conflict. In the second part of the theoretical frame, I address this with the theories of the founder of peace and conflict studies: Johan Galtung. I analyse his typology of violence, since the most basic definition of peace is: peace is the absence of violence.[12] This is followed by the typology of peace and from there, the step is taken towards sustainable peace. This is addressed with the sub question: what is sustainable peace and how can this be implemented?

In chapter three, the focus is on the conflict itself. Mali was a 'poster child for good governance,'[13] with a relatively stable democracy and a popular destination for NGOs and

---

[10] Urquhart, Harding & Chrisafis, on January 2, 2018.

[11] Sieff, K. (The Washinton Post) 'The world's most dangerous U.N. Mission.' http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.efe1ce4a9a85, on May 8, 2018.

[12] Galtung (1969), p. 167.

[13] United States Agency for International Development, 'III. Assistance Environment', in 'Country Strategic Plan FY 2003-2012: USAID MALI: Reducing Poverty and Accelerating Growth Through Partnerships', 2002, p. 11. As found in Solomon (2013), p. 12.

donors.[14] However, the Tuareg uprising of 2012 was the fourth since Mali gained independence in 1960 and exemplified the fragile relationship between the north and south.[15] It is imperative to understand this history and structure completely, so Mali's history, how the conflict started and develops in the years since 2012. I developed two sub questions, which enclose this chapter. Firstly, how did Mali get from a stable democracy to an unstable country, in need for international help? And secondly, the focus is on the presence of religiously framed terrorist groups in the conflict and their breeding grounds. This is addressed with the third sub question: how is religiously framed terrorism shaped in the Malian conflict?

In chapter four, the focus is on the United Nations. Firstly, I give a short history of the DPKO. The focus is on peace missions and the corresponding UN Resolutions, how they have changed over the years and how this affected MINUSMA. Secondly, this chapter gives insight into critiques on the more proactive stance peacekeeping missions take. I further discuss MINUSMA's development and mandates. The sub question that encompasses this is: what are the goals for MINUSMA?

In chapters two, three and four, I mainly let the theories and critics on these central themes speak. Chapter five is the discussion chapter, where I relate and discuss the theories to the subjects and the sub questions are elaborately answered. This thesis is completed with a conclusion, where the research question is answered and the most important findings of my research are presented. I also give recommendations for further research, that emerge from this research.

Objectives

This thesis aims at engaging in the debate on the conflict in Mali. The Netherlands is one of the 53 Member States sending military troops to MINUSMA,[16] and will send a maximum of 250 troops in 2018.[17] [18] Participating in the mission has had political consequences: Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis resigned in October 2017, as a result of an accident in Mali: in a

---

[14] Dool, on May 10, 2018.

[15] Tran, on December 25, 2017.

[16] https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/personnel, on January 5, 2018.

[17] https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/missie-in-mali/nieuws/2017/12/12/kamer-geeft-groen-licht-voor-verlenging-missies, on January 5, 2018.

[18] On June 15, 2018 the Dutch government decided not to extend Dutch deployment in Mali. The current mandate lasts until May 1, 2019 and troops will be withdrawed in the coming months. The main reason for ending the contribution is that this mission requires much personnel and material, which restricts deployment in other missions. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/06/15/kamerbrief-over-toekomstige-nederlandse-inzet-in-missies-en-operaties, p. 3, on July 9, 2018.

military exercise, two soldiers were killed and one was heavily injured, due to a malfunctioning mortar grenade.[19] This accident reignited the debate that the Dutch Ministry of Defence is not guaranteeing the safety of its employees, and the debate that the government should better indicate the risks soldiers have in foreign missions.[20] Therefore, this thesis will be socially relevant. It will offer accessible knowledge on a subject that for many Dutch people is just something very far away.

At the same time, this thesis will provide an insight in the shapes and forms of terrorism in Mali. Many African countries deal with the presence of Islamic terrorist groups and terrorist attacks are frequent; for example in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in July 2016.[21] This attack was committed by AQIM, which has a main role in the conflict in Mali. Thus, to understand the situation of Islamic terrorism in West-Africa, it is important to understand the situation in Mali. This thesis is embedded in the fields of peace and conflict studies, as well as the field of religious studies.

Methodology

This thesis is a literature study and based on primary and secondary sources. I decided to do a literature study for two reasons. Firstly, I address several theoretical concepts: religiously inspired terrorism and processes of peace, including Galtung's typology of violence and peace and peacekeeping and peacebuilding. These concepts are related to the United Nations. This thesis is written with a Western point of view, and it mainly addresses western scholars. For the first part of the theoretical frame, on religiously inspired terrorism, I focused on the modern and social aspect of these groups. In the second part on peace and sustainable peace, I started and based most of my analysis in the theories of Johan Galtung, a very prominent scholar in the field of peace research and the founder of the Journal for Peace Research, founded in 1964. His article *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, published in 1969, is still the most cited from this journal. I also start my analysis with this article, and expand it with other theories, which address other sides of peace research.

Secondly, I look at different religiously inspired terrorist groups and their members. I address breeding grounds for these groups and for membership. However, I had to base this research in secondary literature, while primary data would have given me the opportunity for a broader and more in-depth analysis. The reason I could not do this, is twofold. In the first

---

[19] Outeren & Steenbergen, on January 5, 2018.
[20] Meijer & Du Pré, on January 6, 2018.
[21] Raalte, accessed on January 6, 2018.

place, Mali is not safe. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly advises not to travel to northern Mali; for the southern region the advice is to only travel there when it is unavoidable. The main reason for this warning is the presence of terrorist and criminal and armed groups, and the high risk of terrorist attacks and kidnapping.[22] In the second place, these groups are difficult to approach, so interviewing is nearly impossible for me at this point. Furthermore, there is good secondary literature, which I could analyse for this thesis.

In chapter three, on the course of the conflict, I based my research in newspaper articles. The usage of different newspapers and sources is important: it makes an analysis more reliable, since it is possible that journalists or sources are biased. Chapter four includes mainly information coming from within the organisation: UN Resolutions, reports and websites. In the last paragraph, I analysed five mandates on Mali and MINUSMA, on three different concepts: support to the government, use of force and reconciliation/durable peace. The findings are presented in the paragraph *Mandates*.

It is essential to elaborate more on the approach of this thesis. The UN is a worldwide organisation with 193 Member States.[23] The Security Council, who authorises peace operations, has five permanent members and ten non-permanent.[24] Peace operations are deployed since 1948, but the most operations in Africa are deployed since the 1990s. Critiques say that the Security Council 'had been lax in carrying out its mandated duty […] in Africa in particular,'[25] and that in the challenges in Africa the UN 'are either conspicuously absent from the region or, if present, have had their roles substantially marginalised.'[26] Although this does not imply that the UN works from a Western perspective, it sends a clear message on the situation in Africa.

---

[22] https://www.nederlandwereldwijd.nl/reizen/reisadviezen/mali, on January 21, 2018.
[23] http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html, June 1, 2018.
[24] The permanent members are China, USA, France, UK and Russian Federation. The non-permanent member for 2018-2019 are Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland and Sweden. http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/, on June 1, 2018.
[25] Neethling, p. 3.
[26] Berman & Sams (2000), *Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 4-5. In Neethling, p. 3.

2. Theoretical frame

As explained in the introduction, the theoretical frame is twofold. Firstly, my focus is on terrorism. Terrorism comes in many forms, from left-winged to right-winged political terrorism, to eco- and religious terrorism. In this thesis, I focus on religiously inspired terrorism. So, I outline this theory in the first place, starting with the tension between individual and group identity, which emerges in threatening situations and conflicts. With several theories, I show that these identities are central in new religious communities.

Secondly, the research question focuses on the peacekeeping operation MINUSMA. So in the second part, I introduce the theories of Johan Galtung, and combine his theories with additions of other scholars. After a discussion on violence, we take the step towards conflict transformation, followed by the step to sustainable peace. In the conclusion, these two concepts are combined.

2.1 Terrorism

Given the variety of terrorism, defining it is not an easy task. The UN argues that it might have different expressions in different cultures,[27] and the classic saying 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' is criticised because it only works from the perspective of the person who says it. Therefore, it cannot be used in the practice of counter-terrorism.[28]

This chapter researches the circumstances where religion might inspire its followers to commit a violent act, an act which is perpetrated in name of a religion. I address theories with a focus on group identities and experiences of feelings of humiliation and shame. These will create a sufficient overview of religiously inspired terrorism as a social phenomenon.

Communities and group identities
Hans G. Kippenberg is a German scholar of comparative religious studies. He described the link between religion and violence with a theory of social action.[29] The link between religion and violence is created by the religious community; a community that takes a more and more steady place in the changing world. Traditional actors, such as the state, used to take care of the security of individuals, but these days, they are no longer able to offer this. New religious communities takes this role; communities are bound by similar beliefs and ethics and share a

---

[27] Botha, p. 29.
[28] Ganor, p. 292.
[29] Kippenberg, Searching for the Link between Religion and Violence: A Theory of Social Action.

worldview. The community provides an 'ethic of solidarity'[30] for its members, a feeling of unity, which strengthens the group identity furthermore.

This new religious community might feel threatened; these threats might be given by the more traditional communities, but also by other new religious communities. These might developed around just another path, resulting in another identity. The threats may consist of practices opposing their own beliefs, or may be experienced as humiliation. The latter is a very significant one and will be elaborated in this chapter. The created solidarity and group identity are very strong; intimidation leads up to defending the group. It is not surprising that this can have violent forms.

The perpetrated violent act will be perceived of an act to preserve the community, equally, the community takes care of its members. The community defends the act, as long as it fits into its paradigm, into its worldview. The norms and values of the community are used as instruments to frame the act.[31] All these instruments, the paradigms, worldviews, norms and values, are affected by a religious understanding of the community's history, and by continuing experiences of aggression, humiliation and shame.[32]

Sudhir Kakar's theory is introduced by several authors and it is a theory on group identities. He argues that in threatening situations, the group identity takes over the individual identity. The characteristics of the group identity can take stereotypical forms, which is enhanced by the new construction and structure of the group, what Kippenberg described as well. The group identity evolves and in this process, all positive characteristics are addressed to the group, while negative characteristics are attributed to the out groups.[33] In threatening situations, when the group identity takes over, members of the group will behave in accordance with what is expected from the group.[34] This is in line with how the group is constructed. In most cases, when threats decrease, members of the group will return to their individual identities. However, this is not the case of jihadists, who can feel as in a constant state of threat, what results in the group identity incorporation. In this case, that means that the individual identity is permanently changed into the group identity: 'The jihadi is not a person who wears his religious group identity lightly; for him it is an armour that is rarely, if ever, taken off.'[35] And, as shown above, this strengthens the expected group behaviour.

---

[30] Kippenberg, p. 111.
[31] Kippenberg, p. 102.
[32] Kippenberg, p. 108.
[33] Esmail, p. 60.
[34] Esmail, p. 60.
[35] Kakar, p. 136.

In this process, both religion and ethnicity play a role. Religion has an important part, it is the factor around which group identities evolve. It takes care of both the individual 'I' and the stronger group, the 'We'.[36] What is important to note here, is that this is not the traditional form of religion, but the new forms, as analysed in the following paragraphs.

Ellen Posman describes the differences that arise when group identities develop around religion, instead of derived from a secular perspective. The main difference is the role of the holy scriptures in religious identities. Events described here are seen as the group's 'sacred mythic history'[37], what Kakar calls mythohistory. However by the community, this history is not interpret as mythic, but as true. This applies to other aspects in holy scriptures as well; i.e. the norms and values. These are not placed in the historical context of the holy scripture, but are easily transported to the current time and place.

Since the sacred mythic history is perceived as being true, it is easily linked to the group's secular history. A group, or members of the group, can attempt a (violent) act. This is easier when the group believes they have done it in the past. Posman cites an example of Jonathan Brockopp[38]: 'Muhammad Abduh, Great Mufti of Egypt in the late nineteenth century, wrote the following: "No prophet had such antagonism or faced such humiliation as Muhammad."'[39] Such an experience, where the prophet experiences resistance and humiliation, because of his beliefs and goal in life, can be incorporate in the constructed identity of the religious group. This example of Muhammad is mythohistorical. Events and experiences in recent history might be incorporated in the collective memory in a similar way, strengthening the group identity even more.

Esmail expands Kakar's theory on group identity, in combination with mythohistory, even further. When a phenomenon is found in the group's mythohistory, it can be perceived as true. A phenomenon might be an event, symbol or figure, myth or metaphor. Posman has a similar argument. However, as Esmail argues, this phenomenon is placed in the altering light of the mythohistory. As a result, it is no longer self-contained, but receiving its meaning from the history; it becomes an archetype, an example that needs to be complied with.[40] Mythical event, events described in the holy scriptures, develop along the same path. When these

---

[36] Esmail, p. 60.
[37] Posman, p. 335.
[38] Brockopp, J. (2008) Jihad and Islamic History. In Rennie, B. and Tite, P.L. (eds.), *Religion, Terror, and Religious Violence: Religious Studies Perspectives*. New York: Routledge. P. 153.
[39] Posman, p. 335.
[40] Esmail, p. 61.

events are included in the identity, the difference between time and space dissolves. Esmail describes this process as following:

> [this] has to do with the phenomenon, observable in all militant or fundamentalist Islam, whereby symbols, metaphors, and myths, which refer to the facts of human experience by placing them in a transforming light, so that what results is not the direct representation of a given fact but its assimilation into an archetype, is reduced to a thing, a concrete datum.[41]

So, in fundamentalist Islam, those events and symbols, the symbolic representations, are central and conceived as true. What is perceived as true can easily be included in the group identity. When something is perceived as truly happened, a community can respond to it with actual deeds. So, when a metaphor is understood as true, the consequences will be true too. Esmail exemplifies this with the early Caliphate, which is in the perception of Muslim fundamentalists a primordiality, their utopia.[42] Negative connotations, that this time did have, are not included when this is absorbed in the identity. That is merely logical, given the fact that in the process of creating identities, positive aspects are incorporated into the ingroup and negative features are excluded of its own identity and assigned to outgroups.

So, Esmail enhances Kakar's argument with his ideas of including mythohistory and archetype into the identities. He has a second important additional thought on this theory, on the different ways symbolisms can be perceived. Traditional religious identities are opposed to new and created religious identities. These communities evolve around different paths than traditional ones did. As a result, the basis for new religious communities is multiple and 'neither the group nor the identity is coherent.'[43] What is shared in these communities, are the experiences of shame and humiliation, and particularly, the meaning derived from these experiences.

