REPRESENTING FUNDAMENTALISM

ACADEMIC DISCOURSES ON ISLAM AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF 9/11

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I didn't even know what was meant by Muslim fundamentalism, I did know that Bush's ideology wasn't right, he was a crusader, a self-appointed crusader, but what does Muslim fundamentalism mean I thought by myself, it were terms constantly appearing in the media, Muslim terrorism and Muslim fundamentalism. I started searching and asked people what it means. A Muslim fundamentalist is a Muslim who adheres to the fundamentals of Islam, what's wrong with that? A Muslim is obliged to stick to the fundamentals of Islam, isn't he? How else can you be a Muslim? The only thing I could conclude from this is that the West has problems with Islam itself, because Islam isn't Islam without fundamentals. And terrorism? That too should be a terrible thing, but is it really? What actually is terrorism? Again I took a dictionary, because every time they, on the television, called the perpetrators of the attacks of September 11 terrorists, I shouted to the television "you are terrorists". Terrorism is to terrify by means of violence, what's wrong with that?

(…)

Thus, terrorism is obliged for Muslims. I was impressed, because this was the first time that I found a proof in the Quran that nothing is wrong with terrorism, the term is only polluted by the West, and they made of it that terrorism is the killing of innocent people, women and children, and imagine that is true, that terrorism is killing with political aims, then, isn't America a terrorist?

- Samir Azzouz, 'Autobiography' -

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PREFACE

Academic discourse requires that texts like these contain expressions of gratitude. I am grateful this tradition did not disappear after 9/11. Discourse further informs me to say that none of the persons mentioned here are responsible for the mistakes I have made.

Without feeling obliged, I want to thank Jan Bremmer, Yme Kuiper and Fred Leemhuis. I am grateful for their flexibility these last months and, more importantly, for the inspiration and motivation they provided me with, for their inexhaustible knowledge I could benefit from during the last five years and for the four more years to come.

I am grateful to my parents, who supported me the past eight years. Without them, I would never have learned the pleasance of learning.

Most of all, I want to thank Birgit.

1. Introduction

§ 1 The impact of 9/11

Satan himself showed his face that Tuesday morning. In the sky above New York, the contour of his dark, horned face was clearly recognizable in a video by CNN. Some minutes later he appeared again, this time captured by a photographer of the Associated Press. The appearances lasted only split seconds, but once he was recognized in the smoke of the burning World Trade Centre, his image appeared in magazines and newspapers and was multiplied thousands of times on the internet.[1]

The feelings of the internet users ran high in the hours, days and weeks after the attacks of September 11 (9/11). The prophecies of Nostradamus, for instance, were consulted up to 200 times per minute at the popular searching engine Google that Tuesday.[2] He was believed to have foreseen the events by predicting: 'In the city of God there will be a great thunder; two brothers torn apart by Chaos, while the fortress endures, the great leader will succumb; the third big war will begin when the big city is burning.' The two towers were torn apart that morning and New York was seen as the city of God. Although the prophecy was soon declared inauthentic, 'Nostradamus' became Google's top gaining query over the whole year 2001.[3]

In the days following that Tuesday, President George W. Bush reinforced the image of an enemy that embodied Evil itself. On Wednesday, he stated that 'this will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil'. The perpetrators of the attacks were consequently called 'terrorists' or 'evildoers', who would be hunted down by the 'civilized people'. Bush further circumscribed the attacks as 'cowardly acts' and the enemy as 'barbaric', a 'new kind of evil' that 'hides in shadows' and 'runs for cover' in their caves.[4]

In the first days after 9/11, emotional reactions, dramatic qualifications and apocalyptic scenarios dominated. But soon afterwards, the expressions of mourning, anger and fear, were accompanied by a renewed interest in the backgrounds, motivations and ideologies of the perpetrators. Not only 'American flag', 'anthrax', 'FBI' and the computer virus 'nimda' belonged to the top-20 of gaining searching terms in 2001, but also 'Afghanistan' and 'Taliban' can be found in this Google list. After Nostradamus, Osama bin Laden even became the most 'popular' person searched for in 2001.[5] Furthermore, politicians ordered investigations on the attacks themselves, on the presence and influence of extremist organisations and on radicalization of Muslim youths. Intelligence services

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[1] Cf. http://urbanlegends.about.com/library/bltabloid-arch10.htm; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kBIbz-jXrM; http://www.christianmedia.us/devil-face.html.

[2] See Google Zeitgeist, which offers an overview of the most popular queries at September 11: http://www.google.com/press/zeitgeist/9-11.html.

[3] See for Nostradamus' prophecies on September 11: http://urbanlegends.about.com/cs/historical/a/nostradamus_2.htm. This prophecy was invented by the student Neil Marshal in 1996 to demonstrate, ironically, that Nostradamus' prophecies could be used for almost every interpretation wished for. For the most popular queries on Google, see the archive of Google Zeitgeist at http://www.google.com/press/zeitgeist/archive.html.

[4] Cf. Bush's speeches and statements between September 11 and 16 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/.

[5] http://www.google.com/press/zeitgeist/archive.html.

were extended and national security and counter-terrorism institutes founded. But also dozens of novels and movies focussing on the events were brought to market and hundreds of documentaries were produced about the course of the attacks, international terrorism and the ideologies of the perpetrators.[6] Finally, journalists conducted research in the areas involved, produced background articles and television reports and published several books about September 11, al-Qaeda, suicide bombing and extremist Islamism.[7]

A blending of public fascination and concerns, political duties and interests as well as professional attention and market supply produced a huge amount of information and interpretations about the attacks and their backgrounds. New events and concerns such as the bombings in Bali (2002), Casablanca (2003), Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the conflicts involving Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran continuously stimulated these interests and discussions. Especially religious fundamentalism, militant Islamism and the relation between Islam and violence became central themes in the public debates in the United States and Western Europe. Islam, radicalism and violence became closely connected in Western imaginaries and in the dominant narratives of Western modern history.

Given the remarkable influence of September 11 on public interests, debates and discourses, the question how academic research dealt with these developments seems highly relevant. In disciplines like Sociology, Anthropology and Religious Studies, fundamentalism has already been an object of study for decennia. Although fundamentalism research initially focussed primarily on Protestant fundamentalists in America, the topic of Muslim fundamentalism became increasingly important after several eye-catching occurrences in the late seventies and early eighties. From the Iranian revolution onwards, Muslim fundamentalism was incorporated in the field of study. In the eighties and nineties a large amount of studies appeared that compared Muslim fundamentalists with their Christian or Jewish counterparts and explored their historical roots, socio-political contexts and religious characteristics.

To what extent the events of the twenty-first century have influenced this research, however, has not yet been comprehensively studied. Although some literature has been published in which terrorism research is evaluated, a more extensive historiography of the scholarly representations of Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism is yet to be written.[8] This thesis attempts to fill this gap. By examining the scholarly studies on 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic terrorism', this research analyses to what extent and in which aspects the recent events affected this scholarship. Some central questions will be: did the changing circumstances influence the objects, methodologies and theoretical

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[6] A selection: *movies*: United 93 (Paul Greengrass, 2005); World Trade Centre (Oliver Stone, 2006); Reign over Me (Adam Sandler, 2007); *literature*: Ian McEwan, *Saturday* (2005); Don DeLillo, *Falling Man* (2007); John Updike, *The Terrorist* (2007); *documentaries*: Fahrenheit 9/11 (Michael Moore, 2004); The Hamburg Cell (Channel 4 and CBC, 2004); Inside 9/11 (National Geographic Channel, 2005); The Enemy Within (Frontline, 2006).

[7] A selection: Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Bin Laden* (New York 2001); Robert D. Kaplan, *Soldiers of God. With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (New York 2001); Christoph Reuter, *My Life is a Weapon. A Modern History of Suicide Bombing* (Princeton and Oxford 2002); Der Spiegel, *11. September, Geschichte eines Terrorangriffs* (Hamburg 2002); Joseph Croitoru, *Der Märtyrer als Waffe. Die historischen Wurzeln des Selbstmordattentats* (Munich 2003); Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers. The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York 2005); Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilization: the Conquest of the Middle East* (New York 2005).

[8] Cf. Greg Bankoff, 'Regions of Risk: Western Discourses on Terrorism and the Significance of Islam', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (2003) 413-428; Andrew Silke ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London and New York 2004).

perspectives of the studies? To what extent did the changing public discourses on religion, Islam, fundamentalism and violence affect academic discourses? How were historical narratives on these subjects adjusted to the developments? By first charting the main trends and key publications of the field and by subsequently comparing the scholarly representations before and after 9/11, it is possible to indicate to what extent and in which aspects the discourses were affected by the attacks in the West.

Most of the theoretical notions and approaches I will use to analyse the academic discourses on Muslim fundamentalism will unfold in the course of my argument. Before presenting the structure of my thesis, however, it is necessary to lay the foundations and to make some more remarks about my intentions.

§ 2 *Academic discourses*

In the first place, this thesis is rooted in the long and dynamic tradition of studies examining the scholarship about Islam and the Muslim world. Since the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1978, the study of the Orient itself has become the topic of an intense and fierce debate, questioning the fundamentals of Western scholarship about other cultures.[9] In *Orientalism*, Said had argued that the Orient was not a 'thing out there' which was 'discovered' by scholars, but an imaginary constructed into a knowledgeable object; a meaningful category that could be studied. Based on Michel Foucault's ideas about discourse, knowledge and power, Said stated that by studying and representing it, Western scholars (re)produced something called 'the Orient'.[10] Moreover, he argued that Western discourses on the Orient were not founded upon actual knowledge, but constructed as a negative mirror image of the West itself. The Orient was considered the 'Other', the direct opposite of the positive characteristics of the West. For that reason, representations of the Orient not only reproduced the 'Other' out there, but the superior Self-images as well. In this way, according to Said, Orientalists confirmed the existing power relations and therefore Orientalism could be regarded as a 'Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'.[11]

Said's polemical theses did certainly not pass unnoticed. He was fiercely criticized not only by Islamic scholars whom he had mentioned as prime examples of Western Orientalism, but also by scholars he had praised in *Orientalism*, like Maxime Rodinson, Jacques Berque and Albert Hourani. Said was blamed for concentrating exclusively on the Middle East, for choosing the wrong examples

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[9] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient* (1978; London 1995). That the scholarly field of Orientalism or Oriental Studies was already subject of critical examination before Said's *Orientalism* is shown by Ulrike Freitag, 'The Critique of Orientalism', in: Michael Bentley ed., *Companion to Historiography* (London and New York 1997) 620-638. That Orientalism raised fundamental epistemological questions about Western scholarship is noticed by James Clifford, 'Orientalism', *History and Theory* 19 (1980) 203-223; James G. Carrier, 'Occidentalism: the World Turned Upside Down', *American Ethnologist* 19 (1990) 195-212.

[10] Concerning madmen, Foucault had argued that the study and representations of subjects which are constructed into a knowledgeable object (re)produces it, because they are imagined and treated accordingly. Madmen are imagined and treated as madmen because that is how they are called and known. Knowledge, then, is not only a reflection of its political, social and cultural context, but also (re)produces it. For this reason, knowledge is closely related to power. The ability to define, study and know the 'Other' (re)produces it and thereby confirms existing power relations. Cf. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la Folie à l'Âge Classique* (1961; Paris 1963).

[11] Said, *Orientalism*, 3.

and for omitting others such as German Orientalism.[12] The most serious critique, however, concerned Said's generalizing picture of Western attitudes towards the Orient. 'He unceremoniously dumps every Westerner who has ever studied the Arabs into one big basket', as one of his reviewers commented, while an influential article by Sadiq al-Azm even spoke of 'Orientalism in reverse'.[13] Despite these criticisms, the importance of Said's *Orientalism* can hardly be overestimated. It popularized the already existing debates about Western Orientalism, provided a theoretical foundation for doubts about Western knowledge of the Orient and stimulated new research in the history of Oriental and Islamic studies.

Against the background of these debates and considering recent political developments as well as a renewed interest in Islam and Muslim fundamentalism after 9/11, the question as to how scholars represent Muslim fundamentalism or Islamism is a relevant one. However, the academic field that is examined in this thesis deviates from the one studied by Said, for I will restrict myself to the literature focussing on fundamentalism and terrorism. Therefore, it is not the field of 'Oriental Studies' which will be examined; the studies stem from various academic disciplines and are written by historians, sociologists, anthropologists, religious scholars, political scientists, psychologists and others. The studies are not so much related by the disciplines they come from. Yet, they are connected by their subject. The same organisations, persons, ideologies and events, all connected with Islam or the Muslim world, are investigated in the studies that examine what I, for convenience sake, call 'Muslim fundamentalism' or, when focussing on political contexts, 'Islamism'.[14]

Thus, this thesis will argue that 'fundamentalists', 'Islamists' and 'terrorists' are not just groups of people living 'out there' which are 'discovered' by scientists. Analogous to Foucault's madmen or Said's Orient, it will analyse how scholarly representations (re)produced 'Islamic fundamentalists', 'Islamists' and 'terrorists' and to what extent these representations and constructions were affected by 9/11. This examination of the scholarly representation of Muslim fundamentalists will particularly focus on the historical narratives the authors construct about their subjects. The research on fundamentalism and Islamism is preoccupied with questions like: 'why the revival of fundamentalism?' or 'why 9/11?' To answer questions like these, all scholars construct historical narratives about the origins, rise and development of fundamentalist movements, individuals, ideologies and conflicts.

For that reason, the theoretical background of this thesis is shaped by modern narrativism in the second place. This narrativism, as it was propagated by, among others, Hayden White and Frank

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[12] Cf. for an overview of these criticisms by one of his opponents Martin Kramer, *Ivory Towers on Sand: the Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America* (2001; Washington 2002) 27-43. See also Clifford, 'Orientalism'; Robert Irwin, *For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and Their Enemies* (London 2006).

[13] Donald P. Little, 'Three Arab Critiques of Orientalism', *The Muslim World* 69 (1979) 110-131; Sadiq al-Azm, 'Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse', *Khamsin* 8 (1981) 5-26. Although unmentioned by the authors, this 'Orientalism in reverse' is, renamed as 'Occidentalism', further developed in Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of its Enemies* (New York 2004).

[14] The studies themselves, however, use a lot of labels and concepts to analyse and describe this topic. While many authors use 'Islamic fundamentalism', others prefer 'Islamism', 'Islamic revivalism', 'Islamic activism' or 'political Islam'. When focussing on violence, 'Islamic extremism', 'Islamic radicalism' and 'Islamic terrorism' are employed as well. I will employ the terms used by the authors themselves when presenting emic perspectives – in this case: the perspectives of the studies analyzed here. Otherwise, I will usually employ the term 'Muslim fundamentalism', but, when describing Islamic fundamentalism in its political context, I may use 'Islamism' as well. 'Muslim fundamentalism' is preferred above the often employed 'Islamic fundamentalism' in order to stress the role of the believers themselves and to avoid essentializing perspectives on religion.

Ankersmit, argues that scholars create coherence between historical facts that does not speak from the facts themselves.[15] They collect and select certain historical events and arrange them in a narrative that answers questions like: what happened next, why that happened and, finally, what is the point of it all? Therefore, a historical narrative, according to White, is 'a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of *explaining what they were by representing them*'.[16] When applied to our subject, we may state that authors do not 'discover' certain causes of or explanations for the rise, development or conflicts of fundamentalists in the past – they construct them. So focussing on how the authors represent the history of fundamentalism or Islamism means to investigate how they tell the stories about the past, how they construct their historical accounts or narratives to 'explain' historical developments and from which 'perspectives' these narratives are constructed.[17]

The inevitable conclusion of the foregoing must be that the story told in this thesis – a narrative about other narratives – is a construction as well. Certain 'facts' – studies about Muslim fundamentalism – are gathered, selected and presented in such a way that we are able to notice the impact of 9/11 on the field. Therefore, it is necessary to finally explain and justify my selections and the structure of this thesis.

The studies presented in this thesis belong, almost without exception, to the leading publications about Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism. They figure prominently in public media and/or have been influential in the scholarly field, which is deduced from reviews, quotations, impressions and, in the case of articles, the journals they were published in. To check whether the trends we deduce from these leading publications indeed illustrate more general developments, I will compare the results with different queries in databases which contain the most important newspapers as well as scholarly journals and publications.

In order to avoid accusations of either 'Orientalism' or 'Orientalism in reverse', this thesis has to pay attention to the diversity and changes within the scholarly field. Therefore, in the second and third chapter, the various trends and developments within the study of Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism will be charted. The second chapter focuses on the leading publications before 9/11, the third on the studies published after this moment. Subsequently, we are able to observe some general changes in the field after September 2001, which will be contrasted with quantitative data obtained from the databases in the fourth chapter. The remaining part of this chapter will be devoted to the

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[15] Cf. Hayden White, *Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore and London 1973); Frank Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic: a Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language* (1981; The Hague and London 1983).

[16] White, *Metahistory*, 2.

