

Friendship through Coercion: Discourse Analysis on the Portrayal of the Indonesian War of Independence by the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Catholic People's Party

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Chapter I: Introduction

The colonial history of Indonesia, particularly the so-called 'policing actions' of 1947-1949, has in the last decade re-entered public discourse, becoming a topic of heated debate. This has prompted discussions on how the Dutch colonial period and the military offensives should be portrayed and understood within the Dutch collective memory. In June 2023, king Willem Alexander issued an apology for the violence of the policing actions while also unofficially recognizing the Indonesian Declaration of Independence in 1945.¹ This recognition meant that the policing actions were an unjustified aggression against a sovereign Indonesia. The reignition of this topic provides a unique opportunity to reexamine this period using new academic perspectives, specifically a post-colonial and discourse-based perspective. This thesis contributes to the ways scholars can understand the legacy of the colonial past by better understanding the justifications of the colonizers and their use of violence.

Following Japan's capitulation in WWII, Indonesian revolutionaries declared independence in 1945 and established the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch government did not recognize this declaration and aimed to restore Dutch control over the archipelago. Negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic led to the Linggadjati Agreement in 1947, which aimed to establish the process towards decolonization and the formation of a new Dutch-Indonesian Union. Disagreement on the process towards Indonesian independence eventually led to two bloody military offensives by Dutch colonial forces referred to as the 'policing actions.' While death-tolls are highly uncertain, the total number of casualties are estimated by many scholars to be up to 100.000 Indonesians. In contrast, the Dutch military casualties amount to 4.751 people.²

The objective of this thesis is to better understand how the confessional parties of the Netherlands understood and desired to portray this violent period. The discourse of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the Catholic People's Party (KVP) are analysed and compared to understand the synthesis between politics and religion in relation to the Dutch colonial history and how this shaped the views of their voter-base. The ARP and the KVP were the largest confessional parties in this period. As this thesis aims to analyse discourse, the object of study is not the historical chain of events but rather the portrayal of these events. In other words, the study analyses rhetoric and does not aim to give a historical narrative. The study limits itself to the monthly journals produced by the parties themselves since 1947. These include monthly articles by a group of editors on a variety of topics deemed politically relevant. The study examines the articles published in these journals from April 1947 to February 1950.

¹ NOS (2023). Willem-Alexander biedt excuses aan voor Nederlands geweld in Indonesië. Last accessed on 29-06-2023 <https://nos.nl/artikel/2326517-willem-alexander-biedt-excuses-aan-voor-nederlands-geweld-in-indonesie>

² Harinck, R. et al. (2022). *Empire's violent end: comparing Dutch, British, and French wars of decolonization, 1945-1962*. Cornell University Press. p.143

Methodology

The study situates itself in the academic field of discourse analysis and draws from multiple disciplines and theories. There have been numerous theoretical frameworks developed that combine the study of discourse with the study of history. Notably, this includes the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) developed by Linguist Ruth Wodak et al (2017) and the diverse Historical Discourse Analysis (HDA) of Linguist Laurel J. Brinton (2015). These analyses constitute an interdisciplinary approach which combines the fields of history, sociology, and linguistics. It therefore complements my interdisciplinary background of religious studies. According to Wodak, a historical approach to discourse pays special attention to how the discourse changes throughout a time-period, as discursive practices are embedded in and in relation to the sociopolitical and historical context.³ As this thesis studies a period of three years characterized by significant socio-political change, a historical approach to discourse allows us to fruitfully examine the effects these changing circumstances have on the discourse produced by the two confessional parties. Brinton identifies multiple understandings of the HDA. This thesis focuses on what she identifies as the diachronically oriented discourse analysis, which involves a study of the changes in discourse marking, functions, and structures over time.⁴ The focus is thus not on how history shaped the discourse of the Indonesian Crisis, but rather how the discourse surrounding certain topics changed during the crisis. In contrast to the DHA, this thesis does not incorporate the socio-political orientation of critical theory but focuses entirely on the illustration, analysis and comparison of discourse.

There exists a plethora of definitions of 'discourse', mostly rooted in the Foucaultian tradition that argues that knowledge is constituted of a set of discursive formations.⁵ Linguist Jeremy Hawthorn defines discourse as:

"speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – 'ideology' in the neutral non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which the discourse is embedded."⁶

Discourse analysis thus studies how knowledge is established by these representations and experiences. It is the knowledge, and therefore discourse, which is decisive in creating 'reality.' For this study, the objective is to better discern how this 'reality' was created by the two confessional parties. Based on Wodak, this is done by paying attention to a variety of features of discourse. This includes analysing how actors, events, etc. are named and referred to linguistically; what characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to these actors, events etc.; which arguments are employed in the discourse; which utterances are

³ Reisigl, Martin & Wodak, Ruth. (2017). *The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)*. The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies. p.93

⁴ Brinton, L.J. (2015). *Historical Discourse Analysis*. In Tannen, D. et al. *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* p.140

⁵ Lawlor, L., & Nale, J. (Eds.). (2014). *The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon*. Cambridge. p.121

⁶ Hawthorn (1997), cited in Mills, Sara. (2004). *Discourse*, Taylor & Francis Group. p.5

intensified or mitigated; and from which perspectives the discourse is expressed.⁷ A focus on the vocabulary, arguments, phrasing and perspectives allows us to unravel the discursive framework that shapes these journals.

The study is also situated in media studies, particularly the field of media politics. It serves as an example of media as a top-down flow of information and persuasion. Usually, this flow involves three actors: politicians, media, and citizens.⁸ However, this thesis studies the media produced by the politicians themselves. Recent media studies have explored similar phenomena where the actor 'media' is eliminated and there is a direct communication between politicians and citizens. This study is representative of an early form of such media as the confessional parties directly communicate their ideas to their voter-base without having to adjust to the media actor.

A wide variety of studies exist on the Indonesian decolonization from 1945 to 1950. These include studies on the position and views on most Dutch political parties, although most tend to be dated.⁹ However, there has been little research on the direct analysis of the discourse produced by these parties. Instead, discourse analyses often focus on the legacy of colonialism in our contemporary discourse.¹⁰ Nonetheless, there are several examples of utilizing a discourse analytical approach in the study of colonialism.¹¹ Some studies are diachronic in their analysis and thus study a long timeframe. For example, linguist David Spurr gives a broader study of colonial discourse in western journalism, whereas Felicity Rash (et al.), compares British and German colonial discourse in the late 19th and early 20th century.¹² Other studies limit themselves to one example of media and are therefore more synchronic: for example the analysis of the modern novel *A God in every Stone* by sociologist Inam Ullah and historical novel *Milton's Imperial Epic* by linguist Martin Evans.¹³ This study combines both the diachronic elements as seen in Spurr and Rash and the study of one specific case as seen in Ullah and Evans. The focus on diachrony, together with a comparison between two parties, allows a clearer illustration of how colonial discourse shifts due to different actors and circumstances. The limitation to one medium refrains from overgeneralizing. Using multiple primary sources brings the risk of neglecting the differences between the sources and therefore also the effects it has on the discourse itself. A limitation to one source better illustrates the direct top-down flow of information from the producer (the confessional parties) to the reader (their voter-base). Given that these journals are directed to the readers that primarily agree with the values and ideas behind the parties, the study enables us to understand the idealised portrayal of the conflict by the two confessional

⁷ Wodak et al. p.93-94

⁸ Partington, A. et al. (2020). Political media discourses in *The Routledge Handbook of Corpus Approaches to Discourse Analysis*. Routledge.

⁹ For example, see Bank, J. (1984). *Katholieken en de indonesische revolutie*. De Bataafsche Leeuw; Smit, H. (2006). *Gezag is gezag*. Ser. Passage reeks, 25; Thijssen, F. (1979). *De partij van de arbeid en de indonesische kwestie, 1945-1949*.

¹⁰ For example, see Ziai, A. (2015). *Development Discourse and Global History: From colonialism to the sustainable development goals*. Routledge; Zeini, E. (2019). *The Rest Write Back: Discourse and Decolonization*. Leiden, Brill.

¹¹ Mills, p.94

¹² See Spurr, D. (1993). *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration*. Duke University Press. Rash, F. (Eds.). (2020). *The Discourse of British and German Colonialism: Convergence and Competition*. Routledge.

¹³ See Inam, U et al. (2020). *Colonization and decolonization of the Indian subcontinent: a colonial discourse analysis of 'a god in every stone'*. *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal*; Evans, M. (2018). *Milton's imperial epic: paradise lost and the discourse of colonialism*. Cornell University Press.

parties. This is because it does not have to take into account conflicting opinions as might be required in other contexts, such as the Dutch parliament.

In accordance with a historical discourse analysis, I utilize a conceptual framework borrowed from a variety of scholars. These include the concepts of tacit knowledge, interdiscursivity, and discursive hegemony. Professor of Religious Studies Kocku von Stuckrad defines tacit knowledge as “taken-for-granted knowledge that is so deeply engrained in our trained perceptions and cultural dispositions that we are not even aware of it.”¹⁴ This concept is useful to analyse how for example an idea of the superiority of European values, and an assumed backwardness of non-Europeans, underlie most of their discourse. Interdiscursivity refers to the intertwinement of various discourses with one another.¹⁵ In the context of the Indonesian crisis, this means that the discourse on decolonization is intertwined with discourses on for example WWII, the emerging cold war and the fear for a secularising world. Historian Albert Gouaffo defines discursive hegemony as follows:

a discursive hegemony coordinates the diverse discourses and stresses one dominant discourse from within the totality of discourses, which is then unconsciously consumed and circulated as a global discourse by the members of the social group. This dominant discourse displays certain characteristics, namely regularity and hegemony, the latter linking the discourses and uniting their disparate elements.¹⁶

This study argues that the Indonesian crisis revolves around a discursive hegemony of humanist values and anti-revolution respectively for the KVP and the ARP. Finally, it draws on the understanding of colonialism by historian M. Schubert by distinguishing how the Netherlands creates an image of the Self through the Indonesian ‘Other’. According to Schubert, colonialism relies on an image of the Other in order to justify rule by the ‘Self’.¹⁷ The Self is perceived as the centre of civilization. The ‘Other’ is therefore uncivilized and has to be brought into the civilized world. This hierarchy in civilization is then tied into a racial hierarchy. This distinction between the Self and the Other is vital for analysing the Dutch role in Indonesia which constitutes chapter V.

During this introduction I have referred to the period of 1945 to 1950 in Indonesia as the Indonesian Crisis. There is a variety of ways this period is described in historiography. Usually, it is either described as the Indonesian Revolution or the Indonesian War of Independence. For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen to refer to this period as the Indonesian Crisis as the other terms are misleading for this specific study. Namely, the term revolution holds various implications, especially in relation to the discourse of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. The notion of war is problematic because the period is not characterized by a constant war but rather by short military offensives, civil suppressions, skirmishes and peace treaties. To better understand the perspective of the ARP and KVP, the term ‘crisis’ and ‘military offensives’ is preferred to neither oppose nor support the discourse created by the confessional parties.

¹⁴ von Stuckrad, K. (2022). *Troubled Distinctions: The Soul in Posthumanist Perspective*. In S. Herbrechter, I. Callus, M. et al. (Eds.), *Palgrave Handbook of Critical Posthumanism*. Palgrave MacMillan. P.408

¹⁵ Wodak et al. p.90

¹⁶ Gouaffo, A. *German Imperialist images of the other*. In Rash, F. (2020). P.129

¹⁷ Schubert, M. (2011). *The ‘German nation’ and the ‘black Other.’* *Patterns of Prejudice*, 45:5 p.399

In the following chapters I propose to identify the discourse themes that surround three specific topics. To do this, I first give a historical overview of the Indonesian crisis. After that, each chapter represents a topic, although these topics are inherently intertwined. The focus on one particular topic allows for a better illustration of how the discourse shifted on this topic, especially in relation to what is omitted, intensified or diminished. Otherwise, these details fade within the structure of a historical narrative. However, because the changing sociopolitical circumstances are vital for a historical discourse analysis, the analysis of each topic is done chronologically. Chapter III studies the Republic, which functions as both the main adversary as well as the required cooperator during the Indonesian Crisis. The analysis of the Republic is then followed by chapter IV, which aims to better understand the relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians altogether on a cultural, social and political level. The fifth chapter examines the perceived role the Netherlands should play in Indonesia, both in relation to preserving the Dutch-Indonesian bond and combating the Republic. I argue that these three topics share similar discourse themes. However, they are interpreted differently due to the different discursive hegemonies of the two parties: the focus on humanist values by the KVP and the anti-revolutionary principle of the ARP. As a result, despite sharing similar themes the two parties also give different conclusions as to how the Republic should be dealt with, how the future Dutch-Indonesian relationship should be manifested politically, and what the Dutch role should be in this manifestation.

Chapter II: Historical Overview

On the 17th of August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, Indonesian nationalists under the leadership of Soekarno and Hatta declared the independence of Indonesia. Although their control was limited to parts of Java and Sumatra, the two most populous islands in Indonesia, the Republic of Indonesia was to encompass all of the 'Dutch Indies'.¹⁸ The Dutch were generally unaware of the presence of large independence movements. They saw 'Indië' as a natural part of Dutch territory which they had a strong emotional connection with.¹⁹ Despite this, there was already large support among the Dutch for the decolonization of Indonesia. The question was only how this process was to be achieved. In practice, it was met by disinterest and a continual postponement of sovereignty.²⁰

Because the Dutch were generally unaware of pre-existing independence movements, and because Soekarno and Hatta collaborated with the Japanese, the Netherlands saw the Republic as a Japanese creation. This was especially painful as the stories of the horrid Japanese internment camps during WWII were pouring into the Netherlands. In reality, while many of its members did cooperate with the Japanese, the Republic itself was in the end formed in their own power.²¹ Nonetheless, the Dutch government refused to negotiate and started mobilizing Dutch conscripts and volunteers; many who were inspired by the fight of resistance against Nazi Germany. The goal was to restore order to Indonesia.²²

The situation under the Republic was however unorganized and violent. Already during the Japanese occupation youth militias started showing up demanding independence from both the Japanese and the Dutch. Many of these groups had Marxist or Islamist ideologies.²³ In a period later referred to as the Bersiap, these groups unleashed a slaughtering of the ethnically Dutch and those deemed collaborators. The leaders of the Republic quickly denounced these violent outbursts but were not always able to combat them. The Bersiap in turn resulted in violent countermeasures by both the Dutch and British occupying forces.²⁴

The first successful negotiations with the Republic were started in October 1946, resulting in the treaty of Linggadjati on the 15th of November. Negotiations became tolerable due to the Republic's new premier Sjahrir, who did not collaborate with the Japanese.²⁵ Soekarno however remained president. This treaty held that before 1949, the United States of Indonesia [Verenigde Staten van Indonesië] (VSI) was to be established from multiple states, including the Republic of Indonesia which would control most of Java and Sumatra. The kingdom of the Netherlands would form with Indonesia the Dutch-Indonesian Union [Nederlands-Indonesische Unie] (NIU) with the Dutch monarchy at its head. The treaty was a compromise. The Netherlands had to recognize the Republic and its control over certain

¹⁸ Burgers, J. H. (2010). *De garoeda en de ooievaar: Indonesië van kolonie tot nationale staat*. KITLV Uitgeverij. p.358

¹⁹ Burgers, p.362

²⁰ Smit, p.33

²¹ Burgers, p.355-366

²² Peter Romijn (2012). Learning on 'the job': Dutch war volunteers entering the Indonesian war of independence. *Journal of Genocide Research*, p.318