This can be seen with the case of the Danish cartoon, which were published in 2005. Kurt Westergaard drew this cartoon, which portrayed Prophet Muhammad with a bomb as turban. It had many reactions from all over the Muslim world and it had a two sided reaction. Esmail describes this as following:

> Whereas in classical Islam this symbol carried a rich ideological and affective content, in the contemporary case it is subordinated to the politics of identity. Consequently, sheer emotionalism replaces the earlier, spiritual content of the

---

[41] Esmail, p. 61.
[42] Esmail, p. 61.
[43] Esmail, p. 62.

symbol. The psychological content of contemporary jihadism likewise revolves around group identity. But neither the group nor the identity is coherent.[44]

This quotation shows how elements contributing to identities can be similar for both the traditional and new religious identities. This is not surprising, since both identities are created on the same religion. The difference is found in the interpretation of elements shaping the identity (e.g. symbols and events, both historical and nowadays). New religious identities will include such an element, with the emphasis on the emotions it causes. In this case, that might be anger, following from humiliation.

Traditional religious identities, on the other hand, will see this event in the light of the religious tradition: the Prophet cannot be portrayed. It will not be unlikely that it will cause anger as well, but the origin of this anger has another root cause: it is tradition that the Prophet cannot be portrayed, because it might lead to worshipping him, instead of God. Such an event will not have the same consequences as it has in the new religious identity: there it will be included in the identity itself.

The last two sentences of the quotation show the diversity of modern jihadist groups. These groups, or communities, do not evolve around strictly defined paths. Elements contributing to identity are linked to perceptions of the environment. In other words, different jihadist communities attribute a meaning to symbols consistent with their image of the world. This goes for both historical and present phenomena. Every community therefore has its own 'homebrewed cocktail of snippets of ancient symbols.'[45]

Religious group identities are thus affected by experiences of shame and humiliation, and by non-traditional ways of interpreting symbols found in the group's mythohistory. Coping with these experiences affects the identity as well; a strategy to do this, is to show the group's strength. It is an important way to deal with past humiliation. At the same time, it is a way to show that this will no longer be accepted. Therefore, showing strength can also take to form of turning the roles around: to humiliate in return.[46] This is a clear opening and base for religiously inspired violence.

Holy war, cosmic war

Sudhir Kakar broadens on the concept of religiously inspired terrorism. In his article 'On the Psychology of Islamist Terrorism' he details the psychological dimension of Muslim

---

[44] Esmail, p. 62.
[45] Esmail, p. 62.
[46] Posman, p. 335.

terrorists, which follow of the predominant group identity. He explains that modernity and globalisation are humiliating processes to the Muslim world: 'Today […] Muslims are slaves to Western Christian powers even in lands where they are supposed to be the rulers.'[47] These processes lead to the decline of their world, shown with a decrease of religious faith; moreover, as Kakar describes it: 'political authority, respect, the wealth of both faith (*deen*) and the world (*duniya*) – because they did not keep their pact with Mohammed.'[48] This is in essence a fundamentalist way of thinking; a way of thinking that in the community's mythohistory everything was better. In order to return to this flawless society, it is necessary to return to the religious fundamentals as described in the Quran. In this point of view fundamentalism is a cure for the 'disease of modernity.'[49] The most important part of this cure is jihad. This can be the inner jihad, the pious and devout way of living. It can also expressed as outer jihad, showing strength, which can be done with revenge and a holy war.[50] This idea is central in jihadi thought, it encompasses the idea that the war is fought for achieving a higher aim, for God.

A comparable idea is also found in Juergensmeyer's book 'Terror in the Mind of God.' He describes religious violent acts as performance violence: acts that are intended to have a symbolic meaning and, moreover, to impress. It is a way of showing power or strength of the group and the weakness of the victim.[51] Targets of these acts are a representation as well. Victims of the acts have a symbolic meaning, which can include both the human victims, as well as the location, time and date of the attack. Kidnappings can be an example of this. When a western tourist is kidnapped, he can be seen as a representation of western norms and values and his abduction as a response. Likewise, Al Qaeda perceives the situation in the Middle-East as a war against Islam.[52] As a result, their violence is a reaction to a more encompassing conflict.

This idea of an encompassing conflict is introduced by Juergensmeyer as the concept of a cosmic war, which relates to Kakar's notion of holy war. A cosmic war is a war that is no longer between groups, it is a battle against a worldview. A holy war is fought to achieve a higher aim, to satisfy God: a religious reason to fight the war. A cosmic war is a worldview in itself: when a group is in constant war, it fights for something, the members are not afraid to

---

[47] Kakar, p. 133.
[48] Kakar, p. 133.
[49] Kakar, p. 133.
[50] Kakar, pp. 135-136.
[51] Juergensmeyer, p. 135.
[52] Bin Laden in Juergensmeyer, p. 148.

suffer for what they believe in. This makes the cosmic war all-encompassing, providing 'a cosmology, history and eschatology and offers the reins of political control.'[53] Part of a constant state of being at war is the hope for a good, triumphant result of it. This makes it more difficult to end a war. When the group is no longer at war, that means that the hope towards a good outcome is gone as well. Moreover, being at war can morally justify the use of violence and it can give the group the illusion that it does have power.[54] As a result, some extremists prefer to be at war over having peace.[55]

Conclusion

In this first part of the theoretical frame, I gave an overview how religious communities can reach the use of violence as a way to protect themselves, and more importantly, to protect their group. A group identity is structured around mythohistorical and historical events, including experiences of shame and humiliation. These are interpreted in another way than the traditional religious groups did. The result is a multiplicity of strong communities, willing to defend its group against with all means.

2.2 Sustainable peace

The second focus in this thesis is on peace. In the field of peace research, it is impossible not to focus on violence as well. So, in this part, I firstly focus on Galtung's typology of violence, followed by his typology of peace. after these typologies, I address theories on the necessary process of conflict transformation, which is followed by the step to sustainable peace.

Typology of violence

Johan Galtung is founder of the Journal of Peace Research and a very prominent scholar in peace research. In 1968 already, he wrote the article 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research.' Although this article is a somewhat dated, it is still the most cited article from the journal: 58 times since it was published.[56] It still offers very good insights into the study of peace and therefore, I use it as a starting point for this theoretical frame.

Galtung starts his article with a definition of peace: peace is the absence of violence.[57] To be able to understand the meaning of this proposition, it is necessary to understand

---

[53] Juergensmeyer, p. 158.
[54] Juergensmeyer, p. 157.
[55] Juergensmeyer, p. 157.
[56] http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr, on March 16, 2018.
[57] Galtung (1969), p. 167.

violence. This comes in different forms and has different aspects. Galtung derives six dimensions from this starting point: the distinction between physical and psychological violence; between negative and positive approach of influence; between a hurt object or not; between an acting subject or not; between intended and unintended violence; and the between the manifest and latent level of violence.[58] He makes the distinction between direct and indirect violence as well: the first is the use of resources or means, which are used to directly destroy. Indirect violence, on the other hand, is when resources are wittingly kept away, or used for other purposes. In this case, victims are the groups that are in lower ranks in the society.[59]

These subordinated groups are harmed and when this continues for a longer amount of time, it results in less and unequal life chances, compared to the dominant group. When this social structure is very unequal, and the distinction between high- and low-ranked groups keeps increasing, it can lead to social injustice. Social injustice, which is a synonym for structural violence, is preserved by the society. It is completely intertwined in the social structure and unconsciously preserved. So, when resources are kept away from groups in low ranks of society and it experiences unequal chances as a result, it is called indirect and structural violence. At this point, there is no longer an acting subject.

Direct and personal violence, on the other hand, is aimed at someone directly, one is directly hurt by one another. Both these forms, structural and personal violence, can be manifest and latent. Manifest violence is visible and present, while latent violence is simmering in the society. However, both these forms are equally damaging. When a person (personal) or a group (structural) has to live with this simmering threat, it is much restricted in living, and thus having unequal life chances. Also, when a subordinated group is at the moment not confronted with structural violence, there is no guaranty that it will not face personal violence as well.

Galtung's typology of violence is schematically presented in figure 2.1.[60] Besides personal and structural violence, there is a third category: cultural violence. As described above, personal and structural violence can coexist in conflicts or societies and even influence and affect each other. Cultural violence is an even more exceeding category and Galtung distinguishes the three forms as following:

---

[58] Galtung (1969), pp. 169-172.
[59] Galtung (1969), p. 175.
[60] Galtung (1969), p. 173.

'Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a 'permanence' […], remaining the same for essentially long periods, given the slow transformations of cultures.'[61] Cultures develop around several pillars, among others religion, ideology and science.[62] Aspects of cultures are, of course, very much embedded into societies and can have negative perceptions towards minorities or groups in lower ranks. Perceptions can have a violent aspect, and therefore be used to legitimise and justify the use of violence.


Figure 2.1: Galtung's typology of violence

Cultures do evolve, but in a very moderate way. Given that the violent cultural aspects are strongly embedded, they are difficult to diminish: 'The whole culture possesses a tremendous potential for violence, that can be expressed at the more manifest cultural level and then be used to justify the unjustifiable. […] Changing the cultural genetic code looks at least as difficult as changing the biological genetic code.'[63] Galtung exemplifies cultural violence with slavery, which was a form of direct and manifest violence. It resulted in discrimination, which is a form of structural, latent, violence. The cultural violence derived from it is prejudice.[64] In this case prejudice is the cultural aspect, it comes unnoticed and is difficult to reform to a positive quality.

---

[61] Galtung (1990), p. 294.
[62] Galtung (1990), p. 291.
[63] Galtung (1990), p. 301.
[64] Galtung (1990), p. 295.

This tripartite typology is described as a triangle, shown in figure 2.2.[65] It is interpreted from all three corners. Firstly, cultural violence can justify the use of both personal and structural violence. Interpreted from personal violence, cultural and structural provide a strong basis, justification. Read from the corner of structural violence, the other two are manifestation;[66] clarifying and gaining insights into the cultural violence.[67]


Figure 2.2: Galtung's triangle of violence

Negative and positive peace

Now this typology of violence is established, the following step is to start defining peace. Galtung's starting point, which is that peace is the absence of violence, can be distinguished into two aspects. Firstly, the absence of personal and direct violence: negative peace. Secondly, positive peace, which is the absence of indirect and structural violence. [68] As shown before, structural violence is also referred to as social injustice and positive peace is, similarly, social justice. In societies with social justice, groups have equal chances. In imbalanced societies, or societies with social injustice, groups do not have equal chances. The subordinated groups are excluded from certain aspects. When there is social justice, socially low-ranked groups do have equal life chances as high-ranked groups. One speaks of equal life chances when power and resources are equally distributed and accessible.[69] The two shapes of peace ought to coexist in the ideal situation. One cannot speak of a peaceful society, when negative peace is absent and social justice is present, or the other way around.

If we reason analogously, could we then also speak of a culture of peace? The difficulty with this, as Galtung argues in several articles, is that the concept of peace develops in a certain society, under specific circumstances dependent of that society: 'It [peace] is a concept applied to a system, hence it will necessarily be coloured by the traditions governing concept-formation and system-creation in that civilization.'[70] So, a cultural peace concept

---

[65] Based on Galtung (1990), p. 294.
[66] Galtung (1990), p. 294.
[67] Galtung (1990), p. 295.
[68] Galtung (1969), p. 183.
[69] Galtung (1969), p. 184.
[70] Galtung (1981), p. 184.

which works for one society will not automatically work for a neighbouring civilization, not to mention for a society on another continent. Moreover, enforcing specifics of a culture on another, is a form of direct violence.[71]

So, in developing peace for a conflicted area, one should bear in mind the society itself. This includes, among others, the social structure, the economy and the culture and history. Galtung's triangle of violence can be transformed into a triangle of peace, where the three aspects affect each other constructively. The triangle of violence is a vicious triangle, but the triangle of peace can be virtuous: 'This virtuous triangle would be obtained by working on all three corners at the same time, not assuming that basic change in one will automatically lead to changes in the other two.'[72] When peacebuilders put energy in evolving all three aspects, it will result in positive reciprocity. This reciprocity is not attained when energy is put in merely one aspect.


Figure 2.3: Galtung's triangle of peace

Galtung argued how to achieve peace, how to have an effective triangle of peace, but not who the actors in this process should be. These peacebuilders, in what environment can they be put? How do they relate to other actors in the process of peace? In the following paragraph, my focus is on this aspect.

Conflict transformation

Peacebuilders are a central actor in the process of building peace. Peacebuilding addresses underlying problematic structures and enable positive peace.[73] Conflict transformation can, additionally, be defined as the movement from crisis to desired change.[74] In this paragraph, the focus is on this process and on the different types of peacebuilder in this.

As Galtung's theory showed, violence, and as a result conflict, occurs on the three levels. Creating peace, in his argument, encompasses working on all three angles at the same time, which results than in a virtuous triangle of peace. Miall expands on this theory with the

---

[71] Galtung (1990), p. 291.
[72] Galtung (1990), p. 302.
[73] Peacebuilding is in one line with peacekeeping and peacemaking. In Galtung's terms: peacekeeping is the practice of managing the absence of direct violence; peacemaking uses tools of conflict resolution, which is not useful for conflicts based in structural violence; peacebuilding is has a focus on addressing the underlying problematic structures and instituting positive peace. Based on: McCandless, pp. 202-204.
[74] Lederach, p. 81.

argument that, in order to create peace, the underlying structures of the conflict need to be addressed.[75] When these structures, these constructions, are revealed, they have to be transformed. The constructions he addresses clearly relate to Galtung's tripartite typology, although from a slightly different perspective.