[17] Ankersmit circumscribed historical facts as the bricks that historians use to build their own buildings. These constructions, however, are more than the addition sum of its parts. This surplus, according to Ankersmit, consists of the 'point of view' or 'perspective' from which the used facts are perceived. Johan Huizinga's *Autumn of the Middle Ages*, to borrow one of his examples, sees the fourteenth and fifteenth century as the end of an era, instead as the beginning of a new one. Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic*, 207-239. White and Ankersmit were criticized as well. Especially their claim that narratives only have a metaphorical structure and therefore no truth-value received serious critiques. See for an overview Chriz Lorenz, *De Constructie van het Verleden. Een Inleiding in de Theorie van de Geschiedenis* (1987; Amsterdam 1998) 132-136. These criticisms, however, are not very relevant in the context of this thesis, for my intention is not to judge the different narratives on their truth-value. The aim is neither to tell which studies are 'true' nor to show which are 'more true' than others, but to indicate to what extent they were influenced by the events of 9/11. Modern narrativism is only employed as a tool to analyze the structure, content and perspectives of the narratives themselves.

literature about the relation between Islam and violence. After the main trends within the literature and the general changes after 9/11 are elucidated, we are able to focus on the scholarly constructions of 'Islamic fundamentalists', 'Islamists' and 'Islamic terrorists' and their histories in the fifth chapter.

2. REPRESENTATIONS OF FUNDAMENTALISM BEFORE 9/11

§ 1 *Marginal narratives*

More than one and a half century before Satan appeared on earth and Nostradamus' prophecies seemed to have been fulfilled, Western states were already fighting personified evil. That time, it had taken the shape of a ghost. Driven by a 'nursery tale', according to two young Germans, 'all the powers of old Europe entered into a holy alliance to exorcise the spectre'.

The spectre haunting Europe from 1848 was the spectre of communism, created by Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx in the famous first words of their *Communist Manifesto*.[18] They already indicated that the spectre had a world to win. And indeed, in the decennia following the announcement of the phantom, it would emerge in every corner of the world, it would break its chains in Russia and elsewhere and spread the 'tremble' the authors predicted. About a century after its appearance, the spectre announced by Engels and Marx became part of the dominant narrative of Western modern history, part of the so called Cold War. During this confrontation, which was fought mainly in what came to be known as the 'Third World', communism became the major challenge of Western political and cultural world hegemony.

But this dominant narrative of a bi-polar world came to a sudden conclusion with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Empire. The developments in the late eighties and early nineties of the twentieth century came to be seen as a victory for Western principles, values and beliefs, as the triumph of liberalism, democracy and the free market. This euphoria soon made its way into academic circles, as was illustrated by Francis Fukuyama, who proclaimed the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution'. The 'war of ideas' had finished, the neoconservative author argued, and Western liberal democracy would universalise. The struggle between East and West had been the last stage in human history, which could now be considered to have ended.[19]

Various events in the world, however, seemed to support another view, a next stage in the history of mankind. This new phase appeared to have announced itself already before the disappearance of the old enemy. In 1979 the shah of Iran was overthrown by what came to be seen as 'Islamic fundamentalists', who threatened to 'export the revolution' and to curtail Western influence in the Middle East. For many, the Iranian revolution represented the rise of a new opponent, an 'Islamic Comintern' as one author suggested; a new enemy who not only threatened Western political and economic interests, but also became the new main challenge of Western principles.[20] Events like the

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[18] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Het Communistisch Manifest* (Amsterdam 1995) 5.

[19] Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest* 16 (1989) 3-18; Idem, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London 1992). This narrative, however, was severely criticized by various authors. Jacques Derrida, for instance, opposed this 'new gospel' of liberal democracy in his *Spectres de Marx*, by claiming that the 'plagues' ravaging the global system would incite new activism. Jacques Derrida, *Spectres de Marx. L'État de la Dette, le Travail du Deuil et la Nouvelle Internationale* (Paris 1993).

[20] Daniel Pipes, 'Same Difference: the Struggle against Fundamentalist Islam has Revived the Divisions of the Cold War', *National Review* 7 (1994) 61-66, aldaar 63.

murder of Anwar al-Sadat, Lebanese suicide bombings and the rise of Islamic warriors in Afghanistan seemed to confirm this point of view.

The most prominent representative of this new narrative was the political scientist Samuel Huntington, who argued that the conflicts between nation states had been replaced by the Cold War, which he characterized as a division of the world along the ideological spectrum. He foresaw one more stage in the history of mankind to follow: a clash of civilizations.[21] Civilizations he defined as 'the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity', which are 'differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion'.[22] He identified seven or eight of them: the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and ('possibly') African ones. Cultural and, 'most important', religious differences, he argued, would replace the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War and they would be the most prominent source of conflict in the future.

The Islamic civilization would play a major role in these conflicts, Huntington stated, pointing at the 'bloody borders' of the Arab Islamic civilization: the armed conflicts in Algeria, Sudan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine, Lebanon, the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Kashmir.[23] The clash between the Islamic and the Western civilization, he finally predicted, would be the most prominent source of conflict in the immediate future. The centuries-old military interaction between these blocks would continue, as the Second Gulf War and Arab support for Saddam Hussein illustrated. With these views, Huntington subscribed to the ideas of the British historian of Islam Bernard Lewis. Lewis, who had been criticized by Edward Said for being one of the main proponents of Orientalism, argued that the recent outbreak of Muslim rage was mainly directed against the West, for these civilizations had been fighting each other for some fourteen centuries. He too, described a clash of civilizations between ancient rivals. The recent eruption, according to Lewis, was primarily caused by the domination and penetration of Western secularism and modernism.[24] Islam, he declared, had failed to modernize, and this was the primary cause for its decline and 'wrong going'.[25]

Lewis as well as Huntington is considered to have had a direct impact on American policy. While Lewis was one of the advisers of the Bush sr. administration at the time of the 1991 Iraq invasion, Huntington's clash of civilizations is frequently related to the policies of Bush jr. Although influential in public debates, the narratives these authors put forward were often strongly opposed in academic circles. The German sociologist Martin Riesebrodt, for instance, commented that Huntington's division of the world in civilizations is inconsistent and founded upon essentialist perspectives on culture and religion.[26] Civilizations are not coherent, monolithic entities, but diverse and dynamic, According to Riesebrodt, the picture Huntington proposed is in fact far more complex and actually, he stated, Huntington himself upholds a fundamentalist world view.[27] Professor of Islamic Studies John

[21] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993) 22-50; Idem, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York 1996).

[22] Huntington, 'Clash of Civilizations?', 24-25.

[23] Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 254-258.

[24] Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage. Why so Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will not be Easily Modified', *The Atlantic* 266 (1990) 47-58.

[25] Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford 2002). Although published in 2002, the book was already in print in September 2001. Cf. Lewis, *What Went Wrong?*, vii.

[26] Martin Riesebrodt, *Die Rückkehr der Religionen. Fundamentalismus und der »Kampf der Kulturen«* (Munich 2000) 15-33.

[27] Ibidem, 29.

L. Esposito's criticisms of Bernard Lewis echoed those of Riesebrodt. Lewis too tells a selective and generalizing story, Esposito declared, and pays no attention to the specific contexts in which the 'Muslim rage' arose. He creates an 'imagined monolithic Islam' and sees the world 'through the prism of Khomeini and revolutionary Islam'.[28]

In spite of all criticisms, the presence of Huntington and Lewis in public discourse would only increase, especially after the prism of Khomeini had been replaced by the one of Osama bin Laden. However, before continuing the clash of civilizations debate after September 11, we will first have to address the literature of which this debate formed the backdrop: the studies of Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism in the nineties of the twentieth century.

§ 2 *The invention of fundamentalism(s)*

The label 'fundamentalism' was not invented by scholars. In 1920, the American Reverent Curtis Lee Laws brought up the term in the Baptist journal *Watchman Examiner*. Between 1910 and 1915, already, a series of pamphlets were published called 'The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth', in which leading theologians formulated five fundamentals of faith against liberal views and the increasing bible criticism.[29] By formulating these fundamentals and by calling themselves 'fundamentalists', conservative Baptists and Presbyterians wanted to stress their own position within American Protestantism. Eventually the title was used with pride by the conservative camp. In the middle of the twenties, however, the label got more negative associations. Since the famous trial Scopes vs. Brian in 1925, 'fundamentalists' became increasingly considered backward and anti-modern figures, whose defeat by modernity was inevitable.[30]

For a long time, the use of the term 'fundamentalism' was restricted to this American Christian context. In the seventies, the meaning of the term in scholarly and media usage broadened to include all conservative Christians that preached a biblical literalism. Consequently, the term was, for instance, applied to Pentecostalists and members of the Salvation Army. Moreover, inquiries of the social backgrounds and characteristics of fundamentalists appeared, which made it better suited for comparative approaches.[31]

Only at the end of the seventies, and in particular after the Iranian revolution of 1979, the term was applied to Muslims. Although the application of the term to Islamic movements raised much debate, many scholars defended the use of 'Islamic fundamentalism' by claiming that the possibility it offered for cross-cultural comparisons outweighed the disadvantages. One of the pioneers of a comparative approach on fundamentalism was Bruce Lawrence. In *Defenders of God*, he opposed the objections of 'originists' and 'nominalists', who argued that the Christian origin and the refusal of Muslims themselves to use the name are reasons not to use the term. Lawrence made clear that many terms, like

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[28] John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York and Oxford 1992) 172-181, esp. 180.

[29] The inerrancy of the Bible, the virgin birth of Christ, the bodily resurrection of Jesus, substitutionary atonement and the bodily return of Jesus.

[30] The representations of the fundamentalists during this trial are analyzed in Susan Harding, 'Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant Cultural Other', *Social Research* 58 (1991) 373-393.

[31] Cf. William G. McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform* (Chicago 1978); Ernest R. Sandeen, *The Roots of Fundamentalism* (Chicago 1970); Bryan R. Wilson, *Religious Sects: a Sociological Study* (London 1970).

'religion' or 'nation-state', are used for contexts that differ from their original ones and that a lot of concepts, like secularization or civil religion, are employed without anyone using it to describe themselves. Fundamentalists in different religions are comparable, he argued, for they all oppose modernism, which is found all around the world. By defining fundamentalism as a religious ideology opposing modernism and by proposing specific traits that distinguish fundamentalists from their coreligionists, he was able to compare fundamentalists within Judaism, Christianity and Islam.[32]

In the nineties, an increasing amount of comparative studies on fundamentalism appeared. These studies usually avoided specific definitions of the term. Like Lawrence's 'religious ideology', fundamentalism was broadly defined, after which some characteristics or features of fundamentalist movements from different cultures were formulated.[33] Common to all these studies is that fundamentalism was perceived as a reaction to a changing world and, more specifically, to the rise of modernity. It was, in the words of Richard T. Antoun, 'a cognitive and affective orientation to the modern world'.[34] Fundamentalists felt threatened by processes like individualization, secularization, globalization and industrialization. They experienced marginalization by the political, economic and social transformations that accompanied modernity and resisted the division of social life in different spheres through which religion was privatized. The rise of the secular nation state was particularly opposed, for it was regarded as undermining the position of religion in society.[35]

Although fundamentalists opposed certain processes and ideologies that accompanied the rise of modernity, they should not be considered anti-modern. Fundamentalism should rather be described as a 'symptom of modernization'.[36] Fundamentalist movements in different contexts were reactions to the same processes, and that is the way in which they are comparable. Although the answers they formulated differed widely, all answers were formulated in reaction to the same processes. All fundamentalists faced certain problems in their modern contexts, and they all fought for alternative societies, how diverse these alternatives may be. Fundamentalists, therefore, were not anti-modern, but selectively anti-modern. Some developments were rejected, but others embraced. Their adoption of modern technologies like media or weaponry was for most authors the prime example of their modern character.[37]

Besides their relation to modernity, the comparative studies on fundamentalism described certain common characteristics of fundamentalists in different contexts. Paradigmatic in this case was the *Fundamentalism Project*, which was edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby from the University of Chicago. Between 1991 and 1995, five volumes appeared in which one dozens of case

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[32] Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God. The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age* (London and New York 1989).

[33] Cf. Lionel Caplan, 'Introduction', in: Idem ed., *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism* (London 1987) 4-5; Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 'Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family', in: Idem eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed. The Fundamentalism Project* 1 (Chicago 1991) 814-842; Steve Bruce, *Fundamentalism* (Cambridge 2000) 13-15; Richard T. Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism. Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements* (Lanham and Oxfrod 2001).

[34] Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism*, 153.

[35] Lawrence even describes secular nationalism as the archenemy of fundamentalists in *Defenders of God*, 83.

[36] Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 119; Caplan, 'Introduction', 5.

[37] Cf. Caplan, 'Introduction', 11; Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 41-42; Bassam Tibi, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern Science and Technology', in: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds., *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education. The Fundamentalism Project* 2 (Chicago 1991) 814-842; Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 15 and 24; Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism*, 117-131.

studies on various movements and themes were presented by leading scholars in the study of fundamentalism.[38] The common features of the studied fundamentalists were presented as 'family resemblances'. Many other scholars who made cross-cultural comparisons of fundamentalist movements would follow this approach.

One of the main characteristics noticed, is fundamentalists' 'totalitarian impulse'. Religion must be brought back as a central factor in public policy and existing structures (law, society, economy, etc.) must be replaced by one comprehensive system that is based upon religious principles.[39] This alternative for modern society is often presented as a restoration of a glorious period from the past that is derived from the scriptures. These scriptures are considered as the 'revealed truth' and therefore inerrant, complete and a direct guide for the present.[40] Factually, however, certain elements from the past and the revelations are selected and inventively combined with new interpretations. Fundamentalists, thus said the comparative studies, see themselves as the elite or vanguard for establishing the alternative order based on these selections. Furthermore, fundamentalists set up boundaries to protect their group from dangerous influences from the outside world and to preserve their purity.[41] These boundaries consist mainly of moral issues. Society is accordingly seen in a Manichean fashion. This dualistic representation of the world is expressed by a dramatization and mythologization of their enemies. Only fundamentalists held the right views, they claim, while the others are depicted as ultimate evil. This image is further reinforced by the dualistic and dramatic eschatologies that characterize fundamentalist ideologies, according to which the cosmic enemy will be defeated after an ultimate battle. This dualistic world view translates itself into several actions: the movements may distance themselves from society or try to transform it, either by political and democratic means or by violence.

Together, Marty and Appleby propose, family resemblances like these form an ideal type that represents 'pure fundamentalism'.[42] However, this generalizing picture will not be found in reality, in which the movements are much more diverse. This is the reason why the authors of the *Fundamentalism Project* use the plural 'fundamentalisms'.[43]

In the nineties, the category fundamentalism was well anchored within academic scholarship. Although eventually an emic term, scholars reconstructed it into a category that made possible cross-cultural comparisons and included believers who themselves rejected the label. A 'family' of fundamentalists was invented from which the genealogy ran from Curtis Lee Laws in 1920 until ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Now we have seen the nativity of this family, we can focus on two of the persons who gave birth to it.

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[38] Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds., *The Fundamentalism Project*, 5 vols. (Chicago 1991-1995).

[39] Marty, 'Conclusion', 824.

[40] Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 13-14.

[41] This stress on boundaries is circumscribed as an 'enclave culture' in Steve Bruce, 'Fundamentalism, Ethnicity, and Enclave', in: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance. The Fundamentalism Project* 3 (Chicago 1993) 50-67.

[42] Marty, 'Conclusion', 817, 832.

[43] Besides the *Fundamentalism Project*, Steve Bruce's *Fundamentalism* also uses the plural 'fundamentalisms'.

§ 3 *Inventors of fundamentalism(s)*

The comparative study of fundamentalism was mainly conducted by sociologists. While sociology of religion was a marginal part of sociology in the early eighties, fundamentalism was one of the topics that caused its revival.[44] The resurgence of fundamentalism had to be explained and the secularization thesis, which seemed to have been confirmed at least in the West, demanded renewed attention. Against this background it is interesting to take a closer look at two influential sociologists who not only paid attention to secularization, but also advocated a comparative study of fundamentalism: Steve Bruce and Martin Riesebrodt.

The Scottish sociologist Steve Bruce was one of the defenders of the secularization thesis. His extensive studies on fundamentalist movements in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century, mainly in Northern Ireland and the United States, have not revised his opinion, as he made clear in 2002 with his *God is Dead*. Modernization and industrialization would push religion to the margins, he argued before, and in this work he stated that the facts still supported his thesis, at least for the West.[45] How, then, did he explain the revival and enduring presence of fundamentalism?

In *Fundamentalism* (2000) Bruce sketched a general picture of the theme by examining fundamentalists in the United States and Iran. Parallel to other authors, Bruce saw the political, socio-economical and cultural transformations accompanying modernity as the main feature of the context in which fundamentalism arose in the United States and Iran. In Iran, fundamentalism was instigated by the failed modernization of the shah, Bruce argued, and the American fundamentalists felt equally threatened and marginalized by comparable developments. Their reactions to these comparable circumstances differed, however. These differences, according to Bruce, can be partly explained by contextual factors. But in this respect, the histories, practices and beliefs of the fundamentalists must also be taken into account. Bruce argued that an analysis of the contexts must be combined with an insiders view. The fundamentalist beliefs have to be taken seriously, he stated, for they are one of the factors that influence the decisions they make within their historical circumstances. The selections believers make from their symbolic repertoire are not only influenced by the contexts in which they are, but also by the repertoire they have to their disposal. The repertoires every religion offers are different, and this may explain, Bruce suggested, why some religions (read: Islam) are more connected to violence than others.[46]

By taking the beliefs of fundamentalists seriously, Bruce made clear that they are not irrational or archaic. Threatened by changes, they make rational and reasonable choices which are formed in interaction between their religious tradition and historical contexts. The same beliefs, however, are also the main reason for the failures of fundamentalism so far, he argues. Their dogmatism, for example, makes them vulnerable for schisms and makes it difficult to make compromises or alliances. Therefore, Bruce concluded, it is no surprise that Iran has failed to export its revolution or that American fundamentalists have not achieved any of their goals. In the end, Bruce predicted, fundamentalism will fail, just as it did before.[47]

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[44] Cf. Bryan Turner, 'Fundamentalism, Spiritual Markets and Modernity', *Sociology* 38 (2004) 195-202.

