

# The Securitization of the Water Sector

COMBINING HYDRO-CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN JORDAN

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## ABSTRACT

Jordan is a country which has been water scarce for decades and has been coping with this environment in different manners. With the influx of Syrian refugees the water demand has risen immensely, which has led to the securitization of the water sector. This research analysed whether such securitization affect the environmental refugees present in Jordan. To explain, the Syrian refugees are regarded as environmental refugees for the purpose of this paper. Since hydro-climatic change and environmental refugees are two phenomenon which will grow in the future, looking at policies on this matter in a country which is already facing these issues can lead to some lessons for the future. The vulnerabilities analysed of the Syrian refugees are those related to the water supply and to religion. By analysing these vulnerabilities, an image has been created which shows how the securitization has had a social and material affect on the refugees. Therefore, this study argues that in general the vulnerabilities are negatively affected by the securitization, since it has led to discrimination and a negative outlook on the Syrian refugees, whilst this did not occur during the other refugee waves entering Jordan. Ultimately, it can be stated that the framing of the water scarcity as a national security issue, due to the influx of the Syrian refugees, might have led to the resentment of the Jordanian public towards the Syrians.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EDP	Environmentally Displaced Persons
HCSP	Host Communities Support Platform
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MWI	Ministry of Water and Irrigation
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VAF	Vulnerability Assessment Framework
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organization

## 1. INTRODUCTION

*“We live with a chronic water problem. And we are now at the edge of moving from a chronic water problem into a water crisis. The element that will trigger this movement is the number of Syrian refugees.”*

– Former Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation Hazim el-Nasser (Whitman, 2013, para.8).

Nearly every day we encounter images and news articles concerning refugees, sunken boats and overcrowded refugee camps. It seems as if migration and forced migration is currently one of the most debated subjects. However, there is still a fixed set of parameters to be fulfilled in order to be treated as a refugee, which is outlined in the 1951 Geneva Convention. These parameters approve the acknowledgement of being a refugee, when a person has become victimized in its country of origin due to race, religion, nationality and/or its political stance (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 1951). Besides the parameters named above, there is also another phenomenon growing and getting more attention than ever before; environmental refugees. With scenarios that in 2050 approximately 200 million people will be forced to migrate due to climatic circumstances, climate change has become crucial in sketching the future prospects of the earth and is often regarded as a threat multiplier (Gemenne, 2011b). As climate change is becoming increasingly important as a topic discussed on the international agenda, it becomes relevant how climate change is affecting our civilization and how the governments are responding to such climatic changes. Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to research whether these policies have an impact on those who already encountered climate change: environmental refugees.

Returning to the notion of climate change as a threat multiplier, it becomes clear that a lot of research has been done regarding this subject. According to some researches, droughts or issues related to water have often not led to violent conflicts. Therefore, it does not seem likely that it will in the future, since there is no empirical evidence that supports this (Kallis and Zografos, 2014). Others have claimed, that this will change since climate change will become more acute and severe compared to the past (Barlow et al., 2014). Contrastingly, it will most probably do have an effect on migration. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014), drought incidence is in the list of the three climate change-related processes which are associated with population displacement and human migration (Smith, 2007). Smith argues that due to this climate-induced migration governments are becoming more willing to use the military as a

tool to manage this form of migration. He even states that there is a partial paradigm shift visible concerning the perception of international migration as it is increasingly viewed as harmful to national security (Smith, 2007). If this is related to climate change, several studies have observed that the countries who already struggle with social, political, economic, ethnic and religious tensions have more issues adapting to climate change. One explanation is that it may lead to further marginalization which can lead to violent conflicts (Behnassi & McGlade, 2017).

Furthermore, climate change itself is in many cases becoming increasingly an inherent part of national security (Kallis and Zografos, 2014). This combination of forced migration due to climate change and the predicted consequences of climate change in the future, makes it more compelling to regard the climate-migration nexus as a national security issue. This notion of regarding climate change as a national security matter can be executed in different manners. The first being for humanitarian reasons in the search for relieve to those affected. Secondly, the execution could manifest itself in the enforcement or regulation of those affected and migrating because of climatic reasons (Smith, 2007). Ultimately, climate change is becoming a threat to national security in different aspects. Therefore, research regarding securitization becomes increasingly relevant, in order to deal with the challenges ahead.

The securitization of climate change has already been studied by many different scholars. Focusing on transboundary waters and the security dynamics it may create (Fischhendler, 2015), internal security impacts of climate change or its relations to conflicts (Thomas, 2017). There are even already some researches which study the combined relationship between climate change, securitization and migration (Weinthal, Zawhiri, & Sowers, 2015). The studies focusing on the securitization of climate change, with or without the combination of migration, however, forget to include the importance of the consequences of these securitization measures taken. Therefore, this study will focus on both the securitization part as well as the consequences related to the securitization perceived. In doing so a significant event has to take place in order to justify or even notice a shift from normal politics to securitization.

Since climate change as such is a very broad concept to study, this research has adopted Jordan as a single-case study design and focuses specifically on hydro-climatic change. Jordan has been chosen as a case-study, since the country has already been coping with water scarcity for many years, but is now facing a water crisis with the influx of Syrian refugees. Therefore, the research question is defined as:

*How does the securitization of hydro-climatic change in Jordan affect the vulnerabilities of the environmental refugees present in Jordan?*

To explain, the research will be studied through the lens of the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, followed by an analysis of the vulnerabilities of the environmental refugees in Jordan. By doing so, this research argues that the securitization of the water sector in Jordan indeed had an affect on the vulnerabilities of the environmental refugees.

The Syrian conflict has created turmoil in a region which has already been prone to conflicts and uprisings for the last decades. Jordan is found in the midst of the Arab Uprising and conflicts in the region, taking in refugees. However, the region and especially Jordan is also known for its natural resource scarcity due to its arid to semi-arid climate (Philander, 2012). To explain, hydro-climatic change can aggravates these situations and make Jordan even more vulnerable to water scarcity (Rumman, Hiyasat, G. Sweis, & R. Sweis 2009). In addition to hydro-climate change, the influx of the Syrian refugees also poses a threat to the already exploited water sector in Jordan and leaves the country with an increasing demand for water, without the actual resources to increase water supply (Francis, 2015).

Besides, the analysis of the water sector in Jordan, this thesis argues that the Syrian refugees are in fact environmental refugees. As explained in the upcoming chapters, it can be argued that one of the many causes of the Syrian civil war is climate change. Without excluding any of the other causes, this thesis will presume the Syrian refugees as environmental refugees, since climate change can be regarded as one of the many other factors which contributed to the outbreak of the Syrian conflict (Gleick, 2014).

In response to the main question, several sub questions are dealt with. By doing so, two relevant subjects will be discussed within the scope of this thesis. First of all, the securitization of the water sector, which will be followed by an analysis of the vulnerabilities related to the securitization of the water sector. Before these analyses are outlined, it needs to be established how susceptible Jordan is to hydro-climatic change. This has to be established before all else, since it will provide a deeper understanding of the securitization of hydro-climatic change in Jordan. This question is followed by the analysis of how and to what extent hydro-climatic change is perceived and securitized by the Jordanian government and public. Moreover, it needs to be established whether this securitization is a response to the increase of environmental refugees.

Finally, this will lead to the questions regarding the vulnerabilities of the environmental refugees in Jordan. To explain, vulnerability itself is a broad concept, which

in the case of Jordan can be best understood within the realm of refugees under the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) based on the following indicators:

1. Basic needs
2. Food security
3. WASH
4. Shelter
5. Health
6. Education

This research does not intend to do a redundant analysis of all these indicators, of which there are many available due to independent researches of humanitarian organizations and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nor does this research have to scope to independently study such a diverse and number of vulnerabilities. Instead this study focuses specifically on the water supply indicator of the WASH sector from the VAF, since this links directly back to the hydro-climatic change in Jordan, its current situation and the securitization of the water sector.

Besides the water supply, the social consequences of the securitization relating to religion, kinship and community relations will be vulnerability indicators. The reason for adding these social indicators as a potential source for vulnerabilities, is because it is often left out of the equation when studying vulnerabilities, due to the impartiality and neutrality principles which are guiding the humanitarian organizations (Eghdamian, 2016).

To answer these questions and create a coherent argument throughout the research the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the theoretical and methodological foundations of the research. To elaborate, the first chapter reviews the current debate regarding climate change and migration, identifies a gap in the current literature and relates this back to the aim of this research. The second chapter will elaborate on the securitization theory and how it will be used in regards to the aim of this thesis. Moreover, the second chapter will also specify the conceptualization of vulnerabilities within the context of this thesis. Chapter three will explain the methodological design for this research along with its limitations.

The second part of the research is the analytic part of the study and starts in chapter four by sketching the current situation in the Middle East and Jordan regarding hydro-climatic change and the prospects for the future. This sketch will entail an overview over past, present and future estimations of hydro-climatic change in the region and in Jordan. This sketch is



important to be able to situate Jordan and the region in the realm of hydro-climatic change. Consequently, chapter five will continue by elaborating on the environmental refugees in Jordan. As mentioned before, the Syrian refugees are regarded as environmental refugees for the purpose of this thesis, therefore, this chapter elaborates on this decision and justifies and explains why the Syrian refugees can be regarded as environmental refugees. Chapter six will then continue with the analysis of the securitization moves and measures taken in Jordan. Subsequently, chapter seven will address the social vulnerabilities of the EDPs due to the securitization and the water-related vulnerabilities, alongside the general public opinion as a consequence of the securitization moves and measures. Finally, the analytic part concludes with a discussion and overall conclusion of the research and reflects upon the findings and will suggest future inquiries.

## 2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: A BACK-AND-FORTH DEBATE

Is there such a thing as climate change? And will this eventually lead to migration? If yes, how are we coping with such migration now and in the future? These questions are one of many related to the subject of climate change and migration. A subject open to debate and many insecurities, due to the predictive manners in which scenarios for the future are differently set out within this debate. From discussing the status of environmental refugees, to the connection between environmental change and migration and the current stance on the preferable action taken in regards to the environmental refugees these subjects have been highly discussed. The topic of environmental refugees is one which focuses on the nature of migration and the scope of it. This research will focus on both, but mostly on the governance of this phenomenon and its effects on climate-induced migration.