In the first place, this is cultural violence, which relates to memories. They have an important role in interpreting and viewing the conflict, in the 'socially constructed understanding of the situation.'[76] In this case, prejudice is once again a fitting example. Secondly, on the structural level is the context of the conflict. At both the local and global level, the conflict relates to more developments. This could be the imbalanced societal structure, but also the globalizing world.[77] And lastly, on the personal level, we can find relationships. When this interaction is also imbalanced, it can easily trigger conflicts between parties.[78]

In almost every conflict is a multitude of actors present, who work towards this transformation on different levels and who have peacebuilding as an overarching goal.[79] Within the stricken society, Lederach distinguishes three types of actors: top, middle-range and grassroot leadership.[80] From this perspective middle-range leadership appears to be most successful and includes leaders among others from ethnic, religious and humanitarian context. The main benefit is that actors within this middle-range have connections to both other levels, can address problems on both levels and might inspire both levels to cooperate, or connect peacebuilding activities. Thus, these actors might have the best opportunity to work on the peacebuilding process from within.[81] However, in order to have the possibility to reach a sustainable solution, structures on all levels need to transform. Therefore, the middle-range might have good opportunities, but certainly not the only.[82]

Considered from outside the stricken society, Miall identifies four categories of actors who can contribute to the process of conflict transformation: states and intergovernmental organisations, e.g. the UN; development and humanitarian organisations; international NGOs, who focus on conflict prevention and transformation; and parties and groups within the

---

[75] Miall, p. 7.
[76] Miall, p. 8.
[77] Miall, p. 8.
[78] Miall, p. 8.
[79] Peacebuilding is in one line with peacekeeping and peacemaking. In Galtung's terms: peacekeeping is the practice of managing the absence of direct violence; peacemaking uses tools of conflict resolution, which is not useful for conflicts based in structural violence; peacebuilding is has a focus on addressing the underlying problematic structures and instituting positive peace. Based on: McCandless, pp. 202-204.
[80] Lederach, p. 38.
[81] Lederach, pp. 60-61.
[82] Miall, p. 6.

society.[83] In this case, correspondingly with the actors in leadership, the best results will be attained when these four parties collaborate. When this is not the case, not all the problematic structures might be transformed; this can lead to the danger of relapsing into conflict. In case of proper cooperation a major transformation can take place, which addresses and transforms problematic structures. That can lead to positive peace, additionally to sustainable peace.

Sustainable peace

In this section, the focus is on sustainable peace. As seen above, a conflict needs to be transformed, which leads to positive, structural peace. To make this sustainable, a few more steps need to be taken. This will be addressed with Galtung's triangle of peace as presented in figure 2.3. Since this triangle is virtuous, it will provide useful insights and transparency in the process of sustainable peace.

UN Resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, which were both adopted on 27 April 2016, focus on both peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This latter concept is perceived as both the goal and the process towards this goal. The goal is 'preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict'[84] and the process includes several multidimensional activities, with a main focus on sustaining peace as a shared task, in which both the government and the other, local or regional, concerned parties.[85]

The analysis will start from the most visible point of the triangle, which is the absence of personal and direct violence. Actions that focus on the absence of this kind of violence, are concerned with direct forms of peace. Paul Collier, a scholar in economics, addresses in his TED talk *New Rules for Rebuilding a Broken Nation* several interesting ideas. Firstly, he argues that restoring a post-conflict country should not predominantly focus on elections, since this 'produces a winner and a loser. And the loser is unreconciled.'[86] The importance of reconciliation will be considered in a moment. Collier addresses how restoring the economic environment creates job opportunities for young men, which results in an improving infrastructure.[87] Following this line of argumentation, an improved infrastructure leads to even more economic possibilities for the region, the whole region benefits and that has a positive effect on the structural peace process.

---

[83] Miall, p. 12.
[84] United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2282, pp. 1-2.
[85] United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2282, p. 2.
[86] Collier, 2:08-2:12.
[87] Collier, 8:23-8:30.

To install a new government as a first step would mean that certain groups will not have reconciliation. Hamber and Wilson address in their article *Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in post-Conflict Societies* that closure is necessary after a traumatic time. They formulate this: 'By 'closure' we mean a situation where the trauma is no longer seen as unfinished business, requiring, for instance a compulsion to take revenge. Grief and loss no longer plague the individual consciously or unconsciously, […] where the loss is to a large degree accepted and incorporated into the functioning of everyday life.'[88] When the period is not rightly coped with, the danger of revenge, of relapsing into conflict, will occur. This would be a new form of personal violence, what could fuel the conflict again. So, reconciliation is a genuine necessity.

Secondly, reconciliation a process; it needs to be achieved on a conscious and unconscious level and that might take several steps. There are various techniques to do this, for example with truth commissions and tribunals, but also with 'symbolic acts of reparations'[89], which are characterised by the opportunity they have to 'acknowledge and recognize the individual's suffering and place it within a new officially sanctioned history of trauma.'[90] As a result, the traumatic event is concretised and this has a positive influence on the process of grieving, and with that, on the closure.[91]

So, reconciliation takes mainly place on the personal peace level; its focus is on the right way of coping with past trauma and painful past, in which religion can play a main role. Furthermore, it can strengthen damaged relationships between involved groups and recognize their interdependent future.[92] As we have seen before, this triangle is virtuous and that emerges here as well. In a post-conflict society, groups have a mutual future, where they have to cooperate. When relationships are strong, this will have a positive effect on the political processes; these processes can be seen as part of the structural peace top in the triangle.

Included these political processes are, among others, public administration and financial management, which are transparent, accountable and anti-corrupt.[93] And a very important process in creating structural peace, when the reconciliation has started, is having elections. Having elections, and installing a reliable government will also have positive

---

[88] Hamber & Wilson, p. 147.
[89] Hamber & Wilson, p. 148.
[90] Hamber & Wilson, p. 148.
[91] This argument is based on a paper I wrote for the course Fundamentalism and Religious Violence (2014-2015), which was titled: Reconciliation after a bloody regime. Cambodia's acts of reconciliation after Khmer Rouge's Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979).
[92] Lederach, p. 34.
[93] UN Guidance for Sustaining Peace, p. 2.

influence towards personal peace, it will provide people with trust in the future. Additionally, structural peace includes other, non-political processes, such as equal economic opportunities and equal access to health care.

The third point, cultural peace, is more difficult to establish. Observing, promoting and protection human rights could be a starting point; this would develop equality in the society. Respecting human rights could lead to more unity in the society, which decreases the possibility of relapsing into conflict because of divided groups, and could possibly lead to more even social ranks. This being more equal will lead to less personal and structural violence.

What we should lastly consider in sustaining peace is that it takes a long time, as is shown by several authors.[94] If peace is rushed into a society and the conflict is not appropriately transformed, the root causes are not thoroughly addressed and peace will not be sustainable. Therefore Galtung's triangle of peace would only work if a proper timeframe applies as well.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter I created a theoretical overview, which functions as the base for this thesis. It is based on two central concepts: terrorism and peace, which were broadly discussed. The concept of violence functions as a spectrum; terrorism is on the one side, where violence is used and peace is on the other side, a reaction to it. In this conclusion, I explain the relationship between these two concepts, and argue how an understanding of the first can strengthen the application of the second.

In understanding terrorism it is crucial to understand the group identities, what the theories in the first part showed. Identities relate to Galtung's theory as well, they are shaped on the cultural, structural and personal level. In the case described in this chapter, the personal level is affected by the experiences of humiliation and shame. This can directly influence and is influenced by the relationships towards other groups. On the structural level, the negative influence is economic deprivation and the political processes preserving that. Miall described that as the context of the conflict, the society in which it has developed. The way how this context is interpreted is affected by the group identity as well. On the third level, the cultural level, (constructed) memories are involved. Galtung pointed out the complicated sides in this,

---

[94] Among others Collier, 4:00-4:05 and Lederach, p. 74.

which is mainly that transformation of cultures is a long-term process. So, transforming problematic structures inside cultures is long-lasting, and moreover complex.

Religion and culture are intertwined, religion has therefore an influence on these cultural structures. What Kakar and Esmail stressed, is that this history is included into the identity, or it is used to interpreted events in the light of this history. These two scholars merely addressed this in a negative way. However, phenomena in holy scriptures can also be interpreted positively and used for a positive identity construction. If this is included in reforming conflicts, and in reforming identities with that, cultural peace could be somewhat closer.

This proposal connects to Lederach's theory that middle-range actors are the most connected to both the top and grassroot level of society. In this case, that is also showed and this type of leader will have the best influence on identity determination, because of the connections. Moreover, reconciliation will also benefit from it.

Now that the main theoretical concepts are defined, I focus on the case study in the following chapters. In chapter five, the theoretical insights of this chapter are integrated with the findings of the case study.

3. Mali, the conflict

In 2003 former French president Jacques Chirac visited Mali and in an interview he declared: 'La démocratie malienne s'assume parfaitement et n'a pas besoin d'être sauvée.'[95] In this interview, a press conference with Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré, he spoke about the shape and condition of Malian democracy and concluded that it was functioning well. This was not merely by the French president; the United States Agency for International Development made a similar conclusion in its Strategic Plan for 2003-2012, with calling Mali a 'poster child for good governance.'[96] Moreover, Mali was a popular destination for NGOs and western donors.[97]

With this in mind, the crisis of 2012 seems very sudden and unexpected. It was, however, the fourth Tuareg uprising since Mali gained independence of France in 1960.[98] So, was it really that unexpected? In this chapter, I discuss how Mali's history and internal structures resulted in the double crisis of 2012, with on the one hand the Tuareg uprising, followed by the declaration of independence in north Mali and introducing the sharia, and on the other hand the coup d'état of the military against the government.

History of Mali and crisis of 2012

Mali is a West-African country, with a population of 14,5 million. It is a composition of many different ethnic groups, Bambara being the largest. The ethnic minorities include the Songhay, who live in the valley of the Niger river; Arab communities in the north; the Dogon, who live around the town of Mopti[99]; and nomadic groups as Fula and Tuareg in the northern Sahel region.[100] This region is the southern part of the Sahara, and covers the region from Senegal and Mauritania up to the most northern part of Ethiopia. These two groups are, in varying

---

[95] Interview of president Chirac and president Amadou Toumani Touré, retrieved from http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/037000342.html, on April 4, 2018.

[96] United States Agency for International Development, 'III. Assistance Environment', in 'Country Strategic Plan FY 2003-2012: USAID MALI: Reducing Poverty and Accelerating Growth Through Partnerships', 2002, p. 11. In Solomon (2013), p. 12.

[97] Dool, on April 5, 2018.

[98] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 8.

[99] The Dogon are well-known for their cultural and religious traditions, their territory is the Cliff of Banderiaga, which is included in UNESCO's World Heritage list. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/516, on April 6, 2018.

[100] https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/Plant-and-animal-life#ref54977 and http://minorityrights.org/country/mali/ on April 9, 2018.

degrees, spread throughout this region. Figure 3.1 shows the Malian ethnic groups and their territories in the country.[101]

Mali was colonised by France in the 19th century and remained part of French Sudan until it gained independence in 1960.[102] Since its independence, it has struggled with, among others, politics, natural disasters and poverty.[103] In 1992 democratic elections were held and Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected as president. Under his rule, Mali made progress, reformed institutes of the state[104] and the political situation seemed stable. At the end of his presidency, he was elected again in 1997 and in 2002 succeeded by Amadou Toumani Touré.

During this time, the political situation appeared more stable than it in fact was. The Tuareg have revolted

Figure 3.1: Ethnic groups in Mali

three times before 2012, in 1962, 1990-1996 and 2003-2006.[105] The four uprisings had its own characteristics and intended goals, although resembling in one major feeling: that the Malian government in Bamako subordinated them.[106] In the 1962 rebellion, the Tuareg wanted their own state, called Azawad, in the northern parts of Mali and Niger, and south Algeria. This was imagined by the Tuareg in Mali, as well as by the Tuareg in these other states.[107] Bamako responded to this revolt with a large, military counteroffensive, a merely violent response. During the droughts in the 1970s and 80s, which had a severe impact in

---

[101] Ethnic groups in Mali. Source: 'Atlas Jeune Afrique 2010', *in* Bossard, L., *op. cit.*, OECD, Sahel and West Africa Club, 2015, 191. In Chauzal & van Damme, p. 35.
[102] Homan, p. 14.
[103] Natural disasters were, for example, extreme droughts in 1983-1984.
[104] Homan, p. 15.
[105] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 11.
[106] Cline, p. 619-620.
[107] Cline, p. 618.

northern Mali, many Tuareg had fled to Libya. Many Tuareg were military trained in Libya,[108] joined the military and fought in wars, as the Libyan Chad war in the 1980s.[109] The uprising of the 1990s was ended when both Bamako[110] and one of the rebelling parties signed a 'National Pact,' which was arranged with Algerian help and included four pathways to national peace and stability.[111]

These attempts were of no avail, and between 2006 and 2009, the third Tuareg uprising took place. A new peace agreement was developed, first with Algerian help in 2006[112] and in 2009, with Libyan help as well.[113] It was signed by the main Tuareg groups and the government.[114] Unfortunately, these peace agreements did not last too long and at the end of 2011, the relationship between the north and Bamako was on edge again.

In this year, the Libyan civil war started and the Tuareg, who had fought on colonel Qaddafi's side, returned to Mali. They were well-equipped and trained, and were desiring the independent state of Azawad. The Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) was established by these Tuareg and its aim was to represent all the ethnic groups in the northern region, included Songhay and Arab communities. In 2012, the movement started to attack and take over towns in north-west Mali.[115] Shortly after these events, the MNLA had cleared out the governmental forces and taken over the region. The independence of Azawad was declared on the April 6, 2012.[116] The MNLA started to lose its strong position in the region in the following months; the groups Ansar Dine and Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) won ground in Azawad. Ansar Dine was created by Iyad ag Ghali, a key figure of the rebellion of the 1990s,[117] and both have a strong link to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The role and motives of these three Islamist groups will be elaborate further on in this chapter.

---

[108] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 31
[109] Cline, p. 619.
[110] Bamako was represented by an interim government, as a result of a coup d'état in 1991. Lode, p. 60.
[111] These four pathways were: 'peace and security in the north; national reconciliation; special initiatives to promote social-economic development in the north; and according the north a special status within the framework of the unitary state of Mali.' Lode, p. 60.
[112] Cline, p. 621.
[113] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 11.
[114] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 34.
[115] Al Jazeera, 'Tuareg rebels attack fifth town in Mali' https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/201212614823523986.html, on April 12, 2018.
[116] https://www.webcitation.org/6BTuI59wU?url=http://www.mnlamov.net/component/content/article/169-declaration-dindependance-de-lazawad.html, on April 12, 2018.
[117] Welsh, 'Making sense of Mali's armed groups' https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html, on April 12, 2018.