[45] Cf. Steve Bruce, *God is Dead. Secularization in the West* (Oxford 2002).

[46] He compares religion with a sea that contains a variety of fish. Whether the sea is fresh or salt, cold or warm determines the kinds and combinations of fishes that will be caught. Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 102-110.

[47] Ibidem, 118-123.

The title of Martin Riesebrodt's *Die Rückkehr der Religionen* (2000) already indicates another perspective on fundamentalism. According to the sociologist, secularization and the revival of religion must not be considered opposites, but in relation to each other.[48] In contrast with most comparative studies, Riesebrodt did not approach fundamentalism by describing common features or family resemblances. Instead, he formulated a typological definition of the phenomenon after comparing, again, American and Iranian fundamentalists.[49] First, Riesebrodt claimed, rapid social changes produce a perceived crisis, which may lead to religious revival. Within this revival, utopian reform movements must be distinguished from (more mythical oriented) fundamentalist movements. Subsequently, fundamentalist movements can be subdivided in charismatic and rational, legalistic-literal fundamentalism. The last one, finally, contains world conquering as well as world fleeing fundamentalism.[50]

From this perspective, Riesebrodt analysed American Protestant and Iranian Shiite fundamentalism. He did so by focussing on their ideologies, carriers and mobilization. Fundamentalist ideologies are, among others, characterized by patriarchal monism, ethical monism, religious nativism and messianism. The carriers of the movements, according to Riesebrodt, are not drawn from one social class, but are differentiated by their values and life style. Therefore, they are best described as cultural milieus.[51] He identified the clergy, urban and traditional middle-classes and the 'uprooted' as the main carriers, while considering urbanization, social structural transformations and the rise of centralized and bureaucratic states as the most important processes behind their mobilization. This, finally, led him to his definition of fundamentalism as radical patriarchalism or as a patriarchal protest movement. They are called radical instead of traditional because the perceived threats cause mobilization and radicalization through which they not only revert to tradition, but also innovate. Socio-moral issues, and especially the threatened patriarchal structure, provide the fundamentalists' common ground and these issues are stressed in public debates and conflicts.

Whereas most comparative researches on fundamentalism used case studies in order to formulate some common characteristics of fundamentalist movements, Riesebrodt has developed a model for the study of fundamentalism that integrates long-term transformations, contextual factors and ideology.[52] The conclusions of his studies, however, do not deviate very much from the results of other approaches. Although Riesebrodt's characterization of fundamentalism as a socio-moral milieu was an innovative one, he too considered fundamentalist movements as reactions to certain transformations accompanying the rise of modernity. Moreover, the ideological characteristics he formulated and the causes he noticed for the mobilization of fundamentalists are found in other publications as well. For this reason, it may be useful to take a closer look at some authors that exclusively focus on Muslim fundamentalism and to investigate whether their results diverge from the ones described so far.

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[48] Riesebrodt, *Die Rückkehr der Religionen*, 9-12.

[49] Cf. Martin Riesebrodt, *Fundamentalismus als patriarchalische Protestbewegung. Amerikanische Protestanten (1910-28) und iranische Schiiten (1961-79) im Vergelich* (Tübingen 1990); Idem, 'Een vergelijkende studie naar het fundamentalisme', in: Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, Sjaak Koenis en Pauline Westerman red, *Naar de Letter. Beschouwingen over Fundamentalisme* (Utrecht 1991) 139-160.

[50] Riesebrodt, *Fundamentalismus*, 18-24; Idem, 'Een vergelijkende studie', 148-149; Idem, *Rückkehr der Religionen*, 50-57.

[51] 'Kulturmilieu'. Cf. Riesebrodt, *Rückkehr der Religionen*, 49-93.

[52] The *Fundamentalism Project*, for instance, is criticized for being a collection of case studies while cross-cultural comparisons are almost absent. Cf. Jane I. Smith, 'Fundamentalisms Observed' and Ellis Goldberg, 'Fundamentalisms and Society', *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 28 (1994) 169-172 and 172-175.

Even though comparative approaches to fundamentalism were widespread in the nineties, the transfer of the term from Christian Protestants in the early twentieth century to contemporary Muslims was highly disputed in some circles. Especially Islamic scholars objected to the use of 'Islamic fundamentalism' and advocated alternatives like 'Islamism', 'Islamic activism', 'Islamic revivalism' or 'political Islam'. The resistance against the application of 'fundamentalism' to Islam is often based upon the Anglo-Saxon Protestant origins of the term. John Esposito, for instance, regards '"Fundamentalism" as too laden with Christian presuppositions and Western stereotypes' and argues that the term is 'implying a monolithic threat that does not exists'.[53]

But the most prominent argument against an 'Islamic fundamentalism' is that Islamists are more than their Christian counterparts political activists instead of theologians.[54] This view is expressed by Abdel Salam Sidahmed, who states that the program of the so called 'Islamic fundamentalists' is mainly political. Islamist intellectuals are political activists and social thinkers, he states, and it is this political activism that separates them from their coreligionists.[55] This thesis is further developed by Youssef Choueiri, who proposes three categories of Islamist movements. The first group, according to the scholar of Islamic studies, includes radical groups that condemn democracy as a means of achieving power, but also as a principle. An exponent of this view was the Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb. The second category consist of Islamists such as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood who accept democracy as a means for attaining power, but oppose it as an ultimate form of government. The last group are those Islamists that are officially denied legality, among which is the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.[56]

Olivier Roy equally opposes the label 'Islamic fundamentalism' and proposes to speak of 'Islamists' and 'neo-fundamentalists'.[57] In *L'Échec de l'Islam Politique* he argues that Islamists strongly distance themselves from the traditional views of Islamic scholars. Islamist ideologues were anticlerical and their activism, inspired by failed modernity in the Muslim world, is mainly political. Islamists strive for power and want to replace democracy, but will not establish an Islamic state according to traditional models.[58] Once in power, Roy argues, the changes will be only superficial. His views are supported by the German political scientist from Syrian origin, Bassam Tibi. Tibi equally stresses the political nature of 'political Islam', which he considers as the Islamic alternative of fundamentalism. He describes political Islam as an anti-western and anti-secular political ideology that has little to do with religion.[59]

Roy, Choueiri and Tibi stress the diversity within the so called 'Islamic fundamentalism'. This point is similarly emphasized by Esposito, who writes that 'the variety of Islamic movements are

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[53] Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 8.

[54] This is the main argument of Thijl Sunier, 'Islamitisch Fundamentalisme als Politiek Proces', in: Wim Haan and Anton van Harskamp eds., *Haat en Religie* (Kampen 1994) 119-128.

[55] Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'Introduction', in: Idem eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Oxford 1996) 1-15, esp. 2-5. 'Fundamentalism' is 'tolerated' in the title of the volume only as a label.

[56] Youssef Choueiri, 'The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements', in: Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Oxford 1996) 19-33.

[57] Olivier Roy, *Généalogie de l'Islamisme* (1995; Paris 2001) 29-30.

[58] Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (transl. from *L'Échec de l'Islam Politique*, Paris 1992; Cambridge 1996) 35-47.

[59] Bassam Tibi, *Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung. Der Islam und die Weltpolitik* (1992; Munich 2002).

undercut and distorted by the univocal connotation of the term 'Islamic fundamentalism'.[60] This emphasis is the totally opposite of the comparative studies about fundamentalism, in which the commonalities between fundamentalist movements in different contexts are stressed. Another eye-catching difference between the cross-cultural studies and the literature on Islamism is that the latter emphasizes the political nature of the phenomenon. While Bruce and Riesebrodt focus particularly on the social backgrounds and ideologies of fundamentalist movements and Lawrence describes fundamentalism as a 'religious ideology', scholars of Islam distinguish a political activist 'Islamism' from religious 'fundamentalism'.

Nevertheless, these studies have in common that they all adhere so called 'crisis theories' to explain the resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism or Islamism.[61] The authors consider modernization and accompanying processes as the prime cause of religious revival. The decline of traditional values, crises of legitimacy, socio-economic marginalization caused by industrialization, urbanization, etc., increasing inequalities, the decline of clerical power and the lost Six-day war of 1967, all these factors are considered to have contributed to a perceived crisis that led to the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism. Lawrence, for instance, ascribes the rise of fundamentalism to 'fears of unprecedented catastrophe' and 'severe disappointment' and Antoun to the 'perception of deprivation and powerlessness'.[62] Caplan speaks about 'a symptom of perceived threat or crisis' and Esposito writes: 'Muslim states continue to exist in a climate of crisis in which many of their citizens experience and speak of failure'.[63] Riesebrodt's typological definition, finally, starts from a perceived crisis and considers the revival an 'expression of communal crises.'[64] Although some authors emphasize socio-economic problems while others stress socio-moral or political threats, all authors regard the crisis of modernization as the prime cause for the religious resurgence.

Other perspectives are possible, however.[65] An approach that explicitly rejects crisis theories is the Resource Mobilization Theory, which would later expand into the Social Movement Theory. Resource Mobilization Theory focuses on the rise, organisation and spread of social movements. Introduced by sociologists like Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdams and influenced by rational choice theories, the active role and rational collective actions of social movements are emphasized instead of

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[60] Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 204.

[61] See for a short description Inger Furseth and Pål Repstad, *An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion. Classical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Aldershot 2006) 159.

[62] Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 201; Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism*, 14.

[63] Caplan, 'Introduction', 5; Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 206.

[64] Riesebrodt, *Rückkehr der Religionen*, 52.

[65] A perspective that attempted to reduce external factors as explanations for the rise of fundamentalism and emphasized the importance of Islamic beliefs and tradition themselves was the 'perspective of continuity'. Other interpretations overestimated material factors and socio-economic deprivation, but overlooked the importance of religion, these authors argued. Political scientist R. Hrair Dekmejian, for instance, wrote that 'the conceptual myopia induced by capitalist and Marxist materialism had effectively blindfolded the scholars (...) who tended to disregard or underestimate the regenerative capacity of Islam'. Scholar of Arabic and Islamic studies William Montgomery Watt stated that Muslims had problems to adapt to modernity because of their static views and beliefs. This resulted in an idealization of the past and in the fundamentalist attempt to return to these 'somewhat primitive and barbaric' times of the Prophet. Because of its essentialist view on religion, however, this perspective has never been very influential. Cf. R. Hrair Dekmejian, 'An Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives', *The Middle East Journal* 34 (1980) 1-12, esp. 1; W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (1988; London and New York 1989) 19, 71, 141-142; Thijl Sunier and Arend Jan Termeulen, 'Islamisme als Tegenideologie', in: Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, Sjaak Koenis and Pauline Westerman eds., *Naar de Letter. Beschouwingen over Fundamentalisme* (Utrecht 1991) 163-184, esp. 165-167.

their reactive nature.[66] The authors focus on the ways in which organizations acquire support and finances, on their political opportunities and on how they organize their movements and mobilize people. Although this theory was applied to Islamic movements mainly after 2001, the approach used in Gilles Kepel's *Jihad* shows many similarities.[67] In this work Kepel examines the resources, opportunities and constraints of Islamist movements in various countries. He describes the expansion of education in the last decennia, the repression of Islamist movements, their alliances, the financial resources of 'petro-Islam' and their symbolic or violent actions. He focuses on the movements' actions more than analysing the developments that caused their reactions.

To sum up, we have observed the development of certain trends in the scholarly research on fundamentalism and Islamism. We have seen that some authors constructed a 'hypothetical family' of fundamentalists all over the world, while others opposed their kinship. Some studies emphasized the ideological, sociological and contextual similarities between fundamentalist movements, while other stressed their diversity and political character. These differences, however, must not be overestimated. Although Bruce and Riesebrodt focussed mainly on the ideologies and sociological backgrounds of the movements, they too described their political actions and mobilizations. And whereas the resemblances were the focus of attention in the *Fundamentalist Project*, political ideologies, media use and organization are treated as well.[68]

How these trend in fundamentalism research developed after the events of 9/11 we will observe in the next chapter. First, however, we once again revisit the debate concerning Huntington's clash of civilizations.

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[66] Cf. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge 1994); Doug McAdams, Sidney Tarrow en Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge 2001).

[67] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: Expansion et Déclin de l'Islamisme* (Paris 2000).

[68] In this respect it is noteworthy that some authors who are specialists in 'Islamic fundamentalism', like Olivier Roy and Bassam Tibi, cooperated within the project. Cf. Tibi, 'The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists'; Olivier Roy, 'Afghanistan: An Islamic War of Resistance', in: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds., *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance The Fundamentalism Project* 3 (Chicago 1993) 491-510.

3. REPRESENTATIONS OF FUNDAMENTALISM AFTER 9/11

§ 1 *Marginalized narratives reappear*

The appearance of the second spectre that Huntington had announced in the early nineties seemed to be confirmed by the events in the beginning of the twenty-first century. In New York and Washington, in Bali, Casablanca, Madrid, London and elsewhere, the self appointed vanguard of Islam appeared to prove that its religion was indeed the driving force of the bloody civilization Huntington had announced. Fukuyama's end of history was falsified – another spectre had shown his face. And again the powers of the world 'entered into a holy alliance to exorcise the spectre', first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, according to criticasters driven by the 'nursery tales' of the weapons of mass destruction. The, in the words of the American President, 'monumental struggle of good versus evil' between 'barbaric terrorists' and 'civilized people' was confirmed by the 'terrorists' themselves. In a statement faxed to al-Jazeera, Bin Laden called upon the Muslims to defend Islam against the 'hostility of the Crusader forces' in 'one of the battles of eternal Islam'. Pointing at conflicts all over the world, he stated in a videotape of October 7 that 'these events have split the entire world into two camps: one of faith and one of unbelief.'[69] Huntington's final clash had begun.

In public debates, Huntington's star rose quickly. In newspapers, for example, his name appeared far more often in the years after September 11 than before. In ten leading American newspapers, the combination of 'Huntington', 'clash' and 'civilizations' appeared in eleven articles per year between September 11, 1993 and September 10, 2001.[70] Between September 11, 2001 and September 10, 2007, however, the average per year has increased to 26: an increase of 236 percent.[71] Although Huntington already put forward his thesis in 1993 in *Foreign Affairs* and published his *Clash of Civilizations* in 1996, it were the events of 9/11 that brought his ideas under the attention of the larger public. In Great Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands this pattern was even stronger. The yearly average amount of articles in nine British, six German, nine French and six Dutch newspapers containing the same terms increased with 311, 250, 950 and 243 percent respectively.[72]

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[69] See for the text (September 24 2001) and videotape (October 7 2001) http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=16632 and http://www.aljazeera.net/news/archive/archive?ArchiveId=17555. See for translations Bruce Lawrence ed., *Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (London and New York 2005) 100-105.

[70] The number of hits of 'Huntington', 'clash' and 'civilizations' are counted in the database Lexis Newsportal from the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. The newspapers are *Boston Globe*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Times*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Seattle Times*, *Washington Post*, *Washington Times*, *USA Today* and *Newsweek*. The query is conducted on the content of the articles and thus only articles containing all three terms are counted.

[71] The total amount of hits in the eight years before 9/11 is 91 and in the six years after 9/11 156.

[72] The British newspapers are *The Economist*, *Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, *International Herald Tribune*, *The New Statesman*, *The Observer*, *The Spectator* and *The Times*. The total amount of hits between 11-9-1993 and 10-9-2001 is 75 and between 11-9-2001 and 10-9-2007 166, which means averages per year of 9 and 28 respectively. The German newspapers are *Berliner Morgenpost*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Der Spiegel*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Die Welt* and *Welt am Sonntag*. The total amount of hits between 11-9-1993 and 10-9-2001 is 31 and between 11-9-2001 and 10-9-2007 61, which means averages per year of 4 and 10 respectively. The French newspapers are: *La Croix*, *Les Echos*, *Le Figaro*, *L'Humanité*, *Libération*, *La Nouvelle*

These observations show that Huntington's theory of a clash of civilization obtained a strong hearing after 9/11, at least among American and European journalists, but most probably among their readers as well. The contrast with the scholarly community seems striking. When counting the number of hits for the same query ('Huntington', 'clash' and 'civilizations') in PiCarta, a database containing the scientific books and articles of Dutch universities, the years 1993-2000 show 103 publications containing the term, while the years 2002-2006 show only 29.[73] Instead of an increase, we notice a declining average from thirteen to six publications per year containing these terms.

This apparent discrepancy between academic and media interests raises questions about scholarly opinions and analyses of the attacks. Were they not affected at all by public debates as these facts seem to suggest? Given earlier studies on Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism and the objections to Huntington, how did they include the violence in their explanations and descriptions? Were their publications, their subjects, approaches, narratives and discourses, influenced by the attacks at all?

§ 2 *Fundamentalism(s) reproduced*

The scholars of fundamentalism seem almost unaffected by the 2001 attacks in America. Figure 1 shows the results of a query conducted in the PiCarta database of the Dutch university libraries. For the years between 1980 and 2007, the occurrence of term 'fundamentalism' and the German, French and Dutch translations as well as derivations like 'fundamentalist' are counted in the titles of academic publications and presented in the chart.[74] The influence of 9/11 seems minimal. We notice the rise of the research on fundamentalism in the eighties and the peak in the middle of the nineties. Subsequently, we see a declining amount of publications until 1999, after which a second cycle begins. It may be possible that 9/11 caused a little upswing in the study of fundamentalism, but the effects are minimal and the peak of the mid-nineties was never surpassed. How can we explain these remarkable results?