²³ Burgers, P.349

²⁴ Burgers, p.400-402

²⁵ Liempt, A. van. (2012). *Nederland valt aan: op weg naar oorlog met Indonesië, 1947*. Balans. p.14

territories, and the Republic had to accept a federalized Indonesia and in their eyes an unequal union due to the Dutch monarch serving as its head.²⁶

The treaty proved to be very unpopular within the Netherlands whereas internationally it was welcomed.²⁷ The Dutch government developed an 'addition' [aankleding] which included additional statements where according to historian J.H. Burgers "some added new elements to the agreement, others twisted its meaning to align with Dutch interests, and a few entailed a clear modification of the original design."²⁸ Prominently, it diminished the equality between the Republic and the Netherlands by not addressing the Republic as a separate acting entity. It assumed a significantly more powerful Union as a political entity, and assumed Dutch military duties within all of Indonesia.²⁹ Next to this, the Dutch government assumed that the Netherlands had ultimate sovereignty over all of Indonesia, despite the fact that this cannot be concluded from the treaty and was not accepted by the Republic.^{30 31}

At the same time, the Dutch government started mass-mobilising up to 100.000 conscripted soldiers and 25.000 volunteers.³² Next to this, the Dutch government hastily created the member-states of East-Indonesia and Borneo as a counterbalance to the power of the Republic and started a naval blockade.³³ Because this required full Dutch control over these areas, the Dutch started a bloody military occupation referred to as 'cleansings' [zuivering]. Most notably was the terror under General Westerling, which included many summary executions of those deemed enemies in order to scare the population in pacification.³⁴ All of this was seen by the Republic as a gross violation of the treaty.³⁵

The Dutch parliament came to see the treaty as a roadmap towards a new Dutch-Indonesian Union rather than a political agreement with the Republic. On the 25th of March, the Republic and the Netherlands signed the treaty of Linggadjati. However, the Netherlands signed the treaty including the idea of the 'aankleding', whereas the Republic did not.³⁶ From the start, this meant that there was disagreement in the execution of the treaty. Furthermore, the Republic was disappointed in the Netherlands as the signing of the treaty did not significantly alter their actions such as the naval blockade and the continued imprisonment of Republican leaders.³⁷

The Republic in response to the naval blockade started a trade blockade on the Dutch controlled areas of Indonesia. This led to severe shortages of food.³⁸ The Republic believed that the United States wanted anything but war. Therefore, it did not have to fear a Dutch military offensive as without American support the Dutch army would soon fall into collapse.

²⁶ De Jong, p.88

²⁷ De Jong, p.97; Burgers, p.507

²⁸ Burgers, p.508

²⁹ Idem.

³⁰ De Jong, p.98

³¹ Poeze, H.A. et al. (2022). *Merdeka: de strijd om de indonesische onafhankelijkheid en de ongewisse opkomst van de republiek 1945-1950*. WalburgPers, p.219

³² Dommering, E.J. (1994) *De Nederlandse publieke discussie en de politionele akties in Indonesië*. NJB, p.282

³³ De Jong, p.76-77

³⁴ De Jong, p.82, 83

³⁵ Burgers, p.520

³⁶ De Jong, p.108

³⁷ Burgeres, p.532

³⁸ Burgers, p.538

Under pressure of the more radical nationalists, the Republic chose confrontation, demanding the Dutch military withdrawal and the end of the Dutch blockade.³⁹ This however alienated the United States. In turn, the Netherlands saw their chance and issued their own ultimatum on the 29th of June 1947. This included a variety of demands, most importantly the acceptance of a Dutch-led new gendarme within Republican territory.⁴⁰ The Republic did not accept. As a result, on the 20th of July the first Dutch major military offensive, 'Operation Product', started.⁴¹ A message to the United Nations explained that "police measures of a strictly limited character " had been taken to combat the " inimical actions by the Republic as the destruction of economic assets, the food blockade and hostile and inflammatory propaganda."⁴²

On the Dutch side 169 soldiers died. On the Republican side, the deaths numbered multiple thousands.⁴³ Domestically the offensive was not particularly controversial. The Dutch government made special efforts to portray the policing actions in a positive light. For example, it developed multiple films that portray the Dutch soldiers as serving the Indonesian people.⁴⁴ Negative portrayals, including reports of soldiers, were censored by the government.⁴⁵ In contrast, the offensive resulted in condemnation in the international sphere and the UN security council.⁴⁶ It also put a lot of tension in the Catholic-Red government of the KVP and the Labour Party.⁴⁷ Under pressure of the UN, the Netherlands ceased its military offensive on the 4th of August.⁴⁸ The exact reasons for the policing actions are diverse. However, most historians point towards the threatened economic interests of the Netherlands.⁴⁹

In January 1948, the Republic signed the Renville agreement with the Netherlands. It felt forced to do so due to American pressure for a peace treaty, the worsening economic situation and the Dutch military superiority.⁵⁰ The Renville was more favourable for the Netherlands, acknowledging the current frontline as the new legitimate status quo and most importantly, recognizing Dutch ultimate sovereignty over all of the Dutch East-Indies until the Dutch government transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Favourable for the Republic was that the Netherlands would cease creating new member-states and free prominent Republican politicians.⁵¹

However, it took little time before the Dutch colonial government started violating the new treaty. It continued its naval blockade and continued forming new member-states throughout the occupied Republic.⁵² Furthermore, guerrilla-warfare conducted by Indonesian revolutionaries kept tensions high. In response Dutch military forces often engaged in war

³⁹ De Jong, p.113

⁴⁰ Burgers, p.550

⁴¹ De Jong, p.125-126

⁴² Taylor, A. (1960). Indonesian Independence and the United Nations. London, Stevens. p. 47

⁴³ Burgers, p.553

⁴⁴ Doolan, P. M. M. (2021). Collective memory and the Dutch east indies: unremembering decolonization (Ser. Heritage and memory studies). Amsterdam University Press. p.29

⁴⁵ Doolan, p.32

⁴⁶ Taylor, p.48-49

⁴⁷ Verkooijen, P. (2000). Goed & fout na de oorlog: de grote lijnen van de recente Nederlandse politieke geschiedenis (Ser. Babel boeken inzichten, 10). p.42

⁴⁸ Burgers, p.559

⁴⁹ For example, see de Jong p.131, Dommering p.280

⁵⁰ Poeze, p.235

⁵¹ Poeze, p.239

⁵² Poeze, p.240, 242, 315

crime such as summary executions, torture, and the burning of villages.⁵³ Disagreement on the Renville-Agreement even led to a communist uprising in the Republic. The Soekarno-led Republic was able to suppress this, which was especially favourable for their relation to the United States.⁵⁴ The United States demanded that the Dutch continued negotiations, but the Dutch government had little genuine interest. The Republic and its army were at its weakest point due to a strong economic decline caused by the Dutch blockade, a draught, and a plague pandemic.⁵⁵ The Netherlands saw its chance to finish off the Republic. Multiple new demands were made, most notably the dissolution of their army until the transfer of sovereignty.⁵⁶ Although the Republic continued making concessions through internationally-led negotiations, they did not agree with this ultimate demand.

In response and despite American opposition, the Netherlands conducted a new military offensive on the 18th of December 1948. In one sweep it managed to occupy the Republican capital and significant Republican territory, as well as capture the Republican leadership.⁵⁷ The Dutch population was generally supportive as the Republic was not viewed positively, and the continued creation of new member-states was not seen as an attack against the Republic but as a genuine display of decolonization.⁵⁸ In contrast, internationally it was met with almost complete condemnation, including certain sanctions. Most importantly, the offensive could not gather support from most of the other federal Indonesian member-states who the Dutch considered allies.⁵⁹ Overestimating the favourable situation, the Dutch government had already started to ignore the 'federalists' in the process of decolonization. The second offensive was the final straw that broke the camel's back.⁶⁰ While militarily it was a success, the lack of international and now also federal support meant that politically it was a failure.

The Netherlands thus desired quick negotiations. The 'federalists' together with the Republic agreed to negotiations on the premise of the return of the Republican leadership to their capital.⁶¹ The Netherlands obliged and in August 1949 the Round-Table conference started. The conference lasted until the 2nd of November. The conference was a bitter pill to swallow for the Dutch. Indonesian sovereignty was now not derived from just the Netherlands but also from the Republican 1945 declaration of independence. The Netherlands had to retreat its army and the Republican army were to be transformed into the new Indonesian army. Finally, the NIU would become a union with little actual power.⁶²

After the Round-Table conference the plans were quickly made into reality. In December, the Netherlands transferred full sovereignty to the newly formed RVI. Quickly following was the formation of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. From the very start however, there was little cooperation and friendliness between the Netherlands and the Republic. The Republic, which always aimed to create a unitary rather than federal state, quickly annexed one member-state after the other. Not even a year later the federal state was abolished, and

⁵³ Burgers, p.589

⁵⁴ Poeze, p.295, p.306

⁵⁵ Poeze, p.315-318

⁵⁶ Burgers, p.605

⁵⁷ Poeze, p.323-324

⁵⁸ Burgers, p.598

⁵⁹ Burgers, p.606-609

⁶⁰ Poeze, p.320

⁶¹ De Jong, p.209, p.211, p.216

⁶² Burgers, p.624

the Republic of Indonesia became the sole representative of Indonesia. The Dutch-Indonesian Union proved largely irrelevant and was abolished unilaterally by the Republic in 1956. The Dutch goal of a continued relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, ended in failure. The total number of casualties during the Crisis among the Indonesians is highly speculative but is estimated to be around 100.000 people. Dutch military casualties amount to 4751 people.⁶³

⁶³ Harinck, p.143

Chapter III: *Cooperating with the Enemy*: The Portrayal of the Republic

This chapter analyses the discourse surrounding the Republic of Indonesia which declared independence in 1945. The Republic was the key actor that forced the Dutch hand to start the process towards a sovereign Indonesia. It was the Republic with which the Netherlands had to sign treaties, and the Republic was at the receiving end of the Dutch military offensives. The treaty of Linggadjati established that the Netherlands and the Republic would end up in the same state-construct of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. Despite this, both parties give an undeniably negative portrait of the Republic.

This portrait aims to discredit the Republic and justify violence against them, and I argue that this portrait consists of three discourse themes. The first relates to the memory of Japanese and German occupation. The second relates to the new threat of communism both internationally and ideologically as part of the emerging cold war. The third relates to the morally corrupted and treacherous nature of the Republic. Which themes are emphasised is not consistent both chronologically and between the two parties, and there follows a strong interdiscursivity. I argue that the discourse of the KVP is characterised by a discursive homogeneity of humanist values, specifically human rights and democracy. The aforementioned themes are interpreted through this lens. Because of this, the KVP has a shifting view on the Republic that focuses on the leadership rather than the Republic as a whole. In the eyes of the ARP, the Republic as a whole has to be dismissed due to its revolutionary origin. Revolution forms a discursive hegemony that the other themes centre around. As a result, the ARP focuses less on values and more on the corrupt actions of the Republic. In their discourse, both parties rarely give attention to other nationalist groups. The Republic becomes the sole actor and representative of the revolutionary movement, and is portrayed as separate from the Indonesian population itself. I argue that both parties communicate such an understanding in order to console the readers that this conflict is not between the Indonesians and the Dutch. Therefore, a future strong relationship is not hampered nor is their desire for sovereignty discredited. Furthermore, I argue that the parties situate the Republic in a broader view of a secularising world. The Republic is only one of the many symptoms that threaten Christian politics represented by confessional parties.

First it is of relevance to note that the view of the Republic is produced in a context surrounding broader discussions on fascism and communism. For the KVP, both fascism and communism are seen as the opposite of Christian politics. They are the result of a lack of 'true humanist politics.' They both favour a totalitarian reduction of society to merely the race and state respectively, and thus leave no room for the person. In contrast, the humanist politics focuses on "the whole person, the human in all its relations and duties, to God, to himself, and to his neighbours in society."⁶⁴ The ARP places fascism and communism in their tradition of anti-revolutionary politics based on the biblical text of Romans 13. An opposition to revolution, and therefore upholding gezag [authority], is one of the key components of Christian politics for the ARP. While both parties thus see these ideologies as an affront to Christian politics, the KVP sees them as an affront to the Christian values of freedom and equality that every person possesses, whereas the ARP sees them first as

⁶⁴ Katholiek Staatkundig Maandschrift jrg-1 1947-48.

revolutionary ideologies that reject divine authority.

March 1947 - July 1947. Developing a new Dutch-Indonesian future

After the treaty of Linggadjati is signed, the Republic continues to be discredited despite its newly promised position within the VSI and NIU. In March 1947, the KVP in their first entry of their monthly journal, starts with an explanation of the existence of the Republic. The Japanese, in a final effort of their propaganda against “everything that is considered white,” created the Republic as a ‘timebomb’ against the Dutch. It then asks the reader “to what extent is the Republic of Indonesia still under the influence of the Japanese? To what extent is their nationalism healthy?”⁶⁵

With the memory of WWII fresh in the mind of the Dutch, the connection to fascism makes clear that the Republican declaration of independence cannot be trusted from the start. However, despite this association with fascism and anti-white sentiment, the KVP does leave an opening for future cooperation. The questions above are not rhetorical. They imply that the Republic can move beyond their corrupted start. This balancing between a distrust of the Republic and a future respectable Republic is at the centre of the KVP discourse and fits into their promotion of the NIU. Nonetheless, most descriptions of the Republic are negative. After a hopeful view of the Republic is given, it goes back to illustrating its contemporary corrupt characteristics. These characteristics often move directly from fascism to communism:

"and with regard to the Republic of Indonesia it is announced that according to reliable reports it is certain that Japanese officers regularly act as its advisers, that it is also certain that the army around Djocja and Surakarta is trained by Japanese drill masters and furthermore that the internal government apparatus shows German, Italian and Japanese traits. The committee also has data from which it is established that there are connections between the republic and communist organizations abroad."

Katholiek Staatskundig Maandschrift March 1947

Entering the cold war, it is not surprising that communism plays a significant role in the discourse of the KVP. Furthermore, we can imagine that convincing the world of a communist connection to the Republic would certainly move the United States towards Dutch goals. Large sections of the journal are dedicated to the discussion of communism and the horrors it would cause. The perceived communist elements of the Republic are described as either orchestrated by the Soviet Union or by anarchist troublemakers. Another way the KVP connects the Republic to communism is through the Dutch Communist Party (CPN). Although the CPN is small and politically isolated, it is the party that is most discussed. The journal often states how the Communist Party voted in favour of the Republic. What other parties vote is rarely discussed, which shows the efforts to rhetorically connect the CPN to the Republic. Even when the CPN votes in favour of the government, like with the Treaty of Linggadjati, the Catholic journal takes the effort to explain that the CPN still in fact opposes the government in support of the Republic, and that the vote in favour is nothing more than a technicality.

Curiously, the ARP focuses little on communism. The focus is on the theme of Japanese and Nazi occupation. Just like the KVP, the ARP places emphasis on the supposed Japanese origin of the Republic:

⁶⁵ Katholiek Staatskundig Maandschrift March 1947

“First and foremost, we encounter the revolutionary movement that took shape in the Republic of Indonesia under Japanese influence. The anti-revolutionary standpoint in response to this was clear from the beginning: the authority of the government does not allow it to negotiate on equal terms with revolutionary forces.”