In the summer of 2012 the Islamist groups took over in Azawad. Ansar Dine's spokesman declared: 'We don't put much stock in the idea of an emirate or state. […] Our mission is simply to institute Sharia law in the areas we control and the areas we will control in the future, God willing.'[118] Instituting the sharia is what they did during that summer. Members of Ansar Dine introduced, among others, a religious police in Azawad[119] and destroyed tombs of Sufi saints in a mosque in Timbuktu.[120]

The Malian government was heavily affected by the rebellion. Governmental forces were present in the north, trying to fight the MNLA and other groups. Contrary to the Libyan trained rebels, the Malian governmental soldiers were 'poorly equipped, badly trained and irregularly paid.'[121] They could not control the northern region, which strengthened anger against president Amadou Toumani Touré and his government. Soldiers started a mutiny, resulting in a coup d'état on March 22, 2012. Perpetrators of the coup were united and led by Amadou Sanogo and Amadou Konaré.[122] The Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali after the coup and urged the united perpetrators to 'return to constitutional order.'[123] An interim-government was established in April 2012, with Dioncounda Traoré as president. In the summer of 2012, ECOWAS insisted Mali's interim-government to request military help from the international community.[124] The main reason for this request was the growing influence of jihadist rebels in the north, and the danger for surrounding states. ECOWAS planned African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to start in September 2013 and this was authorised by UN Security Council.[125]

---

[118] Welsh, 'Northern Mali: a dying land' https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/07/201277173027451684.html, on April 12, 2018.
[119] Welsh, 'Making sense of Mali's armed groups' https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html, on April 12, 2018.
[120] Mark, 'Mali Islamists attack world heritage site mosques in Timbuktu' https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/02/mali-islamists-attack-world-heritage-mosques-timbuktu, on April 12, 2018.
[121] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 12.
[122] Al Jazeera, 'Mali Mutiny 'topples' President Touré' https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/201232251320110970.html, on April 13, 2018.
[123] Look, 'ECOWAS Imposes Sanctions on Mali' https://www.voanews.com/a/west-african-leaders-impose-sanctions-on-mali-145801255/180314.html, on April 13, 2018.
[124] BBC, 'Mali interim government urged by ECOWAS' http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18758150, on April 14, 2018.
[125] S/RES/2085(2012), accessed on http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012), on April 13, 2018.

In January 2013, the situation changed quickly. The northern jihadi rebels conquered Konna, a town in central Mali, and moved fast towards Bamako.[126] Interim president Traoré responded with requesting official help from France and the former coloniser responded with Operation Serval. ECOWAS, together with the African Union, responded with AFISMA. Operation Serval was successful,[127] and France recaptured the main northern cities: Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu.[128] This mission was succeeded by UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in summer of 2013. This mission is discussed in chapter four.

Peace negotiations

When the 2012-crisis culminated, Ouagadougou initiated negotiations between three parties: the interim government, MNLA and Haute Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA).[129] Although these negotiations were preliminary, it created a base for elections of summer 2013, where Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected president. These elections were held during the time MINUSMA started, which was on July 1st, 2013, and held throughout the whole country. In the following year, tensions arose again and the MNLA attacked governmental troops in Kidal.[130] MNLA united with HCUA and MAA-Coordination[131] and started to control the north again.

This time, Algeria entered to start negotiations on a peace process, as it had done in the 1990s and 2006. Participants were the government, and two groups: the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Platform.[132] This latter was perceived as pro-government: CMFPR was composed of members of Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso, which were Songhai and Fulani self-defence militia, who had fought against Tuareg and on the side of the

---

[126] The Telegraph, 'Mali asks for help from France as Islamist rebels push forward' https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9794871/Mali-asks-for-help-from-France-as-Islamist-rebels-push-forward.html, on April 13, 2018.
[127] Taylor, 'What Mali means to France' https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/20/what-mali-means-to-france/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a112a8b6031a, on April 15, 2018.
[128] Boutellis & Zahar, p. 10.
[129] HCUA is a political and military Tuareg group, composed of former Ansar Dine members. Chauzal & van Damme, p. 41.
[130] BBC, 'Mali: Tuareg rebels 'defeat government army in Kidal' http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27511448, on April 16, 2018.
[131] Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad was instituted in 2012, in order to defend the Arab communities in the north. MAA-Coordination is a splinter group of MAA and sympathised with MNLA. MAA-Platform is another splinter group, which does not sympathise with MNLA.
[132] The first consisted of MNLA, HCUA and MAA-Coordination, the latter of MAA-Platform (another splinter group of MAA), CMFPR (Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance) and CPA (Coalition du peuple pour l'Azawad, a splinter group of MNLA).

government.[133] The Coordination was a military composition of armed Tuareg groups. Therefore, the Platform was seen as a pro-government compound. The Algerian Negotiations lasted one year (2014-2015) with ups and downs. In this year new tensions developed, between and within ethnic groups and the Coordination and Platform, resulting in new groups as GATIA and MPSA,[134] cease-fires were declared[135] and fighting continued. On March 1, 2015 the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, also known as the Bamako Agreement, was signed. However, by only two of the three parties. The government, of course, and by the Platform, which was represented by the new members GATIA and MPSA. The Coordination initially renounced the Agreement. It argued that in its current shape, where the international community had to guarantee the implementation, it could not fulfil this.[136] Algiers and the Malian government emphasised that the phase of negotiating had passed. Under international pressure, and with the promise that there would be room for further dialogue, MAA-Coordination eventually signed on behalf of the Coordination.[137]

Internal and external factors

As explained before, Mali is a composition of many ethnic groups, and has struggled for its national identity since independence. In the colonial times France had favoured and educated the southern people and instituted them as rulers.[138] When independence was realised, southerners kept governmental power, although there were some attempts to distribute the power more equally.[139] These attempts, however, remained superficial. The dominating classes were biased on the northern regions; Tuareg were considered inferior: 'The Kel Tamasheq [Tuareg] were thought of as a bunch of white, feudal, racist, pro-slavery, bellicose and lazy savage nomads.'[140] At the same time, Tuareg had a feeling of superiority over black southerners. They see themselves as Arab instead of African,[141] and see southerners as slaves, which was expressed in a letter to the colonisers, when Malian independence was around the corner: 'We, the white people of the Sahara, will never accept being governed by blacks who

---

[133] Chauzal & van Damme, pp. 40-41.

[134] Groupe d'autodéfense Touareg Imghad et allies (GATIA), which represents the Tuareg Imghad clan. Secondly, Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l'Azawad (MPSA), again a separation of MAA.

[135] By MINUSMA in May 2014, Boutellis & Zahar, p. 14.

[136] Boutellis & Zahar, p. 17.

[137] Boutellis & Zahar, p. 21.

[138] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 17.

[139] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 20.

[140] Lecocq, 'That desert is our country: Tuareg rebellions and competing nationalisms in contemporary Mali (1946-1996)', p.44, in Solomon (2013), p. 13.

[141] Tuareg have a Berber kinship.

used to be our slaves.'[142] Moreover, Tuareg view their traditional nomadic lifestyle as preferable over the sedentary lifestyle of southerners.[143] This confirms prejudices of southern people, creating a vicious circle of prejudices.

Previous uprisings were formally closed with peace agreements, which included promises for improvement: a special political status for the north, accepting Tuareg in the military and assigning money from development programmes to the north.[144] The government failed in implementing these agreements and expressed prejudices with discriminating the north: e.g. NGO money was firstly spend in the south and only then in the north, and spend on improving the military instead of the social facilities.[145] Consequently, the northern populations had an increased loss of trust in the government. This feeling was enlarged when governmental policies were focussed on enhancing the rich, who were linked to their own political party, instead of enhancing the poorer groups in society.[146] Eventually, this resulted in a much higher poverty and unemployment rate in the north.[147] This and other examples of corruption, in combination with prejudices and discrimination, created a security gap in the north.

This void was easily filled by several groups. Islamic NGOs from countries as Saudi-Arabia and Pakistan came to Mali and offered both charity and religious programmes.[148] Many of these organisations were led by radical Islamist preachers.[149] The NGOs and groups strengthened the deviant identity, and in combination with the global rise of Islamism made the 2012-crisis a reason for the international community to interfere.

Religiously inspired terrorism
Mali was in the 1990s seen as a poster child for democracy, as well as a 'bulwark against radical Islam in Africa.'[150] Remarkable is the completely opposite reason why France, and

---

[142] Giuffrida, 'Clerics, Rebels and Refugees: Mobility Strategies and Networks Among the Kel Antessar', p. 532, in Cline, p. 618.
[143] Solomon (2013), p. 13.
[144] Boutellis & Zahar, pp. 2-5.
[145] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 22.
[146] Solomon (2015), p. 71.
[147] The average poverty rate in Mali is 64%, while it is 82,6% in the north. The unemployment rate in Gao was 80% in 2002. Derived from USAID Assessment: Northern Mali (2004), p. 6.
[148] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 23.
[149] Solomon (2015), p. 69.
[150] Solomon (2015), p. 67.

later the UN, intervened. Northern Mali had turned into a breeding ground for Islamic terrorism, dangerous for both the surrounding countries, as to Europe.[151]

When Tuareg fled to Libya and were incorporated in Qaddafi's Islamic Legion, they had a military training, and were at the same time confronted with radical Islamic thoughts.[152] Returning to Mali, where a security gap already existed, made it easier for radicalised Tuareg to establish and find support for jihadi movements. The Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) had a base in Mali, and developed into AQIM later. AQIM can be seen as the umbrella, with Ansar Dine (2012), MUJAO (2011) and Al Mourabitoun (2013) as descent in Mali. Ansar Dine was created by Iyad ag Ghali, when he was denied as successor for the non-religious MNLA.[153] Ansar Dine has Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad (MIA, 2013) and Macina Liberation Front (MLF, 2015) as splinter groups. MIA is an outsider, claiming to have no links to Ansar Dine or AQIM, and searching for peace and political inclusion.[154] The other groups want to establish an Islamic state, including sharia laws. In January 2017, Ansar Dine, Al Mourabitoun and MUJAO united into Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimim (JNIM). It has claimed several attacks in Mali and surrounding countries.[155]

The first three descents of AQIM have a 'tradition' of kidnapping and trafficking, as a way to finance their activities. For that reason, they are called 'gangster-jihadis.'[156] There are several explanations for these practices. Firstly, Tuareg land covers several countries, but got restricted when new borders were established. So, Tuareg trade routes are traditionally trans-border.[157] In combination with Mali's location and Bamako's position towards the north, cleared the way for smuggling. GSPC and AQIM started this, and it was an easy way to generate income. Kidnapping is another tactic and was practiced before 2012. In the last ten

---

[151] E.g. members of the Nigerian group Boko Haram have been trained at MUJAO in Gao and German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle expressed in that: 'if northern Mali falls, then terrorist schools will be created and then not only Mali and the region, the North African nations, will be threatened but also us in Europe.' Derived from Solomon (2015), p. 75-76.

[152] Solomon (2015), p. 69.

[153] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 10.

[154] BBC, 'Mali's Ansar Dine Islamists 'split and want talks', http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21180766, on April 20, 2018.

[155] E.g. an attack in Burkina Faso on the French embassy (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burkina-security/al-qaeda-affiliate-claims-responsibility-for-burkina-faso-attacks-idUSKCN1GF0GS, on April 26, 2018), and an attack on a resort in Bamako (http://africatimes.com/2017/06/20/mali-militants-linked-with-al-qaeda-claim-responsibility-for-resort-attack/, on April 21, 2018).

[156] Solomon (2015), p. 69, and Lewis, D. & Diarra, A. 'Special Report: In the Land of the "Gangster-jihadists", https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime/special-report-in-the-land-of-gangster-jihadists-idUSBRE89O07Y20121025, on April 20, 2018.

[157] Chauzal & van Damme, p. 26.

years, 17 people have been kidnapped in Mali, mostly by Ansar Dine and AQIM.[158] As argued in chapter two, another reason to kidnap Westerners is because they can be seen as representing Western norms and values. Threatening and terrifying them, and consequently, their countries of origin, will strengthen the organisations position.

What is important to note, is that most of these organisations work in Mali, as well as in the surrounding countries. These religiously inspired terrorist organisations can therefore be perceived as transnational as well. Although their war is not for independence of Azawad merely, as Ansar Dine's spokesman declared in the statement quoted before, they are opposing Mali's government and with attacking MINUSMA peacebuilders,[159] it is plausible to assume that they are opposing this mission too. Furthermore, their demands radicalise, what is due to failing peace agreements and promises which are not fulfilled.[160]

The security gap that opened in the north is filled by these groups. These groups can offer security and protection that the government does not offer anymore. For example with employment and income, by both legal and illegal activities[161] and supplying medicine and SIM-cards.[162]

Groups radicalise in their demands and actions; not only towards the government and the UN,[163] but also against each other. Tensions arise between groups. This can happen if one group wins terrain at the expense of another group or if they clash over contradictory demands. Attacks were conducted in March and April 2018. These were perpetrated by the Malian splinter group of the Islamic State, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, on Tuareg groups.[164] Nii Akuetteh, a political analyst, argued that it might be a way to provoke and to fuel the conflict between Tuareg and the government again.[165]

Conclusion

As seen in this chapter, Mali appeared as a much more stable country than it actually was. It deals with a struggle for national identity and this effort is enhanced by vicious circles of prejudice. This prejudice has strengthened practices of discrimination. At the same time, the

---

[158] https://sahara-overland.com/kidnappings/, on April 20, 2018.
[159] Sieff, K. (The Washinton Post) 'The world's most dangerous U.N. Mission.' http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.efe1ce4a9a85, on April 20, 2018.
[160] Boutellis & Zahar, p. 7. NB. This goes for extremist Islamic groups, as well as for extremist secular groups.
[161] ISS, p. 4.
[162] Boutellis & Zahar, p. 8.
[163] UN bases are under attack often, e.g. on February 28 and April 15, 2018.
[164] Weiss, C., 'Tuareg militias again clash with Islamic State-loyal militants in the north of Mali'; The Guardian, 'Suspected jihadists in Mali kill more than 40 in two days of violence,' accessed on April 30, 2018.
[165] Al Jazeera, 'Suspected rebel fighters kill dozens of Tuareg in Mali,' accessed on April 30, 2018.

government was accused of corruption and malfunctioning, leading to the double crisis in 2012.

What started as a fight for independence in the north evolved into a bigger conflict, being a threat to both Mali, as well as surrounding countries and Europe.[166] This was the main reason ECOWAS urged the Malian government to ask for international help, which was first given by France and the AU, and later by the UN. The following chapter gives an overview of the UN mission, which is marked as the most dangerous mission so far.[167]

There is one aspect of MINUSMA that is important to note here. One of the reasons MINUSMA is marked as the most dangerous UN mission, is the unpredictability. The rebelling groups are revolting against the government, targeting the UN mission, and fighting against each other, even though there are links between religious groups and non-religious groups, as the case of Iyad ag Ghali shows. Religiously inspired terrorist groups are splitting up very fast and radicalise in their demands. This radicalisation can be explained by two factors. Firstly, the previous uprisings were also formally closed with peace agreements. However, the government could not implement the made agreements, resulting in an increasing distrust in the government and in the present peace agreement. Rebelling groups are questioning the reliability and credibility of the government.[168] Secondly, as seen in this chapter, not all groups were included in accomplishing the peace agreement. Therefore, the excluded groups, i.e. the religiously inspired terrorist groups, will not feel addressed in the conditions of the agreement.