Some studies indeed continued along the known paths. *Strong Religion* for instance, which was written by political scientist Gabriel A. Almond and the historians R. Scott Appleby and Emmanuel


République du Centre Ouest, *Sud Ouest*, *Le Télegramme* and *La Tribune*. The total amount of hits between 11-9-1993 and 10-9-2001 is 29 and between 11-9-2001 and 10-9-2007 228, which means averages per year of 4 and 38, respectively. In these newspapers the query is translated into 'Huntington', 'civilisations' and 'choc'. The Dutch newspapers are *Algemeen Dagblad*, *Financieel Dagblad*, *NRC Handelsblad*, *Het Parool*, *Trouw* and *De Volkskrant*. The total amount of hits between 11-9-1993 and 10-9-2001 is 55 and between 11-9-2001 and 10-9-2007 104, which means averages per year of 7 and 17 respectively.

[73] Because PiCarta does not allow searching at exact dates, I have chosen to exclude the years 2001 and 2007. Contrary to the newspaper query, this search is not within the content of the articles, but within their titles, authors, summaries, etc. However, this does not distort the findings. The same query in JSTOR, containing 729 archived journals that can be searched on content, shows a comparable pattern: a decrease from 383 (1993-2000) to 86 (2002-2006), which means from 48 to 17 per year.

[74] The keywords searched for are: fundamentalism, fundamentalisms, fundamentalist, fundamentalists, fundamentalismus, fundamentalistische, fundamentalistischer, fundamentalistischen, fundamentalisme, fundamentalisten, fondamentalisme, fondamentalismes, fondamentaliste and fondamentalistes. The query is conducted in September 2007, so the results of that year are incomplete. It must be stressed that the results of this and subsequent queries are only presented in order to indicate general trends within the scholarly field. Although they provide sufficient information to indicate the general developments searched for, the exact numbers may not be exactly representative because original publications, book reviews, new impressions or editions, translations etc. are all given equal weight in these statistics.

Sivan, draws heavy upon the earlier mentioned *Fundamentalism Project*.[75] Here too, 'fundamentalisms' are described as sharing certain family resemblances that together form 'pure fundamentalism'. Based upon the case studies of the Project, the work presents an analytical framework to explain the rise, development and decline of fundamentalist movements. Structural, change and choice factors explain their origin, growth and decline, according to the authors – a model that does not add very much to earlier researches. The attacks of 9/11 are almost neglected in the study: they are only mentioned in the first and last few pages of the book.

Malise Ruthven's *Fundamentalism* from 2004 is another exponent of the pre-9/11 fundamentalism research.[76] The Islamic scholar, well-known because of his *Islam in the World*, also undertook the search for family resemblances between various fundamentalist movements, mainly within the monotheistic religions. His description is largely based on the well known literature on fundamentalism, such as the works of Lawrence, Bruce, Riesebrodt and Kepel. Unsurprisingly, he recognizes more or less the same characteristics as his predecessors, like selectivity, a historicist reading of the scriptures and patriarchalism. More original is his exploration of the relationship between fundamentalism and nationalism. Opposing Lawrence, Ruthven argues that the two are not always opposites. In some contexts, leaders may use religion to intensify nationalism, polarize society and mobilize their people. In these contexts, religion and nationalism may coincide. Because of these

kinds of functions, he states, religions still plays an important role in some contexts and therefore the secularization thesis has to be abandoned.[77]

Besides these kinds of researches that embroider on older studies, themes and perspectives, we witness some innovatory approaches in the study of fundamentalism. For instance, an increasing amount of psychological researches appeared. In 2005 Ralph W. Hood, Peter C. Hill and W. Paul Williamson published their comparative investigation *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism*,

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[75] Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby en Emmanuel Sivan, *Strong Religion. The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (Chicago and London 2003).

[76] Malise Ruthven, *Fundamentalism. The Search for Meaning* (Oxford and New York 2004).

[77] Ruthven, *Fundamentalism*, 196-197.

in which they developed a psychological approach for the study of fundamentalism.[78] The authors present fundamentalism as a meaning system, which enables fundamentalists to interpret the world and their own position in it. Hood, Hill and Williamson consider holy scriptures as the central defining feature of fundamentalism and therefore they regard intratextuality as the key to understand their meaning system. By examining Protestant and, to a lesser extent, Muslim fundamentalists' engagement with their texts, they investigate how fundamentalists relate everything they perceive to their holy book and thus deduce meanings for their lives from their beliefs.

The social psychologist Peter Herriot proposes to study fundamentalism by using Social Identity Theory.[79] Fundamentalists, according to Herriot, obtain stronger social identities than their coreligionists and their boundaries with the outside world are higher. Therefore, their self-esteem and certainty is stronger, but the possibility of conflicts is greater as well. By thus examining the relation between outer groups, fundamentalist movements and individuals, and by accordingly testing his model on Mohammed Atta and Anglican fundamentalists, Herriot is able to show why individuals join fundamentalist movements and why fundamentalists are more likely to be involved in conflicts than other believers.[80] These conflicts, he states, are difficult to resolve, because 'they are conflicts of ideology, relating to beliefs and values which are incompatible'. Herriot argues that the most important condition to resolve these kinds of escalated conflicts is that other social identities are introduced to enable the construction of other worldviews.[81]

So far, we have seen the continuation of the old-fashioned fundamentalism studies and the appearance of new comparative approaches. Another comparative perspective, the earlier mentioned Resource Mobilization Theory, was further developed as well in the twenty-first century. In what came to be known as the Social Movement Theory, the scope of analysis was expanded. Besides focussing on the mobilization of resources, the social movements were contextualized by investigating their opportunities and constraints within their particular circumstances. Within their broader contexts, movements make strategic choices that depend upon their political space or possible repression. In addition to these structural dimensions of the development of social movements, the Social Movement Theory pays attention to cultural dimensions as well. This is mainly achieved by applying the notion of framing.[82] By formulating collective action frames, for instance by using media, movements attempt to provide people with a diagnosis of their situation. By proposing specific solutions to their problems, they try to mobilize them and motivate and justify collective actions.

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[78] Ralph W. Hood jr., Peter C. Hill and W. Paul Williamson, *The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism* (New York and London 2005).

[79] Peter Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism and Social Identity* (London and New York 2007).

[80] Herriot, *Religious Fundamentalism*, 104-107.

[81] Ibidem, 110, 117-118.

[82] Framing points at the activity of formulating collective action frames, which are interpretive schemata that enable people to localise and understand their situation. By proposing certain frames, movements attempt to construct the frameworks people use to make sense of their situation and of certain developments and events. The concept of framing is derived from the sociologist Ervin Goffman and used to analyse social movements by David Snow and Robert Benford. Gamson applied the notion to their media use. Cf. Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis. An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (London 1974) esp. 21; W.A. Gamson a.o., 'Media Images and the Social Construction of Reality', *Annual Review Sociology* 18 (1992) 373-393; Idem, 'Movements and Media as Interacting Systems', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (1993) 114-125; Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements. An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000) 611-639.

Until the nineties, the Social Movement Theory was mainly applied to Western social movements. Recently, however, Islamist movements too are analysed by using the theory.[83] One of the most important contributions so far is the volume *Islamic Activism*, edited by Professor of International Studies, Quintan Wiktorowicz.[84] Complementing comparative fundamentalism research and resisting crisis theories, Wiktorowicz wants to expand the scope of Social Movement Theory by examining 'Islamic activists' in various regions.[85] By focussing on violence and contention, networks and alliances, and culture and framing, this aim is brought into practice in analyses of movements in Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain, Palestine, Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In doing so, the authors want to avoid stereotypes and essentialist perspectives and bridge the gap between Social Movement Theory and Islamic studies.[86] Islamic activism, seen as a social movement, is described as a rational and strategic choice within particular historical circumstances instead of considering it as an ideology or political movement reacting on crises.[87]

Despite the appearance of traditional comparative fundamentalism studies and the application of new comparative psychological or sociological approaches, the amount of publications about fundamentalism appears not to have increased after 9/11. Furthermore, the studies mentioned so far, do not pay extraordinary attention to the events. Given the enormous influence of 9/11 on public debates and media discourses, this observation is highly remarkable. Therefore, it seems reasonable to examine whether this influence is observable in the studies that focus on Muslim fundamentalism.

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[83] Cf. for an overview Roel Meijer, 'Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously. Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement', *International Review of Social History* 50 (2005) 279-292.

[84] Quintan Wiktorowicz ed., *Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory* (Bloomington 2004).

[85] Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Introduction. Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory', in: Idem ed., *Islamic Activism*, 1-33, esp. 3-5.

[86] Cf. Charles Kurzman, 'Conclusion. Social Movement Theory and Islamic Studies', in: Idem ed., *Islamic Activism*, 289-303.

[87] However, this approach runs the danger to neglect ideological or religious factors. According to political scientist Mohammed Hafez for instance, oppression by regimes is the most important factor for the rise of Islamist rebellion. But in trying to prove his thesis, he only treats religious factors when they contributed to the rise of the activism. And, because he considers repression to be the main cause, ideology is a marginal theme in his work. The concept of jihad, for instance, in only mentioned on three pages. In this way, neither the words of the Islamists themselves, nor ideology or religion in general are taken seriously. Cf. Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel. Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder and London 2003).

The amount of publications about Muslim fundamentalism is not very encouraging in this respect. Again, the PiCarta database is used to count the number of publications with 'Islamic fundamentalism' in their titles. The term 'fundamentalism' and its German, French and Dutch translations, as well as derivations like 'fundamentalist' are counted in combination with 'Islam', 'Islamic' and 'Muslim' and their translations and derivations.[88] The results thus attained are presented in figure 2. This chart is almost similar with the former one about 'fundamentalism'. Here too, we notice two peaks: one in the mid nineties and one around 2002. Although the peak of 2002 does exceed the one of 1994-1995 in this chart, the growth after 9/11 is not very noteworthy, especially because the amount of publications already increased in the year 2000.

Moreover, when comparing the total amount of publications about 'Islamic fundamentalism' (fig. 2) with the number of hits for 'fundamentalism' (fig. 1) the relative amount of publications about Islam within fundamentalism studies appears to have declined. In 2000 the amount of studies about Muslim fundamentalism (51) consisted of 37 percent of the total amount of studies on 'fundamentalism' (138). In the year of the attacks, however, this percentage decreased to 31 percent. In 2002 and 2003 the attention for Islam within fundamentalism studies stagnated with 33 and 31 percent respectively. It seems that the attacks neither influenced the amount of studies about fundamentalism in general, nor that about Muslim fundamentalism.

In this field too, a continuation of old research is visible. The French Islamic scholar and sociologist Gilles Kepel, for instance, published an English translation of his *Jihad* in 2002, almost without adjustments.[89] He maintained that political Islam had failed and was declining. Islamists, he

2. 'Islamic fundamentalism' in scientific publications

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
[88] To be exact: the earlier mentioned keywords (n. 70) are all counted in combination with: Islam, Islamic, Muslim, Muslims, islamische, islamischer, islamischen, Moslem, islamitisch, islamitische, moslim, moslims and islamique and the hits for Muslimfundamentalist, moslimfundamentalisme, moslimfundamentaliste, moslimfundamentalisten en moslimfundamentalistische are added to this total.
[89] Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London 2002).

had stated already in the French original in 2000, were not able to mobilize the Muslim masses and therefore performed individual actions out of frustration and impotence.[90] The attacks of 9/11 were just another example, he commented in his translation.[91] In 2004 he continued this line of argument in *Fitna* by maintaining that the Islamists were loosing ground. Their violent actions alienated the masses, he argued, and caused chaos within the Islamic community all over the world.[92]

Although Kepel stressed the importance of Europe as a frontline in the 'war for Muslim minds', the attention paid to the globalization of Muslim fundamentalism is even more prominent in the publications of another French authority who had declared the failure of political Islam, Olivier Roy. In *L'Islam Mondialisé* he argues that one of the important consequences of globalization on Islam is the rise of 'neofundamentalism'. The central defining feature of these neofundamentalists is their deterritorialisation, according to Roy.[93] Globalized Salafis, Wahhabis and others, reject 'cultural Islam'. Individual worship is emphasized and they strive for a pure Islam and an 'imaginary *ummah*'.[94] This new *umma* can be achieved either by *dawah* (call, invitation) or by jihad and the gap between the proponents of both ways is increasing, he states. The main goal of contemporary *mujahidin* is therefore no longer the nation, but the creation of the imaginary community. Their fighting is a 'spiritual journey', a 'the reform of the self', by which the neofundamentalist fighters like Bin Laden are tools as well as products of globalization.[95]

Political scientist Beverley Milton-Edwards is less cautious in using 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamism' and 'Islamic activism' and considers them interchangeable. In *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945* she focuses on 'Islam as a political experience'.[96] She describes the historical roots of Islamic fundamentalists in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, the religious revivalism of the seventies and the turn to violence in the eighties. The intimate link between Islam and violence, she states, was mainly established in the nineties, when it transformed into a global phenomenon.[97] Constantly stressing the diversity and modernity of Islamic fundamentalism and criticizing media discourses on Islam and terrorism, Milton-Edwards tries to depict a more nuanced picture of the rise of Muslim activism.

So far, we have seen studies that are to a large extent continuations of the pre-9/11 research. Just as before the attacks, some authors used comparative approaches to study fundamentalism, searching for commonalities of fundamentalists all over the world. Just as in the nineties, other authors rejected the term as well as the comparative approach and focussed their research on Muslim fundamentalism, now called 'Islamism', 'Islamic activism' or 'political Islam', stressing the diversity within and political nature of the phenomenon. Therefore, it may be tempting to conclude that the attacks of

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[90] Kepel, *Jihad: Expansion et Déclin*, 213.

[91] Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail*, 207, 375, etc.

[92] Gilles Kepel, *Fitna: Guerre au Coeur de l'Islam* (Paris 2004).

[93] He stresses that these neofudamentalists must be distinguished from Islamists, for instance because of their attitude towards the state and jihad. Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah* (transl. from *L'Islam Mondialisé*, Paris 2002; London 2004) 234, 247ff.

[94] Roy, *Globalised Islam*, 257-272.

[95] Ibidem, 288-289.

[96] Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism since 1948. Making of the Contemporary World* (London and New York 2005) 1-4.

[97] One year after this publication she returned to this theme in *Islam and Violence*, in which she argues that injustice and crises are more important factors for fundamentalist violence than Islam itself. Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islam and Violence in the Modern Era* (Hampshire and New York 2006).

September 11 in the United Stated did not have any affect at all on the academic research of Muslim fundamentalism. Yet, when revisiting the literature presented so far, we are able to notice some superficial changes. The most obvious, perhaps, is the attention the scholars paid to the relation between Muslim fundamentalism and violence. While the pre-9/11 studies by, for instance, Antoun, Bruce, Lawrence and Riesebrodt or the *Fundamentalism Project* considered violence just one of the topics to be dealt with, for Herriot, Wiktorowicz, Kepel and Milton-Edwards protests, conflicts and violence became a prime concern.

Besides the increasing concentration on violence, a second difference inflicts itself as well. For we have noticed that the comparative studies after 2001, which were mainly based upon the pre-9/11 fundamentalism research, still used the terms 'fundamentalism' (Ruthven, Herriot, Hood) or 'fundamentalisms' (Almond). The studies focussing especially on Muslim fundamentalism, however, use other labels: terms that are only suitable for Islamic movements. Wiktorowicz and Hafez prefer 'Islamic activism' or 'Muslim rebellion'. Kepel and Roy distinguish between 'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'neofundamentalism', Tibi speaks of 'political Islam' and Milton-Edwards uses all of them together. Although this pattern was already visible before 9/11, when some Islamic scholars rejected 'Islamic fundamentalism' and searched for alternatives, this development appears to have accelerated after 9/11. At least, the use of alternatives became more widespread; now not only Islamic scholars, but also political scientists and sociologists rejected or neglected 'fundamentalism'.

To investigate whether these patterns were only limited to the studies presented so far or that they represent a broader development, the next chapter will be devoted to the literature about Islam and violence.