Anti-Revolutionaire Staatskunde April 1947

However, in contrast to the KVP, the Japanese influence is not in question. While the KVP refers to ‘reports’ of Japanese influence and questions the Japanese influence, for the ARP the Japanese origin is not that of dispute. The ARP gives no room to the Republic, framing the Japanese influence as an inherent part of its foundation. The Japanese influence is in the context of the overlapping ‘revolutionary’ nature that is the source of their evil. Revolution is not a category used at all by the KVP. For them, the opposition to the ‘Japanese Republic’ is its contradiction to humanist Christian values. This also explains the lack of comparisons to communism by the ARP: there is no need to explain the dangerous anti-Christian values lurking behind the Republic as the main issue, its revolutionary nature, is undeniable. This can also be said about fascism, as the ARP prefers the term ‘Japanese’ or ‘German,’ together with ‘revolutionary’, over ‘fascist’. Even in a section dealing with the de-facto recognition of the Republic, a comparison is made between the Republic and Italian Ethiopia. In this case, Italian rule is still referred to as ‘revolutionary’ rather than fascist. This contrast between the understanding of fascism as principally anti-humanist, or principally revolutionary, remains at the centre of the discursive differences between the two parties throughout most of the Indonesian Crisis.

The month before the policing actions, the ARP becomes increasingly more hostile in its description of the Republic. In contrast to the KVP, it gives in-depth coverage on the economic and social damage the Republic is causing in Indonesia. This is typical for ARP discourse. Because the revolutionary nature is undeniable, the ARP is more interested in showcasing the corruption, misery and anarchy caused by revolutionary ideologies. This damage is not described as due to a lack of expertise or due to chaos, but as an active policy of the Republic. The Republic is deliberately damaging the Dutch position, described through words such as ‘sabotage.’ This sabotage is framed as directed towards the entire Dutch population. The ARP goes in deep detail describing the economic costs in numbers. The loss of life is also graphically described, something unseen in the KVP journals:

Already now, due to the inadequate transportation, the situation is highly severe in certain areas. Famine has been prevalent in Madura for months. In Batavia, an estimated 15,000 beggars exist, with the police finding ten dead bodies on the streets every day due to exhaustion, apart from those who die at home. ...And the Republic continues to deliberately starve the by the Dutch protected cities.”

Anti-Revolutionaire Staatskunde June 1947

The ARP thus goes much further in the discrediting of the Republic, by describing the Republic as active killers. The ARP creates a clear message: Indonesian independence through the Republic only worsens the conditions for the Indonesians themselves; the Republic is actively hostile to the Dutch *and* Indonesian population. Adding to this, the Republic is routinely described as treacherous, someone that you cannot have treaties with. The ARP is very sceptical of the Treaty of Linggadjati, precisely because they believe that a

revolutionary force is in principle not trustworthy.

While both parties thus focus on discrediting the Republic, the implications already start to differ significantly. Namely, for the KVP, the issue of the Republic is ideological, and therefore tied to its leadership. This means that the Republic is mutable and that proper, humanist leadership can salvage the Republic. This idea also underlies the KVP support for the treaty of Linggadjati. In contrast, the issues for the ARP with the Republic are inherent. The Republic's revolutionary origins remain fixed. By showing the havoc caused by the Republic, the message becomes that the Republic as a whole has to go.

What is striking is that no direct mention of anti-Dutch violence in the past is given by either party. We can imagine the mass-killing of Dutchmen during the Bersiap would be the most obvious emotional justification for their own acts of violence. Yet, no such graphic references are given. I would argue that this ties into the discursive goal of both parties: discrediting the Republic, not Indonesians altogether. Both parties endorse a future strong relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians and continually approve Indonesian nationalism. The KVP implies that it is only the elite that is infected by fascist and communist values. The ARP paints a similar picture, also emphasizing their lack of support among Indonesians. Therefore, the fact that the Bersiap is not mentioned is likely due to the bottom-up nature of it. It was not organized by the Republic but rather was ignited by local groups made out of the regular population.⁶⁶ In that sense, mentioning the misdeeds of the Indonesian population itself would in fact sever the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia rather than bolster it.

July 1947 - November 1947. Negotiation and Conflict: the first 'Policing Actions'

The policing actions were justified by the Dutch government as an act to restore order and to combat the deteriorating living conditions in Indonesia. Both the ARP and the KVP follow this idea. The discourse of the KVP follows the themes of the ARP. The Republic is accused of continually violating the treaty of Linggadjati and are therefore seen as treacherous. Furthermore, actions against the Republic are needed to ensure the wellbeing of the Indonesians:

“Meanwhile, the situation in Java and Sumatra worsened, approaching an alarming level of unsustainability. The ceasefire was continuously violated, and terror spread within the territory of the Republic. ...Famine prevailed in Madura. Intervention could no longer be postponed.”

Katholiek Maandblad September 1947

The treacherous nature of the Republic is frequently repeated rhetorically as it “continuing to disregard its obligations.” The phrasing of the Republic as ‘continuing’ to not uphold their duties emphasises that treachery is characteristic of its behaviour, rather than a one-time event. No mention at all is made to the ‘aankleding’ which was never recognized by the Republic. Instead, it is portrayed as the Republic simply not upholding *the* treaty. While historians generally point towards the Dutch violating the treaty, in the journals it is the Republic that did not uphold their end of the bargain.

The first policing action is again placed in the context of anti-fascist resistance, where the policing actions are described as a fulfilling their “ fundamental duty towards the peoples

⁶⁶ Burgers, p.401

of the kingdom, exactly how the Dutch fleet under admiral Doorman sacrificed itself to break the Japanese offensive.”⁶⁷ However, the KVP still maintains the position that the Republic is mutable, a state entity that can still be saved through moral leadership. In the journals, the KVP argues that the policing actions are not an attack against the Republic but an act to restore order against a corrupted government. Nonetheless, while the KVP assures that a ‘good’ Republic is possible, the vocabulary and phrasing clearly points towards an understanding that does not respect the Republic anymore. For example, it starts using the vocabulary of ‘freed’ and ‘occupied’. Republican territory, as agreed upon in the treaty of Linggadjati has suddenly become ‘occupied’. The areas the Dutch conquered have become ‘freed’. It thus links back to the idea that the Republic is not an Indonesian invention as much as it is a Japanese, fascist invention occupying the good Indonesian peoples. For the Republic to regain its position within the Dutch-Indonesian relationship, it requires devout loyalty to the principles of democracy and human rights.

For the ARP however, the need for the policing actions have only shown that the Republic as a whole is corrupt. No differentiation is made between the constructive possibilities and destructive elements within the Republic. The ARP argues for significantly stronger military actions that gets rid of the Republic. It therefore describes the Dutch government as weak and indecisive:

“And now it has witnessed the wavering of the Dutch Government: refusing to negotiate with the enemy, the revolutionary bandit leader; then engaging in negotiations; the failure of negotiations; advancing; halting the advance; waiting for the Security Council. Throughout all of this, there is the fear that negotiating at any point could impose the duty to employ one’s own weapons in service of combatting the enemy’s revolutionary violence.”
Anti-Revolutionair Maandblad November 1947

The Republic is described as “The revolutionary subject who takes up the weapon of the state to turn against their own government. It becomes an enemy thereby, but not on an equal footing, as in a regular war. For the government, the only duty is to suppress the uprising. The dutiful Dutch citizen willingly grabs their weapons for this purpose.”⁶⁸ The ARP’s discourse on the Republic was not changed but rather amplified by the policing actions. The name ‘Republiek’ has been systematically exchanged for the term ‘enemy’. By stating that they are not even equal to enemies in war, the Republic has become nothing more than a criminal organisation rather than a state entity the Netherlands has a treaty with. Next to this, there is a repeated reference to the “enemy’s brutality and injustice.” Any form of cooperation with the Republic will lead to misery, and now it is the government’s role to not be fooled again.

The ARP unsurprisingly uses the term ‘Indonesian revolution’, a term that is not used by the KVP. The revolution of the Indonesians is also phrased as an act against God by disrupting the Dutch role of establishing “divine justice in the affairs of public life, in accordance with the ordinances set forth by the Creator.”⁶⁹ The topic of revolution is where the parties clearly diverge. Interestingly, both parties make references to historical revolutions. The ARP references the Belgian and French revolutions to show how the Dutch have suffered under it. The KVP does not directly dismiss revolutions, and argues that the

⁶⁷ Katholiek Maandblad September 1947

⁶⁸ Anti-Revolutionair Maandblad November 1947

⁶⁹ Idem.

French and American revolutions were ones that in fact celebrated the Christian morality of freedom, equality, and brotherhood. The Republic however does not oblige by these values and therefore their revolution should be rejected. Meanwhile, the ARP considers military action a divine duty. Given that Dutch colonial rule is sanctioned by God's hand, refusal to restore authority in cases of revolution is therefore an active act against God.

January 1948 - November 1948. An uneasy peace through the Renville Agreement

After the Renville agreement, marking a cease-fire between the Netherlands and the Republic, the Republic became a less dominant theme for both the KVP and the ARP. For the KVP, the topic of Indonesia is still commonly discussed, but the attention is directed to matters of statebuilding: the construction of the NIU and VSI. Here, the Republic is treated as a hypothetical state entity, resembling their hopes of the 'good Republic'. In fact, the word Republic has been replaced by a non-concrete category of 'the Indonesians' that would make up the VSI. The views of the Republic are not considered in their evaluation of the future mutual relationship. The KVP seems to want to move beyond the entire issue of the Republic. It builds on the idea of a strong relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The Republican cooperation is assumed. The evident friction between the Dutch and Republican government as a result of the violence are conveniently ignored in order to build the prospect of a new, strong Union. When the Republic *is* directly addressed, it follows the themes as of during the first policing actions, but the tone is significantly less drastic. This all reflects the attitude the Dutch government had during this period. The Renville Agreement established Dutch sovereignty over all of the Dutch East-Indies, and therefore the Republic in the eyes of the Dutch did not have to be dealt with anymore. The process towards independence now did not require cooperation between the Republic and the Netherlands but could entirely be orchestrated by the Dutch. While the conflict with the Republic was far from over, rhetorically it is framed as if the Republic is not a player of significance anymore.

"If the authority in the kingdom were not legitimate, then the Kingdom would be in a state of anarchy. However, there is order. The only existing quarrel [strubbeling] concerns the Republic of Indonesia, and that is not a political organization that spontaneously emerged and grew from the people, but an institution prepared and established by the enemy as a weapon against the Allies. To prevent misunderstandings, it should be noted that in this consideration, the Republic is solely judged based on its historical origin, and this does not exclude the presence of forces within it that strive for healthy progress."

Katholiek Maandblad March 1948

The reference to the Republic as nothing more than a mere quarrel paints the picture that the Indonesian crisis has largely been solved. The excerpt above once again shows the difficult balancing of the Republic between both a hopeful entity and a morally corrupt organization. This odd balancing explains the desire of the KVP to ignore the Republic altogether and focus on the future of the NIU. Some form of enemy has to be present to justify the policing actions, which already saw opposition nationally and internationally, yet too strong of a focus on an enemy would tear down the possibility of a strong NIU. A half year after the Renville agreement the Republic is now described as doing 'repeatedly the incorrect things' and negotiations with them are embroiled in 'vagueness and misunderstanding.' Misunderstanding and 'doing the incorrect things' implies that the Republic is more misguided rather than an enemy. Being misguided also implies that the

Netherlands and the Republic in the end have similar goals. However, the Republic, due to their incompetence or their infection with anti-democratic ideologies, keeps making mistakes in reaching this goal.

Another likely factor at play is that the position of the Republic is here to stay. The first policing actions had shown that there was no international support for military action. Next to this, the coalition partner PvdA showed strong hesitance towards a full military campaign. The lurking hope for a complete destruction of the Republic crumbled. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the focus is now on the rehabilitation of the Republic.

In November, right before the second policing actions, the balance towards a misguided Republic has shifted that even negotiation is deemed desirable:

“And if a government believes that, without resorting to the ultimate means of armed force, the Republic can be incorporated into a framework of responsible self-determination through negotiations, then, in our view, that government acts wisely by engaging in those negotiations, which means acting morally upright. And if a well-founded and justified attempt by the government in this direction would entail a brief extension of disorder in the Republic, it requires little understanding of natural moral law to realize that tolerating such a temporary extension of disorder is justified by the higher good to be achieved.”

Katholiek Maandblad November 1948

Before the Renville agreement, the Republic was deemed as treacherous and untrustworthy. Now it is argued that negotiation towards a ‘responsible autonomy’ is the best course of action. The reader gets painted a picture of a Dutch government that is willing to negotiate. In reality, the Netherlands never put genuine effort in the negotiations.⁷⁰ It is never explained why the Republic has become less treacherous so that it allows negotiation. The ‘Republican problem’ has simply become a matter of guiding them towards a sovereignty that is respectable regarding democracy and rule of law. Regardless of the upcoming war, the tone has become mild and the comparisons to fascism or communism have ceased. No such mildness towards the Republic, and subsequently a certain trust, is seen within the ARP journals. After the Renville agreement, just like the KVP, discussions on the Republic are surprisingly absent in the ARP media. What little that is discussed on Indonesia usually relates to Christianity within Indonesia. The ARP does not budge from its principle of divine authority and therefore the Republic as a revolutionary entity must be eliminated.

November 1948 - August 1949. Merging with the Enemy: the second ‘Policing Actions’

December 1948 saw the start of the second policing actions. The KVP holds a significantly different tone in describing the Republic than in the first policing actions. The situation is described as the KVP doing everything in its power to “through negotiations reach an agreement with the Republic.” Veritably, it was the Netherlands that failed to cooperate in the UN-led negotiations.⁷¹ What is interesting is that for the KVP the purpose of these negotiations was to combat the “disorder” within the Republic. In contrast to before Renville, the Republic is not described as directly causing this disorder. While the military offensive was in fact against the Republic, the Republic itself is not challenged. There is no attempt to discredit the Republic and exclude it from their given understanding of the VSI. Nonetheless, the Netherlands still has a duty in Indonesia. Therefore, the following military actions are

⁷⁰ Poeze, p.315-318

⁷¹ Idem.

described as the result of "The last attempt by our government to fulfil its duty peacefully, [which] has failed." Because it failed, the government:

"Had to resort to violence. In doing so, the government, according to Dr. Drees, pursues no other political goal than the realization of the principles laid down in the agreement with the Republic and with other constituent states, which the Constitution currently allows for. The government aims to bring about, as quickly as possible, a legal situation that initiates Indonesian self-governance."

Katholiek Maandblad January 1949

The Republic is described as 'one of the member-states', an honour never given before in their description, despite it being established in the Treaty of Linggadjati. The military actions are thus also not *against* the Republic, but rather for the realization of the treaties that will lead to the sovereignty of the member-states. It questions the common historiographical view that sees the second policing actions as an attempt to eradicate the Republic. The policing action was short, so this was written with the knowledge that the complete destruction of the Republic failed. However, it shows that right after the KVP does not even attempt to insinuate the need for an eliminated Republic. Next to this, as I argued before, the KVP right before the policing actions did not argue for the elimination of the Republic either. The discourse was always keeping the Republic under control, rather than destroying it. While in reality there was a full-scale war against the Republic, for the readers it was only a war against disorder within the Republican territory rather than against the Republic itself.

Paradoxically, the military conflict against the Republic is framed in a way that in fact helps the Republic move towards self-rule. The blame is still placed on the Republic, but this is done in a surprisingly mild tone and in connection to other culprits, despite the shocking violence in actuality.