---

[166] Terrorist attacks took place in Burkina Faso, and AQIM threatens to attack Spain, France and the UK. Derived from Achter de Linies: Missie in Mali, episode 1 (https://www.veronicatv.nl/programmas/achter-de-linies-missie-mali/videos/0YFxLsj0eza/achter-de-linie-missie-mali/ on April 16, 2018).

[167] Sieff, K. (The Washinton Post) 'The world's most dangerous U.N. Mission' http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.efe1ce4a9a85, on April 20, 2018.

[168] Boutellis & Zahar, p. 24.; Chauzal & van Damme, p. 54.

4. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

On the 1st of July, 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali was deployed. This was decided by the Security Council on April 25, 2013, when Resolution 2100 was accepted. This resolution included the deployment of 11.200 military troops and 1.440 police personnel, provided by UN member states.[169]

This chapter focuses on MINUSMA. In the first paragraph, I shortly explain the development of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the missions it acts out. In the second paragraph, my focus is MINUSMA, how its first mandate fits into the development and framework of the DPKO. Thirdly, I address the Resolutions of the Security Council concerning Mali, so the mandates that are established since 2013. I analysed them on three concepts, which gives a good insight into the changed atmosphere of the conflict.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Today, DPKO today bases its missions in three principles: consent of the parties, impartiality and nonuse of force, except in self-defence or defence of the mandate.[170] The road to these three principles is effected by changing nature of conflicts throughout the years. These changes and UN responses are discussed in this paragraph.

UN peacekeeping was traditionally based in 'preventive diplomacy,' a technique aimed at preventing conflicts from turning violent, and peacekeeping operations started when a peace agreement was signed between the all those concerned.[171] Conflicts were, until then, often characterised as interstate.[172] In 1992, *An Agenda for Peace* was introduced with a new approach to the use of force, which was rarely practiced in traditional UN peacekeeping. The *Agenda* emphasised that deploying force, under strict conditions and with a focus on deploying it with peaceful means, may enhance the situation and increase the credibility of UN peacekeepers.[173] Peace-enforcement units were also recommended, who are more heavily armed than conventional peacekeepers and who can be deployed in situations of direct violence, e.g. when agreed cease-fires are not complied with.[174]

---

[169] S/RES/2100 (2013), p. 6.
[170] These principles are based in *Brahimi Report* and *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping, on May 2, 2018.
[171] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history, on May 1, 2018.
[172] https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations, on May 1, 2018.
[173] Thakur, p. 3.
[174] An Agenda for Peace, p. 12.

These units are an ability of peacemaking, a technique shortly mentioned in chapter two. Galtung argued that this was not a sustaining solution, because problematic structures are not addressed.[175] The UN defines peacemaking slightly different: as a way to bring the fighting parties to an agreement, which is preceded by the process of peacekeeping.[176] The technique of peacebuilding is also introduced in the *Agenda* and it is seen as a way to reach a more sustainable solution to a conflict, which is in accordance with Galtung's theory.

That technique was elaborated on more broadly in UN's subsequent report of 2000: the *Brahimi Report* (A/55/305 and S/2000/809). Conflicts in the 1990s were more often qualified as intrastate, with characteristics as genocides, rivalling ethnic groups, human right violations and deploying child soldiers.[177] Also, conflicts had an increasing presence of criminal gangs and militias, called 'spoilers': groups who use the absence of peace to spread violence.[178] UN mission were a few times deployed while not all parties involved accepted that presence, resulting in working in hostile environments.[179] In these years, three missions started while there was not even a peace agreement, what hampered the progress and peace process.[180] Peacekeepers more often fell victim to malicious acts.[181]

The *Report* aimed to address the shortcomings, the lessons learned, of previous missions and recommendations for further developments.[182] A first recommendation was to deploy peacekeepers as well as peacebuilders. The *Report* saw this as a necessary sequence in the peace process. With the sheer presence of peacekeepers, relapsing into conflict would be too much of a danger. Peacebuilders are able to support changes on structural levels, but their roles are more intertwined: 'While the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers' support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders' work.'[183] As a result of this report, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission (UN PBC) in 2005; its work focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding, on 'lay[ing] foundations for sustainable development.'[184]

A second recommendation the *Report* made, was importance of peacekeepers being able to defend themselves, as well as other components of the mission and the mandate. This

---

[175] McCandless, p. 203.
[176] An Agenda for Peace, p. 9.
[177] Thakur, p. 4.
[178] UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, p. 99.
[179] Neethling, p. 2.
[180] This was the case with the missions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia.
[181] https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/statsbyyearmissionincidenttype_5a_8.pdf, on May 2, 2018.
[182] http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml, on May 1, 2018.
[183] Brahimi Report, p. 5.
[184] http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml, on May 2, 2018.

was stressed with 'robust rules of engagement' and 'robust peacekeeping,' a more proactive use of force.[185] The use of force had to be authorised by the Security Council.[186] This resulted in the strategy of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). With disarming armed groups and reintegrating members into the stricken society, they can participate in the process of peace.[187] Mandates were increasingly in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[188]

In 2008, this proactive stance was emphasised the *Capstone Doctrine* and in 2015 again by the *HIPPO Report*.[189] *Capstone Doctrine* included the notion of 'stabilisation' as the time when a peacekeeping mission is deployed. Critique, however, says that when a mission is deployed, it often happens that there is no peace yet and 'stabilisation' is about defeating spoilers.[190] As a result, it seems the coming generation of peacekeeping operations can be named 'enforcement peacekeeping.'[191] Although the UN Secretary-General emphasises that the 'UN is not an army, or a counter-terrorist force,'[192] in the following paragraph I show that MINUSMA has certain peace-enforcing characteristics.

MINUSMA

MINUSMA was deployed on July 1, 2013 and it was preceded by the French Operation Serval and AFISMA of the AU. These latter troops were incorporated into MINUSMA, and

---

[185] UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, p. 34.
[186] Brahimi Report, p. 10.
[187] DDR is defined as: 'Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of members of armed groups, taking these combatants out of their groups and helping them to reintegrate as civilians into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants and those associated with armed groups, so that they can become active participants in the peace process.' https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration, on May 1, 2018.
[188] Chapter VI of the UN Charter is 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes', succeeded by Chapter VII 'Action with Respect to Threats of the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression', in which prerequisites for the use of force in the process of peace are described. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html, on May 5, 2018.
[189] In 2008, *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* was released and was also known as 'The Capstone Doctrine'. It was followed by *A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* in 2009 and *The future of UN peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations* in 2015.
[190] Which was the case in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Haiti (MINUSTAH), and Mali (MINUSMA), Karlsrud, p. 42.
[191] Peter, p. 366; Karlsrud, p. 48.
[192] 'A peacekeeping operation is not an army, or a counter-terrorist force, or a humanitarian agency. It is a tool to create space for a nationally-owned political solution.' Statement made by Secretary-General Guterres. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-03-28/collective-action-improve-un-peacekeeping-operations-remarks, on May 2, 2018.

Operation Serval developed from a Malian mission into Operation Barkhane, a mission throughout the Sahel region and with a counter-terrorism focus.[193]

In the difficult and changing environment of UN peacekeeping, as showed in the previous paragraph, MINUSMA developed. It deals with the presence of religious terrorist groups, which is a relatively new circumstance. The Secretary-General of the UN reported on Mali, preceding the mission, and recommended a Chapter VII mandate. This report included advising a force, which 'would operate under robust rules of engagement with a mandate to use all necessary means to address threats to the implementation of its mandate.'[194] This is even more proactive than was advised in the *Capstone Doctrine*, what merely advised to 'deter forceful attempts.'[195]

These proactive recommendations were included in MINUSMA's first mandate. The first objective of the mandate is: 'Stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country,'[196] and this objective is specified into five further steps on stabilising and establishing the state authority and deterring threats, spoilers, in the north. A considerable notion in this first focus point, is the use of the term 'stabilisation' and how this is defined in the mandate. It assumes that stabilisation will be achieved when those threats are deterred and when DDR is applied.

The UN entered the conflict in July 1, 2013 and elections did not take place yet. The preliminary Ouagadougou peace agreement had been signed on June 18 that year, but it lasted until March 1, 2015 before the definite Bamako Agreement was signed. So, the mission started, but without a peace to keep: a contradiction to its own guidelines and the situation affiliates to the critique seen in the previous paragraph. With this mandate, techniques of peacekeeping needed to be employed, while there was no basis to build on yet, i.e. peacemaking was not completed. The *Report* was very clear on this, a mission has to be preceded by a signed peace agreement; a learned lesson of the 1990s.[197] Other UN critiques argue that 'without a peace to keep, there is no state to build.'[198] In Mali, this was the case as well. The government was not secure enough when the mission started, although this changed during the mission.

---

[193] https://www.geopolitica.info/operation-barkhane/, on May 10, 2018.
[194] S/2013/189, p. 14.
[195] UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, p. 34.
[196] S/RES/2100 (2013), pp. 7-8; Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, p. 6.
[197] Brahimi Report, p. 10.
[198] Peter, p. 264.

Secondly, stabilisation in Mali has many characteristics of robust peacekeeping. The mandate is very clear: it has to be achieved in combination with deterring threats in the north and applying the technique of DDR. The Resolution even defined these threats as the to Al Qaeda related religious terrorist groups: Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM.

When these threats, enemies, are defined, the instability of the country is emphasised. There is no peace that can be kept, not to mention peace to be build. The 'enemies' are not willing to cooperate in the process of peace, and the UN excludes these groups from participating in that process. Therefore, disarming, demobilising and reintegrating might be successful in the stage following on peacekeeping, but at this time, for members these of these groups, it cannot be successful yet.

The robust and proactive rules of the mandate are emphasised in paragraph 17: '[The Security Council] *Authorizes* MINUSMA to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate.'[199] Even within the rules of robust peacekeeping, this statement goes far in saying that MINUSMA is authorised to use all necessary means. The *Report* stressed that enforcement action could be required, but this mandate is beforehand authorised to use all means, to use force, in order to implement and protect its goals.

As a result of this offensive way to stabilise the country, new means were introduced into Mali. It is the first UN mission deploying an intelligence capability: All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU). ASIFU's aim is to collect and analyse information, such as relations and tension between the different ethnical parties present in the conflict.[200] The Netherlands has a leading role in ASIFU: it initiated this part of this mission together with six other European countries,[201] and is the coordinator. The collected information gives insight into possible disturbing actors in the peace process, on both operational and tactical level.[202] To collect this information, new technologies are incorporated, such as the use of drones, which will be integrated into more humanitarian and developmental missions.[203]

---

[199] S/RES/2100 (2013), p. 9.
[200] https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2011/10/19/defensie-bundelt-inlichtingencapaciteit, on May 5, 2018.
[201] Dalen, p. 306.
[202] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/09/11/kamerbrief-over-nederlandse-bijdrage-aan-minusma-in-2018, p. 14, on May 27, 2018.
[203] https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564452-feature-does-drone-technology-hold-promise-un, on May 7, 2018.

Mandates

The UN Resolutions on the situation in Mali, which include the mandates as well, are every year established for the duration of one year. This means that there have been five Resolutions until now, and the sixth is approaching.[204] This paragraph focuses on the different mandates and how they address the changes in the conflict. This analysis will clear up MINUSMA's goals and what the UN has in mind to achieve these goals.

In comparing and analysing the five mandates, it becomes clear that the UN emphasises that the resolution to the conflict should come from the main internal party: the government. In all the mandates, supporting the government is stressed elaborately. In 2013, the priority was to support the transitional government and the approaching presidential and legislative elections, later in July that year. These elections resulted in the presidency of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. In the following mandates of 2014 and 2015, the importance of supporting the enlargement of the state authority and administration was addressed, especially in the northern regions. This coincides with training and strengthening the army, the Malian Defence and Security Forces,[205] as well as the police and gendarmerie. When the mandate of 2015 was authorised, the Bamako Agreement had been signed and this is reflected in the Resolution, but not yet in the mandate. This could be explained with clashes in Kidal in May 2014,[206] when the MNLA took control in the north again. In 2016 and 2017, supporting the implementation of the Bamako Agreement was listed as the first objective in the mandate.

The mandates exemplify a transition towards more proactive missions. The use of force, the proactive stand towards the conflict and the idea of robust peacekeeping, is explicitly present in the mandates. It is addressed with the notions of 'stabilisation,' 'deter threats,' 'DDR' and 'active steps/defence.' It should be noted that the 2016- and 2017-mandates stress the use of force even stronger than the preceding mandates; all five are authorised to 'take all necessary means to carry out its mandate,'[207] but the last two are stronger on two points. Firstly, they have an extra paragraph: '[The Security Council] *Requests* MINUSMA to move to a more proactive and robust posture to carry out its mandate.'[208] This proactive way of peacekeeping is a response to the difficult circumstances

---

[204] The Resolutions are: S/RES/2010 (2013), S/RES/2164 (2014), S/RES/2227 (2015), S/RES/2295 (2016) and S/RES/2364 (2017). The 2017 resolution extends until June 30, 2018.

[205] The European Union contributes to this with the ongoing European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali).

[206] BBC, 'Mali: Tuareg rebels 'defeat government army in Kidal,' http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27511448, on May 8, 2018.

[207] A/RES/2100 (2013), p. 9; A/RES/2164 (2014), p. 6; A/RES/2227 (2015), p. 6; A/RES/2295 (2016), p. 7; A/RES/2364 (2017), p. 7.

[208] A/RES/2295 (2016), p. 7; A/RES/2364 (2017), p. 7.

MINUSMA is working in, i.e. peacekeepers are targeted.[209] The proactive stance is stressed with two more paragraphs: 'Countering asymmetric attacks in active defence of MINUSMA's mandate,' which is specified into an active defence of the mandate and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or UN personnel. This is reiterated in the next paragraph on the 'protection, safety and security of UN personnel.'[210] So, both the security situation in the country, as well as the safety and security of civilians and UN personnel is associated with and linked to the use of force.

All the mandates elaborate on the enemies of the UN. In the first mandate, the earliest religious terrorist groups were named (AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO), but in the following mandates, Al Mourabitoune, FLM and JNIM were added to this list. The International Criminal Court (ICC) started researching Mali's situation since January 2013. Its focus is on war crimes, including murder, torture, rape and attacking and destroying UNESCO inheritances.[211] ICC's spearheads correspond with certain paragraphs of the mandates. It has sentenced of one Ansar Dine's members and the judicial inquiry of one other member is in progress.[212] Sentencing war criminals could function as a technique in the process of reconciliation; an argument that will be stressed in the following chapter.