4. REPRESENTATIONS OF ISLAM AND VIOLENCE AFTER 9/11

§ 1 *Reappeared narratives marginalized again*

'Many have continued to equate the religion of Islam with global terrorism', John L. Esposito wrote in 2003.[98] For them, 9/11 was 'the proof positive of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West'. The attacks themselves, the words of Bin Laden and the speeches and actions of American politicians stimulated the belief in a clash of civilizations, according to Esposito. He concluded: 'there was "a market for clash"'.[99]

Although marginalized, Samuel Huntington had not totally disappeared in scholarly publications after 9/11. To the contrary, many authors deemed it necessary to oppose his views. Even though the necessity of writing books or articles totally devoted to the condemnation of Huntington's work had disappeared, chapters, paragraphs and subsections were still wearing his name. Esposito too, felt the need to oppose the clash of civilizations once more. Echoing Riesebrodt, he proposed a more complex narrative that takes into account the internal divisions and competitions and the diverse external relations between Muslims and Westerners in past and present. Riesebrodt criticized Huntington for expressing a fundamentalist worldview himself and Esposito's *Unholy War* criticized Huntington as well as the fundamentalists. Islam has a rich past, he emphasized, and is still a religion to admire. The terrorists, however, have hijacked Islam, 'using Islamic doctrine and law to legitimate terrorism'.[100] In fact, he argued, they deviate from the ancient doctrines and traditions and must be distinguished from the 'pure Islam' of the seventh century. That is exactly what makes their wars 'unholy'. They must be confronted; the 'cancer of global terrorism' that afflicts the body must be removed.[101]

Islam is not the problem, Esposito declared, but the terrorists are. They must be distinguished from 'real' Muslims and 'pure' Islam. These conclusions are implicitly directed at Huntington, who wrote: 'the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization.'[102] Instead, Esposito proposed another confrontation, another clash, not between the West and Islam, but 'between the civilized world and global terrorists who engage in an unholy war'.[103]

§ 2 *From fundamentalism to terrorism*

The decreasing amount of scholarly publications on Huntington's clash of civilizations and the discrepancy between media and scholarly interests we observed in the last chapter, appear to be somewhat deceptive. Instead of opposing media and scholarly interests, we should rather regard them as interconnected. We have noticed that Huntington's thesis received a lot of attention in public

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[98] John L. Esposito, *Unholy War. Terror in the Name of Islam* (2002; New York 2003) viii.
[99] Esposito, *Unholy War*, 118 and 126.
[100] Ibidem, 22.
[101] Ibidem, 160.
[102] Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 217.
[103] Esposito, *Unholy War*, x.

debates. There existed, in the words of Esposito, 'a market for clash' among civilians, opinion makers and politicians. The clash was appropriated by others, and this resulted in the fact that Huntington lost the monopoly on the idea of a 'clash of civilizations'. The clash was not Huntington's clash anymore, it had become reality.

This idea is confirmed when 'clash' and 'civilizations' are counted without Huntington's name in the academic publications of the PiCarta database. This query shows an increasing instead of a decreasing average: while the amount of publications containing 'Huntington', 'clash' and 'civilizations' declined from thirteen (1993-2000) to six (2002-3006) publications per year, without Huntington's name the averages increase from twenty to 24.[104] Thus, the clash of civilizations did not disappear from scholarly debates, only Huntington did to some extent.

The fact that the public attention for the clash of civilizations had provoked reactions among scholars shows that the scholars of fundamentalism were not totally unaffected by their surroundings. Moreover, in the studies presented in the last chapter we observed an increasing concentration on violence as well. That these leading publications are indeed part of a broader development is noticeable after consulting the PiCarta database about publications on Islam and violence. When conducting a query with the combinations 'religion' and 'violence' or 'Islam' and 'violence' in the titles of scholarly publications, we notice a strongly increasing average from ten per year in 1990-2000 to 31 per year in 2002-2006. Moreover, when investigating the stream on publications about subjects that, at least in public imagination, are often related to religious violence, this development it clearly observable as well. In 1990-2000, for instance, an average of 76 publications per year contained 'martyr', 'martyrs' or martyrdom' in its title. This average almost doubled in 2002-2006 to 143 publications per year. The amount of publications about jihad and suicide attacks increased even more: 'jihad' rose from 29 to 155 per year and 'suicide bomber(s)', 'suicide bombing(s)' and 'suicide attack(s)' together from 4 to 90.

Another trend we observed in the last chapter after analysing the most important publications about Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism, concerned the exchange of the term 'fundamentalism' for alternatives focussing especially on Islamic movements. We already noticed that the use of 'fundamentalism' and 'Islamic fundamentalism' remained more or less the same after 9/11. At first sight, this seemed remarkable given the impact of 9/11. Yet, the key for understanding this observation could be an increasing usage of alternative terms.

That the observations based on the leading publications are indeed part of a broader development, is again confirmed by queries in the PiCarta database. After 9/11, the use of terms like 'political Islam', 'Islamism' and 'radical Islam' unmistakably increased. The use of 'political Islam' (or French, German or Dutch translations) increased from an average of twelve per year in 1990-2000 to 28 in 2002-2006. In the same periods, 'Islamism' was used 65 times per year before and 198 times after 9/11 and 'radical Islam' two times per year before and twenty times afterwards. Whereas the use of 'fundamentalism' remained more or less stable, the use of alternatives only suitable for Islam obviously increased.

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[104] In American newspapers, the yearly average of hits is now 63 (1993-2001) and 197 (2001-2007) per year instead of 11 and 26, which means an increase of 313 percent instead of 236. So in newspapers too, the mentioning of the clash without Huntington increased.

The most remarkable development, however, is the rise of the term 'terrorism'. Between 1990 and 2000, an average of 374 publications appeared each year containing 'terrorism' or translations or derivations in their titles.[105] In the period 2002-2006, however, this amount increased with 749 percent to 2800 publications per year. Figure 3, which shows the stagnating amount of publications about fundamentalism and the increasing number of studies about political Islam, Islamism, radical Islam and terrorism (which in the chart has to be multiplied by 10), clarifies this development. The developments in 2001 and 2002 unmistakably indicate that scholars were not untouched by the events of September 11, 2001.

To sum up, the comparative study of fundamentalism continued after 9/11. The use of the term 'fundamentalism' remained largely restricted to this comparative approach, as the stagnating and relatively small number of publications about 'Islamic fundamentalism' has shown. Besides these comparative studies, however, the amount of publications focussing on Islamic movements and individuals called 'Islamists', 'radical Muslims' and 'Muslim activists' increased enormously after 9/11.[106] Moreover, while pre-9/11 studies focussed on their social backgrounds, ideological characteristics and political strategies, the research after 9/11 paid special attention to their violent acts. These developments together, caused an explosive increase in the use of 'terrorism'.

Because of these observations, it is necessary to address the studies that deal with these subjects. Therefore, first some studies will be examined that explicitly focus upon the relation between religion, or Islam, and violence. Subsequently, because of the explosion of terrorism studies after 9/11, it is necessary to elucidate how these studies deal with Islam and violence.

3. 'Fundamentalism', 'political Islam', 'Islamism', 'radical Islam' and 'terrorism' in scientific publications, 1990-2006

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[105] The following terms are counted: terrorism, terrorisms, terrorist, terrorists, terroristische, terroristischer, terroristischen, terroristisches, terrorisme, terroristen and terroristisch.

[106] An indication of the fact that the rise of terrorism studies was mainly caused by the so called 'Islamic terrorists' of the twenty-first century is that the terms 'terrorism', 'terrorist' or 'terrorists' combined with 'Islam', 'Islamic', 'Muslim' or 'Muslims' increased from an average of 2 per year in 1990-2000 to 68 in 2002-2006: an increase of 3013 percent.

§ 3 *Religion and violence*

One of the key publications about the relation between religion and violence is *Terror in the Mind of God* by the sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer. Although first published in 2000, the second edition of 2003 was extensively revised to incorporate the new developments. Juergensmeyer's comparative study first examines some cases of 'terror' by Christians (abortion clinic bombings, Timothy McVeigh, Belfast), Jews (Yoel Lerner, Baruch Goldstein, Meir Kahane), Muslims (Abouhalima, Hamas), Sikhs (assassinations) and Buddhist (Tokyo subway attack), after which the second part deals with more general themes concerning religion and violence. His main thesis is that acts of religious violence must be seen as public performances rather than political strategies. The violent acts are theatrical and symbolic and aimed at making impact on the audiences reached. By choosing the stage, time and audience of their attacks, religious terrorists point at something beyond their immediate target; at the worldview or the cosmic war they envisage.[107] By placing events in a cosmic scenario, claiming continuity with the past, ritualizing violence and 'satanizing' their enemies, the violent acts are imagined as religious events.[108] Moreover, religion provides believers a sense of empowerment, which is, among others, visible in the statements of suicide bombers. Therefore, he concludes, religion can indeed make a difference. Although contextual factors like the crises of legitimacy, social uncertainties and the failure of secular nationalism are certainly crucial, and religion does not determine the action of believers, religion can empower terrorism. But the opposite is true as well: violence has empowered religion too. It has empowered believers, has given marginal religious movements a sense of importance and, most importantly, has made religious ideologies impossible to ignore.[109]

Most of Juergensmeyer's views are subscribed by Bruce Lincoln, Professor of Religious Studies in Chicago. In *Holy Terrors* he expresses his observations about religion and its relation to violence after 9/11. He too, describes the attacks of 9/11 as symbolical: they had a 'sign value' instead of a 'use value'.[110] Often, he claims, the relation between religion and violence is presented too straightforwardly. Some authors consider religious factors as the prime cause of violence because they determine the behaviour of believers, while others propose the opposite and consider religion totally unimportant and explain conflicts by pointing at other factors. In fact, their relationship is far more complicated, he concludes.[111] Religion informs practices, transforms human choices into sacred duties and strengthens the morale, intensity and motivation of fighters and conflicts. Therefore, religious factors do indeed matter, but other factors must be given weight as well.

Less nuanced approaches to religion and its relation to violence are characterizing a lot of contributions by political scientists. An exception is Michael Barkun, who in 'Religious Violence and

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[107] Cf. the chapter Theatre of Terror, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (2000; Berkeley and London 2003) 121-147.

[108] Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, 158-160.

[109] Ibidem, 221.

[110] Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after September 11* (2003; Chicago and London 2006) 17-18.

[111] Lincoln, *Holy Terrors*, 73 and 91.

the Myth of Fundamentalism' supports the qualification of religious violence as sacred drama.[112] Moreover, he writes: 'There is no simple, unilinear relationship between violence on the one hand, and religious variables on the other'.[113] These words could have been directly addressed to a lot of his colleagues: political scientists who study 'terrorism'. It are these 'terrorism experts' to whom we will now turn.

§ 4 *Islam and terrorism*

Traditionally, research on terrorism is narrowly related to the political sciences. For this reason, it is not very remarkable that the expansion of the field paralleled the historical development of the phenomenon. Violent acts in Latin America, international events like the hostage-taking at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972 and leftwing or separatist campaigns in, for instance, Germany, Northern Ireland and Spain were the stimuli that caused the rise of terrorism research in the seventies. In the eighties, the literature on terrorism kept growing, partly because of the events in Iran, Lebanon, Palestine and Libya, and the nineties witnessed new upswings after bombings of the World Trade Centre (1993), the Oklahoma City federal building (1995) and American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), as well as the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway (1995). From this perspective, the development of the field after 9/11 becomes better understandable, although the extent of the increase remains extraordinary.

Despite the fast growing literature, terrorism has remained a contested concept, also within terrorism studies itself. In 1988, for instance, Alex Schmid and Peter Jongman had collected 109 definitions of 'terrorism'[114] and since then the disagreement among scholars has only increased.[115] Usually, terrorism is defined in terms of action, method or strategy instead of ideology.[116] Terrorism is seen as violence or the threat of violence and, to distinguish it from criminal acts, most definitions state that the aims and motives of the acts must be political.[117] Moreover, terrorist acts are designed to have far-reaching psychological impacts beyond the immediate targets. For this reason, terrorism could be described as symbolic violence: the targets represent a wider audience and the actions are performed to achieve a maximum effect. Furthermore, some authors propose that terrorists are not

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[112] Michael Barkun, 'Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism', in: Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur eds., *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism* (London and Portland 2004) 55-70, esp. 61-63.

[113] Barkun, 'Religious Violence', 69.

[114] The term itself was invented shortly after the French Revolution to refer to the 'Reign of Terror' or 'La Terreur' (1793-1794) by Maximilien de Robespierre.

[115] Cf. on definitions of terrorism Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: a New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature* (1983; Amsterdam 1988) 1-60.

[116] Cf. the definitions by two of the most leading terrorism scholars: Martha Crenshaw, 'Current Research on Terrorism: the Academic Perspective', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 51 (1992) 1-11, esp. 1; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London 1998) 13-43, esp. 43.

[117] However, others reject this condition and state that terrorism is 'an extremism of means, not one of ends'. Tore Bjørgo, 'Introduction', in: Idem ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism. Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (London 2005) 1-15, esp. 2.

wearing uniforms and that only subnational or non-state groups can be described as such, while others oppose and speak of 'state terrorism'.[118]

Especially since the nineties, terrorism research expanded beyond the boundaries of political sciences. But although sociologists, psychologists and historians increasingly devoted themselves to the subject, the majority of the scholars studying terrorism remained political scientists, most of them from the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel.[119] The main topics of study before 9/11 were in the first place nationalist and separatist movements like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and in the second place Islamic movements, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Besides case studies of particular movements, themes such as Weapons of Mass Destruction or the media use of terrorists were analysed, often by using comparative approaches.

But in terrorism research too, a lot of things changed after 9/11. Terrorism institutes were expanded, many new scholars from various disciplines devoted themselves to the field and terrorism courses attracted more students than ever before. Moreover, scholars paid more and more attention to subjects like the Middle East, Islamic movements, al-Qaeda and suicide attacks. This can be illustrated by the articles in one of the leading journals within the field, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. In the six years before 2001, 2/6 of the issues devoted an article to conflicts, movements or individuals in the Middle East (including northern Africa) and when excluding the special issue about water conflicts in the Middle East this number is reduced to only 1/6.[120] Between 2002 and the present, however, 3/6 of the issues contained an article about the Middle East.[121] The same trend is observable in relation to articles about terrorism and Islam, which doubled from 1/8 articles per issue in 1995-2000 to 2/8 in 2002-2007.[122] The number of articles per issue about al-Qaeda or Bin Laden increased from 1/12 before to 8/12 after 2001 and about suicide attacks from 1/24 before to 8/24 after 2001.[123]

Terrorism scholars too focussed their attention on the Islamic world, Islamic movements and violence or terrorism by Muslims. Nevertheless, their analyses of the relation between Islam and violence often remained superficial. One author stated, for instance, that the increasing amount of 'religious terrorist groups' was caused by the world wide growth of religious fundamentalism and that the rise of religious terrorism 'has apparently increased the lethality of post-Cold War terrorism, because such groups view civilians as legitimate targets of a "decadent society"'.[124] Political scientists and leading terrorism experts Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur suggest an intimate relationship between religion and violence. Pointing at religious violence in the 'Western history before the Enlightenment' and at 'religious experiences in non-Western countries', they do not find much

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[118] Cf. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 43; Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York and Oxford 1999) 156-183.

[119] Cf. Andrew Silke, 'The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research', in: Idem ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London and New York 2004) 186-231.

[120] In the 24 issues between Vol. 18 (1) 1995 until Vol. 23 (4) 2000 eight articles were published about the Middle East. The special issue about water conflicts (Vol. 20 (1) 1997) contains four articles about those conflicts in the Middle East.

[121] In the 40 issues between Vol. 25 (1) 2002 and Vol. 30 (8) 2007 twenty articles were published about the Middle East.

[122] The 24 issues before 2001 contained three articles about this theme, the 40 issues after 2001 ten.

[123] The 24 issues before 2001 contained two articles about al-Qaeda and one about suicide attacks, the 40 issues after 2001 26 and thirteen respectively.

[124] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 'What Do We Know About the Substitution Effect in Transnational Terrorism?', in: Andrew Silke ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London and New York 2004) 119-137, esp. 122.

encouragement that 'contemporary fundamentalist religious movements' will provide better records than totalitarian dictatorships in Italy and the Soviet Union.[125] In the same volume, Pedahzur and Gabriel Ben-Dor 'hope to provide evidence that these events [the historical development of Muslim terrorism] are indeed rooted in the basic nature of Islamic fundamentalism.'[126]

Terrorists' relation to religion was certainly not the prime concern for the political scientists and terrorism experts. They were mainly interested in the political motivations, strategies and consequences of their actions and possible countermeasures against them. Their treatment of suicide attacks will illustrate this point once more.

§ 5 Islam and suicide attacks

Contrary to the main trend after 9/11, research on suicide bombings is characterized by comparative approaches. Attacks from various contexts are compared with respect to the backgrounds, political contexts, strategies and motivations of individual perpetrators and their organizations, the performance of the actions and the consequences of the attacks. The traditional cases are Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers), Turkey (Kurds), Lebanon (Hezbollah), Palestine (various Palestinian organizations), Iraq, Chechnya and attacks in the West (all mainly transnational Sunnite organizations).

Political scientists and terrorism experts on the one hand focus on the individuals that execute the attacks. Political scientists Robert Pape and Ami Pedahzur, for instance, collected data about 315 and 418 suicide attacks respectively, while terrorism expert Marc Sageman gathered biographies of 172 mujahidin.[127] Based on these kinds of data, the scholars agree upon the fact that suicide bombers are not the desperate irrational fanatics they are often considered to be. Although their socio-economical backgrounds and cultural contexts differ, their profiles deviate not significantly from those of their surrounding societies. Their motivations are primarily based upon their dedication to their organizations, personal loss, humiliation and revenge or social pressure from their personal networks or the broader society.

On the other hand, the authors emphasize the importance of the organizations behind the attacks.[128] Suicide attacks are usually part of organized, coherent campaigns against a stronger enemy in a territorial conflict. Therefore, suicide attacks are based upon strategic calculations and political aims.[129] Although some authors point at their symbolic character, at their power to communicate certain messages about the strength, endurance and determination of the own group or the misery the

[125] Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, 'Introduction', in: Idem eds., *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism* (London and Portland 2004) 1-10, esp. 8.

[126] Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur, 'The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Fourth Wave of International Terrorism', in: Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur eds., *Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism* (London and Portland 2004) 71-90, esp. 72.