### 2.1 THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES

Environmental refugees is a highly discussed concept. Since it has not been incorporated in the 1951 Geneva Convention, refugees who fled across borders due to climate circumstances, do not have a legal status. Therefore, the definition of environmental refugees has been discussed and has been too broad, too narrow, focused on internal and/or international migration and has incorporated other factors or none.

The actual concept was formulated by Essam El-Hinnawi in an United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) publication in 1985 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2017). EL-Hinnawi (1985) defined environmental refugees as “people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of life” (p.4). This definition is very broad and encompasses all kinds of environmental change, which can be climate-induced or human-induced.

As the definition is so broad, it has been criticized by many. Therefore, the mid-1980s can be regarded as the start of the academic and political debate concerning environmental refugees (Castles, 2002). Until the late 1990s, other scholars merely rephrased the definition made by El-Hinnawi, of which Norman Myers is a great example. Myers (1993) defines environmental refugees as “people who can no longer gain secure livelihood in their erstwhile homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental problems” (p.752). This definition is equally broad and both definitions do not specify

between a sudden disruption or years of droughts which eventually led to migration, or take other factors into account like economic, social or political drivers (Gemenne, 2011b).

Most importantly, is that a large part of academics who did research on environmental refugees, agreed that most of the time the refugees relocate within their country and therefore become internally displaced persons (IDP), which suggests that there are in fact not many environmental refugees. Despite this matter there is currently no joint definition of climate-induced migrants, may it be internal or external migration, which consequently leads to unsystematic international or perhaps even national responses (Betts, 2012).

Originally the 1951 Geneva Convention refers to the term refugee as persons who have become victimized in its country of origin due to race, religion, nationality and/or its political stance (UNGA, 1951). Undoubtedly, climate-induced migration does not fall within the definition of refugees under this convention. Moreover, one of the reasons why it will probably not be incorporated in the convention in the future, is due to the alarmist approaches by authors like Norman Myers. With Myers (1997) statements like; “Environmental refugees could become one of the foremost human crises of our times” (p.175), and predictions that potentially 150 million refugees might seek refuge in the countries in the ‘North’ due to climate change, leaves the states restless on the definition of environmental refugees.

If the international community opts to include environmental circumstances as a parameter to be called a refugee, it will entail that they will have the responsibility to protect the potentially 150 million refugees in need. However, if it will not be adopted in the convention, the receiving state will have the option to deflect any responsibility and may treat the people immigrating as economic migrants (Piguet, 2008). This makes it interesting to look at projects like those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), since such institutions are bound to the specific writings within its mandate. So, if there is no internationally agreed definition of what constitutes an environmental refugee, they will not be able to give help to those who have become a victim to climate change (Gill, 2010).

As the terminology of environmental refugees is highly discussed in the literature, as well as by the international community, some have opted for more neutral terminologies, like ecological migrants (Piguet,2008). However in line with the goal of this research, the term environmentally displaced persons (EDPs) will be adopted as the correct term (Zetter, 2017). This term makes an end to the discussion of internal and external migration, since it can be divided into internal EDPs and external EDPs and therefore includes IDPs. Moreover, it is not clear whether environmental refugees solely migrate due to their environmental circumstances, or if other drivers are also decisive. The next paragraph will elaborate more

on the debate concerning the actual circumstances and drivers for migration in an environmentally changing world.

## 2.2 A NON-COHERENT METHODOLOGY WITHIN THE FIELD.

Since the definitions of environmental refugees mentioned in the literature is highly discussed, it is worth researching why it is so highly discussed. As the previous paragraph already showed, is the incentive for the international community not to incorporated environmental refugees into the Geneva Convention, the responsibility which comes with incorporating it. However, why is the concept environmental refugees also highly discussed in the scholar community. This paragraph will further research the different theories in the scholar community concerning climate-induced migration. This will automatically explain the discussion concerning the definition of environmental refugees, since it will show the features each theory links to such migration.

As discussed in the previous section, the different definitions of environmental refugees shows different perspectives within the debate concerning climatic-induced migration; the essentialist and the sceptic perspective (Betts, 2012). The essentialist perspective assumes that migration is a logical consequence of climate change and approaches it through an environmental lens. Examples of essentialists are Myers and El-Hinnawi, who mainly research scenarios on how many people will have to migrate as a consequence of climate change and want to raise awareness (ibid). Most argumentation within these researches seem for a large part deductive, creating a direct link between climate change and migration (Castles, 2001). Moreover, most essentialist researchers adopt a deterministic approach to climate-induced migration, which led others scholars to criticize this approach for lacking empirical evidence and basing their studies too much on a deterministic approach (Gemenne, 2011a).

The sceptic approach, reconsiders the direct causal link between climate change and migration. According to the sceptics, like Richard Black or Stephen Castles, multiple factors are in play which depends on the context and adaptability of the individual. This suggests that the vulnerability and demographic trends should also be taken into consideration, alongside the political, economic and social conditions of the refugees. Logically, it therefore does not assume that climate change is the sole factor for migration, but it acknowledges that it is just one of the factors which is able to explain migration (Methmann, 2014).

Earlier studies mostly focused on the deterministic correlation between climate change and migration. Nowadays, academics have come to a general agreement that climate-induced migration has different root causes, including climate change, and considering other indirect causes like political, economic or social issues (Zetter, 2017). Consequently, it will be difficult to analyse which root causes eventually trigger the decision to migrate (Methmann, 2014). For this reason, most research done on climate-induced migration in the last twenty years has incorporated these works and statistics into their work and therefore, it may be that those researches are vulnerable to methodological defects (Gemenne, 2011b). Due to these different methodologies, different scholars also came to different conclusions concerning the amount and the presence of climate-induced migration. One such difference is the inclusion of different root causes, but also the use of sources. For instance, Myers mainly based his research on the broad projections of population growth, the availability of resources and climate change from organizations like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), whereas Black does his own field work besides incorporating national and local studies (Castles, 2002).

Even though, there is nowadays a general agreement within the scholar community concerning the different root causes for forced migration, there is still a lot of experience and knowledge to gain on this subject. Relatively most researches now focuses on the gains and opportunities for multilateral frameworks and international cooperation on the matter of climate-induced migration. In addition, most researches focus on creating strategies to cope with migration as a whole, however, do not study the way policy-making may effect these migrating issues (Zetter, 2017). Therefore, it seems that there is a scarcity in research of the governance of climate-induced migration within a certain country together with the vulnerabilities of the EDPs. Hence, this research will first research how Jordan copes with climate change and climatic-induced migration and perhaps this may show alternatives or examples on how to deal with these issues internationally or in other countries.

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As the previous chapter reviewed the current debate within the climate-migration-security-nexus and identified some relevant gaps within this debate, this chapter will specify the theoretical lens used in answering the main question of this research. Therefore, the first section will clarify the features of the securitization theory, first starting with the classical securitization theory and afterwards specifying this to the environmental sector. The second section sheds light on the conceptualization of the social and water related vulnerabilities within the context of this thesis, which will be used as a tool to indicate the status of the vulnerabilities of the EDPs post-securitization.

#### 3.1 THE SECURITIZATION THEORY

Classical security complex theory was first coined by Barry Buzan in the book *People, states and fear* in 1983 where it was applied to several regions as case studies, like the Middle East (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998). He argues that international security is a relational matter, especially concerning threats and vulnerabilities (*ibid*). This relational dynamic is already known in the field of security studies within the realist school of thought which mainly focuses on the military capabilities and the balance of power as the foundation of security between states (Dunne, 2013). This school of thought relies on an ontological outlook towards security based on objective material factors, like the amount of armoury acquired with states as its main subject of inquiry (Šulović, 2010).

As the classical security complex theory focuses mainly on the military and the political sector within the subsystem of the state, the new take on the theory, also referred to as the securitization theory includes more sectors and is based on a constructivist approach. Consequently, the levels of analysis can be put in perspectives in relation to a specific sector. Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde have identified five sectors: the military, political, economic, societal and the environmental sector. They argue that each of these sectors have their own set of relationships towards security, which identifies distinct categories of interaction and therefore have different dynamics. This is regarded as widening the scope of previous security studies and the classical security complex theory, since it focuses also on other sectors than merely the military and the political sector and is based on a constructivist perspective (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998).

To explain, the securitization theory defines security as threats which are socially constructed (Šulović, 2010). According to the securitization theory, there has to exist an existential threat, which cannot be resolved by non-politicized means as well as politicized

means. Differently phrased, normal policies will not change the structure and therefore the actors will opt for solutions beyond the rules available. Consequently, the existential threat needs to be framed as one, in order to gain the public support to move beyond these rules (Thomas, 2017). If you would conceptualize securitization, it can provide a framework with three lines of inquiry. The first being related to the framing of a particular issue; conceptual framing. The second line of inquiry relates to the level of urgency in which the particular issue was/is being framed; temporal framing. This type of framing particularly looks at if it is proportional to use emergency measures with the emergence of that particular issue. Finally, the actual measures taken in response to these framings need to be assessed, where actual emergency measures taken and were these measure accepted by the public (Thomas, 2017). Therefore, three types on measures will be analysed: linguistic, structural and institutional measures. Linguistic can be identified as the framing of the situation. Structural measures are those measures taken to physically securitize the water resources present in the country. And institutional mechanisms characterize those institutional measures taken to counter threats (Fischhendler, 2015). For the purpose of this research these lines of inquiry are being analysed within the water sector of Jordan. Therefore, the next section will explain how the environmental sector in accordance with the securitization theory can be best understood within the context of this research. For now, it can be established that the securitization theory identifies security as socially constructed and is in need of an existential threat in order to make the shift from ‘normal’ politics to securitization along the three lines of inquiry.

### 3.2 THE ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR

After discussing the securitization theory on its own, this section specifies it to the climate change-security nexus. Climate change has become increasingly important on the international agenda, since it entails threats to our current civilization. These threats are manifested in different areas of the environmental sector. Therefore, this section outlines the most common threats to our environment and discusses these issues in the light of the securitization theory. This section therefore focusses on the specific framework set out for the environmental sector and relates it back to the aim of this research. Moreover, it also discusses the concept environmental security, in order to understand why the environmental sector can be securitized.

Over the last decades, a lot of research has been done concerning the development of climate change in the world. During these researches a set of issues were established to be the

most threatening to our way of living. Consequently, climate change may be understood as natural or human-induced disasters, droughts, environmental degradation and population induced-ecological stress. In other words it is a decrease in the capacity usage of renewable resources available and equally the slowing down process of the natural renewal of that resource (Smith, 2007).