"A grave misunderstanding of the Republic and many in the world, including many powerful figures in the world. A grave misunderstanding that carries deep tragedy. If the world had been able to attain a better understanding of justice and Christian politics, perhaps the ultimate sacrifice and the embittered adherence to mistake [dwaling] by many in Indonesia could have been avoided. Peace, justice, and freedom in Indonesia would not have needed to be brought about by the sword. Netherlands' forbearance would have received a more fitting reward than is currently the case, and many forces in Indonesia itself would have been preserved for the constructive work of the future."

Katholiek Maandblad January 1949

The second policing actions are framed in a surprisingly religious discourse. Before that, the KVP only referred to the 'secular' concept of human rights. Now the Republic is directly accused of 'lacking' Christian politics. But just like in November, it is not phrased as something innate to the Republic. Their hope for a Republic inspired by Christian politics is implied given that the Republic is merely misunderstanding. The word 'dwaling' (mistake, from the word 'dwalen' meaning to wander away from) also implies that the Republic, among other Indonesians, moved away from an origin that was in fact practising Christian politics. But it is not only the Republic, but many powers in the world that are making this mistake. This is important as the policing actions is recontextualized in a broader world that is moving away from Christian politics. The blame is disseminated, and the Republic is simply making errors rather than orchestrating a hostile plan, and these errors are merely a symptom of a broader global issue.

The mild tone towards the Republic remains in direct contrast to the ARP. First, the

ARP ramps up the comparisons between fascism, communism, and the Republic. After the second policing actions the ARP dedicates an entire section to communist influence in Indonesia. Communism and fascism are described as closely tied to each other. The ARP differentiates between the more international communist influence as supported by the Soviet Union and the strongly national form of communism that is described as "strongly related to those [ideas] of fascism and national socialism." This fascist form of communism aims to create "a one-party system, entirely in line with fascism, under a dictator who will assume control of the state. The imperialistic aspect is not lacking either: Burma, Siam, Malaya, the Philippines, Northern Australia, and Indonesia will have to be united in one Asian republic."⁷² The equation of fascism and communism is not just evident in this "nationalistic communism" and its leader 'Tan Malakka'. The ARP also references Soekarno. While he was described during the first policing actions as a fascist collaborator, it is now argued that through him Marxist thought has become commonplace in the Republic. The connection between communism and Soekarno is peculiar. Soekarno was at the forefront of suppressing the communist revolution of September 1948 led by Tan Malakka. It is also the reason the United States placed a lot of trust in the government of the Republic. However, half a year later, no reference is made to this. Instead, there is an active effort to associate all of the Republic with this communism.

August 1949 - February 1950. The transfer of sovereignty and the disappointment of the Dutch-Indonesian Union

After the second military offensive, the Catholic and Protestant journals reflect the post-war period of the first military offensive. Namely, the Republic is largely ignored in favour of discussions on a hypothetical NIU and VSI. The ARP focuses its frustration inwards on the lacklustre and disappointing colonial governance of the ruling KVP and PvdA. Both seem to have accepted that the Republic is permanent. Due to the lack of international and national support for a third offensive, the ideology of the Republic cannot be determined by the Dutch anymore. After the end of the roundtable-conference in November 1949, which confirms the near-upon transfer of sovereignty to the Republic, the content of both the ARP and the KVP media is characterized by that of reflection. There is a remarkable shift in discourse for the KVP. The KVP first regrets the fact that East-Asia was overwhelmed by a revolutionary rather than evolutionary spirit. However, in contrast to the ARP, the issue is not revolution per se but the fact that this revolution meant a sudden break in relations between the European and Asian peoples. After the transfer, the KVP opens the discussion on the Republic.

The KVP describes the policing actions as the result of the disagreement between the Republic and the KVP on the nature of the NIU. The Republic never wanted a strong union and saw it as a threat to its sovereignty. This explanation has never been given before. Previously, the views of the Republic were never given, their cooperation was simply assumed. The policing actions were previously described as the result of the Republic violating the treaty. Now the policing actions are understood as a disagreement between the Netherlands and the Republic on the NIU. The motivation of the Republic changed from a fascist, communist and anti-Dutch motivation, summed up as non-Christian politics, to merely a strong wish for sovereignty.

"For the course of events, including the armed conflicts with the Republic, was partly a result of the incompatibility of these positions. In the associated sphere of sentiments, it acted as a

⁷² Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde February 1949

catalyst in such a way that on the Indonesian side, sovereignty was repeatedly elevated to an absolute value, and the Dutch Union concept was seen as a deliberate erosion intended by the Netherlands, a deliberate threat to the highly coveted good of sovereignty."

Katholiek Maandblad February 1950

The KVP now starts equating the Republic with 'Indonesia'. This is even the case in relation to the policing actions: "A period of negative development of the societal relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia" has emerged as a result of the "in any way regrettable dragging conflict." The blame is not put anymore on the Republic, but rather on the deteriorating relations because of the military conflicts. The Netherlands therefore carries part of the blame, or perhaps no one carries the blame.

For the ARP however, no such reflection is given. The anti-revolutionaries remain hostile towards the Republic. In November, just before the transfer of power, the ARP publishes a piece aptly named 'the Indonesian tragedy'. The ARP argues against the transfer of sovereignty and berates the way the Dutch government has handled the situation. Interestingly, this article is also the first time the Bersiap is explicitly mentioned. The Republic is described as terrorising the entirety of Indonesia into a revolutionary roes [intoxication], which also resulted in the "Bersiap-waanzin" [madness].

The ARP illustrates a future where revolution will lead to corruption, both within Indonesia and its leadership. But most importantly, Indonesia will be dominated by a new discourse theme; fear: The deceitful, inconsistent, opportunistic, wavering, non-principled politics have invoked the spectre of fear; the fear that dominates almost the entire Indo-Dutch and Indonesian society. It describes the fear in a poetic, repetitive manner, summing up the types of fear that will be present among every minority of Indonesian society. Christian Indonesians were forced into supporting the Republic out of "fear for their own lives and the lives of their close relatives." The ARP focuses not on ideology, not on the wish for sovereignty, but on the chaos and brutal violence perpetrated by the hateful Indonesians that victimize the Dutch:

"I assume that from the side of Christian republicans, internal protests have been raised against the preaching of hatred against the Dutch, the incitement to mass murder of the Dutch, the actual mass killings, arson, and ruthless attacks on unsuspecting travellers and peaceful inhabitants of these lands, often even their own compatriots who were shamefully killed, robbed, and looted. They would have protested against the entire "scorched earth" policy, which not only caused hundreds of millions of damages and claimed many victims among the Dutch but also inflicted immeasurable harm and loss in terms of lives and property on the large native population, destroying livelihoods and pushing this beautiful country and its people closer to the abyss."

Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde November 1949

In the eyes of the ARP, the Republic and its supporters are not motivated by the wish for sovereignty but by bloodlust and hatred. Furthermore, while the future motivations of the Republic are never discussed by the KVP, the ARP predicts that the Republic aims to annex all of Indonesia. The very fact that they do not wish to distance themselves from the name 'Republic of Indonesia' shows that they will not accept to be merely a member-state of a federal Indonesia under a royal union. It accuses the Republic of being Javanese supremacists, where "The Republic demands control over the entirety of Sumatra, but won't the existing anti-Republican sentiments on the island increase once the coveted "freedom" is achieved? Will they not turn against Javanese hegemony and resist a Javanese imperialism reminiscent of the time of Majapahit?" Due to this Javanese Imperialism, all other minorities would be in danger of Republican oppression. While the KVP ends with a discourse of trust

and understanding towards the Republic, the ARP shows nothing but distrust. Not only is the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia at stake, but also the entire wellbeing of Indonesia. The trust that the Dutch government has placed in the revolutionary forces, will only end in chaos, corruption, and misery.

Conclusion

In the beginning of the four-year conflict between revolutionaries and the Dutch government, both the KVP and the ARP centre their discourse on the Republic. Other actors, such as the other federal member-states of the United States of Indonesia, are rarely discussed. The events leading up to the conflict, such as the amendment to the treaty of Linggadjati, are not discussed either. Instead, the conflict is attributed due to the characteristics of the Republic. The actual violence, both the violence perpetrated by the Indonesian population and the Dutch government, is avoided. I argue that violence as a discourse theme is avoided because another key discourse theme for both parties is a future strong relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians, which I will discuss further in the following chapter. Because a strong relationship is not possible if hostility between the two groups exists, the Republic is solely blamed for the violence. This despite the fact that a lot of violence towards the Dutch was in fact bottom-up, from smaller Indonesian militias rather than the Republic itself.

Both parties argue against the Republic based on three intertwined discourse themes. The first revolves around the idea of a fascist Republic with at its head the collaborator Soekarno. The second associates the Republic with communist forces such as the Soviet Union and the Dutch Communist Party. The third describes the Republic as untrustworthy and as a catalyst for violence and misery. For the Catholics, these three themes are however balanced with the idea that the corruption of the Republic is not permanent nor inherent, but a result of its leadership. The Republic is mutable. The anti-revolutionary journal is dominated by the discursive hegemony of the anti-revolutionary principle. Fascism, communism, the treachery and the violence are all explained through their revolutionary nature. Because this revolutionary nature is inherent, the Republic is not salvageable.

Because the KVP places more emphasis on values, their discourse on fascism and communism are more extensive in order to prove the immorality of the Republic. Memories of fascism and fear of communism are utilized to prove that the Republic infringes on basic human rights and the principles of democracy. Because revolution is central to the ARP, the mere mentioning of fascism and communism as revolutionary ideologies is sufficient. In contrast to the KVP, revolution is an inherent evil. Therefore, it does not have to be explained why the Republic is immoral. Instead, the main point of focus is proving their revolutionary origin and showcasing their revolutionary nature by action. Therefore, the ARP places more emphasis on the actions of the Republic whereas the KVP places more emphasis in describing its values.

As the sociopolitical landscape changes after the first and second military offensives, the balancing between a corrupt Republic and a misguided Republic becomes increasingly difficult for the KVP. During the first policing actions, the Republic is described in a hostile manner, but afterwards the balance tips towards a portrayal of a less corrupt Republic. Even during the second policing actions, negotiation has become a moral good.

I argue that the sociopolitical changes that cause this shift are the lack of success militarily, especially in suppressing the guerilla-movements in occupied Republican territory, and the lack of international and later national support for a continued war in Indonesia. As time went on, the position of the Republic became more certain and a Republic with *new* leadership in the VSI became impossible. The Catholics had to become more tolerant

towards the Republic. The comparisons to communism and fascism fade, and the Republic is not actively causing harm for their own gain but rather is making 'mistakes'. This also nuances the historiographical idea that the Dutch government aimed to destroy the Republic with the policing actions. While this might be their true motivation behind the scenes, it cannot be said that this goal is also communicated to their voter base. The Catholics prefer avoid the topic of the Republic altogether. Instead, they deal with hypothetical member-states where no specific characteristics, qualities and ideas are attributed to. The ARP maintains its hostile discourse throughout the entire Indonesian Crisis. A simple explanation to this is that the KVP has to an extent defend the policies of the Dutch government. However, the religious aspect cannot be ignored. Because the Republic emerged in a revolution against legitimate authority, a simple change of leadership would not change its revolutionary nature. Consequently, the Republic has to be eliminated.

Chapter IV: *Colonial yet equal*: Relation between the Dutch and Indonesians

The following chapter covers the discourse on the relation between the Dutch and Indonesian peoples. It answers how the parties viewed the connection between the two peoples on a socio-cultural and political level. It studies their understanding of colonialism, how the hierarchical relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians is portrayed, and how this relationship should be established politically.

Both the ARP and the KVP argue that the wishes of the Indonesians and the Dutch in fact align. The dominant characteristic both parties share is a continual affirmation that their main goal is the sovereignty of Indonesia. The military offensives against the Republic are not phrased discursively as opposed to the principle of Indonesian sovereignty. Therefore, as shown in the previous chapter, the Republic is not discredited based on its wish for self-rule but rather on its characteristics. In studying the Dutch-Indonesian relationship, I identify three main discourse themes: a stressed equality and respect for Indonesian nationalism; an understanding of colonialism as either obsolete or as a moral good; and the idea of the natural indivisibility of the kingdom. Through this is argued that the Dutch-Indonesian relationship is virtuous, despite the ongoing violence in Indonesia. Both parties share these themes, although through these themes the KVP argues for a strong Dutch-Indonesian Union whereas the ARP opposes it.

March 1947 - July 1947. Developing a new Dutch-Indonesian future

The Catholic journal phrases the relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians as that of complete equality. The emphasis on equality is the discourse theme that will come to dominate most discussions on the relation between the Indonesians and the Dutch. This in turn relates to their view on colonialism, which is incorporated into the discourse of equality. It is evident that the KVP is well-aware of the controversy of colonialism, also within Catholic circles. Therefore, it either shifts between denying the colonial nature of the relationship, or later, describing the current relationship as colonial in order to promote new policies to establish equality. In 1947, the general theme is to dismiss the idea that the Netherlands is colonial. In discussions on the relation between Indonesia, Suriname, and Curacao, the KVP admits that there are certain inequalities between the Dutch 'oversea-territories' and the mainland Netherlands. However, these are described as "remnants of a colonial past," thus implying that the Netherlands is in large not colonial anymore in its actions. Because Suriname and Curacao are less far in its process towards sovereignty, the KVP considers an equal treatment of Suriname and Indonesia as representative of a "less correct 'colonial' governance from the past, to consider both parts of the kingdom one and the same".⁷³ The use of inverted commas allows the judgment of the colonial past to be up to the reader. This indecisiveness towards colonialism will remain a common theme for the KVP.

As explained in the previous chapter, the ARP has an inherently hostile position towards the Republic due to its revolutionary nature. Therefore, from the very start the ARP takes issue

⁷³ Katholiek Maandblad April 1947

with the equality proposed by the treaty. Just like the KVP, the ARP assures its support of Indonesian sovereignty, but the notion of 'equality' does not take a central position in their discourse. For the Catholics, the Republic should not be dealt with based on their violation of human rights principles, but this does not imply that their relations are unequal. The ARP argues however that from the start the relation between the Dutch authority and Indonesian movements are unequal by merit of the divine authority that the Netherlands has:

“Based on anti-revolutionary principles, the recognition of God's guidance in history is affirmed, acknowledging that history unfolds through the sins of humanity. Considering reality and giving due regard to what has become historical is not only a requirement of good governance but also a matter of principle. According to this perspective, the connection between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies is not accidental; rather, the Netherlands acquired legitimate sovereignty over the Dutch East Indies throughout history, and therefore, it is now incumbent upon the Netherlands, as ordained by God, to govern the Dutch East Indies to the best of its knowledge.”

Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde April 1947

The ARP thus gives a religious justification for colonialism that is not present in the Catholic discourse. An unequal relationship therefore does not indicate immorality because this inequality is directly guided by the hand of God. In fact, the Catholic discourse implies the opposite. The KVP underlines the Christian origins of equality and freedom. Equality is the result of Christian politics. Therefore, the Catholic discourse functions on an idea of a God-given equality, whereas the Protestant discourse is based on a God-given inequality.