[127] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia 2004) 185-189; Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (2005; New York 2006) 3; Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide terrorism* (Cambridge and Malden 2005) 204.

[128] According to Pedahzur, more than 95 percent of the suicide attacks are committed by organizations. Pedahzur, *Suicide terrorism*, 12.

[129] These are the main conclusions in Mia M. Bloom, *Dying to kill. The global phenomenon of suicide terror* (New York 2005); Pape, *Dying to win*; Pedahzur, *Suicide terrorism*.

enemy will have to endure in the future, in the end they are strategic means to achieve political goals.[130]

The attention these political scientists and terrorism experts pay to cultural factors, religion and Islam is minimal.[131] After criticizing Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* and its supporters, Pedahzur states: 'the group of culture-based researchers did not provide a sufficient explanation for the phenomenon of suicide terrorism', after which the cultural contexts are set aside.[132] Pape takes the same stance by writing: 'the data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any of the world's religions'.[133] Because cultural factors cannot explain the phenomenon all over the world, these often praised authors choose to search for other explanations.

The contrast with, for example, sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer is striking. Juergensmeyer argued that acts of religious violence must be seen as public performances rather than political strategies. This view is supported by Malise Ruthven, who presents the backgrounds of the attacks of 9/11 in *A Fury for God*. Ruthven also opposes the neglect of religion in the debates about 'religious violence'. After describing the rise of militant Islamist ideology, global movements and concepts like jihad and martyrdom, he states about 9/11: 'ultimately, there exists a theological dimension to this most singular and spectacular act of terrorism'.[134] Referring to Juergensmeyer, he points at the symbolic character of religious violence, at cosmic battles, re-enactments of golden times and denial of death.[135]

That cultural approaches are able to contribute to the understanding of suicide attacks is also made clear by *Terror im Dienste Gottes*, a volume edited by the historian of religion Hans Kippenberg and the Islamic scholar Tilman Seidensticker. Although focussing on only one document of four pages, the final instructions or 'Geistliche Anleitung' found in the luggage of Mohammed Atta, they are able to shed light on the backgrounds of the perpetrators and the performance of the attacks in the United States. The document provides a mental preparation for the attacks. By carefully selecting elements from the symbolic repertoire – like traditional battle customs, classical battle sermons and religious slaughter rituals – it provides the perpetrators with feelings of superiority and fearlessness.[136] They create the idea of a superior 'neo-*umma*' by presenting the attacks as one of the stages within the cosmic battle in which the martyrs are the vanguard.[137]

This endeavour for an imaginary neo-*umma* returns in *Les Nouveaux Martyrs d'Allah* by Farhad Khosrokhavar. By combining cultural and sociological perspectives, the French-Iranian sociologist is

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[130] Cf. terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, who describes suicide attacks as a 'signalling game' in Bruce Hoffman, 'Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27 (2004) 243-281.

[131] See also Jan N. Bremmer, 'The Motivation of Martyrs: Perpetua and the Palestinians', in: *Religion im kulturellen Diskurs. Festschrift für Hans G. Kippenberg zu seinem 65. Geburtstag* (Berlin and New York 2004) 535-554. Bremmer argues that a persuasive analysis of the motivation of suicide bombers has to combine the general political situation and personal aspects, as well as ideological discourse.

[132] Pedahzur, *Suicide terrorism*, 24.

[133] Pape, *Dying to win*, 4.

[134] Malise Ruthven, *A Fury for God. The Islamist Attack on America* (London and New York 2002) 279-280.

[135] Ruthven, *A Fury for God*, 245.

[136] Bruce Lincoln, 'Die Meditationen des Herrn Atta, 10 September 2001: Eine genaue Textlectüre', in: Hans G. Kippenberg en Tilman Seidensticker eds., *Terror im Dienste Gottes. Die "Geistliche Anleitung" der Attentäter des 11. September 2001* (Frankfurt 2004) 39-54, esp. 43-46; Albrecht Fuess, 'Die islamitische Slachtrede und die "Geistliche Anleitung"', in: Ibidem, 55-66.

[137] Hans G. Kippenberg, 'Terror als Gottesdienst. Die "Geistliche Anleitung" als Begründung und Koordination der Gewalttaten des 11. September 2001', in: Ibidem, 67-86, esp. 83-85.

able to distinguish two kinds of martyrdom among modern jihadists. The first type is connected to a threatened or frustrated nation building. In Lebanon and Palestine, for instance, perceived crises in combination with religious motivations can inspire suicide bombers. The second type is a result of globalization, according to the sociologist. The desired but unattainable transnational neo-*umma* and perceived individual or communal humiliation and marginalization result in the struggle for an imaginary *umma* by urban young Muslims in the West.[138] The two kinds of martyrs Khosrokhavar distinguishes illustrate a broader development in the literature about Islam and violence, as will become clear in the fifth chapter, in which we will focus on the scholarly constructions of 'Islamic fundamentalists' and 'terrorists' and their histories.

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[138] Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers. Allah's New Martyrs* (transl. from *Les Nouveaux Martyrs d'Allah*, Paris 2002; London 2005).

5. SCHOLARLY REPRESENTATIONS: FROM FUNDAMENTALISM TO TERRORISM

§ 1 *The clash of narratives*

Edward Said already criticized Bernard Lewis' narrative in 1978. In *Orientalism*, he opposed the "authority" as 'aggressively ideological' and 'a perfect exemplification of the academic whose work (…) is in reality very close to being propaganda *against* his subject'.[139] Two and a half decennia and countless debates, articles and letters later, the tone of the discussions had hardened. 'Bernard Lewis', Said told *al-Ahram*, 'hasn't set a foot in the Middle East, in the Arab world, for at least 40 years. He knows something about Turkey, I'm told, but he knows nothing about the Arab world.'[140] The same was true for the man 'who relied heavily on the veteran Bernard Lewis', Samuel Huntington. In *The Nation* Said stated that Huntington was equally ideological and, moreover, 'a clumsy writer and inelegant thinker'.[141]

After 9/11, Said pointed once more to the political influence of Lewis and Huntington and the danger of their ideas. Lewis was one of the 'greatest outside influences on the administration's Middle East policy' and Huntington 'very clearly had his eye on rivals in the policy-making ranks, theorists such as Francis Fukuyama and his "end of history" ideas'. His 'clash of ignorance' was one of the main sources from which officials drew their vocabulary after 9/11, Said wrote, pointing at 'crusade', 'good versus evil' and 'freedom against fear'. The consequence was, Said indicated, that 'the knowledge they [from the administration] have of the Middle East, to judge from the people who advise them, is to say at least out of date and widely speculative'.[142]

Bernard Lewis and his supporters reacted equally fierce. Although four years after the initial publication of *Orientalism* – something Said subtly pointed at – Lewis answered by strongly denying any hostility to the people he studied.[143] 'It is difficult to argue with a scream of rage', Lewis wrote, but Said's presentation of Orientalists in the service of imperialism was 'absurdly inadequate'.[144] After 9/11 Lewis only reacted by claiming that the attacks confirmed his old theses without spending any more words on Said in his new books.[145] Lewis' student Martin Kramer, however, took over his stance in his *Ivory Towers on Sand: the Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America*. Middle Eastern scholars had failed, he argued, by overlooking the dangers of Islamism. After ferociously criticizing Edward Said and the Americans who 'demanded for a Palestinian perspective', he addresses Roy,

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[139] Said, *Orientalism*, 316.

[140] Amina Elbendary, 'Resources of Hope', *Al-Ahram Weekly*, April 2, 2003, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/631/focus.htm

[141] Edward W. Said, 'Clash of Ignorance', *The Nation*, October 22, 2001.

[142] Elbendary, 'Resources of Hope'; Said, 'Clash of Ignorance'.

[143] Bernard Lewis, 'The Question of Orientalism', *The New York Review of Books* 29, June 24, 1982, 49-56; Edward W. Said and Bernard Lewis, 'Orientalism: an Exchange', *The New York Review of Books* 29, August 12, 1982, 44-46.

[144] Lewis, 'The Question of Orientalism', 54; Said and Lewis, 'Orientalism: an Exchange', 46.

[145] Lewis, *What Went Wrong?*; Idem, *The Crisis of Islam. Holy War and Unholy Terror* (London 2003).

'who as early as 1994 had the courage to publish a book entitled *The Failure of Political Islam* and to write of the Middle East as having entered the stage of "post-Islamism"'. But especially John Esposito was to blame, he made clear: the 'academic entrepreneur who arrived from the far margins of Middle Eastern Studies' to answer Said's call for Islam-friendly studies.[146] The academics were blinded by the paradigms of Said and Esposito, Kramer declared, they were quarrelling over the diversity of terrorists while minimalizing the danger of Bin Laden. In short, led by Said and Esposito, the academic community accused public, media and government for ignorance of Islam, but refused to see its own intellectual failures.[147]

After 9/11, the debates between Said, Lewis, Huntington, Esposito, Kramer and others were more and more related to American policy and strategies. The study of the Middle East and Islam were directly related to foreign policy and 'homeland security' and the importance of scholarly knowledge rose enormously, at least in their perception. This was one of the causes for the increasing ferocity in the debates that were running for decennia already. The various authors were directly facing each other in intense discussions, attacking each other personally and trying to convince public and politicians of their position.

To avoid criticisms about 'Orientalism in reverse', we have tried to sketch a nuanced picture of the academic scholarship about Muslim fundamentalism. In the foregoing chapters, we have noticed various trends in the research, before as well as after 9/11. First, we have seen how, especially in the nineties, Islamic movements were included in fundamentalism studies. Comparative studies of movements within various religious traditions appeared that identified common characteristics and tried to explain the 'religious revival' in the secularizing world. Many Islamic scholars, however, opposed to this approach and focussed in particular on Muslim fundamentalism, stressing the diversity and political character of the fundamentalist resurgence in the Middle East. After 9/11 these trends continued, but other approaches, such as the Social Movement Theory, were applied to Islamic movements as well. Moreover, the attacks in the United States caused an increasing focus on Muslim fundamentalism. Because the main advantage of the term 'fundamentalism' – i.e., the possibility it offers for cross-cultural comparisons – had disappeared, we witnessed an increasing use of alternative terms that were only suitable for Islamic movements, like 'Islamism', 'political Islam' and 'radical Islam'. Furthermore, Muslim fundamentalists were more and more related to violence. Not only the attention for the relation between religion and violence increased, the attention for 'Islamic terrorism' did as well. That cultural and terrorism studies differed widely in their interests, approaches and theoretical perspectives, we observed in some leading studies about suicide attacks.

Parallel to these trends, we have noticed the rise of a narrative that, although controversial in academic circles, grabbed the attention of media and politicians. The debates between Lewis and Said started at the end of the seventies already, but extended in scope and intensity with the narratives of their pupils, Huntington and Esposito – the first proposing a clash between the West and Islam, the second between the civilized world and 'unholy' terrorists. After 9/11, these debates became even more passionate when the perception strengthened that scholarly production had important implications for actual policy.

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[146] Kramer, *Ivory Towers*, 44-60.
[147] Ibidem, 60.

So far, these debates have been presented separately from the study of Muslim fundamentalism. In the following paragraphs, however, the interconnectedness of the 'marginal' narratives, media discourses, political debates and scholarly study of fundamentalism will become clear once we have explored the narratives, constructions and othering within scholarly research of Muslim fundamentalism

§ 2 *Historical narratives about fundamentalists, Islamists and terrorists*

According to Hayden White, historical narratives are aimed at questions like: what happened next, why that happened and what is the point of it all?[148] Applied to our subject, it will be clear that the historical narratives about Muslim fundamentalism, Islamism or terrorism are usually aimed at explaining the 'fundamentalist resurgence', the 'rise of religious terrorism' or simply 'why 9/11?'. To explain these developments, historical events are selected and arranged in a narrative to indicate structures and processes in the past that led to the resurgence, rise or violence. By examining these selections and arrangements of the literature about Muslim fundamentalism, we will notice important differences between the studies before and after 9/11.

The historical narratives of fundamentalism and Muslim fundamentalism before 9/11 are predominantly arranged in two stages. Firstly, case studies of fundamentalist movements in national context are presented. Cross-cultural comparative studies often focus on movements in the United States in the early twentieth century or in Iran in the sixties and seventies and describe the rise of fundamentalism within these national contexts. Studies concentrating on Muslim fundamentalism do the same with respect to national contexts in the Arab world. Secondly, these movements are compared and structured within a general framework using concepts like modernization, colonization, secularization or resource mobilization. By thus relating the national movements to transnational historical processes and structural developments, grand narratives are constructed in which their rise is explained.

The narratives thus arranged usually start around the First World War, when the first fundamentalists arose out of interdenominational conflicts in America. An urban protest movement came up protesting against socio-cultural and economical transformations, declining political influence and socio-moral criticism. This episode in the history of fundamentalism was a short one, however, and ended soon after the pyrrhic victory of the Monkey Trial in 1925.[149] But at the end of the seventies, fundamentalism returned to scene: first the Moral Majority in the United States, soon followed by Iranian fundamentalists. In Iran, the clergy, urban middle classes and young people protested against the socio-moral transformations, loss of power and Western influences. The alliance between conservatives, social reformers and fundamentalists finally succeeded in opposing the failed reforms of the shah after which Khomeini established his Islamic Republic.[150] The concept linking the

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[148] White, *Metahistory*, 2.

[149] Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 66-70; Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 153-188; Riesebrodt, *Fundamentalismus*, 40-122.

[150] Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism*, 94-97; Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 46-55; Riesebrodt, *Fundamentalismus*, 123-213.

cases is especially modernization, which caused a perceived crisis within some religious traditions. The processes were comparable, indicate the authors, although national repercussions could differ.

The narratives of scholars concentrating on Muslim fundamentalism diverge at some points from these comparative studies. In the first place, whereas the comparative studies often focussed on Iran, countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon and Palestine are equally important in these studies. Besides these different national contexts, regional events are more emphasized, such as the Six Day War or the oil crises. Besides the selection of other events, the processes explaining the rise of fundamentalism are adjusted to the Muslim world. Western imperialism, failing nationalism, socialism and pan-Arabism, discrepancies between secular elites and urban young poor; all these aspects play a more prominent role in the narratives of Islamism.[151] The general structure is the same, however: national cases are related to broader historical processes to construct grand narratives.

Most narratives of Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism after 9/11 have a totally different character. Some authors stick to the two stage model. Almond, Herriot, Wiktorowicz, Juergensmeyer and various studies of suicide attacks still present case studies and connect these with broader historical processes. Their cases, processes and concepts, however, differ widely from the ones of the pre-9/11 studies. Thus, Herriot uses social-psychological concepts to analyse Mohammed Atta, the volume edited by Wiktorowicz focuses at political and social transformations and studies the rise of Islamist activism by employing concepts like resource mobilization, political opportunities and framing and Juergensmeyer elucidates cases of individual and collective violence by concentrating mainly on ideology, making use of, for instance, performance violence. The grand narratives thus constructed explain the relationship between individuals and groups, the rise of social movements and the phenomenon of religious violence, respectively.

Nevertheless, many scholars also depart from this structure. National cases are omitted and only one diachronic grand narrative is presented, usually in several phases. Huntington's thesis is an extreme example of a grand narrative that only examines global political and ideological processes to tell the story of the clashes. Esposito pays more attention to specific historical contexts, but he too omits case studies and presents his narrative in one line from the beginning (the holy wars of the Prophet) until the end (the unholy wars of Bin Laden).

On the one hand, this development could be a consequence of the increasing concentration on Islam and violence which we have noticed before. Whereas the pre-9/11 studies mainly tried to explain the religious revival since the seventies, the studies after the attacks in the United States attempt to clarify the 'recent rise of religious violence'. This, of course, has consequences for the events which are selected and the historical processes by which they are structured. Conflicts in the Middle East, the 'genealogy' of Islamist ideologues and the history of concepts like jihad and martyrdom had become elements that often return.[152] Together, they are rearranged in one narrative of 'violence and Islam'.

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[151] Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 44-47; Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 12-17; Choueiri, 'The Political Discourse ', 24-26; Sidahmed, 'Introduction', 6-9; Charles Tripp, 'Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East', in: Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Oxford 1996) 51-69

[152] These genealogies are often very similar and follow the pattern of, for instance, Roy, *Généalogie de l'Islamisme*; Johannes J.G. Jansen, *De Radicaal-Islamitische Ideologie: van Ibn Taymiyyah tot Osama ben Laden* (Utrecht 2004).

On the other hand, al-Qaeda's violence had another consequence for these narratives: an increasing attention for globalized Islamism. Before 9/11, scholars predominantly studied national movements in Iran, Egypt, Palestine and elsewhere. This is well illustrated by the categorization of Islamists Choueri proposed in 1996 by distinguishing between three kinds of movements, all of which fought local or national enemies.[153] After 9/11, such a categorization without transnational or global movements became unthinkable. Since that moment, the distinction provided by Khosrokhavar seemed more reasonable. Besides Islamism in threatened or frustrated nations like Iran, Lebanon or Palestine, he described a globalized Islamism, which strove for a transnational neo-*umma*. This rise of what Roy called 'neo-fundamentalism' became a central theme in the literature after 2001. Kepel, Khosrokhavar, Kippenberg, Lincoln, Milton-Edwards, Roy, Ruthven, terrorism experts and others, they all described this new type of Muslim fundamentalism. September 11 had raised scholarly interest for this 'new' type of movement with its different political objectives and strategies, divergent social backgrounds of the members (part of them from the West), universalized ideology and new (Western) enemies, increasing use of internet and other media, international training camps and loosely organized cell structure.