According to Behnassi, there are four kinds of climate changes which can be a causal link to social destabilization: a decline in food production, an increase in natural disasters, a decrease in water supply and environmentally-induced migration (Behnassi & McGlade, 2017). Contrastingly, Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde have identified three types of climate changes which pose a threat to the environmental security. First, natural disasters are identified as a threat to human civilization, since earthquakes, drought, storms and other types of natural disasters may create fear for a permanent change of the current habitat of the earth. This type of threat is specifically identified as a threat to human civilization. Furthermore, there are those threats to the climate which are human-induced and have a direct impact on our living environment. Examples may be greenhouse gas emissions and environmental exploitation, like dumping and extraction. The final threat also involves human-induced climate changes, however, these do not pose a direct threat to our human existence, like the usage of mineral resources, since it is expected that innovation can fill the gap left in the depletion of these mineral resources (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998).

The second threat can be considered to be the most associated with environmental security, since it displays the direct issue regarding human behaviour and the causal effects on the environment and its self-defeating properties. Subsequently, this way of thinking sets the idea of reversibility forward by adopting different forms of human behaviour (ibid). Interesting is that Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde do not mention climate-induced migration as a security issue relating to the environmental sector. Smith, however, argues that due to this climate-induced migration governments are becoming more willing to use the military as a tool to manage this form of migration. He even states that there is a partial paradigm shift visible concerning the perception of international migration as it is increasingly viewed as harmful to national security (Smith, 2007). Hence it becomes even more interesting to research the actual link between the securitization of the environmental sector and the effects it has on the EDPs.

Most research tries to establish a relationship between environmental change and conflicts and in turn try to establish a sustainable environmental agenda to deal with these environmental issues as a form of environmental security. Therefore, a lot of national security



agendas include subjects related to environmental concerns (Floyd, 2008). The main argument for this inclusion can be traced back to the concern that if these environmental issues are not included it will ultimately lead to conflicts (Fischhendler, 2015). These developments show that there are indeed incentives to include environmental issues as a security concern. This does not entail that the environmental sector should be securitized, however, it shows that there have been some attempts to securitize it (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998).

Besides the debates concerning climate-induced migration, environmental security as a concept is also discussed within the literature and relevant to the aim of this research. Since there is a consensus within the debate concerning environmental security over the fact that humans are both determined by the environmental condition and also construct the environmental conditions (Buzan, et al., 1998). In other words, we as the civilization living on this planet can be hold accountable for a part of the environmental conditions of the earth, which is currently eroding. This may also be defined as human-induced climate change (Gries, Redlin, & Ugarte, 2018).

The main issue is that often these environmental issues are dealt with in another policy area, like economic policies. Therefore, this research will specifically focus on the environmental sector and discusses this through the lens of the securitization theory. This theory created by Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde (1998) defines environmental security as: “If we define environmental security in terms of sustaining ecosystems that are necessary for the preservation of achieved levels of civilization, it follows that when and where this security fails, the conflicts will be over threats to these levels of civilization—that is, threats to nonenvironmental existential values. The environment, modified by human interference, sets the conditions for socio-political-economic life. When these conditions are poor, life is poor.” (p. 84).

When looking at the actors in the environmental sector, the most identified actors are functional actors. These actors are mostly economic actors, who directly affect the environment due to their activities, however, these actors generally have no aim to politicize or securitize these affects (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998). Contrastingly, there are two sets of agenda’s which do focus on the securitization of the environmental sector and are not profit driven: the scientific and the political agenda. To explain, the scientific agenda is driven by the scholarly community and academic standards, with the aim to inform the people and governments on their findings and give recommendations on how to deal with these findings. The political agenda, is mainly driven by public decision making and public policies on environmental issues. Therefore, the political agenda can be understood as intrinsically

consistent of government and intergovernmental institutions (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998).

In addition, the decision making process on climate change, has to deal with lower levels of uncertainty in comparison to other sectors, like the economic or military sector. This can be explained by the scientific evidence and thus the scientific agenda (Behnassi & McGlade, 2017). However, for the purpose of this research, the political actors and agenda are the most interesting to study in the light of securitization in relation to the vulnerabilities of the EDPs. Therefore, governmental policies and/or actions taken in Jordan in regards to the environmental sector will be analysed with a securitizing lens.

### 3.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF VULNERABILITY

As the previous section has highlighted the securitization theory, which is used as a lens to analyse the securitizing or political actions taken in regards to climate change in Jordan. This section will subsequently focus on the vulnerability as a set of indicators in order to analyse the effect of the securitization. This section explains how vulnerability is understood within the context of this thesis and categorizes it in social and water-supply vulnerabilities.

The aim of this study is to analyse how securitization is affecting the vulnerability of EDPs. To explain, vulnerability may be understood in different manners, however, for the purpose and the scope of this research it specifically focuses on the social and water-supply related vulnerabilities of the EDPs. More specifically, the analysis focuses on whether the securitization moves and measures have had an impact on these vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability is a concept which can be defined in many ways. Humanitarian organizations often define it as used by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (n.d.): “ the diminished capacity of an individual or group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard.” ( para. 1).

This definition is dynamic and therefore can be associated with different indicators, however, there is a main focus on the material and the physical vulnerabilities and needs of refugees, but ignores the social needs (Eghdamian, 2016). The reason why these social indicators are also important in this research, constitute from the fact that the discourse of the water sector is being analysed alongside the securitization theory as a consequence of the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan. Hence, it is not only interesting to research the material and

physical vulnerabilities for the Syrian refugees as a consequence of the securitization, however, also whether this securitization had an impact on the social vulnerabilities of the Syrian refugees as a result of the framings of the situation.

These social vulnerabilities will specifically focus on whether there are any consequences regarding the securitization measures taken, and will also analyse whether there are any difference amongst these vulnerabilities due to religious, kinship and community relations. This is relevant, since religion is most often just analysed as being the main cause for the eruption of conflict and forced migration, but almost never seems to have a place in humanitarianism centred research (Eghdamian, 2016). Moreover, there appears to be almost no knowledge on religious experiences, therefore, the inclusion of these vulnerabilities creates a more substantial analysis of the social conditions of the refugees, than merely focussing on their water needs.

The measured vulnerabilities relating to water, are based on the VAF which has been developed for Jordan. As mentioned before this framework focuses on different sectors:

1. Basic needs
2. Food security
3. WASH
4. Shelter
5. Health
6. Education

Although all these sectors are important in establishing the vulnerability of a refugee, alongside the social vulnerabilities as mentioned before, the scope of this research does not allow a substantial in depth analysis of all these vulnerabilities. Moreover, the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector specifically aligns with the focus of this research: the water sector. Therefore, water supply as an inherent part of the WASH sector is analysed. To explain, water supply is specifically interesting to study, since it is worth analysing the consequences of the securitization measures for the Syrian EDPs. Ultimately, the vulnerabilities can create a deeper understanding on how securitizing and framing of an existential threat can affect the EDPs.

## 4. METHODOLOGY

The aim of this thesis is to analyse whether state policies related to hydro-climate change have an effect on the vulnerabilities of the EDPs in Jordan. According to the securitization theory, security can be viewed as a socially constructed threat by the usage of speech acts (Munster, 2014). Therefore, this study will adopt a single case study design that focuses on qualitative methods and provides some additional information through secondary quantitative sources. This section provides an overview regarding the methodological design. It explicitly specifies the operationalization of the securitization theory, the selected case study, the data selection methods and the limitations of the chosen research design.

### 4.1 CASE STUDY SELECTION AND THE OPERALIZATION OF THE SECURITIZATION THEORY

This research relies on the securitization theory as discussed in the theoretical framework. It provides a tool to analyse the central issues in these countries through the lens of securitization. As mentioned before, securitization is seen as a constructed threat through discourse (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998). Jordan has been chosen as a case study in this thesis, since it already deals with hydro-climatic change in the Middle East. Therefore, it is already experiencing droughts and limited water resources, even before the influx of the Syrian EDPs (Rajsekhar, 2017). Jordan seemed the right choice for a single-case study, since the influx of the Syrian refugees have put an enormous strain on the countries already scarce water resources. Therefore, this case study is interesting since it can provide insights into similar situations which can present itself in the future.

Since the goal of this thesis is to establish how the securitization is affecting the vulnerability of the EDPs in Jordan, it is first necessary to establish what is securitized. Therefore, the water discourse will be analysed in order to establish whether these framings of the water sector in Jordan have an effect on the vulnerabilities of the EDPs. The timeframe of the research will start at the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Even though Syria is not a case study in this particular research, it has created a turmoil period for the region due to the high amounts of refugees. Therefore, it is especially interesting to see how such a refugee burden in the case of Jordan can affect the discourse of the water sector.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, this timeframe seems the most interesting to start the study on the securitization of the water sector in relation to the vulnerabilities of the EDPs.

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<sup>1</sup> The Syrian refugees or the Syrian civil war will not be discussed by itself, it is merely observed as an event in time, which creates a specific time frame for this study.

To explain, the discourse analysed in this research is the one of the Jordanian water sector. To conduct the discourse analysis, governmental policy documents related to the water sector in Jordan will be analysed. Three examples of the documents mostly used for the discourse analysis are:

- Water for Life: Jordan's Water Strategy 2008-2022 by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation
- National Water Strategy 2016-2025 by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation
- Jordan Response plan for the Syria Crisis 2015 by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.

These documents are mentioned here, since these documents emphasize the specific changes made in the National Water Strategy as the first document (Water for Life) was written before the influx of the Syrian refugees and the second one (National Water Strategy) during the Syrian refugee crisis. Hence, it will constitute a good comparison in order to analyse whether securitization is taking place and how. Therefore, it will also focus on the second threat identified by Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde as being the most associated with environmental security. Moreover, according to the IPCC, drought incidence is in the list of the three climate change- related processes which are associated with population displacement and human migration (Smith, 2007). The next section further elaborates on the case study selection and the data analysis methods.

#### 4.2 DATA SELECTION AND METHODS

This research relies on a mixed method design which aligns with the exploratory sequential design, focusing on qualitative data and using quantitative methods as additional information. As explained before, this research consist out of the single-case study Jordan which is studied through the lens of the securitization theory. By doing so, discourse analysis and document analysis have been used.