Reconciliation can be a step towards sustainable peace; also a recurrent as well as increasing theme in the UN Resolutions and mandates. In 2013, this was addressed with the notion of supporting the 'restoration of constitutional order, democratic government and national unity.'[213] Since 2014 the Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation (CVJR) is instituted as a result of the Bamako Agreement.[214] Furthermore, MINUSMA is mandated to support national dialogue and social cohesion. The aim of this is diminishing tensions between different parties in the conflict, since these are increasing the last few years.

---

[209] Sieff, K. (The Washinton Post) 'The world's most dangerous U.N. Mission.' http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.efe1ce4a9a85, on May 8, 2018; Boutellis & Zahar, p. 12.

[210] S/RES/2295 (2016) p. 9; S/RES/2364 (2017), p. 9.

[211] https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali, on May 9, 2018.

[212] These members are Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, who was responsible for attacks on historic and religious buildings in Timbuktu, and Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, whose trial has started and who is under the suspicion of crimes against humanity. https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/pages/alleged-crimes.aspx and https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1377, on May 10, 2018.

[213] S/RES/2100 (2013), p. 7.

[214] The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2014, resulting from the Bamako Agreement. Boutellis & Zahar, p. 24.

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the environment in which MINUSMA works, including the history and development of UN peacekeeping missions in general and within the Malian mission. The UN DPKO works in a difficult environment; conflicts have been and are changing in nature and the DPKO has to find a response. This response is hampered; it has to be both effective, but it is criticised when it is too proactive.

These critiques argue that the mission is too robust, too proactive. The UN is waging war, portrayed with (modern) strategies as deploying many troops and police personnel, using intelligence agencies and drones, but also with naming enemies and excluding them from peace negotiations and agreements. It is possible that this stance creates an even more hostile environment and creates more enemies, what could be another explanation for the splinter groups that keep developing. Also, it might lead to targeting peacekeepers, what is evident in Mali, with targeted UN personnel and civilians. It could be substantiated that proactive peacekeeping results in more offensive responses of the enemies and spoilers, functioning as a vicious circle: 'The robust posture may also have a self-fulfilling effect, drawing attention to the mission and increasing the chance of targeted attacks against the UN.'[215]

The UN seems to conclude this as well; in a recent debate on peacekeeping operations Secretary-General Guterres made the statement: 'I call on Member States to sustain your political engagement and push for political solutions and inclusive peace processes, including through bilateral diplomacy and sanctions if necessary. A peacekeeping operation is not an army, or a counter-terrorist force, or a humanitarian agency. It is a tool to create the space for nationally-owned political solution.'[216] It shows the possible step away from proactive peacekeeping missions, and a step back to peacekeeping with peaceful means.

---

[215] Karlsrud, p. 47.
[216] https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-03-28/collective-action-improve-un-peacekeeping-operations-remarks, on May 12, 2018.

5. Discussion

In the previous chapters, I analysed the theories and backgrounds concerning the five main themes of this thesis: sustainable peace, religiously inspired terrorism, the conflict in Mali and the UN mission that is deployed there. In those chapters, I mainly let the primary and secondary literature, as well as the critics speak. In this chapter, I discuss and integrate the different theories and perspectives, thus answer the sub questions. Every paragraph is addressed to one sub question, in the order as presented in the introduction.

What is religiously inspired terrorism?
In the first part of the theoretical frame, I created a theoretical overview of the concept of terrorism, with different and complementary theories on terrorism. I have addressed this case as a modern and social phenomenon, which means that I view these communities or groups as opposing to the traditionally oriented groups. When the latter developed, they were based in conceptions of religions that evolved in very different times, corresponding with development of cultures and where the government had taken disparate role, where it was able to provide (social) security.

In modern times, religious communities are taking very various positions. The world and traditional factors in it are susceptible for change, resulting in a void of individual and communal security. New religious communities are able to fill these voids with an identity based on religious beliefs and with corresponding worldviews and ethics, and they could also react to modern day developments, such as globalisation and westernisation. These new religious communities have a strong group identity and solidarity, and oppose to out-group identities. The religious foundations are based on a perspective of the religion, distinct in several aspects. Firstly, this is the conception of mythohistory and perceiving phenomena in the holy scriptures as realistic, contrary to a symbolic interpretation in traditional communities. Secondly, certain experiences can be regarded in an emotionally severe way. This applies to experiences of shame and humiliation, which can be found in holy scriptures, as well as in (recent) history. Experiences interpreted in this framework are conceived in a much broader sense; the 'war on terror' could be interpreted as a Western war against Islam. Individual experiences receive, analogously, a similar severity; when a group member is intimidated, this attack could be perceived as an attack against the group. This is all incorporated in the group identity and worldview.

Identity and solidarity are very strong, resulting in a need to protect the group. In threatening situations the group identity will even take over. Consequently, groups living under constant threat live with constant group identity; individual identity is pushed to the background. A coping strategy is showing the group's strength and humiliate in return, often with using violence. These violent acts are justified within the group's worldview and defended by its members, which strengthens the group identity more. A step further is to use violence as a symbolic act, with its victims and targets symbolising a worldview; the war fought is all-encompassing, cosmic, and therefore, in the group's perception, morally justified.

The question to be asked at this point is whether this use of violence is religious or not, whether this can be called religious terrorism or not. Religion is the basis for the group identity and additionally for defending the group. This is endorsed with the idea of an all-encompassing, cosmic war. On the other hand, religion is not the only inspiration. Modern developments, such as globalisation and westernisation, but poverty as well, are ground for violence too. It can be used to show resistance to the present course of events. Therefore, the term 'religious violence' should be replaced by 'religious inspired violence,' since religion as influence is most in view.

What is sustainable peace and how can this be implemented?

In the second part of the theoretical frame, I addressed Galtung's theories considering peace. Peace and conflict studies are interrelated, since the first definition of peace includes the notion of violence.[217] Additionally, the typology of violence can be presented as a vicious triangle: personal (direct), structural (indirect) and cultural violence affect each other negatively. Correspondingly, there is a tripartite typology of personal (negative), structural (positive) and cultural peace; a virtuous triangle. These typologies are represented in figures 2.2 and 2.3 on pages 20 and 21.

Imbalanced societies are an opening for using personal and structural violence, while at the same time, it can be a result of cultural and structural violence. So, in order to end violence, create social justice and to find a durable solution, the cultural and structural aspects of the conflict have to be addressed. The virtuous theory implies that when all three corners are addressed, the conflict can be transformed. In fact, the corners need to be addressed simultaneously, otherwise, the conflict will easily relapse into the use of personal or even

---

[217] 'Peace is the absence of violence,' Galtung (1969), p. 167.

structural violence. However, achieving cultural peace is difficult, since cultural violence is often intertwined in a whole society.

Cultural and sustainable peace are closely connected. Techniques that can be used to achieve sustainable peace are constructive in attaining cultural peace, such as reconciliation and addressing the situation of human rights. However, where cultural peace can solely be applied to the society where it was achieved, the road to sustainable peace is more broadly applicable, so in other conflicts as well. Sustainable peace is the extension of peacebuilding, which is focused on addressing problematic underlying structures.

Collier argued in his lecture that the road to peace should not start with elections, but with establishing a strong economic environment.[218] Elections will automatically result in a defeated party, since there can only be one winner: problematic in the process of reconciliation. A complication in his argument, however, is that this makes a country too dependent on external factors. If there is no government to finance the construction sector, it has to come from either the county's private sector, or from foreign donors, NGOs or other parties. As a result, the country depends too much on external factors and internal actors are left out, although they are most successful in transforming the conflict from within, as seen in Lederach's argument.[219]

Furthermore, best results are achieved when internal and external parties cooperate. Peacemaking, -keeping and -building are strongly related, but address several stages of conflict in their own important way. The UN DPKO is concerned with keeping peace, with 'managing the absence of direct violence.'[220] The UN PBC is an advisory body, established to intervene when a conflict has settled. In recent years, it started to incorporate certain characteristics of peacemaking and -building into its practices; also, it started to cooperate with different international and regional actors, e.g. French counter-terrorism operation Serval/Barkhane, and took a more proactive stance. These developments should be interpreted in the changing nature of conflicts, as intrastate and regional, ethnic, religious, and with a presence of terrorism and fastly developing splinter groups.

With these developments, the UN is in a predicament. On the one hand, it has to hold to its three principles,[221] while on the other hand, it deals with difficult developments and hostility, as is confirmed with the increasing number of malicious acts towards UN

---

[218] Collier, 8:23-8:30.
[219] Lederach, p. 38.
[220] McCandless, p. 203.
[221] Namely: consent of the parties, impartiality and nonuse of force, except in self-defence or in defence of the mandate. See footnote 168.

peacekeepers. The reaction the UN had towards these changes is one of peace enforcement. The question has to be asked whether this can be seen as a way of imposing peace. Galtung stressed the theory that imposing cultural peace is a form of direct (personal) violence.[222] It is necessary to place the present stance of UN in this theory. In the last sub question, I return to this idea.

How did Mali get from a stable democracy to an unstable country, in need for international help?

As I showed in chapter three of this thesis, the situation in Mali was not as stable as the Western world wanted to believe. Western donors and NGOs had been involved a country which was both a 'model for democracy,'[223] as well as a 'bulwark against radical Islam in Africa.'[224] However, on both the political and the social level, the society started bursting. Foundations of these bursts can be found in historical imbalances and governmental failed promises.

As elaborately addressed in chapter three, the relations between the fertile south and the northern desert have been on edge. This thesis does not have the space to research these relations before the French colonial time, but during that time and after independence, the southerners were offered more opportunities to govern, to have power. Moreover, the south was economically more successful, and less damaged by environmental disasters than the north. So, the society was very imbalanced, with many different ethnic groups and certain biased groups.

This could be framed as cultural and even structural violence. I have already argued that the Malian society had a vicious circle of prejudice. On the one side are the Tuareg, who feel superior over the southerners, because of their nomadic way of life, but more importantly, because of their ancestry. Tuareg have a Berber kinship and already during French colonisation, they requested not to be governed by the southerners.[225] This is an example of structural violence; they discriminated the southerners on the colour of their skin, because of their descent. For southerners, this confirms their opinions on Tuareg: a group of racist and pro-slavery nomads. So, both groups base ideas and expectations on prejudices, creating a base for discrimination and consequently, a base to act out on.

---

[222] Galtung (1990), p. 291.
[223] Dool, on May 23, 2018.
[224] Solomon (2015), p. 67.
[225] Giuffrida, 'Clerics, Rebels and Refugees: Mobility Strategies and Networks Among the Kel Antessar', p. 532, in Cline, p. 618.

Governmental failed promises were another fracture in Mali's unstable basis. Past rebellions were closed with peace agreements, including promises for improvements in the north. The government was not able, did not, realise these agreements: an experience of humiliation, of being forgotten and underrated by the government. This can be framed as structural violence.

These two forms of violence are strongly intertwined with the country's culture, and as a result, these patterns did not stand out to foreign involved parties. Mali was an example in the sense that it had absence of personal and direct violence. In other words, Mali's peace was negative. This strengthened the idea of a stable democracy.

Eventually, this led to personal and direct violence in 2012 and afterwards. The rebellion was based in the situation described above and directly affected by the Arab Spring and ensuing Libyan civil war. The presence of cultural and structural violence resulted in the presence of personal violence, a logical consequence. Personal violence is a direct way of resistance against these long-standing distorted relations, but induce a violent response.

In the course of the conflict, and implementing the Bamako Agreement, it is not an option to make mistakes. Failures will easily create new breeding grounds for discontent, a confirmation of experienced discrimination and consequently, new violent responses.

How is religiously inspired terrorism shaped in the Malian conflict?
The conflict in Mali started with the armed struggle for independence, initiated by the Tuareg. However, soon after the declaration of Azawad, the independence of the north, religiously inspired terrorists took over. These terrorists mostly have a Tuareg descent as well. Since 2012, the power in the north alternated between Tuareg rebels and religiously inspired terrorists. The presence of these terrorists and threat they cause to Mali, West-Africa and consequently to Europe was the main, or the most considerable reason for intervening of the AU, France and UN.

These terrorists developed along the line as described in the first paragraph of this chapter. The government lacked improving the situation in the north, as a consequence and phenomenon of structural and cultural violence. In addition, a security gap arose in the north, which was easily filled by new, but strong, religious communities. These influenced each other: the void was an opening for the increasing religious communities, and at the same time, because these were growing, the government lost more control and the void intensified.

The Tuareg rebels and religiously inspired terrorists both evolved in northern Mali, so they had corresponding experiences. These terrorists coped with the experiences in line with

expectations: a strong group identity that takes over continuously, the impossibility of taking off this armour, humiliate the dominant group in return and with that, show its strength. They seized power of the government and the secular and nationalist Tuareg, who were united in, among others, the MNLA.

Another reason the religiously inspired terrorists had this strong position in the north, is due to their economic position. They control the smuggling routes throughout the Tuareg land and use criminal activities to finance their religiously inspired activities; this resulted in characterising them as 'gangster-jihadis.' Moreover, a fairly recent article (September 23, 2017) interviewed young members of these armed groups, and concluded that they became members in their search for security, while their religious affiliation was only a secondary or tertiary reason.[226] However, religion is all-encompassing in societies and cultures. It affects cultural development, norms, values and remembrance of past events, and thus creating a very strong sense of community for those whose only option is joining these groups.

These two aspects strengthen the argument I made, suggesting not to call these groups 'religious terrorists,' but rather 'religiously inspired terrorists.' The situation in which they developed is not strictly religious, although it is important to note that religion is the cause that connected these individuals most strongly into a group, into a new religious community. The religious community and their solidarity are strong; resulting in basic security and a pathway out of the void.

These days, conflicts around the world are changing again and many deal with a presence of terrorism. This creates difficult circumstances for UN DPKO missions, being in an area of tension between effective and proactive/offensive approach. The latter approach is a characteristic of MINUSMA. MINUSMA's stance and responses of the appointed enemies have a reciprocal influence and created the course of the conflict together, resulting in religious groups splitting up and radicalise further in their demands and means. I will return to this perspective in the conclusion of this thesis.