The ARP holds a paradoxical view on Indonesian nationalism where it is both celebrated as well as dismissed as non-existent. I argue against the historiographical idea that the ARP was anti-nationalist.⁷⁴ Although the nationalist movement was seen as closely related to the revolutionary movements, a non-revolutionary nationalism should be “greeted with sympathy.” Rather, the nationalism is supported in principle but in practice is often delegitimized. The ARP denies the Indonesian origin of Indonesian nationalism and explains that it “must be acknowledged that the unity of the entity we now know as the Dutch East Indies was established and continues to exist as a result of Dutch activity...” The usage of the word 'sympathy' counterbalanced by the Dutch origin of Indonesian nationalism, places a special role of the Dutch in Indonesian nationalism. Indonesian nationalism is completely understandable, but it is misguided because the Indonesian nation does in reality not exist without the role of the Netherlands. The logic underlying it is that Indonesian nationalism warrants Dutch authority, and a relation based on equality only threatens the unity of Indonesia. It is Dutch authority rather than the Indonesians themselves that keep Indonesia together.

The lack of emphasis on equality does not mean that the ARP proposes to continue old-fashioned colonialism. The ARP instead emphasises that they always had the good and interests of the Indonesian peoples in mind. It recognizes the controversy of colonialism and defend itself by explaining that the ARP has a long history of advocating for Indonesian self-governance, giving multiple examples dating back to the first years of the 20th century. However, this support for self-rule has to be balanced by a responsible respect for a Dutch divine authority. The term 'colonial' is not the main term to describe the relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Generally, it just refers to the 'current state-construct' or the

⁷⁴ For example, Smit, p.67, p.109, p.445

'current government of the Dutch-Indies'. However, in contrast to the KVP, the ARP does work on the assumption that the current governance is in fact colonial. For example, it acknowledges that every party has Indonesian self-rule as "the goal of its colonial politics." The understanding of colonialism is simply less negative. It admits that the rule over Indonesia before 1940 was authoritarian, but its rule is described as that of an "enlightened despot": an endorsement within anti-revolutionary discourse. The revolution of the Republic is portrayed as an action that only disrupts the path towards sovereignty. The ARP makes open comparisons between the rule of the 'sovereign' Republic and the Dutch colonial rule. It portrays colonial rule as both more just and prosperous. Interestingly, colonial rule is also described as a more efficient path towards Indonesian sovereignty than through the NIU as established in the treaty of Linggadjati. This is because the ARP emphasizes that colonialism is evolutionary and thus "Unlike a colonial relationship, which naturally undergoes development, a unitary state carries a static element that makes any significant modification akin to a revolutionary breakthrough."⁷⁵The ARP describes the proposed Dutch-Indonesian Union as a 'superstate', with the implication that it holds significant overreach that does not respect the differences between its members. Not only will this superstate planish its differences, but it will also place too much power in the hands of the Indonesians. Because of this, I argue that it cannot be stated that the KVP 'care less' about Indonesia than the ARP. This is often assumed due to their lack of history in Indonesia, and the lack of interest in Indonesia by the Catholic Church.⁷⁶ In contrast, the KVP has an ardent desire to maintain a strong bond between Indonesia and the Netherlands. They celebrate a tight relationship between the Dutch and Indonesians as it will guarantee continued influence in Indonesia. For the ARP, the tighter the relationship, the more dangerous it becomes.

July 1947 - November 1947. Negotiation and Conflict: the first 'Policing Actions'

For both parties, the military conflict draws all attention to the Republic. The future relation between the Indonesians and the Dutch fall into the background, as the Republic has become the great disrupter that first has to be dealt with. Nonetheless, the first policing actions are a source of great discomfort for the KVP. Military conflict did not fit into their prospects of an equal and non-colonial relationship. While the KVP attempts to avoid the term colonial, the international criticism cannot be ignored. As a result, the KVP does briefly discuss the 'accusations of a colonial war' by other countries and media. For example:

"The American press went even further in this regard. It accused the Dutch government of waging a colonial war and lamented the fate of the "poor Indonesians" who had to resist Dutch airplanes, Tommy guns, and tanks with spears and other inadequate weapons."
Katholiek Maandblad October 1947

The overall tone of this excerpt is that of ridicule. The KVP decides to not explain why it is not a colonial war, but it is evident that such an idea is dismissed. The Dutch public would be aware that this military conflict is not that between 'tanks' and 'spears'. The foreign media is therefore described as sensationalist, hysterical and misinformed. By rhetorically binding accusations of colonialism with this hysteria, both ideas can be dismissed together. It also

⁷⁵ Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde April 1947

⁷⁶ Bank, p.479-480, Smit, p.24

connects criticism of colonial war as communist. It singles out the Soviet Union, which it accuses of only using such terminology so that it can portray itself as the defender of the 'poor colonial peoples.' In both cases, the KVP puts 'poor Indonesians' in inverted commas, dismissing the idea that there is an Indonesian victim in the first place. Instead, the war is phrased as defending the kingdom from those that wish to harm freedom, equality, and democracy. Underlying the entire discussion of the conflict is a tacit knowledge that the presence of Dutch authority assures the respect of these three principles. For the ARP, the policing actions are not a matter of crisis. The Netherlands has divine authority over Indonesia, and therefore must act according to this authority. This includes the need of military action, which in the end is to the benefit of the entire Indonesian population in face of the revolutionary dangers.

January 1948 - November 1948. An uneasy peace through the Renville Agreement

The year 1948 is dominated by the prospect of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. Most of the articles discuss the formation and structure of the Union. This is especially the case for the KVP. The KVP continues its emphasis on equality within this Union. Evidently, the first military offensive required this to be emphasized even more than in the past. In discussing the NIU, the phrase "whose [Indonesia and the Netherlands] position is completely equal" is repeated in an almost mantra-like fashion. The situation described by the KVP starts to differ significantly from the actual situation. The KVP presents a Dutch-Indonesian Union that would later be referred to as the 'heavy union'. However, no distinction is made between a light or heavy union in the Catholic journal. Instead, the heavy union is portrayed as the only one. The KVP proudly displays the features of this union, including its own army, its own parliament, and an infallible monarch. The phrasing implies that this structure is already set in stone. In reality, no such union was agreed upon with the Republic in the Renville Agreement. The Republican goal remained ultimate independence, and only agreed to a Union under the threat of the Dutch military. Yet this Republican disapproval, nor the conflict only a few months ago, is portrayed as causing any doubt in the prospect of a strong union.

The union is portrayed as a preservation of Dutch influence while also assuming the willingness of the Indonesians to not infringe on their equality and right to self-determination. Interestingly, it is explained that some sovereignty has to be lost:

"I have referred to these limitations as significant and of great concrete value. They are significant because, in the development of the legal order of the new Kingdom, our country, the Netherlands, no longer has sole authority. With their hand on the Dutch Constitution, Indonesians, Surinamese, or Antilleans can say to us: Friend, listen, you must discuss with me because you must attribute real value to this discussion."

Katholiek Maandblad June 1948

This again showcases that the Catholics are less afraid of an Indonesian influence than the Anti-revolutionaries. This can also be seen by the positive description of Indonesians as 'our friends'. The situation is often described as mutual: the Indonesians see the Dutch as a friend to work with. Nonetheless, the loss of sovereignty is framed as mild. It is not described as 'deciding together,' but only that the Netherlands has to consider their input by discussing it. The Dutch population does not have to fear actions that are against their own interests. Furthermore, this loss of sovereignty is balanced by the importance of the monarch. The KVP repeatedly stresses the role the monarchy plays; of a king that will wear 'two crowns'.

Despite the historically troubled relation between the Catholics and the Protestant monarchy, The argument relies on the tacit idea that the monarchy guarantees a high quality of statesmanship and legitimacy.⁷⁷ The royal nature of the Union will assure that the basic principles of Christian politics are safe.

In covering the points above, the KVP phrases their discussions on Indonesia in hypotheticals.⁷⁸ In describing the future, the structure of the VSI, the NIU, the transition of sovereignty, the KVP always argues based on hypothetical realities. The KVP refers to a hypothetical VSI, a hypothetical Indonesia, while they completely ignore the reality of a hostile relation with the Republic: an entity that will be a part of this VSI. So, in selling their proposed future, the KVP creates a discourse on an idealised scenario that has little connection to the actual events taking place at the very same time. It pretends the issues are already solved and that the NIU will come without issue. This is all further based on the tacit knowledge that the Netherlands and Indonesia are inseparable. The idea of a separate Indonesia is never entertained despite it being the main goal of the Republic.

As explained in the previous chapter, 1948 saw little discussion on the Republic. It shows the uneasiness of the KVP with the current circumstances, instead opting to ignore the present to focus on a hypothetical future. The monarchy functions as the main red thread in legitimising this hypothetical future. In contrast, the ARP places little importance on the monarchy in relation to Indonesia. Instead, the Anti-revolutionaries prefer to frame the relation through religious discourse. The anti-revolutionaries echo their statements in 1947 which emphasise the religious origin between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Not upholding authority and the unity of the kingdom would be “forsaking a divine calling.”⁷⁹ The implications are that the relation between the Dutch and Indonesians are not framed in a language of equality but of hierarchy. Not only has God connected the Dutch and Indonesians, but God specifically gave the Dutch the duty to rule over the Indonesians through good policy. What is interesting is that this task does not necessarily refer to the colonial raising of the Indonesians. The task is described as the “governing of Indonesia to our best knowledge.” While the development of Indonesia would certainly be included in “governing to the best of our knowledge,” it does mean that this religious duty is irrespective of the specific position of the Indonesians. It is the governance in and of itself that has divine authority and at the end it is the Dutch view on good governance that decides this divine relationship. At the same time, the word duty implies that the continuation of this governance is also a moral question towards God and the Dutch people rather than just the Indonesians. Such an understanding means that the moral justification of the Dutch-Indonesian relationship is twofold. The first is the colonial relation, which focuses on the improvement of the wellbeing of the Indonesians. This portrays Dutch governance as a form of philanthropy and enables the comparisons between the colonial governance and the Republic based on the well-being of the Indonesians. Second, the upholding of Dutch rule, irrespective of future goals or their relation to the Indonesians, becomes a moral duty for the Dutch towards God.

The NIU remains an issue for the ARP. Its lack of authority remains the main issue:

“The authority is not realized because a Union, as outlined here, cannot exercise real

⁷⁷ The Catholics supported the monarchy to not be perceived anti-national, despite the Dutch monarchy looking down on Catholics. See, Luykx, Paul, 'The Netherlands', in Buchanan, T. (eds)(1996), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965*. Oxford. P.245

⁷⁸ Hypothetical is defined here as 'imagined or suggested but not necessarily real or true'. From Cambridge Dictionary. 01-07-2023 '<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hypothetical>'.

⁷⁹ *Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde*, September 1948.

authority due to its parity character. Freedom is compromised because this Union cannot guarantee it due to a lack of necessary independent powers. This proposal is not progressive; it is retroactive against both authority and freedom.”

Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde September 1948

The fear that freedom would suffer from the lack of authority of the NIU, again displays the distrust of the Indonesians beneath the criticism of the structure of the NIU. Freedom needs to be guarded from a threat that only a strong authority can provide. This threat thus comes from the other partner of the Union. This distrust is projected towards the entire Indonesian side, rather than just the Republican leadership. The clarification that the proposal of the NIU is not ‘progressive,’ shows that even for the ARP accusations of colonialism become troublesome. It often shows its frustration with the fact that : “a tendency can be observed to label the anti-revolutionaries, who steadfastly adhere to their principles in their policy towards the Revolution in the Dutch East Indies, as conservatives. They are accused of wanting to maintain the colonial policies of past centuries and obstructing the progressive policy aimed at the independence of Indonesia.”⁸⁰ While the past is not disparaged, the clear message is that the past colonial politics are not acceptable for the present. Nonetheless, the anti-revolutionary colonial politics are described through a long tradition of loyalty to the development of the Indonesian well-being and self-determination. From the late 19th century, it gives examples of how ARP politicians were at the forefront of changing the colonial relationship from that of material benefit for the Netherlands to that of the ‘moral and material prosperity’ of Indonesia. In line of arguing for the well-being of Indonesians, it explains that this sometimes also requires a strong authority, which included the suppression of rebellions. While no mention is made to the policing actions, it is an obvious connection to make for the reader. Just like in the past, good authority requires the suppression of local revolutionary movements in order to protect the wellbeing of the Indonesians.

While before the Renville agreement the KVP refrained from describing the Dutch-Indonesian relationship as colonial altogether, in 194, it is often the current situation that is described as colonial in order to ‘sell’ the idea of the NIU. This new state configurations would do away with all colonial aspects and create a new relation based on complete equality. This is however not to say that the Catholics denounce the Dutch colonial past. Just like the ARP, colonialism is described as developing the spiritual and material ability of the Indonesian peoples.

“Prosperity, both spiritual as well as material, is not the greatest good the colonial power can bring the colonized. The greatest good is true, honourable independence. Also, the general wellbeing of the colonized territories should be seen by the colonizer in relation to the ultimate goal of independence. Therefore, is colonizing a question of reaching harmony. On one side the general well-being must be guaranteed to a minimum basis and then raised to a maximum. On the other side can this raising not hinder the ultimate goal of honourable independence.”

Katholiek Maandblad June 1948

Often, this relation is explained similar to how a parent raises a child. The general idea here is thus that the Netherlands has a moral duty to raise Indonesia to ‘adulthood’ where it functions as its own independent state. But it is the idea that Indonesia is not yet there that

⁸⁰ Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde September 1948

justifies the continued power the Netherlands should have over Indonesia.

However, the Catholics disagree with the anti-revolutionaries on the level of development of the Indonesians. While there are still some questions left to be answered, there is a trust in the Indonesians. Right before the KVP-sanctioned second policing actions, the KVP even accuses those opposed to the NIU of continuing “colonial views.”⁸¹ It is the NIU that can finally end the ‘colonial delusions’ under which critics of the Dutch government and Dutch rule over Indonesia suffer.

In 1948, while the KVP focuses on the future, the ARP focuses on retrospect. In fact, no article is written on the contemporary situation in Indonesia. Instead, it discusses the role of the Dutch government, the Dutch monarchy, and the anti-revolutionaries in Indonesia in the last decades. It is no surprise that the ARP focuses on the past while the KVP focuses on the future. I argue that this links back to their understanding of equality versus hierarchy. The KVP has an awkward relation to its colonial past, recognizing shortcomings of Dutch rule. Because its main message is that of equality, it is not a surprise that the hypothetical future is so attractive. A focus on the past would only emphasise the inequality that they would move away from through the proposed NIU. In contrast, the main message for the ARP is the Dutch divine role within Indonesia. The Anti-revolutionaries have little trust in the NIU and the treaties present with the Republic. The contemporary situation has therefore little to offer. A focus on the past functions as a critique of the government’s colonial politics, as it gives an example of Dutch rule where the divine role of the Netherlands was respected.

November 1948 - August 1949. Merging with the Enemy: the second ‘Policing Actions’

Just like during the first policing actions, most of the attention is directed to the Republic. The Indonesians are portrayed as victims of the Republican misdeeds. For the KVP, the discussions on the NIU halt. The second military conflict is a clear disruption of the equality and assumed cooperation as described in the preceding year. As a result, the discussions on Indonesia have become surprisingly rare as a whole. The redeeming feature in preserving their discourse is the discrediting of the Republic. The war is not described as a threat to this equality, it is the Republic that is a threat to this equality. The second policing actions share a similar idea of fulfilling its duty to the kingdom and its peoples. However, it is apparent that the willingness for military action has diminished.

The Catholics emphasize that all attempts for peaceful alternatives have been made, but unfortunately the government was forced to bring “peace, justice and freedom through the sword.” It explains that this offensive is only to uphold the agreements of the treaty, and states that “Those who fail to recognize from these words that there is no colonial war being waged, cannot honestly tell that they are speaking the truth.”⁸² The anxiety over the war is evident. The need for the clarification that this is *not* a colonial war reflects the ongoing discussions in the Netherlands and the international criticism of a lingering colonial mindset.