Discourse analysis is the main tool in examining the securitization of the environmental sector. Hence, this research will also opt for a discourse analysis along the three lines of inquiries as discussed in chapter three. Discourse analysis is used to research the securitization in the case study. The analysis has been done with the use of Atlas.ti, in order to save time in the coding and sorting of the data available. The main focus for analysis

is on the governmental policies regarding the water sector. Examples of the some of the documents used are the government policy document named in the previous section.

Discourse analysis has been chosen since it has the ability to compare attitudes or framings before and after a certain event took place, in this case the influx of many Syrian EDPs. Document analysis on its own could have provided the necessary insight to securitization of the water sector in Jordan. However, in order to accurately analyse framings and specifically linguistic framings, discourse analysis is necessary within the context of the securitization theory.

Document analysis, however, has been used throughout the research by making use of the many policy briefs, updates and researches conducted by the humanitarian organizations or international organizations present in the region and Jordan. Examples of such organizations are UNHCR, CARE, MercyCorps and IPCC. This provides a deeper understanding of the changing environment in Jordan, since the report mainly focus on the situation of the refugee crisis in Jordan.

Moreover, there has also been made use of secondary interviews, since primary interviews were due to circumstances no longer a viable option. Therefore, an interview by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has been used to provide additional information into the social vulnerabilities of the Syrian EDPs in regards to religion. This interview has been executed by interviewing 40 Syrian refugees within an individual and a group setting. The relevant aim of the interviews were to establish their perception of their religious free and human rights condition as a refugee opposed to their time as a Syrian citizen. The interviewees are refugees from the refugee camps as well as from the host communities (USCIRF, 2013).

In addition to qualitative methods, there has been made use of quantitative methods in several instances to provide additional information in the form of secondary quantitative sources. Since, this research did not allow the time to produce primary data, like questionnaires or surveys within Jordan, there has been made use of secondary sources, like a survey and statistical data available. This survey from the International Republican Institute (IRI) took place among a 1,000 Jordanian citizens which were questioned each year from 2015 until 2017 and focused on the public opinion of the Jordanian citizens on their outlook on the prospects of Jordan.

So to conclude, the research design is a single-case study based on qualitative research which has been substantiated with a view secondary quantitative sources. Overall, the securitization of the water sector in Jordan is analysed by the usage of discourse analysis,

which is supplemented by document analysis and the usage of secondary interviews and surveys.

#### 4.3 LIMITATIONS

Every research design experiences certain limitations in the analysis of the main question. Since this research focuses on a single case study, it is a possibility that the outcome of the analysis is mainly applicable to Jordan and cannot be regarded as a general example of those in a similar situation. Preferably, this research should have been a case comparison between two countries situated in the same climatic conditions and experiencing high amounts of migration. However, due to the scope and time for this research only one case study was feasible.

Ultimately, the single case study has led to a more extensive analysis of Jordan and can provide a better understanding of the situation in Jordan and hence give future inquiries. However, this will probably lead to a more general answer to the research question, without taking different situations, policies etcetera into account. Unfortunately, a larger scope is not possible within the timeframe of this research, but is interesting to test in future research.

In addition to the single case study, is discourse analysis also prone for interpretation flaws during the data analysis. Discourse analysis can create a misleading representation if interpreted incorrectly. Moreover, the secondary data used is also prone to interpretation flaws, since there has been no influence on the impartiality of these interviews or the amount and kind of participants. Therefore, it may create a different, general view than the actual situation. Fortunately, this secondary data is used as additional information to support other sources.

Even though there are some limitations to the current research design, it was the most feasible and reliable method to use within the scope and timeframe of this research. Moreover, these limitations also provide an opportunity to do more research on this area of study and will be dealt with in the future inquiries in the final chapter.

## 5. HYDRO-CLIMATIC CHANGE IN THE MIDDLES EAST: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

In a region, which is known for its deserts, droughts and low precipitation numbers, it is most interesting to research the climatic circumstances. This chapter will therefore outline how hydro-climatic change is manifesting itself in the Middle East and specifically in Jordan. Therefore, the first section will delve into the specifics of hydro-climatic change in the region. Whereas the second section will specify these hydro-climatic changes to Jordan. Both sections will deal with the past, present and future hydro-climatic change. For the aim of this thesis it is necessary to first establish the hydro-climatic change in the region and in Jordan, before specifically analysing the securitization of the water sector in Jordan. Since it cannot be argued whether the water sector is indeed changing due to hydro-climatic change combined with other factors, without having the background information of the hydro-climate in Jordan.

As mentioned before, hydro-climatic change is understood as all water-related climatic changes. To explain, in the Middle East this will mostly entail droughts in relation to precipitation numbers and in some cases even sea-level rise (Smith, 2007). The region has diverse characteristics within its environment, like the Taurus and Zagros mountains which provide water through the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the Dead sea with its sinkholes, alongside the many deserts in the region (Lelieveld et al., 2012). Even though the region is already known for its droughts, there is an expectation that the Middle East will be strained with an approximate temperature rise of 8 degrees Celsius by the end of this summer. More importantly, from 1961-1990 there has already been identified an increase of 0.2 degrees Celsius per decade, which is expected to increase at a faster rate (Waha et al., 2017). Many different studies have been done regarding droughts scenarios in the Middle East, and across these studies an definite increase in extreme drought conditions within the region has been established (ibid). According to the IPCC, temperature rise is increasingly more apparent in the last couple of decades (IPCC, 2014b). A National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) study even suggests that a drought in 1998 in the Middle East, especially in the western part of the Middle East, has been the most devastating drought in the past nine centuries (Gray, 2016). NASA also identified different root causes for the drought occurrence and concludes that the droughts indeed intensified due to human-induced global warming. Therefore, this study will assume that the drought conditions in the Middle East are already more present than in the past, and will only continue to increase in the future.

Besides the increase in temperature, is the number of precipitation is important in determining if there is hydro-climatic change. Precipitation numbers differ within the region,



with more than 60 cm of precipitation on the Mediterranean coast and mountains, and more than 180 cm nearby the southern coast of the Middle East (Barlow, 2015). In general, the region is water scarce with 300 mm rainfall or less each year. The areas along the coast and in the mountains encompass the most productive areas in the region for agriculture dependent on rainfall, due to the water sources available there (Waha et al., 2017). Notwithstanding, it is expected that in the future the region will receive a lower number of annual precipitation, with numbers ranging from a decline in precipitation by 5-25 percent in 2040-2069 and even up to 30 percent between 2070-2099 in comparison to the precipitation numbers between 1961-1990 (Lelieveld et al., 2012). Jordan is among other countries of which this decline in precipitation is expected to be especially large and greater than 15 percent (ibid).

To conclude, the Middle East is a region which is prone to extreme droughts, deals with water stress and low numbers of precipitation. Now that the past, current and the future prospects of the hydro-climate in the Middle East has been discusses, the next section will specifically relate this to Jordan.

#### 5.1 HYDRO-CLIMATIC CHANGE IN JORDAN AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE COUNTRY.

Now that it can be established that hydro-climatic change is indeed happening in the Middle East, this section will specifically focus on the manners in which this hydro-climatic change is presenting itself in Jordan. Moreover, this can tell us whether hydro-climatic change is indeed happening in Jordan and to what extent.

The climate of Jordan can mainly be identified as predominantly Mediterranean and can be categorized into three different climate regions (arid to semiarid) within the country: the Jordan Valley, the Highlands and the Badia and Desert region (Philander, 2012). The country can also be defined as one of the driest in the entire world and hence has one of the scarcest water resources in comparison to other countries. Therefore, Jordan heavily relies on precipitation, since it provides the country replenishments to several water resource systems (Rumman et al., 2009). The precipitation period in Jordan can be characterised by starting in October and ending in May. The highest amount (75%) of rainfall is taking place from December to March (“Climate Change Adaptation,” n.d.). As Jordan is highly dependent on precipitation systematic changes in the precipitation numbers, it may have enormous effects on the country (Rumman et al., 2009). With an expected decline in precipitation numbers in the region, Jordan is among other countries of which this decline in precipitation is expected to be especially large and greater than 15 percent in the future (Lelieveld et al.,

2012). Besides being dependent on precipitation, Jordan has also been depended on the freshwater supply from the transboundary Yarmouk-Jordan River, which is shared with Syria and Israel. Consequently, Jordan is affected by water development projects which are unilaterally introduced by Syria in the Upper Yarmouk basin, alongside similar projects by Israel. As a result, Syria and Israel have been possessing large parts of the head water of the Yarmouk-Jordan River (Rajsekhar & Gorelick, 2017). Even though this does not relate back to hydro-climate change, it is worth mentioning, since the decrease in precipitation makes the dependency on the river greater. Since the water resources are already far below the water poverty line according to WHO of 1000 m<sup>3</sup> per capita per year, the low water supply due to precipitation and the access to the Yarmouk-Jordan River is only going to decrease these water resources in the future (“Climate Change Adaptation,” n.d.). It is estimated that the country is now depending for 54 percent on groundwater supply and for 37 percent on surface water supply. The surface water in Jordan was expected to increase from 295 cu. M in 2007 to 365 cu. M in 2022, however, due to the hydro-climatic changes in precipitation and temperatures, these numbers cannot be upheld and will decline (Philander, 2012).

Besides the precipitation numbers, there is also an expectation of increasing temperatures, as seen in the regional expectations in the previous section. Some trends have already become apparent in Jordan, with a maximum temperature increase ranging from 0.3 and 1.8 degrees Celsius and a minimum temperature increase ranging from 0.4 and 2.8 degrees Celsius (Philander, 2012).

Having these numbers in mind, the consequences which have been discussed in several studies are worth mentioning. For instance, there is an expectation of increases in water-related illnesses, like cholera or trachoma, which may worsen when the water scarcity increases due to climate change and related events (Waha et al., 2015). In addition, is the population growth on its own, next to the intake of more than 1.3 million refugees not beneficial for a country which is already water scarce (Rajsekhar & Gorelick, 2017). As a consequence, the extraction of groundwater cannot sustain the population at this point and this has become a problem for the country (Philander, 2012). Besides the population growth, the dependency on the agricultural sector is also a vulnerability for the country, as the production is highly dependent on the precipitation. Right now the supply and demand ratio exceed 100 percent which leads to groundwater resource depletion. Consequently, Jordan is already not able to produce all the food domestically and has to import food (Waha et al., 2015). This problem will only intensify with the expected climatic changes in Jordan.