What are the goals for MINUSMA?
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is an operation of the UN DPKO. This department is one of the oldest of the UN and has made significant changes in its policy since the 1990s. In that decade, wars started to change from interstate to

---

[226] Inks, 'Terrorism in Africa: ending violence in Mali starts with building communities,' http://www.newsweek.com/terrorism-africa-mali-al-qaeda-668803, on May 24, 2018.

intrastate, and the UN responded with a change from preventive diplomacy to robust peacekeeping, with a proactive use of force.

MINUSMA was deployed on July 1, 2013 and is an example of the UN's proactive and offensive approach to a conflict. It is a stabilisation mission and the critiques comply here: religiously inspired terrorist groups are addressed as 'spoilers.' This started during the peace negotiations, initiated by Ouagadougou and Algeria, when these groups were excluded and it was continued by MINUSMA, when they were allotted the role of enemy. It results in more radicalised demands, new splinter groups and new affiliations as JNIM, who perpetrate malicious acts on (Malian) civilians, peacekeepers and tourists. Additionally, discontent and anger were a cause of the conflict of 2012, but due to this position and treatment, it may root even deeper.

The conflict in Mali is one of international importance, but the root causes of the conflict, as I have distinguished them, are not addressed. Moreover, the mission focuses on manifestations and anticipates on that; for example with a Chapter VII mandate and the use of force. Consequently, the breeding grounds for rebellions in different forms are not addressed properly. Rebellions in this recent conflict shaped as secular and additionally as religious. There are transnational openings for religiously inspired terrorism, as the presence of Al-Qaeda and Tuareg incorporation in the Islamic Legion, where they were exposed to radicalised Islamic ideas.

Although the Secretary-General emphasises that the UN is not a counter-terrorist force or an army, excluding these terrorist groups created a war structure: the UN fights its enemies with forceful mandates and means, and is targeted as result. Moreover, the stabilisation mission started, but against UN's own guidelines, because there was no peace agreement, and no basis to keep the peace. The resolutions and mandates demonstrate that the trust for this basis was placed in Mali's elected government,[227] with support of the mission.[228] The question that should be asked here is whether a new government is able to fulfil this task, if it represents the country's population well and consequently, if it addresses all (ethnic) groups in the country. The new government is not only supporting coming acts of reconciliation, it is also a reconciling act itself. Including all ethnic groups in the new government will enhance the reliability and trust. The Secretary-General released a report on January 18, 2018 on

---

[227] The government that was elected in the summer of 2013 and established in September that year. This year, July 2018, new elections will take place.
[228] In the mandates, this is described with phrases as: support the reestablishment of the State authority (2013, 2014), support national political dialogue (2014), support the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (2015-2016-2017).

peacebuilding and sustaining peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43), where he stressed the idea that non-traditional partners should be included in reconciliation, which he specified to youth and women groups. It is very important here to include (ethnic) minorities as well, or in Galtung's terms, the subordinated groups. The UN places all responsibility for rebuilding the country and reconciliation on the government, but with this model, subordinated groups are excluded. Structural and consequently cultural peace will never be reached.

Another remark can be made on reconciliation as a coping strategy and on the UN's involvement. Reconciliation and closure are necessary to be achieved; when certain groups do not reach this, there is a main danger of relapsing into direct violence. As I addressed in the end of chapter two, this practice can address both personal as structural peace, it can bring back harmony into an imbalanced society. The UN stresses the importance of this practice as well: in the Resolutions on Mali, reconciliation, and the step towards sustainable peace, is addressed in all the mandates. Firstly, this is done with the ICC, which researches and prosecutes the situation and perpetrators since 2012. Secondly, in the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, the parties agreed upon installing the CVJR, which focuses on transitional justice.

However, there are two points of critique in this part. The UN supports the government, and the government bears responsibility for reconciliation, for example, it is responsible for the CVJR. The UN condemns certain groups, which means that they are excluded from this reconciliation process. Given that people become members for other primary reasons than their religious affiliation, they are confronted with extremist thoughts and violence, which will affect them. It is necessary that they achieve reconciliation as well. The question is whether they are included in this process and how they achieve reconciliation, since the UN condemns these groups.

Secondly, reconciliation is about achieving closure, about accepting loss and traumas on a conscious and unconscious level. The conflict in Mali did not end yet, it is even still dealing with attacks. So, how can groups reach closure, incorporate and cope with experiences, while these experiences are still happening?

A last remark can be made on the security void. Theories showed that in a void, religions can supply social security. This was confirmed in answering the previous sub question: religion is in most cases not the first reason to join a religiously inspired terrorist group, it particularly offers social security and an identity, a group to belong to. So, if this argument continues, a (new) religious community can also offer security in a more positive way. Moreover, religious communities can enhance the process of reconciliation and

positively effect this. Norms and values coming from the holy scriptures can positively influence the memories, i.e. the cultural peace.

6. Conclusion

In the previous chapter, I discussed the different sub questions, which addressed the themes of this thesis: religiously inspired terrorism, sustainable peace, peace processes within the UN and the conflict in Mali. The research question that I developed to relate these themes, is: *What challenges faces MINUSMA in achieving its goals, in perspective of religiously inspired terrorist groups?* In this conclusion, I answer this question and present my most important findings. Secondly, I address limitations of this research and possibilities for further research.

Conclusion

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali faces many challenges; challenges specific in the Malian situation, as well as challenges that could face other UN peacekeeping missions. MINUSMA's start was a major challenge, because it clashed with the guidelines of the DPKO: there was no peace to keep yet, no peace agreement signed. The DPKO has learned its lesson considering peace agreements in the 1990s, as described in chapter four. Furthermore, the UN aims achieving peace from within, so the main responsibility is addressed to the post-conflict, democratically elected government.

The new stance of the UN, i.e. approaching the situation proactively and even offensively, creates challenges as well. The situation in Mali manifests this; the internal disunities in the country are strengthened by deeply rooted imbalances and mutual prejudices, which can be categorised as structural and cultural violence. As a consequence of this situation, a security void developed, and was enhanced by the presence of returning Tuareg from Libya, who were not only well-equipped and trained, but who had also been exposed and affected by radical Islamic thoughts. In this void, and under this influence, new religious communities evolved and found their breeding grounds.

These breeding grounds include many factors; the historical imbalances and mutual prejudices as noted above, and emanating governmental decisions and consequences, as the higher poverty and unemployment rate in the north. When the new religious communities started filling this gaps, they developed a new security for their members. However, because of the development of the situation in the north, this was soon the only possibility for security in the region. As a result, religious affiliation is, for new young members, not the primary reason for joining anymore.

At the same time, we have to be wary not to underestimate these groups. Their radicalisation in demands and means is a fact, demonstrated by the increasing amount of attacks on UN peacekeepers. This is a challenge for peacekeepers; the attacks religiously inspired terrorists commit, can be placed in the light of fighting a holy or cosmic war. The war is fought against a worldview, against the Western 'war on terror' or 'war against Islam,' and moreover, to satisfy God. Approaching and diminishing a worldview is a very difficult task, for both internal as well as external parties.

The UN, the external party, approached this situation with a proactive mandate, which became more offensive over the years. MINUSMA's focus is mainly on instituting and monitoring two aspects of the triangle of peace: personal and structural peace. This is exemplified with monitoring the ceasefire agreements and the support of rebuilding the Malian security sector. There is much more focus on these two aspects than on acts of cultural peace. For that, merely the basis is covered, when the focus is on reconciliation and the promotion and protection of human rights.

The theoretical frame on peace addressed Galtung's theory of the virtuous triangle of peace. The process of achieving peace is most successful when addressing all three corners at the same time. These aspects of peace will affect each other and reach a more powerful and durable outcome. Therefore, MINUSMA should have an increased focus on this latter aspect.

So, one aspect of the UN's current approach to terrorist groups present in conflicts, is distinguishing enemies. In this case, they are found in the religiously framed terrorist groups. The way the UN approaches them, lead to the critiques that the UN is waging war. Although the UN Charter Chapter VII addresses peacekeeping with the use of force in certain situations, it collides with the principles of peace and peace process in this extent. As Galtung framed this: peace should be achieved with peaceful means.

Approaching certain groups as enemies is not only challenging for the role of the DPKO, it is also challenging for the course the concerned mission; for the possible reactions of these 'enemies' to the way they are approached. As I substantiated in the discussion chapter, it is very important to address breeding ground for terrorism in order to achieve peace. This applies to both the structural and the cultural level. However, the offensive approach of the UN will trigger the targeted groups. In chapter two, Kakar's theory demonstrated the strength of a group identity and how this will take over the individual identity in threatening situations. Additionally, when experiencing a constant threat, the group identity will also become constant, even permanent. The use of violence can fit into the group's worldview and is therefore not condemned by its members.

There is a last conclusion that can be drawn here. The UN is in a very difficult position; the world is changing and the conflicts are changing as well. Decisions that are made, among which UN's current response with a proactive stance towards terrorism, have to be reviewed. It seems that the present Secretary-General will address UN's position in peacekeeping missions again, and it is necessary to keep doing this. Conflicts will never be a uniform process, neither are the responses.

Limitations and recommendations

This research was limited in several areas. First and foremost, it is very hard and for this thesis impossible to interview members of groups involved in the conflict. Therefore, I had to base my research in secondary literature: an article from a news website and reports on root causes of the conflict. Direct contact would have created a much broader overview, and could have addressed important concepts, including the notion of a holy or cosmic war, what could at this point neither be verified nor falsified.

This same limitation applies to the reasons for joining a religiously inspired terrorist group. I addressed different and complementary theories, which stressed the importance of groups and religion to offer security. As a social phenomenon, religiously inspired terrorism groups fit into this frame. However, having primary data on this subject would strengthened this argument a lot.

Another constraint is the limited amount of words for a master thesis. There are certain approaches and theories that would have given a very interesting perspective. Firstly, this thesis could have a more political approach. A first angle could be to shift the focus more towards the coup d'état in March 2012, and research the underlying perspectives. The UN Resolutions could also have been analysed with a political approach; e.g. on the fact that a Resolution is established for one year at a time, even while the process of achieving sustainable peace requires a long-term involvement of peacekeepers. I decided not to take these approaches, since it would give this thesis a political emphasis. Given this is a thesis for the Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, and for the master Religion, Conflict and Globalization, the angle I took was more interesting. However, to understand the conflict and the responses better, it should be considered from this political angle as well.

Secondly, it would be very interesting to expand on the theories and practices of reconciliation. I addressed this shortly throughout the thesis and in the discussion, but when this is analysed more broadly, it could give good insights into the Malian conflict and its path

to sustainable peace. This will enhance UN's position and credibility in other peace operations as well.

7. Bibliography

Printed sources

Boutellis, A. & Zahar, M.J. (2017). *A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement*. New York: International Peace Institute.

Chauzal, G. & van Damme, T. (2015). *The roots of Mali's conflict. Moving beyond the 2012 crisis.* The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Cline, L.E. (2013). Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36(8), pp.617-634.

Cristiani, D. (2017). Ten Years of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Evolution and Prospects. *Terrorism Monitor* 15(9), pp. 8-11.

Dalen, J.A. van (2015). ASIFU. Baanbrekend inlichtingenexperiment in Mali. *Militaire Spectator* 184(7-8), p. 306-320.

Daniel, J. (2017). Building sovereigns? The UN peacekeeping and strengthening the authority of the state in Lebanon and Mali, *Global Change, Peace & Security* 29(3), pp. 229-247.

Esmail, A. (2011). Religion, Identity and Violence: Some Theoretical Reflections. In A.R. Murphy (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence* (pp. 50-65). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research* 6(3), pp. 167-191.

Galtung, J. (1981). Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 18(2), pp. 183-199.

Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 27(3), pp. 291-305.

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization.* Oslo: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Ganor, B. (2002). Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist another Man's Freedom Fighter? *Police Practice and Research* 3(4), pp. 287-304.

Gerchicoff, B. (2013). Keeping Capstone in Context: Evaluating the Peacekeeping Doctrine, *Strategic Analysis* 37(6), pp. 729-741.

Homan, K. (2013). Van model-democratie tot mislukte staat, *Atlantisch Perspectief* 37(7), pp. 14-19.

Heems, M. van (2016). *Hallo mijn slaaf, alles goed? Berichten uit Mali, een opgewekt land in crisis.* Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Brandt.

Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence.* Berkely, CA: University of California Press.

Karlsrud, J. (2015). The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DCR and Mali, *Third World Quarterly* 36(1), pp. 40-54.

Kippenberg, H.G. (2010). Searching for the Link between Religion and Violence: A Theory of Social Action, *Method and Theory in the Study of Religion* 22(2), pp. 97-115.

Lederach, J.P. (1997). *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lederach, J.P. (1995). *Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation across Cultures.* Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press.

Lode, K. (2002). Mali's Peace Process: context, analysis and evaluation, *ACCORD Issue* 13, pp. 56-63.

Marty, M.E. (1988). Fundamentalism as a Social Phenomenon, *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 42(2), pp. 15-29.

McCandless, E (2011). The UN's Tripartite Peace Architecture amidst Promises and Challenges for Sustaining Peace. Galtung's relevance a third of a century later. In: J. Johansen & J.Y. Jones (eds.), *Experiments with Peace: Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 80th birthday* (pp. 201-213). Cape Town, Dakar, Nairobi and Oxford: Pambazuka Press.

McGregor, A. (2017). Anarchy in Azawad: A Guide to Non-State Armed Groups in Northern-Mali, *Terrorism Monitor* 15(2), pp. 8-13.

Miall, H. (2004). Conflict Transformation: A Multidimensional Approach. In: A. Austin, Fischer, M. & N. Ropers (eds.), *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook* (pp. 67-89). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Neethling, T. (2009). Whither peacekeeping in Africa: Revisiting the evolving role of the United Nations, *African Security Review* 18(1), pp. 2-20.

Peter, M. (2015). Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma, *Global Governance* 21, pp. 351-370.

Posman, E. (2011). History, Humiliation, and Religious Violence. In A.R. Murphy (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence* (pp. 331-342). Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Solomon, H. (2013). Mali: West-Africa's Afghanistan, *Rusi Journal* 158(1), pp. 12-19.

Solomon, H. (2015). Ansar Dine: Between Tuareg Nationalism and Islamism. *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa. Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Spencer, C.R. (2012). *Politics, Agricultural Development, and Conflict Resolution: An In- Depth Analysis of the Moyen Bani Programme in Mali*. Maryland: University Press of America. Available as e-book.