The new narratives are characterized by several relatively autonomous lines that merge in the course of the eighties, producing a violent amalgam, and thereafter diverge to some extent. Usually, an independent line is created for the histories of concepts like jihad, *takfir* and martyrdom, starting in the times of the Prophet and ending with violent Islamic movements in modern times. The main lines, however, begin in colonial times. The most important is the Egyptian one, in which Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb figure dominantly. Other lines start in Saudi Arabia (Wahhabism), Pakistan (Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami) and Palestine ('Azzam). Subsequently, the narrative unites these various lines in Afghanistan. The ideologies and warriors from different countries and movements merged in the struggle against the Soviet Union. The jihad against the Soviets produced a network of warriors that became headed by the Saudi Bin Laden, who was educated by Qutb's brother and 'Abdullah 'Azzam and founded al-Qaeda in 1988. After the successes in Afghanistan, the 'movement' globalized. The warriors flew out, some of them to their home countries, but many to fight elsewhere, in Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir. The idea of a global movement or even network did not disappear, however, and various connections between regimes, movements and individuals prove this idea. Sudan, Libya, Iran, Syria and the Taliban had connections with militant movements, the authors suggest, and supported them in the struggle against secular regimes, Israel and the West. Al-Qaeda was a spider in this global web, as it showed by attacking embassies, marine ships and, finally, the symbolic heart of the world.

In rough lines, this is the narrative of which the main characteristics are found in many studies after 9/11.[154] Malise Ruthven's *Fury for God*, for instance, starts with a description of 9/11 itself (Ch.

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[153] Choueiri, 'The Political Discourse', 20-21.

[154] Esposito, summarizing his narrative, writes: 'The "armies of God" have passed through several stages, becoming ever more global in outreach. Initially, most groups focused on their own countries. They were primarily Egyptian, Algerian, or Tunisian movements. The Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation marked a turning point as Muslims in record numbers travelled to Afghanistan to join in the jihad against oppression of Muslims. The experience and success of that jihad created a new, more global jihad sentiment and culture embodied in Afghanistan – and in a sense of solidarity, which subsequently brought Muslims from various parts of the world to participate in jihads in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, Central Asia, and Chechnya. (...) A hitherto

1), after which he describes the history of the concept jihad (2), Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (3), Egyptian fundamentalist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood (4), the spread of Wahhabism (5) the 'seeds of terror' in Afghanistan (6) and the 'jihad against America' (7). Milton-Edwards considers al-Banna to represent the transition from pre-fundamentalism (a.o. Wahhabism) to fundamentalism and says about Afghanistan that 'many writers traced the origins of the jihadi *salafi* struggle terror campaign to this location and they were right.' Consequently, she describes the spread of this new terror to Bosnia, Chechnya and the Philippines.[155] Terrorism scholars too, see the rise of a new kind of terrorism developing from Afghanistan in the eighties, a religious terrorism that subsequently spread around the world.[156]

Thus, the traditional grand narratives of (Islamic) fundamentalism were adjusted at major points to fit in the new developments. The events used in the stories were adjusted by focussing at violent movements, radical thinkers and conflicts in the Muslim world. Transnational Sunnite movements dominated the new narratives, instead of the traditional case of Shiite Iran.[157] The structure of the narratives changed, because the increasing attention to violence and the development of the globalized movement caused a departure from the 'comparison-through-cases model'. Instead, a kind of 'tree-model' developed that sought the roots of globalized radical Islamism in colonial times, the trunk in Afghanistan and the intertwined branches all over the world.[158] Finally, the processes linking the events were altered. Whereas the traditional fundamentalism studies linked their cases by pointing at comparable historical processes connected to modernization, the guiding principles of the post-9/11 narrative became ideology and violence. Although the impact of modernization, national and regional political circumstances and social transformations still played a role to explain the development of some thinkers, movements and conflicts, they did not structure the entire narratives anymore. The red line in the new grand narrative was the radical Islamist ideology and the development of concepts like jihad, *takfir* and martyrdom. Moreover, no abstract concepts were linking the globalized Islamists, but real contacts: direct, like in Afghanistan, and indirect, in writings or on the internet. Comparable cases in different periods and nations had become one straight line; a hypothetical family had developed into a real genealogy, a family tree from al-Banna to Bin Laden.

§ 3 *Othering fundamentalists*

The hypothetical family was called 'fundamentalist' and the genealogy most often 'Islamist' or 'terrorist'. These fundamentalists, Islamists and terrorists were not clearly demarcated groups of people that were 'discovered' by scholars in the field. It was no special faction of Muslims in Iran,

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little-noted part of the world spawned a Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance that became the base for a network of organizations and cells from across the Muslim world that hijacked Islam.' Esposito, *Unholy War*, 116-117.
[155] Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 75-79 and 92-112.
[156] However, in their narrative 'religious terrorism' replaces nationalist and separatist terrorism. Cf. Ben-Dor, 'The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism'; Enders, 'What Do We Know', 121-122.
[157] This is also visible in Ruthven's *Fundamentalism*. Although this study is based primarily on pre-9/11 secondary literature and can in a lot of respects be seen as a continuation thereof, Qutb and Egypt are more often mentioned than Khomeini and Iran.
[158] This picture, however, is generalizing to some extent. According to Roy and Kepel, for instance, the tree was dying and most of its branches had already died off.

Afghanistan or elsewhere which was overlooked by scholars until it ascended the stage in 1979 or 2001 to enter the spotlights of the researchers. Instead, they were deliberately separated from their coreligionists or fellow warriors and constructed into a category with some special features that could be studied and described.

The label 'fundamentalism' was adopted from the early twentieth century Protestants and was formed it into a prism through which the global religious landscape was observed. Several characteristics were 'identified' as boundaries between 'fundamentalists' and other believers. The individual features, however, were not unique for fundamentalists. They were not the only ones who selected some elements from a glorious past, rejected a number of aspects of modernity or created symbolical boundaries with the outside world. But when 'enough' characteristics could be ascribed to a movement, it could be called 'fundamentalist' and separated from 'modernists', 'liberals', 'cults', 'sects' and other categories. Fundamentalism remained a contested concept, however.[159] On the one hand, this was caused by disagreements about the definitions, family resemblances and boundaries of the identified groups. On the other hand, public imaginations, prejudices and associations made that all authors felt obliged to justify their employment of the concept and distance themselves from popular usage of the term.

The negative associations of 'fundamentalism' in public discourse are often explicitly resisted by the scholars. Esposito, for instance, states that 'the varieties of Islamic movements are undercut and distorted by the univocal connotation of the term *Islamic fundamentalism*' and Sidahmed writes: 'the "fundamentalist phenomenon is neither a single movement nor the same force in all corners of the region.'[160] Lawrence too, stresses that 'we must try to resist ethnocentrism and stereotyping'. Moreover, he indicates that 'there is no single reaction characteristic of all Muslims', while Charles Tripp notices: 'the Islamic responses have varied.'[161] Behind this diversity, however, always hide similarities. Lawrence's 'reaction' and Tripp's 'responses' point at parallel historical processes: at the transformations accompanying modernity.

The most important communal aspect of the various contexts is the rise of modernity. The red line of the grand narrative connecting the various cases is that fundamentalists react against several aspects of this development, such as secularization, the rise of nationalism and decline of traditional values. 'They are modern, however', is the constantly returning credo of the authors, mainly pointing at their use of modern techniques.[162] They are part of our grand narrative of modernity, the authors emphasize. Yet, the fundamentalists are always 'they'. Fundamentalists are the 'Other', a category of believers 'we' can study. They may be part of 'our' modernity, but at the utmost they are dwelling at its margins. They oppose the merits of 'our' modern time, like freedom of religion, pluralism, women emancipation, equality and individual autonomy. They resist main characteristics of modernity, such as secularism, individualization, nationalism, relativism and liberalism. Driven by several crises, they

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[159] Sidahmed even remarks that 'although "fundamentalism" is here to stay as a label, it is yet to be established as a generic concept'. Sidahmed, 'Introduction', 5.

[160] Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 204; Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'Preface', in: Idem eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Oxford 1996) vii-viii.

[161] Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 191 and 225; Tripp, 'Islam and the Secular Logic of the State', 52.

[162] Caplan, 'Introduction', 11; Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 41-42; Riesebrodt, *Fundamentalismus*, 16 and 238; Marty, 'Conclusion' 825-827; Riesebrodt, *Rückkehr der Religionen*, 50; Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 15 and 24; Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism*, 117-131.

try to transform society by politics or violence or they choose to withdraw from 'our' world. Except technology, their participation in the modern world seems involuntarily.

The image that rises from the fundamentalism studies is obviously more differentiated than the popular discourse they oppose. Sometimes, however, the studies still show glimpses of negative views of fundamentalism, although subtle.[163] For instance, Bruce writes: 'It can not be sufficiently stressed that most Muslims are not fundamentalists.'[164] He attempts to exonerate Islam by denying identification with fundamentalism, but, in the mean time, shows to perceive fundamentalism as a yoke for the religion. Another example is Martin Riesebrodt's accusation of Huntington for upholding a fundamentalist worldview.[165] This charge too, does not speak of a very positive image of the fundamentalist worldview when uttered in a book of which the major part is devoted to the condemnation of Huntington's views.

Thus, fundamentalism is constructed into a category that is diverse at the lower level but united at the higher, unified by its resistance against historical processes that shaped modern society. Scholars construct them into an Other, which is positioned in the margins of the modern world from which they cannot escape. By making them into an Other, the authors are able to oppose them with the Self: with Western modern society. The fundamentalists are made into a mirror, showing the Self-image of Western modern society. On the one hand, they show 'us' 'our' failures and shortcomings. For instance, Riesebrodt writes that they are needed to address the structural problems of modern societies that would otherwise remain unidentified, while Lawrence and Esposito argue that they are needed to adapt our liberalism and secularized mentality to other faiths, to point at our cognitive limits, our bias against religion and our monolithic view of reason.[166]

On the other hand, however, fundamentalists function to show the superiority of 'our' society. Foremost, the constructed Other points at the merits and power of 'our' society, thereby reproducing the superiority of 'our' worldview and securing the hegemony of 'our' modernity. In this case, Bruce can serve as an example, for he states that fundamentalists will ultimately fail because people will always demand central values of 'our' world: 'greater personal freedom, greater egalitarianism and greater equality in gender roles.' Therefore, he writes, they will not develop a viable alternative for Western liberal democracy, so 'there is no chance of Muslim states (even if most of them followed the Khomeini model) becoming a serious threat to the global domination of the USA or of its culture.' They will fail, as did the American Protestants and Khomeini's Islamic state before.[167] Lawrence takes the same stance, by predicting that fundamentalists will neither succeed in replacing Western cultural norms, nor in destroying the nation state, 'the political norm for all human kind'. Therefore, 'failure in the political realm is inevitable', he indicates.[168] In scholarly discourse fundamentalists are constructed into an Other functioning as a mirror to address Western society. Sometimes they may seem

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[163] Sometimes the subtlety is absent, however. An isolated remark from Lawrence in his attempt to explain fundamentalism is for instance: 'Throughout the twentieth century most Muslims, like most citizens of the third world, have remained rural and illiterate'. Montgomery Watt writes about the fundamentalist attempt to return to the 'somewhat primitive and barbaric' times of the Prophet. Montgomery Watt *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 19; Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 87.
[164] Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 64.
[165] Riesebrodt, *Die Rückkehr der Religionen*, 29.
[166] Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 228; Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 177; Riesebrodt, *Fundamentalismus*, 251.
[167] Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 119.
[168] Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 225, 227 and 241.

dangerous, but in the end, they are only the 'last-ditch defenders of God', a 'symptom of modernization' – marginal signs indicating that we are heading in the right direction.[169]

§ 4 *Othering terrorists*

The 'terrorist' al-Qaeda too, was used as an Other in attempt to unite the Self and to confirm its superiority. 'America is united', Bush stated one day after 9/11, and 'the freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side', because 'freedom and democracy are under attack'. 'We remain strong and united', he urged his people at September 13, 'one nation under God'.[170]

September 11 caused a shift in academic and popular discourses, a shift in favour of the term 'terrorism'. In ten leading American newspapers, 31.827 articles between January 1, 1996 and 9/11 used the term 'terrorism' or 'terrorist', while in the same period afterwards (until May 20, 2007) it was employed in 179.968 articles. The terms 'fundamentalism' or 'fundamentalist' were only used in 5682 and 8789 articles in the same periods; the terms 'Islamism' or 'Islamist' in 1034 and 7111.[171] The contrast between the increase of almost 150.000 for 'terrorism' and only 3000 and 6000 for 'fundamentalism' and 'Islamism' respectively, is striking. The pattern noticeable in academic publications is comparable. Between 1996-2000 and 2002-2006, the total amount of publications containing the title word 'terrorism' or translations derivations increased with more than 10.000, but 'fundamentalism' and 'Islamism' merely with less than 50 and 350 respectively.[172] 'Fundamentalism' and 'Islamism' became even more marginal categories after 9/11.

In media as well as public discourses, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were almost exclusively called 'terrorists'. That terrorism studies described the events as such is not very remarkable. Neither is it unexpected that scholars like Beverley Milton-Edwards, who uses the terms 'fundamentalism', 'Islamism' and 'terrorism' more or less indiscriminately, label 9/11 as 'terrorism'. The same is true for Juergensmeyer, who employs the term to describe 'religious violence' in various traditions. It is noteworthy, however, that even authors who usually speak about 'fundamentalists' or 'Islamists' often employ 'terrorists' when describing the events of 9/11. In *Fury for God*, for instance, Malise Ruthven seems to prefer 'Islamism', but concerning these events he frequently uses 'terrorist attack' as well.[173] But also Kepel, Khosrokhavar, Roy and others are using this term especially to describe 9/11 and al-Qaeda. Although these authors are generally very cautious in employing their terms and devote special paragraphs to explain and justify their use of 'Islamism', 'fundamentalism', 'neo-fundamentalism', etc., their naming of 9/11 as an act of terrorism seems self-evident. Concerning these events, the concept is not problematized but simply taken for granted.

This is remarkable, for 'terrorism' is a contested concept as well. Just as 'fundamentalists', 'terrorists' are separated from other people; in this case, other people committing violence. Here too,

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[169] Caplan, 'Introduction', 5; Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, ix; Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, 119.

[170] Cf. his speeches of September 12 and 13 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/.

[171] Counted in Lexis Newsportal from the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Cf. n.66 for the newspapers.

[172] Counted in PiCarta. 'Terrorism' increased from 2728 to 13998, 'fundamentalism' from 685 to 729 and 'Islamism' from 484 to 808.

[173] In his *Fundamentalism*, he also limits the use of 'terrorists' to al-Qaeda, Bin Laden and 9/11. Introducing his subject on the first page of his book, he speaks of a '"fundamentalist" atrocity'. Cf. Ruthven, *Fundamentalism*, 1 and 116.

scholars discuss the boundaries between terrorist actions and, for instance, criminal acts or guerrilla warfare. For this reason, some specific characteristics are 'identified'. Terrorism, for instance, must be violence that targets civilians, causes psychological impact and contains political motivations. These boundaries, however, are more contested among scholars than the ones of 'fundamentalism'. Moreover, in popular imagination, terrorism is an even more value-loaded term than fundamentalism. Yet, the most important reason to problematize the concept is that the currently handled criteria show an unmistakably Western bias.

This becomes clear by realizing that perceptions of 'violence' are culturally bound. Actions that 'we', Westerners, recognize as 'violence' may be perceived differently in other cultures.[174] Our understandings of the concept, for example, are strongly informed by the historical process of monopolization of violence by the state. For that reason, we focus on the instrumental value of violence, which has to be meaningful, useful and rational.[175] But the state monopoly also informs the perception that violence by non-state performers is illegitimate and criminal. These perceptions, then, are closely related to the associations 'terrorism' evokes. Terrorism is even more than violence perceived as illegitimate and unlawful. In 1937, for instance, the United Nations defined terrorism as: 'All criminal acts directed against a State (...)'. In 1992, the earlier mentioned terrorism expert Alex Schmid suggested the United Nations to adopt 'the peacetime equivalent of war crimes' as legal definition, while the United States Defense Department describes terrorism as 'the unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence (...)'.[176] These definitions, constructed by terrorism experts, are supported in their publications. Not only the illegitimate nature of the phenomenon is stressed, but also is terrorism often limited to non-state groups.[177]

In his recently published *On Suicide Bombing*, Talal Asad underscores that these perceptions of terrorism are informed by Western liberal perspectives. Whereas we consider violence by Islamic jihadists as terrorism, he indicates, we consider violence by the state as a legitimate mean do defend and protect the nation. Our states have the right to defend themselves against other states or groups, while violence outside our institutions horrifies.[178] Moreover, we neglect the fact that our liberal states and laws themselves are founded by and depend on violence. 'If modern war seeks to found or to defend a free political community with its own law', he concludes, 'can one say that suicide terrorism (like a suicidal nuclear strike) belongs in this sense to liberalism?'[179]

Instead, modern scholarly discourse conceives the perpetrators of the 9/11 suicide attacks are as 'terrorists'. They are part of 'terrorism', a category with special characteristics and an object against which a war can be fought. 'Islamic terrorism' is regarded as a monolithic entity, a global network threatening our society. Al-Qaeda, for instance, is often depicted as a 'global terrorist network', which

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[174] Cf. David Riches, 'The Phenomenon of Violence, in: Idem ed., *The Anthropology of Violence* (Oxford 1986) 1-27, esp. 1-2.
[175] Cf. Anton Blok, 'The Meaning of "Senseless" Violence' (1991), in: Idem, *Honour and Violence* (Cambridge, Oxford and Malden 2001) 103-114.
[176] Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 5; United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (sic!), 'Definitions of Terrorism', at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html.
[177] Bjørgo, 'Introduction', 2; Lincoln, *Holy Terrors*, 20. Laqueur describes the definition of the Defence Department as 'one of the best' and Hoffman constraints terrorism to 'violence perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity'. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 43; Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, 5.
[178] Talal Asad, *On Suicide Bombing* (New York 2007) 59-63.
[179] Ibidem 92.

has one command centre and is actually performing the global war it preaches on its videos.[180] When these observations are related to the earlier described dominant narrative after 9/11, we may notice that the genealogy from al-Banna to Bin-Laden is in fact a genealogy leading up to 'Islamic terrorism'. Whereas some authors describe this whole genealogy as 'terrorist', others use the term since the birth of this global network in the eighties, while a third group limits the use of the term to the attacks in the twenty-first century.[181] The structure of the narrative remains the same, however, and the binding elements remain Islam and violence.