Being one of the driest countries in the world, with a drier prospect of the future, it is expected that Jordan will not be able to take care of the water needs of its growing population. Moreover, only with a clear understanding of the current environmental state of these countries, can a coherent and clear analysis be done regarding the securitization of the water sector and the affects it has on the EDPs within these countries.

## 6. THE HYDRO-MIGRATION NEXUS IN JORDAN

*“It’s now believed that drought and crop failures and high food prices helped fuel the early unrest in Syria, which descended into civil war in the heart of the Middle East.”*

- Former President Barack Obama (The White House, 2015, para. 29).

Jordan is known as a country which has taken in many refugees in the course of its history. Many Palestinians fled to Jordan in 1948 when Israel became an official state, as well as Iraqis during the War on Terror. However, in recent events a large amount of Syrian refugees have entered Jordan. Even though many state that the Syrian civil war not started because of climate change, this chapter will argue that one of the root causes of the conflict is indeed hydro-climatic change according to the sceptic approach as discussed in the first part of this research.

There is no doubt that the Syrian conflict is rooted in many different issues that the country was and is facing, with diversity in religion, economic, social and political differences amongst these issues. However, climate change is often disregarded as one of the main catalyst of the conflict. For the purpose of the main question of this research, this section argues that the Syrian conflict has also erupted as a consequence of climate change, alongside other manifested issues. Therefore, this chapter will elaborate on the Syrian conflict and the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan as being an event which was amongst others triggered by climate change. Hence the Syrian refugees in Jordan will be regarded as EDPs.

In the Middle East migration for the purpose of searching for water and food has been a historically traditional lifestyle in the form of pastoral nomadism. Nowadays, internal as well as external migration has become a tool to create a higher livelihood security and is often still a response to climate circumstance as well as a decrease in social, economic or political security (Waha et al., 2015). Before the Syrian conflict begun the country had experienced several droughts, which most often only endured one or two seasons. To specify, from 1900 until 2005, six serious droughts took place in Syria. During these droughts, the agricultural sector could rely on the government for their subsidies and alternative water resources (Mohtadi, 2012). Even though droughts are very common in Syria with its arid to semi-arid climate, Syria encountered a humanitarian crisis in 2007-2008, which led to large-scale

migration (De Châtel, 2014). With only 30% of the average precipitation in 2008, it can be regarded as the worst drought in 40 years (Erian, Katlan & Babah, (2010). Syria is a country which is characterized with droughts. Normally droughts would last approximately up to one season, however in 2006 a droughts lasted up to two seasons, which was succeeded by a drought which lasted up to 4 years (ibid). Due to this drought, over one million were affected and were dealing with massive food insecurities (Erian et al., 2010). In a country which for the most part relies on its agricultural sector, such a drought has massive implications for its population, resulting in coping mechanisms such as a reduction of food intake and migration (Erian et al., 2010). Families who based their living on agriculture were forced to migrate to the cities to search for alternative jobs, since the drought this time lasted longer than 2 years and therefore increased their unproductiveness due to failed crops (Erian et al., 2010).

Before the Syrian conflict took place, the region was already affected by the so-called 'Arab Spring'. The Arab spring can be defined as a series of upheavals in the region, searching for political reform (Robins and Fergusson, 2014). The Syrian conflict was triggered by a series of social, economic and political factors. These factors include government decisions which increased poverty in Syria (De Châtel, 2014). Many argue that climate change itself was not amongst those triggers that led to the breakout of the Syrian conflict, but was a preceding of already present governance failures relating to Syria's natural resources (De Châtel, 2014). If so, these policy failures were enlarged in the public eye due to climate change. However, there is no doubt that water and conflict can exacerbate one another (Gleick, 2014).

In the case of Syria, there has already been a depletion of natural resources since the early 1970s, due to a governmental decision for agricultural self-sufficiency, without the consideration of the amount of available water resources (Wendle, 2016). Syria is indeed one of the most water scarce countries, together with Jordan, with annual precipitation numbers at less than 250 mm (Gleick, 2014). Besides the water scarcity population growth also plays a role in the divide of these resources. Since the Syrian population has also grown from 3 million in 1950 to 22 million in 2012 this has also put a strain on the allocation of the available water resources (Gleick, 2014).

Since all of these factors are intertwined and influence each other, it is difficult to establish a hierarchy among them and identify certain elements as the definite trigger to the Syrian conflict (De Châtel, 2014). This does not mean that climate change needs to be excluded from the factors, however, it does not need to be over exemplified in relation to the other issues at hand.

Eventually, many Syrians sought refuge in neighbouring countries, due to the Syrian conflict. Jordan is one of those countries. The Syrian refugees present in Jordan are classified as EDPs, since there cannot be made an explicit distinction between the motivations of the refugees to seek refuge in Jordan. However, as explained above, this thesis regards climate change as one of the root causes of the Syrian conflict and therefore regenerates this back in the Syrian refugees. This being said, the argument made in this chapter is in no manner claiming that climate change was the sole and only trigger for the Syrians to flee their country. On the contrary, it is widely recognized that many issues were at play during the outburst of the Syrian conflict. However, for the purpose of this thesis and the lack of keeping track of EDPs in the literature, due to the non-acceptance of the term in any legal form, it seemed the most feasible to enlarge the climate variable in this case. Moreover, in the literature review it has already been explained that environmental migration is never solely caused by climate change, but most often also entails social, economic and political issues (Methmann, 2014).




Figure 1: Percentage of total Syrian refugees present in Jordanian Refugee camps.(UNHCR, 2017.)

Identifiably, 2.9 million displaced migrants were living in Jordan in 2015, and constitute approximately 38% of its total population (Connor, 2016). Registered Syrians constitute approximately 22% of these displaced migrants, which can be translated to approximately 628,000 people (Connor, 2016). In 2017 this number increased to 649,000 of which only 54,000 were registered with UNHCR in 2016 and merely 21% is living in the three main refugee camps in Jordan (UNHCR, 2017). See figure 1 to see how these refugees are distributed amongst the refugee camps.

The other refugees are living outside the refugee camps and thus living amongst the Jordanian population. These Syrian refugees are the highest concentrated in the most vulnerable communities in Jordan which stresses the available capacities of these host-communities (Francis, 2015).

### Syrian Refugees in Jordan - Governorate Level

Syrian Refugees in Jordan (Total Population) as of 31 December 2016




Figure 2: distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan (UNHCR, 2017)

So, now that it is established that the Syrian refugees are regarded as EDPs for the purpose of this research, alongside the amount and distribution of the Syrian refugees in Jordan, the next chapter can start with the analysis of the securitization in Jordan. The establishment of the presence of the Syrian EDPs was necessary in order to lay the basis for the analysis of the vulnerabilities of these EDPs, as well as providing some background into the framing of the Jordanian government in regards to the Syrian EDPs. The following chapters will provide a deeper understanding of the securitization in Jordan and the consequences it has had on the Syrian EDPs.

## 7. THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER IN JORDAN

Securitization is based on the notion that it goes beyond the normal politics and justifies the measures taken (Buzan et al., 1998). This section will outline the securitization efforts of the Jordanian government as a consequence of the massive influx of Syrian EDPs into the country. This has resulted in ever increasing water scarcity, which has already been on the policy agenda for years, due to hydro-climatic change and its prospects for the future. The chapter is divided into several sections focussing on different elements related to the securitization of water in Jordan.

For the discourse analysis of the water sector in Jordan, several policy documents have been used. First of all the policy document “Water for Life: Jordan’s water strategy 2008-2022” has been analysed in comparison to the “National water strategy 2016-2025”. These documents have been carefully chosen, since the first has been written before the influx of the Syrian EDPs whereas the second has been written while the Syrian conflict was taking place and there were already many Syrian EDPs present in Jordan. Both documents justify the need for a water strategy in a different manner. This chapter will specifically focus on these two policy documents, however, it will also include other policy documents of the Jordanian government related to the water sector or the refugee crisis to create a more thorough analysis.

The linkage of water scarcity to national security issues is often done with the aim to create public awareness and a sense of urgency in order to fast forward any desired policy outcomes (Fischhendler, 2015). And if the securitization of the water sector is linked to issues which will directly affect the population, like poverty, health and security, it will be easier to tackle climate change through policy efforts (Hale, 2010). Therefore, it is worth analysing the linguistic measures taken by the Jordanian government in the water sector, since it can show how the government has changed the framing of the emergency level in the water sector (Balzacq, 2005). Besides the linguistic measures, it needs to be analysed whether the Jordanian government took any structural and institutional measures. In order to research these measures, according to the securitization theory, the first section will start by analysing the securitizing moves in Jordan relating to the water sector. In addition, will the second section focus on how the moves have been executed in terms of structural and institutional measures. The linguistics measures are dealt with throughout the chapter, in order to truly analyse how the situation is portrayed and framed.



## 7.1 A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The aim of this section is to do an analysis of the water discourse in Jordan, in order to research whether the water sector has been securitized. In doing so, it is important to see whether there has been a shift in the perceptions of the water sector in Jordan after the massive influx of the Syrian EDPs, as discussed before. Therefore, this particular section focuses on the manifestations of the water sector as a national security issue and if this can be related to the influx of the Syrian EDPs or whether this has been framed as a national security issue before the influx of the Syrian, due to the water scarcity which has already been present in Jordan for the last couple of decades.

Looking at the Jordanian national water strategy from before the Syrian conflict, it is noticeable that it indeed highlights the water scarcity in the country with examples made by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) (2009) like: *“The water scarcity in Jordan poses a serious challenge that will affect all sectors if not addressed with serious efforts.”* (foreword). One might say that this can already be regarded as a securitizing move, since it describes the scarcity of water in Jordan as a threat to the Jordanian society. However, comparing this to the adapted national water strategy which has been written after and during the influx of the Syrian refugees, a clear shift is visible in describing the issue. An example here is the tone and words used to describe the water scarcity issue in Jordan of MWI (2015): *“Water scarcity poses a serious challenge that affects the wellbeing, security and economic future of all Jordanians.”* (p. 1). Both sentences start with the statement that the water scarcity poses a serious challenge, however, in the revised document there is a clear shift visible in how this challenge is expressed.

The first quotation is merely stating that this will affect the Jordanians, whereas the water scarcity is linked to security and the wellbeing of all Jordanians in the revised document. As said before, it is eventually easier to make policy changes if the water sector is linked to issues related to for instance health and security (Hale, 2010). Since, these quotations give a specific example of the shift in the framing of the water sector, it can be regarded as a securitizing move, according to the securitization theory. The discourse has now presented itself with an existential threat: water scarcity (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998).