As negotiations start in May, it is clear that the previous descriptions of the hypothetical NIU are not realistic. The journals start adding asterisks to the idea of a completely equal NIU that at the same time follows Dutch ideals. The Catholics continue their emphasis on equality. However, the NIU has become not only equal, but also a “voluntary connection.” The Union is now up to the Indonesians, not just the Dutch. Not only does the usage of ‘voluntary’ imply no Dutch control over the Indonesian self-rule, it also opens up the possibility that Indonesia is *not* a part of the Dutch sphere. The political failure

⁸¹ Katholiek Maandblad September 1948

⁸² Katholiek Maandblad January 1949

of the second policing actions makes the painful reality clear that Indonesia and the Netherlands are not inherently inseparable. Therefore, in June 1949 a new discourse theme arises to address this issue. The KVP starts making arguments as to why Indonesia should be a part of the Netherlands. It introduces the topic of economics, a topic that was previously ignored. It explains the intertwined nature of the Dutch and Indonesian economies, and the Dutch origin of most economic, technical, and administrative facilities. It explains that prosperity can only be achieved through a third way: not through a fully independent Indonesia, not through a Dutch-ruled Indonesia but through an "Independence of Indonesia under an Indonesian government supported by a working community of Indonesians and Dutch there."

The second policing actions change little in the discourse of the ARP. The main argument remains: we are in favour of Indonesian sovereignty but opposed to the current state of affairs. Certain discourse topics are expanded on further. Not only is Indonesian nationalism a Dutch product as discussed in the past, Indonesian nationalism is now also tied to communism.

"Regarding Indonesia, nationalism served as one of the best channels to fuel a revolutionary movement that would oppose Dutch authority. This Dutch authority prevented the utilization of Indonesian resources and labour for the service of Russian imperialism. Hence, the initially commendable nationalism was seized upon by the Communist Party to achieve its goal of world revolution. This method is still being followed by the communist rulers in Indonesia, and it cannot be denied that they have already achieved some degree of success with it."

Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde February 1949

Although the ARP claims they do not oppose Indonesian nationalism, an entire article is devoted to explaining the relation between nationalism, communism and revolution. The local population has come to use communist phrasing, encouraged by a communist elite, to understand their nationalism. While this does not disapprove of nationalism per se, it frames the opposition to nationalist movements as a fight against not just communists, but also Soviet influence. This type of rhetoric has long disappeared among the Catholics but is only strengthened by the ARP. While the KVP has already placed responsibility on the Indonesian people for the future Dutch-Indonesian relationship, the ARP does not back down on the Dutch supposed role. The policing actions are not seen as something regrettable, but rather a natural element of legitimate Dutch authority.

August 1949 - February 1950. The transfer of sovereignty and the disappointment of the Dutch-Indonesian Union

The round-table conference marked the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. Both journals in this period reflect on the Indonesian Crisis. The future Dutch-Indonesian relations now rely on the Indonesians themselves. For the KVP, the general tone is that of disappointment: disappointed in the gaunt form of the NIU, and disappointed in the need for two policing actions that only further separated the Dutch and the Indonesians. While before the second policing actions the ideas among Indonesians were never discussed, they now become a central theme.

"The Netherlands sought strength in synthesis, while Indonesia was so deeply influenced by

revolution that it could never fully transform its unilateral action into a pursuit of synthesis. Indonesia remained fixated on absolute sovereignty, and it became increasingly evident that it only wanted to enter a Union with the Netherlands after obtaining such sovereignty, through an act of sovereign will.”

Katholiek Maandblad February 1950

The Catholics argue that Indonesia and the Netherlands always desired different things. This idea was never stated before. Instead, the Dutch goals were described with the implication that these were shared with the Indonesians. After the Round-Table conference, not only are they described but also given as the reason for the current NIU. It is explained that the Indonesians never wanted a heavy union like the KVP. Despite the past always having a complete certainty in the ‘heavy’ Union, now it is admitted that not just the Republic but also the other federal states were opposed to this Union. What is also remarkable is the use of ‘Indonesia’. The reference to revolutionary nationalism refers to the Republic, yet it is the term ‘Indonesia’, not ‘Republic’ that is used. The mere fact that ‘Indonesia’ is referred to as an actor, instead of the United States of Indonesia or the Republic signifies a significant difference in discourse that describes the Indonesians as both a singular people with a singular desire. Before that, it was the Republic that was considered at odds with the Indonesian peoples.

The co-operation with Indonesians has become uncertain. While in the past the NIU was a certainty, now it is phrased that cooperation is possible only if the Indonesians themselves recognize the economic and social benefits of the relationship. The Netherlands is not in the position to rule, but to convince and help the Indonesians.

“The Netherlands may confine itself to providing explicit and positive assistance in Indonesia's spiritual and material development. This stance must ultimately be based on a trust in the inherent strength of the Indonesian people and a belief that, during the period of our authority, that we have not failed to sow the seeds of Indonesian self-reliance. The extent to which this strength will flourish favourably and the manner in which we will continue to be helpful in that process are directly proportional to the magnitude of the Netherlands' opportunities to be of service to itself, Indonesia, and the world, in conjunction with Indonesia.”

Katholiek Maandblad January 1950

The current union is described as the result of Indonesian wishes. It is a disappointment, but with trust in the Indonesians, a stronger Union is still possible. It even argues that “The Dutch in Indonesia are regarded [by Indonesians] as welcome guests, highly esteemed foreigners from a friendly nation.” The KVP aims to convince the reader to have trust in the Indonesians. In truth, there was little friendship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Republic, which dominated the VSI, was clear in that no strong Union was desired, nor were the Dutch seen as welcome guests. In fact, the Republic developed a long tradition of anti-Dutch propaganda during the crisis.⁸³ It is no surprise that the NIU, in its already weak form, only lasted 6 years. Nonetheless, the KVP still portrays the Dutch-Indonesian relation as that of friendship. Furthermore, the Indonesians are described as having a lot of interest in economic cooperation. Just like before the Round-Table conference, a hypothetical, unrealistic world is created. But now it is not about a future

⁸³ Zara, A. (2022). Images of the Indonesian war of independence. Leiden University Press.

strong Union, but of a strong Indonesian-Dutch friendship in which hope can be placed. While the current NIU is a failure, Indonesia is not yet lost.

Such a message is in sharp contrast to the ARP. There is little trust placed in the Indonesians. Interestingly, both the KVP and ARP start equating the Republic with Indonesia as a whole, but the ARP maintains its previous understanding of the Republic. Therefore, the understanding of 'Indonesians' becomes significantly more negative. The ARP was always against the NIU because it deemed it authority-less, and after the Roundtable conference has little trust in the benefits and longevity of the NIU and the VSI. The overall tone is very negative. While the KVP asks for trust in the Indonesians, the ARP believes that Indonesia is lost forever. It covers the period up to the conference, explaining that the ARP always had the best interests of the Indonesians in mind. The relations are not described as equal, but as part of a wise process towards independence. It responds to the criticism towards the ARP that they are labelled as "conservative, reactionary, and - the worst possible insult - colonial." Instead, they argue that their colonial politics in the past were "so progressive" that they even suffered insults such as "Defeatist, unpatriotic, ethically weak, and excessively Inlander-freundlich".⁸⁴ The tone is tongue-in-cheek, rejecting the complaints about colonialism from progressive parties as naive for underestimating the dangers of the Republic. The colonial relation is needed to assure a good future for Indonesia, but the early transfer to a revolutionary force has demolished that future.

The ARP is dismissive of the idea that the Netherlands was at fault in the disappointing transfer of sovereignty. It rejects the notion that it was the military violence that separated the Dutch and the Indonesians. And even *if* the Netherlands did make these mistakes, it never warranted the Indonesian revolutionary action. Based on the use of 'even if', the ARP clearly does not see the Netherlands as having acted too strong-handed. What is peculiar is that the majority of the argument in this period is devoted towards the Indonesian Christians. The vast majority of the Indonesians were Muslim, yet their positions are rarely discussed. It is evident that there is a tacit mistrust of Islamic society. The Dutch-Indonesian relationship instead is reliant on the Christians. Because good Christians cannot support revolution, the Indonesians are divided between their cause of nationalism and upholding Christian principles. However, pressured by the Republican leaders, they disfigured Indonesian nationalism from a legitimate idea to an "idol." Nationalism has been worshipped above God. This argument is extended into a comparison to Nazism:

"Doesn't the recent history of the Christian Church in Germany prove that those who subordinated Christianity to nationalism caused incredible damage to the essence of Christianity? Isn't there now a growing realization that a large part of the German church is guilty of the misery brought upon the world, including their own people, by the excessive nationalism of Hitler?"

Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde November 1949

While they continually balance their criticism of Indonesian nationalism with the idea that nationalism as a whole is not objectionable, it is clear for the reader that Indonesian nationalism is not to be trusted. It is still a nationalism that is polluted by revolution, communism, and an even Nazi-like devotion to nationalism. Such a nationalism is unworkable, and as a result the NIU will result in failure. The Netherlands should have never agreed to a transfer of sovereignty to a revolutionary entity. The KVP attempts to paint a

⁸⁴ Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde November 1949

hopeful picture, hoping that the Dutch education for the Indonesians have been sufficient. For the ARP, there is no hope. The ARP is clear that all efforts towards the material and spiritual development of Indonesia have been futile and that it will take “take years before there is any semblance of peace, order, and security, which are certainly essential conditions for recovery and reconstruction. Likewise, the holding of free and democratic elections seems highly unlikely.” The period that follows will be dominated by one thing: “Chaos!”⁸⁵

Conclusion

Both parties view the Dutch-Indonesian relationship as inseparable, and therefore a full independence of Indonesia is inconceivable. However, this does not imply that the parties oppose Indonesian nationalism. Both parties consistently express their support for the wish for Indonesian sovereignty. As a result, the interests of the Indonesians and the Dutch are not portrayed as in contrast to one another. The main goal for the KVP was always an equal, strong union. It is clear that Indonesia was not some Protestant endeavour but a central aspect in the Catholic Dutch identity. To promote this, it describes the Dutch-Indonesian relationship as warm and friendly. This warmth goes as far that giving up a little sovereignty has become something to be celebrated as representative of a new form of friendship. As accusations of colonialism have become difficult to deal with, the KVP continually emphasizes that the Union is based on complete equality. Colonialism has become outdated. However, in reality, the relationship between the Dutch and the Indonesians is all but friendly and equal. Therefore, in promoting the Union, the KVP becomes increasingly distant from reality. It assumes the willingness of the Indonesians to cooperate in a strong union and refrains from mentioning the actual views and positions among Indonesians. During the crisis, the Dutch-Indonesian relationship is thus described as significantly better than it actually was. This justifies the military actions as not a war against Indonesians, yet makes the failure of the NIU only more difficult to explain. The ARP pays little attention to the views of the Indonesians because they deem it less relevant. It is God’s hand in history that has legitimized Dutch authority over Indonesia. It therefore also does not deny that Dutch authority is colonial in nature, nor does it deny the hierarchical relation. Nonetheless, the ARP also distances itself from the accusations that the anti-revolutionaries only want to continue colonial rule. While it opposes the NIU, it denies allegations of a colonial, conservative mindset and instead argues that they only remain true to the Christian principle of authority. While both parties thus support Indonesian independence, it is the approval of a hierarchical Dutch-Indonesian relation that allows the ARP to have a significantly less tolerant approach to the existing Indonesian independence movements and consequently advocate for continued military interference. The indivisible Dutch-Indonesian relationship can therefore remain hierarchical for the time being. Because the KVP embraces equality rather than hierarchy, the conflicts are difficult to deal with. In maintaining the Dutch-Indonesian relationship, the focus is thus placed on a hypothetical future where the Dutch and Indonesians are united in a new friendship.

⁸⁵ Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde November 1949

Chapter V: *By Dutch hands only*: Dutch role in the independence of Indonesia

The previous chapters have shown that both journals are clear in their support of a future sovereign Indonesia. However, the question of Indonesian sovereignty is also something that the Dutch government should be heavily involved in. The first chapter displays how the Republic is disqualified for leading Indonesian sovereignty. The second shows that the ARP and the KVP both see the relation between Indonesia and the Netherlands as self-explanatory and of utmost importance to continue. This section deals with how the process towards a united Netherlands and Indonesia should be reached. Pathways towards Indonesian self-rule were already discussed before the end of WWII.⁸⁶ Discussions in the Netherlands were thus not on the right to sovereignty, but the process towards this sovereignty.

I argue that the journals balance between two points. On the one hand, the Netherlands should be responsible for the process towards independence because Indonesia itself is unable to do so. The Indonesian Other is portrayed as lacking the expertise around statesmanship. In contrast, the Dutch Self is portrayed as experts in such matters due to their long tradition of human rights and rule of law. For the ARP, this also includes a heavy emphasis on religion. On the other hand, the self-determination of Indonesians is not directly opposed. Because the Catholics are more trusting towards the Indonesians, they phrase the Dutch involvement as a guiding hand. In contrast, the ARP considers Dutch authority inherently legitimate, while also having less trust in the Indonesians. Therefore, the Dutch role has to be more leading and authoritative in its nature. For the KVP, the Indonesian crisis is not caused by poor Dutch governance, but due to the interference of international actors. In dealing with the United Nations and foreign relations in general, foreign states are portrayed as inexperienced or irrational. Many painful decisions the Netherlands had to make, such as the use of the military, are the result of irrational decisions by foreign powers that are motivated by anti-Dutch biases. While the ARP does not necessarily oppose this idea, it portrays the Indonesian Crisis as first and foremost a result of the concessions made to revolution. The Dutch government and the international actors have legitimized revolution, and the violence and misery during the crisis are a result of this.

March 1947 - July 1947. Developing a new Dutch-Indonesian future

The very first article on Indonesia in the KVP journal start with questioning the Indonesian devotion to democracy and human rights:

“Now the crucial questions come. How strong are the remaining Japanese influences today? How powerful and extensive is the natural and inherently healthy nationalism that possesses constructive force? Is this nationalism genuinely popular, or is it primarily driven by group interests? Is there a sense of unity among the populations of Indonesia, and to what extent does it exist? Does a democratic spirit exist that can be directed towards serving an abstract

⁸⁶ Smit, p.443

principle, or is loyalty to an individual the decisive factor in this Eastern society? Does this community possess sufficient capable and upright forces to lead an internal organization that guarantees legal certainty, protects the fundamental rights of all individuals regardless of race, religion, or nationality, and provides cultural and economic care to the populations? These questions hold significant importance in assessing the current state of affairs.”
Katholiek Maandblad March 1947

These questions are not rhetorical. Instead, the purpose is to leave these questions up to debate. It shows that there is a measurement of democracy and human rights, but these are also vulnerable and, in many cases, questionable. Because this basis is questionable, it naturally makes room for Dutch involvement to assure that these principles are met in a secure manner. Especially because in relation to the Republic, there is a clear threat in the form of both communist and fascist influences. From the signing of the treaty up to the policing actions, the justification of Dutch involvement is however not discussed to a significant extent. Both Journals refrain from using vocabulary of superiority or inferiority. However, there is an evident tacit understanding that the Western socio-political standards are superior. Given that the Dutch are the most able to bring these values to Indonesia, the Dutch involvement is assumed rather than argued for. Furthermore, there is a strong trust in the treaty, which assumes that the process as described by the treaty will be without significant issue. In reality, the situation was already chaotic and violent. However, the clear message is that the treaty is a success.