The image emerging from this narrative is the birth of a terrorist Other, a criminal opponent who moves outside our institutional framework and penetrates 'our' world. Whereas fundamentalists inhabited the margins of 'our' world, terrorists are the outsiders threatening 'us'. But who are the 'Self' and the 'Other' after 9/11? The answer to this question is more ambiguous than before 2001. Although scholars debated about the boundaries of fundamentalism, its inner core was always more or less the same. It were American Protestants in the twenties and seventies, Iranians since the seventies, it were some Jewish groups like Gush Emunim or Sunnites like Qutb and Mawdudi: all resisting some aspects of the modernized world. But they were always demarcated from their coreligionists. After 9/11, however, the relation between 'Islamists' or 'Islamic terrorists' and their religious tradition became increasingly blurred.

In this respect, Huntington's 'marginal' narrative is an extreme example. Huntington's Self-image is obviously exclusivist, for he proposes to exclude the rest of the world from 'our' Western civilization. The boundary between 'Islamic terrorism' and Islam has collapsed and the Other is simply the Islamic civilization.[182] In Lewis narrative, the boundary between 'Islamic terrorists' and Islam is a fragile one. 'Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists, but most present day terrorists are Muslims', he wrote in his *The Crisis of Islam*, to subsequently explain why this is the case.[183] Other authors as well attempt to explain why Islam is more connected to violence. Ben-Dor and Pedahzur, for instance, concluding their attempt to show that 'Islamic terrorism' is rooted in the 'basic nature' of 'Islamic fundamentalism', indicate that Islam is indeed vulnerable to end up with violence.[184]

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[180] Cf. Asad's criticism of Roy, who even puts Van Gogh's murderer on his al-Qaeda list. Ibidem, 109-110, n.28.

[181] The moment at which 'Islamism' (or alternatives) transformed into 'terrorism' is usually not explicated. Some authors, however, explicitly describe this transformation. Beverley Milton-Edwards, for instance, describes in a section titled 'from resistance to terrorism' how 'Islamic terrorism' originated in Afghanistan in the eighties. Ben-Dor and Pedahzur also notice that 'in the early eighties, however, a shift in the nature of terrorism appeared (…) which was inspired by religious causes'. Ben-Dor, 'The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism', 83; Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 97-99.

[182] I want to emphasize that this picture is a general one. In social interaction, selfing and othering always depend upon the contexts in which the agent dwells. The same is true for the literature about Muslim fundamentalism. Within these studies, sometimes other Self-images are propagated when dealing with special subjects. When proposing concrete political measures, for instance, even Huntington proposes to build coalitions with other civilizations (Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', 48-50). The selfing and othering described here, are the ones derived from the grand narratives of the authors, based upon their worldview or social imaginary and, in the end, ideological position. Cf. White, *Metahistory*, 1-42; Gerd Baumann and Andre Gingrich eds., *Grammars of Identity/Alterity. A Structural Approach* (New York and Oxford 2005).

[183] Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, 107.

[184] Ben-Dor, 'The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism', 72 and 86. Other examples are Ruthven, who points at the absent separation of church and state in the Muslim world since the seventh century and of the requirement of checks and balances in politics, and Khosrokhavar, who notices that the Islamic doctrine of jihad is rooted in Islamic theology, while the Christian crusades are not. Ruthven, *Fury for God*, 252-261 and 280-281; Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers*, 13.

In their attempt to understand the recent eruption of Muslim terrorism, these authors search for explanations in the Islamic doctrine, traditions and history. This is understandable when we take the grand narrative after 9/11 into account, for this narrative mainly focuses on the genealogy of 'the global network of Islamic terrorism' within the Islamic tradition itself. This may lead to essentialist perspectives on religion when the specific contexts in which the violence arose are overlooked.[185]

That the Western bias leading to the construction of 'Islamic terrorists', who, in some cases, are hard to separate from their coreligionists, can have serious consequences, will become clear in the final paragraph.

§ 5 *Knowledge and power*

'Much attention has been focused on the intelligence failures that led to the tragic events of 11th September 2001. Surprisingly little attention, however, has been devoted to the academic failures'.[186] These words of one of the leading scholars of terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, illustrate that scholarly debates and 'real' politics were more and more connected after 9/11; a development we noticed in the first paragraph of this chapter in relation to the discussions between Said, Lewis, Huntington, Esposito and Kramer. 'Scholarly knowledge really matters' was the perception which was reinforced by 9/11. This resulted in intense debates and in a close connection between academic debates, public interests, political discussions and 'marginal' narratives.

In the first place, scholarly and public interests increasingly merged after 9/11. The demand for information, descriptions and explanations of the events was enormously. Hundreds of popular scientific books by journalists, 'experts' and autodidacts appeared. Especially terrorism research 'suffered' from an overflow of publications by non-academics, by politicians, foreign ambassadors, retired or active government analysts and intelligence employees.[187] Moreover, academic publications themselves popularized. Studies about Islam, terrorism and 9/11 are often written for a broad public, containing attention grabbing photo's at the front pages and catchy titles like *Holy Terror*, *A Fury for God*, *Allah's New Martyrs* or *Terror in the Mind of God*.

In the second place, the literature on Muslim fundamentalism pays more attention to popular conceptions after 9/11. Public understandings are explicitly or implicitly resisted and misconceptions corrected. Most authors, for instance, regularly emphasize that those Muslims performing violence are only a small minority, although, as Milton-Edwards indicates, 'it is barely possible to address the rich manifestation of Islam when the fear of fundamentalism plays on the Western imagination'.[188] Many of the scholars – obviously, except terrorism researches – would underline Olivier Roy's words 'I may have spent too much time dealing with terrorism.'[189] The militant Muslims are only a minor part of the

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[185] At the other side of the spectrum, Esposito's perspective is essentialist as well. He too portrays a reified static 'pure Islam' which determines the actions of the believers, but in his case it were the 'terrorists' who deviated from their traditional religion.

[186] Bruce Hoffman, 'Foreword', in: Andrew Silke ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London and New York 2004) xvii-xix, esp. xvii.

[187] Cf. Silke, 'The Road Less Travelled'.

[188] Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 9. Khosrokhavar too, constantly stresses the diversity of the Muslims. Cf. Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers*, 21, 29, 83, 96, 139, 204 and 228.

[189] Roy, *Globalised Islam*, 340.

community. Moreover, they emphasize that Islam does not cause violence. Although Ruthven explicitly provided reasons why Islam could be more vulnerable for violence than other religions, he also stresses: 'None of this means, of course, that "Islam is to blame"'.[190] But the scholars also fear misunderstandings of their attempt to understand their subject. Asad, for instance, gives 'a brief warning against a possible misreading' by declaring: 'I do *not* plead that terrorist atrocities may sometimes be morally justified.'[191]

In the third place, the direct connection between academics and politics, intelligence services and counterterrorism institutes became closer. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Tore Bjørgo, Bruce Hoffman, Bernard Lewis, Gilles Kepel, Martin Kramer, Olivier Roy, Ami Pedahzur, Andrew Silke and Leonard Weinberg; all have been advisers, members or chairmen of governments, counter-terrorism institutes or national security organizations since 2001. In their evaluation of terrorism research, Andrew Silke and Gaetano Joe Ilardi notice that the field is largely driven by short-term political concerns, and, moreover, is characterized by 'a bias towards topics of particular relevance for Western democracies and in particular to topics of relevance to the USA'.[192] That the attention for counterterrorism and intelligence increased after 9/11 is also obvious in the leading journal *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Whereas the issues between 1995 and 9/11 contain only six articles about this subject, the issues since then contain 24.

In the fourth place, the scholars often explicitly attempt to contribute to political debates. In particular their criticisms of America's foreign policy are remarkable. The United States' Middle Eastern policies are often severely condemned. They were not only unprepared and surprised by the sudden appearance of the new enemy, but they also had planted its seeds themselves by their short-term policies of supporting autocratic regimes or opposition groups. Various authors feel obliged to notice that the mujahidin in Afghanistan had been trained by the CIA itself. America's attitude against the Middle East is called 'hypocrite' and even anti-Islam.[193] Moreover, Bush' reactions against the attacks are harshly criticized by some authors. The invasion of Iraq similarly meets little approval.[194] Furthermore, the administration is often explicitly advised for how to handle with terrorists, Islam and the Middle East. This is well illustrated by the fact that Bjørgo, Juergensmeyer, Milton-Edwards, Ruthven, Pape, Pedahzur, Silke, Weinberg and others all devote the last section of their books to questions like how to deal with the problems, how to combat terrorists or how to prevent further attacks.

In the fifth place, the authors participate in public and political debates implicitly. We already saw that the debates between Huntington and Esposito were strongly politicized. Their existed a market for Huntington's clash and, moreover, Bush's politics were often associated with Huntington's worldview. In this respect, it is striking that many authors still resist Huntington's clash with Islam, although, from a scholarly point of view, his theses had been eliminated before 9/11 already.

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[190] Cf. Ruthven, *Fury for God*, 124.

[191] Asad, *On Suicide Bombing*, 4.

[192] Gaetano Joe Ilardi, 'Redefining the Issues: The Future of Terrorism Research and the Search for Empathy', in: Andrew Silke ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures* (London and New York 2004) 214-228, esp. 214-215; Andrew Silke, 'The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism', in: Ibidem, 57-71, esp. 58; Idem, 'The Road Less Travelled', 210.

[193] Almond, *Strong Religion*, 237-238; Ruthven, *Fury for God*, 168-169 and 288-291.

[194] See, among others, Ruthven, *Fury for God*, 168-200 and 288-291; Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers*, 229; Almond, *Strong Religion*, 237-241; Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 78 and 126.

Therefore, the ongoing criticisms against Huntington seem to serve other goals. That a lot of authors still participate in the debate about the clash of civilizations could be considered as an implicit disapproval of popular conceptions and Bush's policy. Bruce Lincoln, analysing the president's rhetoric, states that an 'equally dualistic construction is provided by Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations"'. It is only for strategic reasons, he writes, that Bush avoided incorporating Huntington in his public statements.[195] By associating Huntington with Bush and resisting the former, the latter is implicitly attacked.

In many aspects, Huntington has served as Foucault's 'madman'. By continuously resisting his views he has been placed in the margins of the scholarly community. His 'simple, almost fundamentalist' worldview was resisted by the scholars over and over again, emphasizing and reproducing their superiority, claiming that their knowledge is needed to assist governments and to adjust 'dangerous' popular misconceptions. In the mean time, however, they had supported another clash. While Huntington was still resisted, not one of the authors presented so far criticizes or problematizes Esposito. His clash between the civilized world and terrorists is tolerated or even supported. Based upon Western biases, a clash with terrorists is normalized. While a lot of authors condemned the invasion of Iraq, the invasion of Afghanistan evokes little comments, because 'we' are allowed to attack terrorists who attempt to destroy our nation. The category of 'terrorists', constructed upon Western biases and in interaction between Western scholars, politicians, media and public, all fighting for hegemony, is an Other against which the only possible response can be annihilation.

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[195] Lincoln, *Holy Terrors*, 27.

6. CONCLUSION

The young Dutch Muslim Samir Azzouz was not unmoved by the attacks of 9/11. In his so called 'autobiography', he repeatedly wrote that he at that moment 'started searching and asked people what it means', 'Muslim fundamentalism' and 'terrorism'.[196] He was not the only one whose attention for Islam, fundamentalism and terrorism was raised by the events of 9/11. Journalists, politicians and civilians started searching as well since that day. And, finally, scholars too appeared not to be unaffected by the attacks in the centre of their world. In this thesis, we have noticed in which respect their work was influenced by 9/11 and we were able to observe how scholars in interaction with their public negotiated the meanings of the terms Samir Azzouz was questioning.

At the end of the seventies, scholars started to (re)produce the category 'fundamentalism'. They constructed a 'hypothetical family' of fundamentalists in various corners of the world. The members of the family had different religious backgrounds, but they could be separated from their coreligionists by identifying certain special features of which the most important was that they opposed certain aspects of modernization. Once the category was established, they could be studied and their histories described. The narratives about the fundamentalists emphasized the differences between the various contexts, but equally stressed their commonalities by relating them to global historical processes. Some authors, however, opposed the existence of the family. These scholars used other concepts, like 'Islamism' or 'political Islam' to investigate their cases. Although their narratives emphasized some aspects which were characteristic for the Islamic world, the structure of their narrative remained the same: different cases were studied and subsequently related to each other by certain historical processes.

The literature after 9/11 diverged significantly from this perspective. In the first place, we noticed that the term 'fundamentalism' was increasingly exchanged for 'Islamism' or 'political Islam'. The main shift in scholarly discourse, however, was from 'fundamentalists' to '(Islamic) terrorists'. This development was interconnected with the increasing abandonment of the comparative perspective characterizing most pre-9/11 fundamentalism studies. Because of the increasing focus on Islamic movements, the main advantage of the concept of fundamentalism – the possibility it offers for cross-cultural comparisons – was lost. Moreover, the attention for violence and its relation with Islam increased enormously. Not only the studies about Muslim fundamentalism and Islamism devoted much more attention to this theme, we also witnessed that a lot of studies especially concentrated on this topic. Besides the increasing focus on Islam and violence, the scholars 'discovered' a new type of Islamism: a globalized one. All these developments are noticeable in the dominant grand narrative after 9/11. Instead of a 'hypothetical family' of 'fundamentalists', the histories of the 'terrorists' after 9/11 were characterized by the genealogy. The 'tree-model' observed several roots of the globalized movement in colonial times. These lines came together in Afghanistan, where a global network of

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[196] Dienst Nationale Recherche, '"Deurwaarders". Bestand aangetroffen op de computer van Samir A.', available at http://www.novatv.nl

terrorists was born which spread around the world in the nineties. This narrative attempted to explain the rise of 'global terrorism', which was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

Almost all authors call the people and movement responsible for the attacks of 9/11 'terrorists'. Just as 'fundamentalism', this category was constructed and distinguished from others by identifying certain characteristics. As the features separating 'fundamentalists' from their coreligionists, the boundary between 'terrorists' and other people committing violence was strongly debated. But even more than in the case of 'fundamentalists', the construction of the 'terrorist network' was based upon Western biases. The monopolization of violence by the state has informed Western perceptions about the legitimacy of violence. States are considered to have the right, or even obligation, to defend their nation against attacks, while violence outside state institutions is sooner regarded as illegitimate or criminal. Violence is perceived through the prism of the nation state, and therefore movements defending other communities, real or imagined, are sooner declared illegal and criminal and, thus, 'terrorist'.

'Fundamentalists' and 'terrorists' were constructed into categories that could be observed, described and known. The construction of these categories was strongly related to power. Western politicians, scholars and media were in the position to define fundamentalists and terrorists as an Other. By defining the Other they (re)produced it and thereby confirmed the existing power relations. Fundamentalists were othered by describing their resistance against central aspects of 'our' modern society. Although they should be considered modern, they were at the utmost dwelling in the margins of modernity. Against this Other the scholars positioned a superior Self. Never, they claimed, would fundamentalists be able to overthrow 'our' society.

The consequences of the othering of 'terrorists', however, could be far more severe. While fundamentalists were dwelling in the margins of modernity and served the superior Self-image of modern society, terrorists were perceived as the criminal Other attempting to intrude our states and destroy our society, against which the only possible response could be annihilation. Although the authors constantly emphasized the fallacies of political discourses, popular perceptions, media imageries and marginal scholarly narratives, they had – in interaction with these politicians, civilians, journalists and marginal scholars – simultaneously constructed the global Muslim terrorists network into an Other against which wars could be fought, and, moreover, justified.

Propagating an almost reverse view, Samir Azzouz blamed 'the West' for having 'problems with Islam itself' and he declared that 'terrorism' was unmistakably connected to Western attitudes and convictions. Instead, he rhetorically asked, could America not equally be considered 'terrorist' for killing innocents with political aims? Ironically, Azzouz himself was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for preparing a terrorist attack. Without justifying his actions or beliefs, his words illustrate that other perspectives than the ones presented in this thesis are possible. Moreover, by explicitly addressing the term 'terrorism' and its advent, while many scholars did not, they may encourage a thorough rethinking and problematizing of the concepts employed in the study of those called 'fundamentalists', 'Islamists' or 'terrorists'.

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