Beside the differences in language between these two sentences, it is worth noticing that in the first national water strategy the terms security and crisis have not been used once (Ministry of Water and Irrigation [MWI], 2009), whereas in the revised version these terms are used in 21 different sentences (MWI, 2015). The next quotation by MWI (2009) can be

regarded as such an example where the water scarcity is directly linked to national security: *“Linking water scarcity with water security - and perhaps national security, puts a heavy responsibility for all custodians of water in the Kingdom”* (foreword). Hence, there is no specific need to analyse all these different incidences, since this is clear evidence that there at least has been a shift in the terminology used to describe the water scarcity issues in Jordan. As mentioned before, this shift in terminology can be regarded as a securitizing move (Buzan et al., 1998). The next section will elaborate on how the government has justified this securitizing move.

## 7.2 THE REASON TO SECURITIZE

Since it has been established that the Jordanian government has indeed made securitizing moves in the water sector, due to the influx of the Syrian refugees. This section specifically focuses on ‘why’ the government chose to make such securitizing moves. In order to do so, several documents are analysed to make sense of the securitizing move and the motivations behind this in order to legitimize the measures taken. Moreover, it will specifically focus on how it is justified to the Jordanian citizens.

In analysing the documents several findings appeared. First of all the rhetoric towards the Syrian refugees differed immensely, meaning that the amount of linkage between the increase in water scarcity in Jordan was in some documents increasingly more highlighted as a consequence of the influx of the Syrian EDPs compared to other documents. These differences can be attributed to the differences made between the refugees currently present in Jordan and the Syrian EDPs.

Jordan has a history of taking in refugee populations, like the Palestinian refugees after the creation of the Israeli state in 1948 and Iraqi refugees (De Bel-air, 2016). So, if Jordans society has a history of taking in refugees, one might suspect a tolerance toward the current influx of Syrian EDPs. Without stating that such tolerance does not exist, the rhetoric towards taking in new refugees has shifted and has also drawn more attention to the already present refugees which were present from before the Syrian conflict. Examples of such rhetoric by MWI (2015) may be: *“The Water sector in Jordan is characterized by severe water scarcity, increasing demand due to high population growth, hosting several fluxes of refugees and economic development needs. Jordan’s renewable water resources are limited and insufficient to meet national demand”*(p. 8).

As is shown in this quotation, the emphasis does not lie on the new influx of Syrian refugees, however, broadens it to encompass all the influxes of refugees in Jordan which MWI (2015) even links back to the influx of Palestinians since 1948: *“Earlier influxes of Palestinians and Iraqis and the rapidly growing Syrian refugee population have placed additional strains on Jordan’s limited water supply”* (p. 10).

More importantly, these quotations show that the government is framing the cause of the water scarcity in Jordan, as something which has among others been caused by the influxes of refugees. However, since these earlier influxes of refugees were already present while the document “Water for Life: Jordan’s water strategy 2008-2022” was written, it is interesting to point out that refugees as such were not mentioned in this document as the cause of the water scarcity facing Jordan (MWI 2009). The document (MWI, 2009) does make a reference to the possible consequences when the population will increase: *“Any unexpected population growth due to regional instability, as was the case during the past decades, would increase water demand and impact the plans to reach a balanced demand and supply.”* (p.9). This remark, can however not be compared to the situation framed by MWI (2015) in the revised National Water Strategy: *“The situation is further exacerbated by the influx of refugees from neighbouring countries. With a population that is expected to double by 2050, there is a dire need to increase water availability.”*(p. 8).

As it has become clear that the influx of refugees is indeed being framed as one of the main causes of the increasing water scarcity, there are also several examples which specifically focus on the Syrian EDPs and some which do not mention the EDPs in any manner. Interestingly, there are several Jordanian policy documents available that start with the changing environment Jordan has faced due to the influx of Syrian refugees. However, in the modification and adaption of the national water strategy, the Syrian refugees are nowhere to be found in the foreword of the Minister of Water and Irrigation. Instead the minister and therefore MWI (2015) focus all their attention on the Jordanians with statements like: *“the need and opportunity to prepare for a water-secure future for all Jordanians”, “ impact on the health and economic well-being of all Jordanians. ”* (Foreword). This implies that this national water strategy will only apply to the Jordanians and not to the approximately 650,000 Syrians present in Jordan.

However, looking at for instance the foreword written by the Minister of Environment for a policy document written by Switchmed the tone used with regards to the Syrian refugees is much harsher than in the “National water strategy 2016-2025”.

*“Jordan currently faces many challenges, with the Syrian conflict being the most urgent and demanding one. The ever increasing number of Syrian refugees entering Jordan and blending in to its social fabric has caused tremendous burdens on infrastructure and resulted in exploiting of our already scarce natural resources. Moreover, the influx of refugees is having a negative impact on national sustainable development plans and programmes which in turn is being reflected negatively on the performance of the economy and people livelihoods.”* (Foreword, Ministry of Environment )

In line with the framing of the issue in this documents, there are several other examples where issues relating to water are being framed as a consequence of the influx of Syrian EDPs, especially in the media. Resulting in article titles like this example written by Nahhas (2017), *“Jordan’s water shortage made worse by refugee crisis”*. (title). This is merely an example of all the news articles that are circulating through Jordan since the influx of the Syrian EDPs. This framing and blaming the Syrian EDPs in Jordan for Jordan’s current water scarcity, alongside the securitizing moves in the water sector, can only be regarded as securitization when the Jordanian public accepts the emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998 ). In other words the Jordanian public needs to give their consent in some manner to these securitizing moves, in order for it to be true securitization. According to the securitization theory, this consent has to be created by justifying the emergency measures taken and explain why these steps are needed to safeguard the security of the Jordanians (ibid). Therefore, extreme measures taken have to be analysed in order to see whether securitization is indeed taking place or just the securitizing move.

### 7.3 MEASURES TAKEN

Looking at the securitizing moves, it has become obvious that the water sector has become a matter of national security since the influx of Syrian refugees has strained the resources available in Jordan which has been framed in this manner by the usage of linguistic measures. However, which extraordinary measures have been put into place in order to battle the issues at hand.

Looking at the same documents as before, several things became clear. Most often securitization policies concern measures over transboundary waters, since these allocations and inter-state negotiations are often regarded as a national security issue over resources (Fischhendler, 2015). However, in the case of Jordan this is one of its least concerns, which

has become clear in the previous sections. Hence the securitizing measures are focused internally in order to ‘survive’, since the problem is also framed as an internal problem, created by indirectly related issues: the influx of the Syrian EDPs.

As described earlier emergency measures can be identified through three mechanisms: structural, institutional and linguistic (Fischhendler, 2015). The linguistic measures have been analysed by framing water scarcity as a national security matter, as well as portraying the Syrian EDPs as the cause of the water scarcity. This section will therefore specifically focus on the structural and institutional measures taken by the Jordanian government, in order to execute these securitizing moves.

### *Structural mechanisms*

As identified before structural measures are those measures taken to physically securitize the water resources present in the country. In Jordan this has taken different forms, starting with the strict-rationing program the government has installed. As a consequence of this rationing program, the average Jordanian household will only receive water once a week. A part of this program includes that those who do not have access to the formal networks will not receive the same amount of water but even less. This also counts for households, which do not have the capacity to store those amount of water. The water rationing program will therefore affect the informal communities, the poor and the refugees the most (MWI, 2015). Besides the water rationing program, the Jordanian government is also dividing the amount of distributed water among the lowest and highest populated areas. To explain, low populated areas only receive water every 12 days, whereas the higher populated areas receive water every seven days which has been laid down by MWI (2015) as the following measure:

*“The Government has implemented a strict water-rationing program, supplying water to households only once a week. Households that are not connected to the formal networks or have limited storage capacity, including those in informal settlements, nomadic communities, the poor, refugees and migrants, consume less.” (p 12)*

Important here to notice, is that the Jordanian government is again justifying this measure by including the influx of the refugees as well as population growth. This measure also drastically differs from the measures planned in the previous “Water for Life: Jordan’s water strategy 2008-2022”. The previous documents had merely incorporated the maximum water flow limits and the enforcement of strict building codes (MWI, 2009). In this case, Jordanian households

would have limited capacities in showering and toilet flushing in order to cut down on high water consumers, however, this new policy will enforce a specific amount of water to households without even reaching the whole society.

In addition, the Jordanian government is also campaigning against the illegal drilling of groundwater wells and the usage of them. Beside campaigning this has been enforced by adapting the legislation and enforcing these rules through penalties. The ultimate goal is to minimize the criminal activities within the water sector (MWI, 2015).

### *Institutional mechanisms*

Institutional mechanisms characterize those institutional measures taken to counter threats. As mentioned before the threat is water scarcity, which eventually has been exacerbated by the influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan, according to the Jordanian government. Therefore, the government has incorporated the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) as an institutional measure to cope with the influx of refugees in the water sector as well as in other sectors by focusing on the resilience of the refugees themselves as well as the host communities (MWI, 2015). JRP is included as an institutional measure since it is the first Jordan plan which combines responses for the refugees as well as for the Jordanian public (Francis, 2015). This seems counter intuitive, since it has been made clear in development of the structural mechanism that the water supply for these communities would be the lowest in comparison to the average Jordanian household, by implementing the water rationing program.

The structural and institutional measures identified in this section are a reflection of how these mechanisms are described according to the identified measures from Fischhendler. This does not ignore the fact that the Jordanian government has set up many different measures in order to cope with the water scarcity in the country. It merely identifies those measures taken, which have been taken outside of the 'normal' politics and hence can be regarded as securitization measures. The next section will analyse how the Jordanian public is aware and is responding to these securitization measures, alongside the consequences of these securitization measures for the Syrian EDPs.

## 8. THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES

The aim of this chapter is to see whether the securitization of hydro-climate change has an effect on the vulnerability of the Syrian refugees. By doing so, several elements are taken into account. First of all, the public opinion towards the Syrian refugees and the securitization measures will be analysed, as a consequence of the linguistic, structural and institutional measures taken by the government. Secondly, specific vulnerabilities will be analysed, in order to see how the vulnerabilities of the Syrians have changed due to the securitization of the water sector. As mentioned before these vulnerabilities are divided into different sectors. For the relevance of this paper the WASH and social sector as identified before have been chosen, in order to see how the securitization really had an impact on the Syrian refugees.