Thakur, R. (2005). From Peacekeeping to Peace Operations, *Conflict Trends* 4, pp. 3-9.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2003). *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (2008). *UN Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines*. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Development Programme (2017). *Guidance on Sustaining Peace.* New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly (2005). Resolution A/RES/60/180. New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly (2016). Resolution A/RES/70/262. New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (1992). A/47/277 S/24111 An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (2000). A/55/305 S/2000/809 Brahimi Report. New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (2015). A/70/375 S/2015/682 The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO report). New York: United Nations.

United Nations General Assembly/Security Council (2018). A/72/707 S/2018/43 Peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2012). Resolution S/RES/2085 (2012). New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2013). Resolution S/RES/2100 (2013). New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2014). Resolution S/RES/2164 (2014). New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2015). Resolution S/RES/2227 (2015). New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2015). S/PRST/2015/22 Statement by the President of the Security Council. New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2016). Resolution S/RES/2282 (2016). New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2016). Resolution S/RES/2295 (2016). New York: United Nations.

United Nations Security Council (2017). Resolution S/RES/2364 (2017). New York: United Nations.

Wijsen, F. (2007). *Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace. From Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa.* Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.

Zandee, D. (2013). Interventie in Mali. Franse én Europese belangen, *Internationale Spectator. Clingendael Magazine voor Internationale Betrekkingen* 67(4), pp. 57-58.

Web sources

Aa, G. van der (December 28, 2017). Wonen in een conflictgebied: 'Als ik ontvoerd word, heb ik pech.' *NRC Handelsblad*. Accessed on December 29, 2017, on http://academic.lexisnexis.eu.proxy-ub.rug.nl/??lni=5R8S-GGB1-DYMH-R25D&csi=259064&oc=00240&perma=true.

Al Jazeera (January 26, 2012). Tuareg rebels claim attack fifth town in Mali. *Al Jazeera.* Accessed on April 12, 2018, on https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/201212614823523986.html.

Al Jazeera (March 22, 2012). Mali mutiny 'topples' President Toure. *Al Jazeera.* Accessed on April 13, 2018, on https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/201232251320110970.html.

Al Jazeera and resources (April 6, 2012). Tuaregs claim 'independence' from Mali. *Al Jazeera*. Accessed on January 2, 2018, on http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124644412359539.html.

Al Jazeera (August 13, 2013). Timeline: Mali since independence. *Al Jazeera.* Accessed on December 9, 2017, on http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/2012322111037483270.html.

Al Jazeera (February 28, 2018). Four UN peacekeepers killed in Mali. *Al Jazeera.* Accessed on April 30, 2018, on https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/peacekeepers-killed-mali-180228200939530.html.

Al Jazeera (April 15, 2018). Fighters disguised as peacekeepers attack UN base in Mali. *Al Jazeera.* Accessed on April 30, 2018, on https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/fighters-disguised-peacekeepers-attack-base-mali-180415062009438.html.

Al Jazeera (April 29, 2018). Suspected rebel fighters kill dozens of Tuareg in Mali. *Al Jazeera*. Accessed on April 30, 2018, on https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/suspected-rebel-fighters-kill-dozens-tuareg-mali-180429075636520.html.

Baker, K.M., Clark, A. & Imperato, P.J. (no date). *Mali,* in Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed on April 9, 2018, on https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/Plant-and-animal-life#ref54977.

BBC (July 8, 2012). Mali interim government urged by ECOWAS. *BBC.* Accessed on April 14, 2018, on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18758150.

BBC (January 24, 2013). Mali's Ansar Dine Islamists 'split and want talks'. *BBC.* Accessed on April 20, 2018, on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21180766.

BBC (May 19, 2014). Mali clashes in Kidal leave civilians dead. *BBC*. Accessed on April 16, 2018, on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27463481.

BBC (May 22, 2014). Mali: Tuareg rebels 'defeat government army in Kidal'. *BBC*. Accessed on April 16, 2018, on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27511448.

Broere, K. (April 29, 2016). Waarom is Al Qaida zo populair in de Maghreb? *De Volkskrant*. Accessed on January 6, 2018, on http://academic.lexisnexis.eu.proxy-ub.rug.nl/??lni=5JN2-77H1-DYRY-N42Y&csi=259070&oc=00240&perma=true.

Chauzal, G. (June 8, 2015). A snapshot of Mali three years after the 2012 crisis. *Clingendael*. Accessed on December 7, 2017, on https://www.clingendael.org/publication/snapshot-mali-three-years-after-2012-crisis.

Counter Extremism Project (no date). *Al-Mourabitoun*. Accessed on April 19, 2018, on https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-mourabitoun.

Dool, P. van den (January 14, 2013). Van democratische oase tot terroristisch broeinest. Vier vragen over Mali. *NRC Handelsblad*. Accessed on January 2, 2018, on https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/01/14/van-democratische-oase-tot-broeinest-terrorisme-vier-vragen-over-het-geweld-in-mali-a1438208.

European Parliament (November 14, 2017). *Motion for a Resolution*. Accessed on November
  30, 2017, on

  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B8-2017-
0635&format=XML&language=EN.

Ezilon Maps (no date). *Mali – Political Map of Mali*. Accessed on May 31, 2018, on
  https://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/mali-maps.html.

Finnemore, M. (July 29, 2017). *Al-Mulathamun Battalion*. Accessed on April 19, 2018, on
  http://lawin.org/al-mulathamun-battalion/.

Global Security (no date). *Macina Liberation Front.* Accessed on April 20, 2018, on
  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mlf.htm.

Global Security (no date). *Nusrat ul-Islam. Ansar al-Din.* Accessed on April 20, 2018, on
  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htm.

Guterres, A. (March 28, 2018). Remarks on Security Council High-Level Debate on
  Collective Action to Improve UN Peacekeeping Operations. *United Nations Secretary-
  General*. Accessed on May 2, 2018, on

  https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-03-28/collective-action-improve-
un-peacekeeping-operations-remarks.

Guterres, A. (April 24, 2018). Remarks to the General Assembly high-level meeting on
  peacebuilding and sustaining peace. *United Nations Secretary-General.* Accessed on
  May 2, 2018, on https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-04-
24/peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace-remarks-general-assembly.

Government from the Republic of Mali (2015). *Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in
  Mali. Resulting from the Algiers Process.* Accessed on December 30, 2017, on
  http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/Agreement%20on%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliati
on%20in%20Mali.pdf.

Inks, L. (September 9, 2017). Terrorism in Africa: ending violence in Mali starts with
  building communities. *Newsweek*. Accessed on December 4, 2017, on
  http://www.newsweek.com/terrorism-africa-mali-al-qaeda-668803.

International Centre for Transitional Justice (April 7, 2016). *Mali's Truth, Justice and
  Reconciliation Commission: Opening the Way Towards Sustainable Peace?* Accessed
  on May 5, 2018, on https://www.ictj.org/news/mali-truth-justice-reconciliation-
commission-peace.

International Criminal Court (no date). *Mali. Situation in the Republic of Mali ICC-01/12*.
  Accessed on May 9, 2018, on https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali.

Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (April 20, 2018). Reisadvies Mali. *Nederland Wereldwijd*.

Accessed on January 21, 2108, on

https://www.nederlandwereldwijd.nl/reizen/reisadviezen/mali.

Latorraca, M. (January 16, 2015). Operation Barkhane: goals and reasons why it could fail.

Geopolitica. Accessed on May 10, 2018, on https://www.geopolitica.info/operation-

barkhane/.

Lewis, D. & Diarra, A. (October 25, 2012). Special Report: In the Land of the "Gangster-

jihadists". *Reuters*. Accessed on April 20, 2018, on

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-crisis-crime/special-report-in-the-land-of-

gangster-jihadists-idUSBRE89O07Y20121025.

Look, A. (April 1, 2012). ECOWAS imposes sanctions on Mali. *VOA News*. Accessed on

January 2, 2018, on https://www.voanews.com/a/west-african-leaders-impose-

sanctions-on-mali-145801255/180314.html.

Mark, M. (July 2, 2012). Malian Islamists attack world heritage site mosques in Timbuktu.

The Guardian. Accessed on April 12, 2018, on

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/02/mali-islamists-attack-world-heritage-

mosques-timbuktu.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (September 11, 2017). *Kamerbrief Nederlandse bijdrage*

aan MINUSMA in 2018. Accessed on May 27, 2018, on

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/09/11/kamerbrief-over-

nederlandse-bijdrage-aan-minusma-in-2018.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (June 15, 2018). *Kamerbrief over toekomstige*

Nederlandse inzet in missies en operaties. Accessed on July 9, 2018, on

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/06/15/kamerbrief-over-

toekomstige-nederlandse-inzet-in-missies-en-operaties.

Ministerie van Defensie (October 19, 2011). *Defensie bundelt inlichtingencapaciteit*.

Accessed on May 5, 2018, on

https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2011/10/19/defensie-bundelt-

inlichtingencapaciteit.

Ministerie van Defensie (December 12, 2017). *Kamer geeft groen licht voor verlenging*

missies. Accessed on January 5, 2018, on

https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/missie-in-mali/nieuws/2017/12/12/kamer-geeft-

groen-licht-voor-verlenging-missies.

Minority Rights Group International (November, 2017). *Mali*. Accessed on April 9, 2018, on
      http://minorityrights.org/country/mali/.

Meijer, R & Du Pré, R. (September 29, 2017). Militaire gebreken krijgen fatale gevolgen. *De*
      Volkskrant. Accessed on January 6, 2018, on http://academic.lexisnexis.eu.proxy-
ub.rug.nl/??lni=5PKF-12C1-JC8X-62FY&csi=259070&oc=00240&perma=true.

Nieuwsuur (November 24, 2017). IS-strijder blijft op valse papieren in Nederland. *NOS*.
      Accessed on November 30, 2017, on https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2204431-is-
strijder-verblijft-op-valse-papieren-in-nederland.html.

NOS (April 29, 2018). Extremisten doden Tuaregs in Mali. *NOS*. Accessed on April 30, 2018,
      on https://nos.nl/artikel/2229496-extremisten-doden-toearegs-in-mali.html.

Outeren, E. van & Steenbergen, E. van (October 3, 2017). De minister die het zo lang
      volhield. *NRC Handelsblad*. Accessed on January 6, 2018, on
      http://academic.lexisnexis.eu.proxy-ub.rug.nl/??lni=5PMD-V3N1-JC5G-
111M&csi=259064&oc=00240&perma=true.

Raalte, J. van (August 15, 2017). 18 doden bij aanslag in Burkina Faso. *De Volkskrant*.
      Accessed on January 6, 2018, on http://academic.lexisnexis.eu.proxy-
ub.rug.nl/??lni=5P7V-9J41-JC8X-647N&csi=259070&oc=00240&perma=true.

Sahara Overland (update April 2018). Kidnappings. Accessed on April 20, 2018, on
      https://sahara-overland.com/kidnappings/.

Sangare, I., Diarra, A. & Dearden, L. (June 20, 2017). Al Qaeda claims responsibility for
      terror attack that killed at least five people in luxury resort in Mali. *Independent*.
      Accessed on December 11, 2017, on
      http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mali-attack-resort-bamako-le-
campement-al-qaeda-claim-responsibility-death-toll-injured-latest-a7798361.html.

Sieff, L. (February 17, 2017). The world's most dangerous U.N. Mission. *The Washington*
      Post. Accessed on April 20, 2018, on
      http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-
peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.5fbe1ee32ec7.

Taylor, A. (November 20, 2015). What Mali means to France. *The Washington Post*.
      Accessed on April 15, 2018, on
      https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/20/what-mali-means-
to-france/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a112a8b6031a.

The Guardian (April 29, 2018). Suspected jihadists in Mali kill more than 40 in two days of
      violence. *The Guardian*. Accessed on April 30, 2018, on

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/29/suspected-jihadists-in-mali-kill-more-than-40-in-two-days-of-violence.

The Telegraph (January 11, 2013). Mali asks for help from France as Islamist rebels push forward. *The Telegraph.* Accessed on April 13, 2018, on https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9794871/Mali-asks-for-help-from-France-as-Islamist-rebels-push-forward.html.

Tran, M. (January 16, 2013). Mali: a guide to the conflict. *The Guardian*. Accessed on December 9, 2017, on https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/16/mali-guide-to-the-conflict.

UNESCO World Heritage List (no date). *Cliff of Banderiaga (Land of the Dogons)*. Accessed on April 6, 2018, on https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/516.

Urquhart, C., Harding, L. & Chrisafis A. (February 2, 2013). François Hollande visits Timbuktu as Mali intervention declared successful. *The Guardian*. Accessed on January 2, 2018, on https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/02/francois-hollande-timbuktu-mali.

Vie Publique (no date). *Conférence de presse conjointe de MM. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, et Amadou Toumani Touré*. Accessed on April 4, 2018, on http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/037000342.html.

Weiss, C. (March 8, 2018). Tuareg militias again clash with Islamic State-loyal militants in northern Mali. *Threat Matrix/Long War Journal*. Accessed on March 20, 2018 on https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/03/tuareg-militias-again-clash-with-islamic-state-loyal-militants-in-northern-mali.php.

Welsh, M.Y. (January 17, 2013). Making sense of Mali's armed groups. *Al Jazeera*. Accessed on January 2, 2018, on http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/01/20131139522812326.html.

United Nations (no date). *Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present.* Accessed on June 1, 2018, on http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html.

United Nations News (September 6, 2017). *Feature: Does drone technology hold promise for the UN?* Accessed on May 7, 2018, on https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564452-feature-does-drone-technology-hold-promise-un.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2016). *Humanitarian Needs Overview Yemen 2017*. Accessed on November 30, 2017, on

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YEMEN%202017%20HNO_Fin

al.pdf.

United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (no date). *Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission*. Accessed on May 1, 2018, on http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/mandate.shtml.

United Nations Security Council (no date). *Current Members*. Accessed on June 1, 2018, on http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/.

United Nations Peacekeeping (no date). *United Nations Peacekeeping.* Accessed between December 2017 and May 2018, on https://peacekeeping.un.org/en.

Zantingh, P. (March 27, 2012). ECOWAS schorst Mali na staatsgreep – 'onmiddellijk macht weer overdragen'. *NRC Handelsblad*. Accessed on April 12, 2018, on https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/03/27/ecowas-schorst-lidmaatschap-mali-na-

staatsgreep-a1446403.

8. Thanks

I really enjoyed working on this thesis, even though it was a very difficult process. I would like to thank dr. Tarusarira for his supervision and comments, Karin for her help during this process and my parents, sisters and brother for their support and coffee breaks. And Chanthal, whose house I could always use when I needed a more inspiring environment.

I finished this thesis with my grandmother in mind, who passed away on June 28, 2018.