For the ARP, the Netherlands has to continue their colonial upbringing, while at the same time preserving authority to protect basic rights and freedom. Underlying this is a clear mistrust of Indonesians as a whole, not just the Republic. While the KVP explicitly mentions the areas in which the Indonesians are lacking (mainly around democracy and human rights), the ARP simply argues that Indonesians cannot have too much power yet, especially in relation to the NIU. The stress is generally on the consequences of transferring power.

“The responsibility of the Netherlands, viewed internationally, means that the Netherlands bears the responsibility for peace and security in the Dutch East Indies, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the fundamental rights and freedoms in Indonesia are also guaranteed under the new state structure. Additionally, from a national perspective, the Dutch government would not be responsible and would forsake its duty as a governing authority if it were to relinquish its authority without the assured certainty that the rights and interests of Indonesians and foreigners are safeguarded under the new arrangements.”
Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde April 1947

For the ARP, the Indonesian declaration of independence is a threat to not only the Dutch but also the Indonesians themselves. It would be considered irresponsible to give away power when the Indonesians have not reached their level of ‘upbringing’ that would preserve their rights and interests. This becomes a common discourse theme. The idea that they are a threat to themselves means that the Dutch government does not necessarily need Indonesian consent in the process towards sovereignty. The indisputable right to Dutch governance does not just rely on the religious duty towards authority, but also because the Indonesians cannot be trusted in pursuing good due to their intoxication with revolution. This contrasts with the discourse of the KVP, which argues that it is not that the Indonesians cannot be trusted, but rather that they do not have the intellectual or material means.

Next to this, the ARP stresses that the Indonesian crisis is primarily an internal issue.

As a result, the journal also gives significantly less attention to the international landscape than the KVP. The view on international actors is not particularly negative and the Protestants do not portray these actors as forcing the hands of the Dutch. It recognizes that the USA is making demands, but it sees this as a fair exchange for their participation in the economic recovery of Indonesia. The blame is instead placed on the Dutch government for neglecting its duty of “handhaving [to uphold] of the kingdom.” With the treaty, the Dutch government has failed in pursuing a genuine anti-revolutionary solution to the crisis. The fact that the Dutch government is now also not upholding the treaty shows an incredible weakness. The violations of the treaty made by the Dutch government are not mentioned. Instead, it is the Republic violating the treaties and the mistake of the government is only the inability to keep the Republic in line.

Furthermore, a topic central to the ARP which the Catholics surprisingly lack is the issue of minorities. One of the main Protestant arguments for strong Dutch control is the defence of vulnerable minorities. While the ARP despises the NIU, it celebrates the VSI and sees it as inspired by Protestant efforts. The VSI is vital to respect the diversity of the Indonesians. The main threat described is that the unitary wishes of the Republic aim to swallow up the minorities. For the ARP, the Dutch hand is required not just for the preservation of divine authority, nor the well-being of Indonesians in face of chaos. There is also a significant threat to the minorities present in Indonesia.

July 1947 - November 1947. Negotiation and Conflict: the first ‘Policing Actions’

After the first policing actions, the KVP devotes an entire article just on the position of various countries in relation to the Indonesian crisis. It laments the international situation and blames both other nations as well as the UN for the need of the policing actions. It is the constant involvement of these actors that did not allow the Dutch to retake proper control. Other countries do not see the things the Netherlands has to do, the duties we have towards our kingdom and its peoples. Not just expected adversaries such as the Soviet Union but also western nations like the United States are portrayed negatively.

The Catholics make the editorial decision to depict the Netherlands as alone in the world: the world is against the Netherlands. This does not just relate to Indonesia. There is a clear interdiscursivity with other topics. With topics such as the annexation question of German land, and a larger position in NATO, there was a continued feeling of the Netherlands being sidelined and not respected.⁸⁷ Furthermore, this discourse is strengthened by the fact that there is a KVP-PvdA coalition. This coalition considered itself the proper solution in between the American capitalism and the Russian communism.⁸⁸ The international situation concerning Indonesia thus builds on a larger discourse in which the Netherlands is continually hampered by foreign powers. The criticism the Netherlands receives internationally is covered extensively. It is dismissed in two ways: The first is connected to the idea of expertise and experience.

“It is almost impossible to find even one paper in the world that advocates the Dutch case regarding the police action in Indonesia. One can say that the misunderstanding of the Dutch point of view is grotesque and fantastical.”

⁸⁷ Maas, P. F. et al. (1996). *Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945. Het kabinet-Drees-van Schaik (1948-1951)*. Centrum voor Parlementaire Geschiedenis. p.96, p.249

⁸⁸ Verkooijen, p.46-48.

Feelings play an important role here, and we cannot change this with political or legal arguments. It's no use being offended by this. It makes much more sense and is of the utmost importance for the Netherlands to take this into account when determining the Dutch attitude towards the world."

Katholiek Maandblad October 1947

The opposition to the Netherlands is simply a manner of misconception and misunderstanding. Other nations refuse to hear the rational arguments of the Netherlands. The Netherlands is forced to undertake certain actions, such as not attacking the Republican capital of Djokjakarta, because it cannot ignore the international position towards the Netherlands no matter how irrational it is. The journal continues by making a specific effort to undermine the United Nations Security Council by questioning its ability. This undermining serves a specific purpose: It is the international community that is to blame for the half-completed military offensive.

"What people in the Netherlands do not realize sufficiently, is the fact that the Security Council is determined to continue this case [against the Netherlands], no matter it is qualified or not. The Dutch side can hammer as much as it could, on the fact that there was no competency, it did not matter. It is unfortunate to confirm, that there is so little understanding of law in one of the highest institutes of the world, but it leaves us with no choice but to take it into consideration."

Katholiek Maandblad October 1947

The world is in an irrational frenzy towards the Dutch, and as a result the kingdom is placed repeatedly in a difficult situation due to outside forces. The journal aims to redirect the anger and worry of the Dutch population towards the international community. Here, it is neither the Dutch government nor the Indonesians that are the issue. The issues within the Republic could have been dealt with if it were not for the need to do "realpolitik" due to the irrational Security Council. The security council is depicted as actively anti-Dutch. Not only do they lack legal arguments. The opposition to the Dutch military offensive by the Council is portrayed as an attempt to destroy the Dutch kingdom: There is a French saying: "qui se fait brebis le loup le mange." and we would not argue that the sheep has the high legal obligation to let itself be eaten, when the wolf dresses itself in a judge's robe." The Catholic journal actively victimizes the Netherlands during the policing actions. The loss of Indonesia is also portrayed as the loss of the Kingdom, and the United Nations therefore wishes to destroy the innocent Dutch.

The second way of dismissing the international criticism is through accusations of communism or anti-Dutch sentiment. It thus builds on the interdiscursivity in relation to the Republic and the cold war. This is most clearly seen in the case of Australia. Australia and its new Labour government had a strained relation with the Netherlands due to its strong opposition to colonialism.

"This country, as far as Indonesia is concerned, has always adopted an anti-Dutch attitude since 1945 and has supported the pro-Indonesian Australian sailor unions with greater or lesser enthusiasm. In fact, these Trade Unions stand under the influence of predominantly communist leaders, who received their orders from Moscow and for this reason alone had ordered their members to sabotage the Dutch cause in every way."

Katholiek Maandblad October 1947

This refers to the decision of the Australian government to refuse the stationing of Dutch military ships to attack the Republic. The Australians are not acting out of rational argument, but out of an anti-Dutch sentiment that is fuelled by a communist ideology that is supported by the Soviet Union.

For the ARP, the policing actions and its less than satisfactory results are not the result of the international community but due to a lacking government and the revolutionary aspects within the Indonesian nationalist movement. It is treated as only an internal issue, something that according to the ARP even the Republic agrees to as stated in the treaty of Linggadjati. The international situation is only discussed as a given that a good government should be able to manoeuvre around. However, the government has caved into international pressure and the chaos in Indonesia, by making concessions to revolutionary forces. By making these concessions, it is no surprise that this resulted in military conflict. Furthermore, they emphasize that the Dutch government is acting through a 'majority-dictatorship' that is itself a result of the French revolution:

"The aforementioned accommodation of the minority is being squeezed by a positively revolutionary majority. This always leads towards a Rousseauian direction. The state then becomes tyrannical, as does the majority within the state. The evidence for this can be seen in the French Revolution and, in our country, the liberal majority during the time of Kappeyne. Today, it can be observed in the Labour government in England. ...Similarly, in our country, the Dutch East Indies policy of the Catholic-Labour majority is also an illustrious example of such majority dictatorship, perhaps not so much in the policy itself but in the manner in which it is concocted outside the States General in party alliances between ministers and members of parliament."

Antirevolutionaire Staatskunde November 1947

The accusations of a revolutionary mindset within the Dutch government creates a world where in every corner good Christian politics are threatened by revolutionary forces. International allies such as the United Kingdom and the United States, nationalist forces in Indonesia and even the Dutch government itself has been infected by a revolutionary plague. The situation is described as grim, and not particularly hopeful. The only solution is to stay true to the main principle: no concessions to revolution. Given that it is only the Dutch authority that is legitimate, it inherently means that only the Dutch can salvage this situation. Such a discourse allows all means within a legitimate authority to restore its authority. For the ARP this means that continued military action is needed to prevent further catastrophe.

January 1948 - November 1948. An uneasy peace through the Renville Agreement

As the KVP aimed to describe the relation between Indonesians and the Dutch as friendly and equal, the policing actions are clearly difficult to deal with in retrospect. Hence, the Catholics attempts to ignore the violence while emphasizing the friendship. Despite the constant conflict in reality, the KVP argues that the Indonesians themselves want help in state-building matters. While details or examples of this request for help are never given (likely because such views were not at all dominant among Indonesians), the message is that a strong Dutch hand does not conflict with their legitimate wish for nationalism and self-determination.

For example, in the journal of March 1948 discussing the United States of Indonesia, it states that the arrangement of their states is first and foremost a job for the Indonesians themselves. However, after that the KVP states that “even the most independent Indonesian is convinced that they cannot miss the help of the Dutch with their knowledge and experience of governance of these states.” This idea that the Indonesians desire a continued Dutch presence in Indonesian governance is common throughout the journal. Meanwhile, the Republic under Soekarno, who was in fact a moderate in the Republic, already declared full independence in 1945, without any wish for a continued governance under the Dutch kingdom. The continued Dutch presence in Indonesian governance is phrased as something that is logical and obvious. An Indonesian-led independence is described as “putting the cart before the horse.”

The tension between Indonesian independence and the idea that this independence should be led by the Netherlands is partially recognized by the KVP. This can be clearly seen in the following excerpt:

“Above all is the transformation of the Kingdom in the Union. As opposed to our compatriots overseas, we possess a centuries-old experience in statesmanship and possess a long education in democratic statehood. On that ground we should have a great part of the leadership, so that a good functioning union shall arise. There lies nothing denigrating in this for the compatriots of our empire [rijksgenoten], nor does it harm the equality between us. Nor does it mean that there should be no discussions or that the Dutch plans should be forced on them.”

Katholiek Maandblad March 1948

It recognizes the issue for the readers that a Dutch designed independence seems paradoxical. They mention areas where Indonesians are capable of making their own decisions, such as the internal geographic divisions and the arrangement of a special relationship to the Kingdom, while in the same sentence stating that the Dutch “constructing their states can be of great help.” Through mentioning these areas, the focus is placed on what the Indonesians *can* do, which leaves the other areas that are implied that they cannot do, in the hands of the Dutch government. It frames the situation not as the Dutch interfering with Indonesian business based on an unequal relationship, but as the Dutch government helping the Indonesians in matters they are not competent in. As a result, the continued Dutch rule becomes equivalent of rather than contrary to Indonesian sovereignty.

The ARP continues hammering on the “revolutionary politics conducted by the government in relation to the Dutch East-Indies” The period after the Renville-agreement is characterized by its frustration with the Dutch government. It is not the ARP that is regressively colonial, it are the other parties that have forgotten the goal of colonialism by making room for revolution. It is their loyalty to Christian politics that kept them on this course. The journal consoles the reader by stating that they are not a part of an old-fashioned colonialism but rather are principled Christians. Dutch rule and the policing actions have become a question of Christian politics. The journal explains that they aims to be as progressive as possible, while remaining loyal to “the principles of authority and freedom.”⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde. September 1948.

As it slowly becomes evident that the Renville-agreement has failed and that the Republic has not accepted the Dutch domination within the transfer of sovereignty, the discourse of the KVP starts shifting towards an increasingly less trusting position towards the Indonesians. It again continually repeats the main purposes of the Dutch kingdom: to guarantee the preservation of the rule of law and the fundamental human rights and freedom. The Netherlands' devotion to virtuous governance is contrasted with the dangers of the Republic. Thus, the continued Dutch rule is a moral duty, while this is also balanced with the Indonesian right to self-determination. While in March the KVP argued that the Dutch plans should not be forced on the Indonesians, leading up to the second policing actions this has clearly changed. In the dilemma between moral rule and self-determination, it is explicitly stated that the Indonesian independence can only happen according to Dutch standards, even if forced:

“Just think of an orderly government, of freedom of religion, of human rights, just think of the historically developed rights and duties of both peoples towards each other. The Netherlands therefore sets conditions and restrictions. The Netherlands could and should even be rejecting of a certain expression of self-determination, and the Netherlands is. Furthermore, the Netherlands could and should certainly be hostile to a certain expression of independence formation, and the Netherlands is!

This means that when determining its attitude in seeking its solution, the Netherlands must view the entire problem and work it into the morally acceptable, morally correct final solution. The Union will guarantee rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms and good governance. One may therefore not deviate from all this in the new provision of the legal order.”

Katholiek Maandblad November 1948

Just like the anti-revolutionary journal, the Catholic journal before the second military offensive argues through a moral duty towards Indonesia. This duty can even infringe on the wishes of the Indonesians. The phrasing of 'being hostile' towards certain expressions of nationalism is certainly a reference to the upcoming policing actions which were already planned at this point. 'Hostile' (vijandig), is a remarkably strong word which implies a distinction between a good 'we' and an 'enemy.' There is no enemy named, but it represents a nationalism that apparently opposes freedom of religion and human rights. The reader is prepared for a conflict not against a specific entity, but an enemy representing the opposite of freedom and human rights. It is thus not fundamentally a question of authority, nor a question of the unique Dutch-Indonesian relation, but a fight against evil. But because no specific entity is named, it does not have to distance itself from the equality and friendship with the Indonesians.

November 1948 - August 1949. Merging with the Enemy: the second 'Policing Actions'

The policing actions start a distinctly Christian discourse topic for the KVP. While the ARP always centralized their devotion to Christianity, the KVP argues that Dutch authority had to be restored precisely because the other actors (the international community and the Indonesians) lacked a Christian politics: It is possible that if the world had been able to reach a better understanding of justice and Christian politics, the ultimate sacrifice and the

stubborn adherence to error by many in Indonesia could have been prevented."⁹⁰ The usage of the term Christian politics is especially interesting because what is meant with this term are fundamentally the principles of human rights and democracy. But as I have shown throughout this chapter, such values have already been repeatedly mentioned as serving as the justification of Dutch authority and its military actions. We can imagine due to the unpopularity of the second policing actions the KVP decided to utilise an even stronger discourse. Now the Indonesian nationalists are not only fighting against the basic principles of governance, but against Christian principles itself.