### 8.1 PUBLIC OPINION & SOCIAL VULNERABILITY

The previous chapter revealed that the government is framing the water crisis as a consequence of the influx of Syrian refugees. Since it is established that the government has taken securitizing moves and measures, the public opinion regarding these moves have to be analysed. Only when the Jordanian citizens give their consent to the emergency measures, true securitization has taken place. Beside the analysis of the public opinion, this section will also focus on the social relationship between the Jordanians and the Syrian EDPs. This is especially important since the government has framed the problem as something which is caused by the Syrian EDPs. The question is whether this has resulted in resentment and more interestingly, how this manifest themselves amongst relationship between the Jordanians and the Syrian EDPs in terms of religious affiliations.

#### 8.1.1 Public Opinion

Among the Jordanians there is somewhat of a negative stance towards the Syrian refugees, however, it is not clear whether this can specifically be attributed to the securitization measures. The most resentment can be found among the vulnerable populations in Jordan, since they are also the ones who are mostly affected by the influx of the Syrian refugees. An specific example is the water rationing program, which leaves the poorest and rural Jordanian population with fewer water than those less vulnerable (MWI, 2015). Moreover, the competition of public services is also the highest in these vulnerable communities, which are most often also host communities, since a high amount of Syrian EDPs are residing here (Francis, 2015). It is however clear, that most of the resentment of the

Jordanians is based on the decrease in public services. Relating this to this thesis, it is important to note that Jordanians are in general aware of the climatic changes and some of the causes of these climatic changes (UNDP, 2014). Hence, it cannot specifically be argued that this kind of resentment over public services can be linked to the securitization measures taken in the water sector.

Since the influx of the refugees the demand for public services has increased immensely. As a consequence, the quality and quantity of public services provided has decreased due to the influx of the Syrian refugees which led to increasingly more demand and pressure on the public services (Carrion, 2015). As argued before, there cannot be made a specific link between these public services in general and the securitization measures taken. However, one of these public services is the water supply, which has decreased immensely as shown in previous chapters.

Since the Jordanian public is used to taking in refugees, like the Palestinians or the Iraqis one might suspect that the influx of the Syrian refugees is no different. However, after a massive influx of Syrian refugees who are mostly living among the Jordanians themselves, it seems as if the generosity has diminished. To explain, a survey done by the International Republican Institute (IRI) among a 1,000 Jordanian citizens agreed that in May 2017 more than half of the participants agreed that Jordan should permanently close the borders to Syrian refugees. In addition, it is put forward that the attitude towards the Syrian refugees only has worsened since 2016 (International Republican Institute, 2017).

This can be explained due to the ongoing competition between the Syrian refugees and the Jordanians public over resources. This competition does not only take place over water resources, but also over employment and healthcare (Francis, 2015). Without jumping to conclusions, the competition over public services and resources, could become an issue which can create more resentment. Especially, since Jordanians base their resentment not on the debates and statistical finding, but more on their experiences, media and their quality of life. Therefore, the opinions of those in office and the public are influencing the opinions of the Jordanian citizens (Carrion, 2015).

Hence, such linguistic framings, as discussed in the previous chapter can explain the resentment towards the Syrian EDPs, alongside the perception that the Jordanians have to share their public services with the Syrian EDPs. Moreover, there is also a perception among the Jordanians that Syrians receive most aid and assistance, which leaves the Syrians more prosperous than the Jordanians who are also vulnerable. An example of such resentment is the Jordanian refugee camp the youth movement Hiraq “Nashama al-Mafraq” had established,



in order to point out that landlords are renting out to Syrians, which leads to the eviction of Jordanians (MercyCorps, 2014).

Ultimately, the public opinion towards the Syrian EDPs is different than towards the other influxes of refugees Jordan has taken in. There is resentment towards the Syrian EDPs, due to the lack of availability of public services and because of the vulnerable communities who are struggling due to the high amount of refugees present there. There is no direct link between this resentment and the securitization of the water sector, however, it is argued that the linguistic framings could play a large part in the creation of this resentment. Moreover, their own experiences with the Syrian refugees and the consequences it has created in their daily life has played a major part in the creation of this resentment.

### 8.1.2 Social vulnerability

When researching the vulnerabilities of refugees, there is a common perception that these vulnerabilities have to be measured according to the material and physical needs, without incorporating social needs (Eghdamian, 2016). Since, most institutions focus on the material and physical needs of refugees, it is worth wondering whether it is even necessary to take religion into account in the context of forced migration. Leaving aside the many circumstances religion could play a role in the decision making to migrate or seek refuge, and how it can define the journey of the refugee, this section specifically delves into the situation of the refugees once they have arrived in their host country Jordan. How does religion affect the attitudes of the Jordanians towards the Syrian EDPs and how are these attitudes manifested among the Syrian EDPs themselves?

Religion as such is relevant to this thesis, since Syria itself is a country which has a high diversity in religions, with many different minorities. In a country and a region which is in turmoil, due to amongst others religion, it is worth shedding a light on the consequences religion might have after seeking refuge. In relation to the securitization taking place in Jordan, it is worth analysing whether the earlier established resentment is different towards different religious affiliated groups. Moreover, the religious aspects adds more dimension to the ordinary focus on the material and physical vulnerabilities of refugees.

To explain, religious identity usually does not play a role in humanitarian situations, since it often involves contradicting principles like impartiality and neutrality (Eghdamian, 2016). However, even though religion does play an increasingly important role in handling

the refugee situation in Europe, it seems to be secularized in the Middle East. Examples of such secularization is the exclusion of religion in important reports like JRP, where the main focus lies on the distribution of public services, without any specific link to religion. To explain, the JRP does refer to strengthen of social cohesion and therefore addressing the social imbalances within the host communities in order to avoid the exacerbation of vulnerabilities (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015). The strengthening of the social cohesion is based on issues related to shelter, livelihoods and food security, social protection and justice strategies. All of these objectives are related to material and physical need, although it seems that social protection could be a feature which could include religion. However, looking at the definition of social protection, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2015) defines it as: *“To provide vulnerable groups affected by the crisis with access to improved social protection and improved legal and operational protection frameworks and services in governorates most affected by the Syria crisis.”* (p. 40) Table 2 specifies this definition with the objectives related to social protection.

Refugee Specific Social Protection Objectives JRP 2015	
<b>Objective 1</b>	Improved access to territory and international protection and the preservation of protection space.
<b>Objective 2</b>	The strengthening, engagement and empowerment of families and communities in order to contribute to their own protection solutions. While the most vulnerable people’s needs are identified and addressed through appropriate services and interventions.
<b>Objective 3</b>	Mitigation of the risks and consequences of experienced sexual and gender-based violence risks.
<b>Objective 4</b>	Increased equitable access to quality child protection interventions for girls and boys affected by the Syrian crisis.
<b>Objective 5</b>	The meeting of basic household needs of the refugees in camp and non-camp settings through the provision of in-kind or monetized voucher assistance.

Table 2: Refugee Specific Social Protection Objective. (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015).

Looking at these specifics, all of the objectives still focus on the material and physical needs, except for objective three which includes sexual and gender-based violence. Religion is however nowhere to be found. This raises the question how religion is manifested amongst the Syrian refugees in Jordan? This manifestation can be divided into two categories. At first, is religion analysed in the context of the entering stage, camp-setting and the relation amongst

Syrian refugees. Secondly, is the role religion plays in the relations between the Jordanians and the Syrian EDPs.

Religious minorities may face continued discrimination within their host country, among the Jordanian citizens or even amongst the Syrian refugees themselves. It has been established that in Jordan, the minorities are often reluctant to register at the humanitarian agencies, due to this fear of discrimination (Minority Rights Group International, 2017). Besides not registering, Syrians also opt for registration under a different religious affiliation. For example, among the Syrian refugees 90 % of whom registered with the UNHCR identifies themselves as a Sunni Muslim (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom [UNSCRIF], 2013). Looking at the religious distribution of the religious minorities among the Syrian population, this number however does not reflect the distribution among the registered refugees with UNHCR (ibid). As explained in chapter six the Syrian population identifies themselves with many different religions.

The choice for registration under a different religious affiliation is often made because it might create more opportunities for resettlement (Mayer, 2007), and in order to be eligible for the material and physical needs one has to be registered (UNSCRIF, 2013). This showcases that the focus on these material and physical needs precede vulnerabilities which in some cases unfold before the refugees even encountered these 'needs'. To explain, religion is connected if not an intertwined part of someone's identity, however, in these cases some choose to propagate a different religion than their own in order to be eligible for receiving basic needs (Mayer). But therefore they feel as if they need to hide a certain part of their identity.

This raises the question why religious minorities feel the need to not register or register under a different religious affiliation. According to the UNHCR, the refugees who identify themselves with a religious minority are afraid to register as a Christian or another minority religion, since it might have a negative impact on the relations with the other Syrian refugees (UNSCRIF, 2013). One of the issues raised for not registering themselves by their own religious identity, is the fear of reprisal attacks along sectarian lines (UNSCRIF, 2013).

Besides the fear for reprisal attacks from other Syrian refugees and the general public opinion regarding the Syrians EDPs, there can also be made a specific divide amongst religious affiliations in explaining the relations between the Jordanians and the Syrian EDPs. One of these relations are tribal affiliations between Jordanians and Syrians. To explain, even before the Syrian civil war broke out Syrians as well as Jordanians would travel back and forth to visit and maintain the good relationships with these relatives (MercyCorps, 2014).

These affiliations are mostly found in Mafraq and have ensured solidarity towards the Syrians. Unfortunately, these kinships are not visibly present everywhere in Jordan. Interestingly, it is visible that in those areas where the refugees are most distant from the Jordanian roots, the rhetoric also becomes increasingly anti-Syrian (ibid.)

This can also explain, why the Syrian religious minorities are mostly living in areas where there are Jordanian citizens which identify themselves with the same religion (UNSCRIF, 2013). The Syrian refugees who are living amongst the Jordanians are increasingly moving into mixed neighbourhoods. The findings of the CARE report states that these Syrian refugees do not encounter any problems with their Jordanian neighbours. (CARE, 2017). A CARE report even stated that the participants agreed that the Syrian refugees had an negative impact on their lives, but still over 75% had a positive relationship with their Syrian 'neighbour' (CARE 2017).

So to conclude, religion can make the Syrian EDPs more vulnerable since religious minorities can be more prone to discrimination and exclusion. This can be traced back to the framing of the Syrian refugees in the first place, since the resentment already exists among the Jordanian citizens towards the Syrian EPDs, however, the religious minorities within the Syrian EDPs feel as if this can create even more resentment towards them is they state their true religious affiliation. The tribal affiliations are however an exception to this argument, these affiliations do show solidarity towards the Syrian EDPs.

## 8.2 WATER VULNERABILITIES

This section analyses if the Syrian refugees are becoming more vulnerable due to the securitization in terms of water supply as defined within the WASH sector. The WASH sector focuses specifically on water, sanitation and hygiene (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2009). Since this thesis aims to study the water sector in Jordan, the WASH sector is undoubtedly intertwined. Hence it becomes the obvious choice to study the vulnerabilities of the Syrian refugees within the WASH sector as a result of the established securitization as discussed in the previous sections. Due to the scope and aim of this thesis, sanitation and hygiene are not specifically analysed, since it does not specifically relate back to the research question.

As mentioned before, around 80% of the Syrian refugees live outside of the refugee camps in Jordan (REACH Initiative, 2017). With most humanitarian organizations managing the water supply within these camps, the main responsibility outside these camps lies with the Jordanian government. Although the government is receiving several grants to manage the WASH sector, this section specifically focuses on the activities of the Jordanian government, without incorporating the plans of the donors.

Looking at the water supply in Jordan it already has become clear in the previous chapter that Jordan already coped with extremely low water supply issues. Therefore, it can be established that the problem already existed before the influx of the Syrian EDPs, however, it is exacerbated due to the Syrian refugees (REACH Initiative, 2017). Most host communities were already burdened with an aging water supply system. The main problem in the water sector thus already lied in the Northern governate and only increased due to the influx of the Syrian refugees. Even though the government is developing long term projects to increase the water supply, it seems as if the securitization measures taken affects the refugees and the vulnerable Jordanians negatively. Looking at the securitization measures, the water rationing program seems to affect the Syrian refugees as well as the vulnerable Jordanians the most.

The Jordanian government states that the minimum international humanitarian standard for the WASH sector has been achieved in the refugee camps like Za'atteri and Azraq camp (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015). The UN and many other organizations alongside the Jordanian government itself have helped to realize this, however, are short on funding to set up a similar substantial WASH initiative for the host communities (Inter-Sector Working Group Jordan, 2017).

Subsequently, one might already draw the conclusion that the water access outside the refugee camps has worsened. To explain, within the camps approximately 35 liters is

available each day per person (Unicef. n.d.). Within the host communities the water supply often does not manage to reach 30 liters per day per person, which may lead to worsening sanitation situations and lead to more diseases (MercyCorps, 2014). 91 percent of the people in the host communities have access to the piped water system, however, have high levels of losses due to leakages in the system. This has to be addressed by the government in order to provide these communities with enough water. The water losses are in some areas more than 60% (Unicef. n.d.). Moreover, the access to water as well as the sanitation and hygiene has left up to 60% of the Syria EDPs highly vulnerable to WASH risks. One of the main causes is solid waste management (Vulnerability Assessment Framework, 2015). Even though in governmental reports the access to water is portrayed as positive, the leakages are not taken into account, which eventually creates a misleading representation of the current WASH situation in the host communities.

Besides, the differences in the water supply between the refugee camps and the host communities, it has been established that there is a lot of tension over water within the host communities and as a consequence of differences in the amount of aid given to the host communities and the refugee camps (MercyCorps, 2014). Examples of such tensions manifest themselves in the access to water for Syrian refugees. To explain, there have been instances when Syrians are renting a house from a Jordanian landlord, but do not get any access to water. Consequently, this forces the Syrians to buy water from privatized wells (ibid). Moreover, Jordanians within the host communities also have to make use of the privatized wells due to the defective piped water system. Eventually, this led to the prioritization of costumers based on social influence, friendly relations etcetera. Therefore, it becomes even harder for the Syrian refugees to get water (ibid.)

In addition, to the water access, differences in the usage of the water also plays a role in manifestations of the relations between the Syrian EDPs and the Jordanians. For instance, Jordanians do not understand why the Syrian's that do have 35 litres of water per day are washing their cars or hosing the streets, since there is an increasing water deficit in Jordan ( Warrick, 2013). Syria is a country which does not deal with the same amount of water deficiency as Jordan, which result in the fact that Syrians have a different relation towards water than the Jordanians do. Jordan is known for its history and it capabilities to deal with a low water supply. Ultimately, this difference in perception of the usage of water creates more resentment from the Jordanians towards the Syrian EDPs, since they have been rationed from the 1980s onwards (MercyCorps, 2014).

To conclude, this section has analysed the vulnerabilities of the Syrian refugees in regards to the WASH sector, specifically focusing on water supply. In doing so, it may be concluded that the Syrian EDPs living in the host communities are becoming more vulnerable, as the water supply is low, the piped water system leaks up to 60% of the supplied water, being able to get access to other sources of water is highly dependent on one's social status within a community. Moreover, the cultural difference between Syrians and Jordanians in regards to their relationship to water does not improve the general public perception of the Syrian EDPs. So, due to all the issues relating to the vulnerabilities of the Syrian EDPs in this chapter, it can be concluded that Syrian EDPs have indeed become more vulnerable due to the securitization which has taken place in Jordan. However, within this conclusion there has to be made a difference between the Syrian EDPs living in the refugee camps, and those living in the host communities. As it has been made clear, that those living in the refugee camps do have more protection, rights and access to water, which leaves them less vulnerable to the issues discussed in this section.

## 9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE INQUIRIES

This research focused on the securitization of the water sector in Jordan and tried to establish whether such securitization measures create consequences for the EDPs present in Jordan. By doing so, this research answered the question:

*How does the securitization of hydro-climatic change in Jordan affect the vulnerabilities of the environmental refugees present in Jordan?*

By using this research question, this study tried to shed light on the consequences securitization might have on those affected by it. Therefore, this research started by addressing the actual hydro-climate change in the Middle East and Jordan. During this process it has been concluded, that Jordan is one of the most water scarce countries in the world and that hydro-climatic change will only worsen the current situation.

Alongside the hydro-climatic circumstances in Jordan, the EDPs present in Jordan needed to be analysed. By doing so, the argument was that the Syrian refugees present in Jordan can be characterized as EDPs according to the sceptic approach. It also became clear that there are approximately 650,000 Syrian EDPs present in Jordan of which almost 80% is living in Jordanian communities. This has exacerbated the water issues which was already present in Jordan before the influx of the Syrian EDPs. Since it could be concluded that hydro-climatic change and the influx of the Syrian refugees are and will create only more water-related issues now or in the future, it became increasingly more interesting to see how hydro-climatic change was managed in Jordan through the analysis of the water sector, according to the securitization theory.

Whilst analysing the water sector in Jordan this study has made use of the securitization theory from the Copenhagen School. In doing so, the main focus lied on the three lines of inquiries. Therefore, it first has been established that the Jordanian government indeed has framed the water availability in Jordan as an issue, according to the first line of inquiry. This has been framed in this manner, before and after the influx of the Syrian EDPs, since the water scarcity was already present at that time. However, it became clear that after the influx of the Syrian refugees the level of urgency of the water scarcity had changed from being a serious challenge to becoming a national security issue, which can be regarded as a securitizing move along the second line of inquiry. This level of urgency was justified due to the influx of Syrian EDPs. Different examples have showed the framing of the government as well as the media, that water scarcity has become a national security issue due to the influx



of the Syrian EDPs. Due to this clear securitizing move, the securitization measures could be analysed in accordance within the three categories as discussed by Fischhendler. The linguistic measures can be categorized as those statements and documents by the Jordanian government which frame the water issues in Jordan as a national security problem, due to the influx of the Syrian EDPs. Moreover, several specific securitizing measures could be identified and led to the conclusion that the water sector has indeed been removed from the 'normal' politics and has been securitized.

It however did not specifically became clear whether the Jordanians find these measures justified. It could be concluded that they find the current situation not ideal, especially not those living in the vulnerable communities. Resentment towards the Syrian EDPs is growing in Jordan, which can be attributed to the decrease in availability of public services, but also the disproportionate divide of aid and assistance, according to the Jordanian public. A clear link between the linguistic framings and the public opinion cannot be drawn, however, for the purpose of this research it has been argued that it is a manner on which the resentment is based.

Ultimately, this led to the analysis of the vulnerabilities of the Syrian EDPs. Amongst the Syrian EDPs, the religious minorities have a fear to register under their own religious affiliation. Moreover, in the areas where no tribal affiliations are present the resentment towards the Syrian EDPs is higher. Therefore, many Syrian EDPs have chosen to live in neighbourhoods where people live with a similar religious affiliation or in mixed-neighbourhood. So, it can be concluded that there is indeed resentment towards the Syrian EDPs and that this can manifest itself also along religious lines. Moreover, a fear exists among the EDPs to acknowledge their religious affiliation, since it might lead to discrimination. The vulnerabilities related to water can be described as being insufficient within the host communities. The water rationing program plays a part in this, as well as the piping systems. Moreover, Syrian EDPs are prone to discrimination from landlords and privatized wells.

So, since the securitization has been discussed alongside the vulnerabilities of the EDPs, this research argues that the securitization has a negative affect on the vulnerabilities of the EDPs in Jordan. This can be concluded, due to the resentment which the Jordanian public holds towards the Syrian EDPs, which leads to discrimination in water supply as well as on religious affiliations.

## 9. 1 FUTURE INQUIRIES

Since this research focused on the vulnerabilities related towards religion and the water sector, many vulnerabilities were left out of the analysis. Therefore, it is interesting to study these other vulnerabilities within the context of the securitization of hydro-climatic change. Moreover, different case-studies need to be studied, since this will create a more complete analysis of what the effects of securitization can be on refugees.

Ultimately, the aim of this study was to see whether securitization has an effect on the EDPs and tried to study two specific phenomenon which will become more pressing in the future: hydro-climatic change and environmental refugees. Therefore, this research hoped to shed light on how important it is to already take notice of governmental policies relating to hydro-climatic change, since it might be expected that in the upcoming years many countries have to take measures or also have to securitize due to hydro-climatic change. Moreover, since hydro-climatic change in the future is a given, there will also be more environmental refugees. Therefore, it becomes interesting to specifically study the linguistic framing towards environmental refugees in the future. This could provide evidence on how environmental refugees are treated without having any legal right.

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