At the same time, the KVP repeats the blame it put on their international allies and the United Nations: "Finally, it had to become clear how the Chamber would react to all of this. The international involvement had created a very tangled knot in the Indonesian issue. Could it still be cautiously and tactfully unraveled, or did the interest of Indonesia require a radical, Gordian blow?"⁹¹ The reference to the Gregorian knot characterizes the message of the KVP in response to the policing actions: the situation is very difficult and no solution is perfect. It shows the difficulty the editors have with justifying the second policing actions. They bring up Christianity and explain the impossibility of the situation. It also tries to wash its hands in innocence, arguing that this knot has been caused despite the Dutch actions. Other states, including the USA, are denounced for their involvement. Interestingly, the situation is thus described as already out of the hands of the Dutch. While the guiding Dutch hand was optimal, it never had the chance to do its duty.

The ARP still pays surprisingly little attention to the international demands in the Indonesian crisis despite its historic significance. The international sphere is described as polluting the minds of Indonesians, especially through communist and other non-Christian ideologies. However, the blame remains with the government willing to negotiate with these revolutionary forces. Furthermore, the KVP and PvdA refuse to consider the wishes of the other parties that are in the minority. The main message remains constant: the Netherlands does not have to justify its actions because its authority is legitimate in principle. It must do everything in order to preserve it.

August 1949 - February 1950. The transfer of sovereignty and the disappointment of the Dutch-Indonesian Union

After the second military offensive, the ARP continues its criticism of the government, describing them as dictators that do not consider the parties without a majority. The government has acted untrustworthy and thus have betrayed the faith of genuinely good colleagues. As stated in Chapter IV, the ARP becomes increasingly negative in their portrayal of the Indonesians. This also relates to the role of the Netherlands. The ARP starts explaining that they are sceptical of the idea among Indonesians that they "can do everything in their own power," as they want to. The Indonesians are not just revolutionary, but are also tainted by irrational feelings.

They [Indonesians] desire a state with all its flaws, but one made with their own hands. Or as a republican from Sunda once said to me, "What do we care about your perfectionism as long as we have the say in it."

⁹⁰ Katholiek Maandblad. January 1949.

⁹¹ Katholiek Maandblad, March 1949.

Their wishes for sovereignty are described as childish and dangerous, sovereignty for the sake of sovereignty. It shows again that it is only the Dutch that can maintain order as the Indonesians are now an irrational force. For the reader, a violent colonial politics is therefore justified because it serves the interests of the Indonesians. It is just that the Indonesians themselves are unaware of their interests. Furthermore, the ARP also addresses the perceived incompetence of the Indonesians. Like the KVP in the past, the anti-revolutionaries argue that the "Intellectual forces are inadequate to comprehend the entire political, social, economic, financial problem." They give multiple examples of how the Indonesians are lacking in their ability. It is not just their revolutionary origin but also because of their incompetence that the Indonesian sovereignty should not be Indonesian-led. The journal dismisses the now common idea that authority should make way for guidance. Therefore, towards the formation of the NIU, the ARP only strengthens its support for an indisputable Dutch authority. Not only on the grounds of divine authority and its opposition to revolution, but also because the Indonesians themselves have shown to not possess any of the qualities that would legitimate authority.

As explained in chapter IV, for the KVP the formation of the NIU has become a disappointment. What is interesting is that this period also directly contrasts their previous arguments. Because they admit that the Indonesians never wished for Dutch involvement, the role of the Dutch hand has become marginalized as well. The KVP does not argue anymore for why the Netherlands had to take the role it did. Instead, it just laments that the Netherlands apparently did not do enough to convince the Indonesians. Interestingly, there is little blame on the international situation anymore. The disappointing results are merely the result of the poor Dutch-Indonesian relationship, as described in the previous chapter. The KVP attempts to illustrate scenarios where Dutch influence is kept alive, but it is clear that in the end this is still up to the Indonesians, not the Dutch. For both parties, it has become evident that the Dutch hand, whether guiding or leading, is unable to decide the future of Indonesia.

Conclusion

Both the KVP and the ARP see the policing actions as first an effort to restore order in Indonesia. Order is vital because it is the Dutch governance that assures the well-being of the Indonesians. Both parties rely on an image of the Self as the bringer of civilization. The superiority of European values is tacitly understood, and therefore the Netherlands has a right to assure that these values are preserved. As it is in the later stages of colonialism, an explicitly racist image of the Other is avoided. However, it relies on the racist assumption that the Eastern 'Other' is incapable of creating a prosperous and respectable society. The well-being of Indonesia thus requires a Dutch hand. The Catholics argue that this is at the request of the Indonesians themselves. They see and respect the ability of the Dutch. For the anti-revolutionaries Dutch authority is legitimate anyhow, irrespective of the Indonesian wishes. The KVP justifies the Dutch hand through the discursive hegemony of human rights. The Dutch government has to act in Indonesia to preserve democracy, freedom, and equality in Indonesia. The Catholics are more trusting of the Indonesians, and therefore portray the Dutch hand as guiding. The anti-revolutionaries are less trusting, and worry that an Indonesian independence is not just a threat to proper statebuilding but also to the rights of minorities. Therefore, through the principle of authority, the ARP argues that the Netherlands should take a leading role until a respectable, non-revolutionary sovereignty is

possible.

Both parties see the international actors as hampering with the Dutch goals and therefore also the well-being of Indonesians. For the KVP, the international actors lack the expertise and knowledge to make appropriate decisions. They have forced the Dutch through a difficult path that only makes the situation in Indonesia worse. The blame is put on entities such as the United States and the Security Council. The ARP portrays the world as abandoning the Christian principle of authority. The Dutch government, the international actors, and the Indonesians themselves have all succumbed to a revolutionary disease. It is up to the Dutch government to restore authority, yet their lack of willingness to do so, regardless of international opposition, is what created the crisis in Indonesia.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

In studying the discourse of colonial wars, many historians have pointed towards clear depictions of racism and ideas of superiority that justified colonial rule.⁹² But for both the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Catholic People's Party, the Indonesian crisis was not phrased as a war to continue colonial rule. Both portray the sovereignty of Indonesia as their main goal. How then, can they justify a war that caused thousands and thousands of deaths if the principle of sovereignty by the Republic was not challenged? I argue that despite significant discursive differences, both parties aim to justify the military offensives and the entire Indonesian crisis as an effort towards the well-being of Indonesia. However, underlying this is the tacit knowledge of the superiority of European civilization, and that Indonesia cannot be separated from the Netherlands. After an almost 350-year long history between the two nations, the idea of a 'lost' Indonesia is not just undesirable but inconceivable. The prospect of a completely independent Indonesia is not discussed, considered nor entertained. Therefore, the question becomes how Indonesian sovereignty can be achieved while also maintaining the Dutch-Indonesian relation.

This means that despite the strained relationship between the Dutch and the Indonesians, the Indonesians as a whole cannot be discredited as it would only sever this relationship. Consequently, both parties develop a discourse that attacks the Republic as an actor, while respecting its goals. Meanwhile, the relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians are portrayed more positively and not representative of the Republic. The discourse developed differs significantly by party. This is mainly due to two different discursive hegemonies. The discursive hegemony of the KVP revolves around the notion of humanist values, specifically human rights and democracy. The discursive hegemony of the ARP centres on the notion of revolution. In discrediting the Republic, there is a shared interdiscursivity based around three dominant themes: the memory of fascism, the fear of communism and the moral corruption of the Republic. But these topics are thus understood differently. The KVP sees these three discourse themes as first and foremost an affront to human rights and democracy. Therefore, the military actions are efforts in defence of these values. The ARP sees the three themes as the result of a revolutionary mindset. All issues are therefore caused by the willingness of the Dutch and international governments to negotiate with revolutionaries. Because the Dutch-Indonesian relationship and the Dutch authority are the results of the guidance of God, the military actions are phrased as a defence of the core principles of Christianity.

Because of the two different discursive hegemonies, the way of dealing with the Republic are also phrased differently. Because of the focus on values, the KVP tries to convince the reader of the abhorrent values the Republican leadership hold in order to discredit it. The issue is thus not with the Republic per se but with its leadership. Therefore, the KVP can continually balance between a good Republic with moral values and a bad Republic with corrupt values. The Republic is mutable. Due to this, the KVP is able to defend on the one hand the military offensives against the Republic, and on the other hand the treaties with the Republic. For the ARP, the Republic is a revolutionary entity and therefore inherently wrong. The revolutionary nature of the Republic is undeniable and therefore it must be eliminated. As a result, it aims to highlight the consequences of this nature by

⁹² See for example Lindler, U. and Gouaffo, A. in Rash (2020).

paying significantly more attention to the violence and despair caused by the Republic. As time progresses and the position of the Republic becomes increasingly certain, the KVP moves towards a less rejecting portrayal of the Republic. The Republic is now not representative of an evil leadership, but a misguided one. The Netherlands has to therefore guide, and later inspire their leadership. The ARP however remains constant in the idea that the Republic must be eliminated.

At the same time, the Dutch government was building towards the NIU and the VSI. In this, the views among the Indonesians are rarely discussed. Cooperation of the Indonesians in the building of the VSI and the NIU are simply assumed. The message sent to the readers is that the Indonesians have no qualms with the current plans of the Dutch government. Simultaneously, the Dutch actions that caused most of the friction, such as the 'aankleding' or the naval blockade are not mentioned at all. Only the Republic causes issues, but because it is discredited in multiple ways their opposition does not have to be considered. As a result, during the crisis there develops an increasing gap between the future described in the journals and the reality in Indonesia. This is especially the case for the KVP. Here, the described cooperation with the 'good' Republic of the KVP is in essence a hypothetical, idealized Republic that has no basis in reality.

Furthermore, the KVP places a lot of emphasis on the equality between the Dutch and Indonesians. It is clear that during this period both parties have a difficult time dealing with the accusations of colonialism. Therefore, the KVP refrains from portraying the current situation as colonial. It only portrays the present as colonial if it argues for a new, equal future. The ARP does not deny the current colonial relationship. The guiding hand of God that brought the Dutch to Indonesia justifies the Dutch authority. Yet it does continually dismiss the idea that the ARP is 'conservative' or that it wants to return to the 'old colonial way.' Hence, both parties repeatedly state that they do not infringe on the Indonesian desire for self-rule.

Consequently, the parties are challenged to justify the military actions and the continued Dutch presence in Indonesia, while at the same time rejecting accusations of colonialism, and respecting Indonesian well-being and their calls for sovereignty. They justify this in different ways. Both parties argue that the Indonesians must be defended from the dire situation that has arisen due to the Republic's actions. The military actions above all bring peace and order. Next to this, the Indonesians are portrayed as lacking the experience and skills required for developing their own state. Hence, the Dutch need to help them in the process of sovereignty. For the Protestants, this means continuing Dutch authority until this point is reached. Whether there is support or not, through the hegemony of the anti-revolutionary principle is argued that authority is a moral good in itself. Furthermore, authority is needed to defend the Indonesian minorities from Javanese supremacy. The Catholics, through their discursive hegemony of human rights, assert that the Indonesians themselves have requested help in the matters of state-building. In truth, this is far from representative of the views of the Indonesian population. But the KVP thus portrays the Dutch involvement as not only for the well-being of Indonesians, but also at the request of the Indonesians. The issue however was that the international community, including the Security Council, refused to see this. Due to their involvement, the Netherlands was unable to restore order and preserve a promising Dutch-Indonesian relationship through the Dutch-Indonesian Union.

The role of religion cannot be underplayed in the discourse of both parties. The role in the Protestant discourse is more evident, as Dutch authority has become a Christian matter through the hand of God. However, while the KVP makes little direct references to the

Bible or God, there is a tacit knowledge that human rights and democracy are Christian-derived principles. Therefore, the protection of human rights and democracy through the NIU are also a question of preserving Christian values and as a result Christian politics.

Historians have pointed to the importance of Islam in the relation between the Dutch and the Indonesians during the Indonesian crisis. Especially the ARP is understood as fearing the influence of Islam.⁹³ Based on the journals however, Islam plays an insignificant role in both the discourse of the KVP and the ARP, despite the prominence of Islam for chief members of the Republic and the violence perpetrated by Islamist extremist groups like the Darul Islam.⁹⁴ Islam plays a tacit role in the distrust of Indonesians by the ARP, but at the same time Islam is also defended as a bulwark against revolution.⁹⁵ I argue that this is due to two reasons. First, Islam is not just a characteristic of the Republic but of most Indonesians. Therefore, to direct attention to Islam would make it more difficult to consider the Republic an entity separate from the Indonesian population. Second, both confessional parties situate the Indonesian crisis in a broader context of the secularization of politics. Both parties berate the lack of Christian politics. This not only refers to the secular force of the communist world, but also to secular parties like the Dutch and British Labour parties. The emphasis on fascism, communism and revolution points towards an issue that is decisively secular. A threat of Islam would not fit into this image.

Altogether, both parties, in efforts to justify Dutch presence in Indonesia, develop a discourse that simultaneously discredits the existing independence movements as morally corrupt, while also emphasizing that colonialism has become a thing of the past and the well-being and rights to sovereignty are respected. While Dutch interests might be a welcome side-effect, the 'policing actions' were first and foremost in the interest of the Indonesians themselves. The findings of this study contrast the historiographical idea that the KVP is less interested in Indonesia due to the notably smaller history between the Catholics and Indonesia. In fact, the trust the Catholics place in the Indonesians and the willingness to function in an 'equal' Union displays that in many ways the relation between the Catholics and the Indonesians were warmer than that of the Protestants. The Catholics were even willing to give up power in order to maintain the Dutch-Indonesian unity. Historians have often characterized the ARP as championing old-fashioned colonialism and as opposed to Indonesian sovereignty and nationalism. While the ARP has proven to be significantly more willing to use violence among other means to destroy the Republic, it would be misleading to merely understand this as old-fashioned colonialism. Instead, their entire position during the Indonesian crisis rests on their religious principle of anti-revolution. While one can of course argue these are mere fig leaves for their true colonial interests, it cannot be denied that their discourse actively hurts a long-standing colonial policy as it aims all its hostility towards the Republic while endorsing other forms of nationalism. Likewise, the KVP can be considered equally colonial because it combats the contemporary revolutionary movements on the basis of democracy and human rights, rather than opposition to revolution. Both are thus attacking actors rather than principles.

Numerous authors have pointed towards a variety of interests that caused the Dutch government to engage in this extraordinary violence, including many human rights violations. Whatever the true interests of the Dutch government might have been that necessitated this

⁹³ For example, see Smit p.110, Burgers p.360

⁹⁴ Poeze, p.295, p.308

⁹⁵ Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde, Februari 1949.

violence, I argue that both parties created a discourse that made a continued colonial rule impossible and inconceivable. Even if the Netherlands was successful in destroying the Republic and suppressing Indonesian revolutionaries, it did so by having to embrace decolonization through an Indonesian sovereignty. Therefore, the readers of their journals, likely their most loyal supporters, were taught that no path except for one that leads to Indonesian sovereignty was legitimate. Despite the horrid violence caused by the Dutch hand, both parties created a reality in which only a sovereign Indonesia can exist.

This thesis limited itself to only one medium for both parties. This brings the benefit of not generalizing the discourse of either party, and allows us to better understand the relation between the specific medium used and the discourse utilized. However, this does mean that the results of this thesis should not be considered representative of the entire discourse of both confessional parties during the Indonesian Crisis. It is likely that the discourse changes depending of the setting in which it is used. Therefore, to better understand the discourse of both parties and the reality it created for their voter-base, more research has to be done on different forms of media by both parties. This should also include media which is not produced by either party, yet is likely communicated to their voter-base. Only through a wider study of a variety of media can we conclude how the Dutch population viewed the conflict in Indonesia.

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