

The Not So Quiet Encroachment of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding  
Their Rise and Fall Between January 25, 2011 and June 30, 2013

Final Version

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## Abstract

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was the first Islamist organization elected into office with a large majority. This unique situation provides an interesting case study for the opportunities that are available to an Islamist organization. I argue that the study of the Brotherhood's political opportunities, mobilizing resources and framing efforts gives a look into the workings of an Islamist organization in power.

I also pose that such a social movement theory (SMT) analysis is greatly enhanced by including Asef Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary. I argue that this gears SMT more toward the specific study of an Islamist organization in an Arab nation. Moreover, it recognizes the key role of citizens in the Islamist group's position and the influential role of religion. Lastly, using Bayat's concept allows me to use three core concepts that are an intrinsic part of that concept in my discussion, namely: globalization, space and agency.

I apply this adjusted conception of SMT to three recent key periods in the Brotherhood's history between 2011 and 2013, capturing both the rise and fall of the group within society. As data I use the input of three English language Egyptian news websites and the Brotherhood's own Ikhwanweb.com. After applying my new understanding of SMT to this data, I come to three major conclusions. Firstly, I maintain that by tapping into the power of quiet encroachment among disenfranchised Egyptians, the Brotherhood was able to gain in political power. I secondly argue that tapping into the quiet encroachment powers of ordinary Egyptians was a condition for the Brotherhood to stay in power. Lastly, anyone can tap into this quiet encroachment of Egyptians. The one who does this most successfully is the one most likely to be in power.

This thesis concludes with the recommendation that the Brotherhood's pathway to influence in Egypt, be it political or societal, is by harking back on their Islamist background of helping and being part of the lives of the disenfranchised.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt, Islamism, Islam, social movement theory, quiet encroachment, democracy, globalization, space, agency, ikhwanweb

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## Introducing the Muslim Brotherhood's chances in Egyptian Hegemony

*"Islam is the solution"*<sup>1</sup>

This was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's official slogan until the Arab Spring touched down in Egypt on January 25, 2011. I use this slogan as the beginning of this thesis as it succinctly summarizes the Brotherhood's position in Egyptian society. In their view, as an Islamist organization seeking to create "a modern, male dominated political movement to reinstitutionalize their conception of Islamic laws (Sharia), institutions (zakat or tithe) and other imagined practices of the first Muslims,"<sup>2</sup> Islam is the solution to all Egypt's problems. However, in 2012 when the Brotherhood's political arm, the FJP, quickly came to elected power in an Egypt with disturbed social relations, political corruption and a dwindling economy, they changed their slogan to "Freedom is the Solution and Justice is the Application."<sup>3</sup> Such a pragmatic slogan made sense, as it was their task to help a large poor struggling citizenry and enforce major reformations of Egyptian politics, economy and social relations.

The new slogan mirrors the enormous change for the Brotherhood in general during this period, namely from January 25, 2011 when the revolution started and Mubarak was ousted, to June 30, 2012 when the Brotherhood took in a powerful position in politics, until July 3, 2013 when Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi was ousted after being in power for just one year. Before 2011 the Brotherhood had been an illegal organization under Mubarak. Back then the Brotherhood spread their influence in inconspicuous, but effective ways. Members joined politics as independents. They also tried to control both student associations and professional unions, which provided them much control over civil society and the educated elite. Lastly, by setting up an intricate system of

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<sup>1</sup> Khalil Al-Anani, "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring," *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 3 (2012), 469.

<sup>2</sup> Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, "Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts and Social Movements," *Working Papers, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies* 6 (2001), 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ruth Starkman, "The concept of Brotherhood: beyond Arendt and the Muslim Brotherhood," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* iFirst (2012), 4.

social services they provided, among other, food, jobs and healthcare to Egypt's poor.<sup>4</sup>

The MB has thus traditionally been a force to be reckoned with in Egypt, thoroughly organized and influential within important levels of society: among the educated elite, in politics and among the poor, always with Islam as their guide. The fact that they, as an Islamist organization, came to be elected at all is an enormous feat. It provides an opportunity to analyze how and why they came so far politically at this specific moment in time and what this meant for them as an Islamist organization.

As the above-mentioned events are quite recent, scholarly work on the Brotherhood after January 25 and post-Arab Spring Egypt is still in its infancy. The first works that can be found, mainly explored the possibilities of the increasing agency of Egyptian citizens.<sup>5</sup> When it quickly became clear that the Brotherhood was taking an important political role, more works were written on the Brotherhood specifically. Several scholars discuss the influence of the Brotherhood's participation in politics on their Islamist ideals and whether a change in these ideals influenced their chances of success in politics.<sup>6</sup> One focuses on the mistakes made by the Brotherhood in their framing tactics.<sup>7</sup> Others explore if democratic ideals and Islamist ones can be combined for a

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<sup>4</sup> Laurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon, "Understanding Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," *African Security Review* 17, no. 3 (2008), 119 - 120.

<sup>5</sup> Brian K. Barber and James Youniss, "Egyptian Youth Make History: Forging a Revolutionary Identity Amid Brutality," *Harvard International Review* (2013), 68.; Lila Abu-Lughod, "Living the 'Revolution' in an Egyptian village: Moral Action in a National Space," *American Ethnologist* 39, no. 1 (2012), 21.; Hussein Ali Agrama, "Reflections on Secularism, Democracy and Politics in Egypt," *American Ethnologist* 39, no. 1 (2012), 26.; Sherine F. Hamdy, "Strength and Vulnerability after Egypt's Arab Uprisings," *American Ethnologist* 39, no. 1 (2012), 43.; Emad El-Din Shahin, "The Egyptian Revolution: The Power of Mass Mobilization and the Spirit of Tahrir Square," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 3, no. 1 (2012), 46.; Jessica Winegar, "The Privilege of Revolution: Gender, class, space, and affect in Egypt," *American Ethnologist* 39, no. 1 (2012), 67.

<sup>6</sup> Khalil Al-Anani, "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring," *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 3 (2012), 466; John Voll et al., "Political Islam in the Arab Awakening: Who are the Major Players?" *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 2 (2012), 10; Rachel M. Scott, "What Might the Muslim Brotherhood Do with al-Azhar? Religious Authority in Egypt," *Die Welt des Islams* 52 (2012), 131.; Roel Meijer, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Democratic Experience in Egypt," in *Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism Dynamics in the West and in the Middle East* edited by Erkan Toguslu and Johan Leman (Leuven, Leuven UP: 2014), 130.; Robbert A.F.L. Woltering, "Post-Islamism in Distress? A Critical Evaluation of the Theory in Islamist-Dominated Egypt." *Welt Des Islams* 54 (2014), 118.; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. *The Muslim Brotherhood: An Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2013).

<sup>7</sup> Rehab Sakr. "Why did the Muslim Brotherhood Fail? The Double-Faced Discourse of Ikhwan and political response to Islamist-secular diversity in Egypt." *Danubius* 32 (2014), 75.

better future for Egypt.<sup>8</sup> And again others disregard the Brotherhood's Islamist background and purely look at their political decisions and actions and how that led to their downfall.<sup>9</sup>

Among the most recent articles written after the Brotherhood's fall from power in July 2013, one looks for answers on how the military could have grabbed power again after the Brotherhood's short period in charge.<sup>10</sup> Another focuses on how the Egyptian people can move past the failures of the Brotherhood and the military's coup.<sup>11</sup> And most discuss what political missteps the Brotherhood made to cause their downfall.<sup>12</sup>

What binds most of these scholarly explorations into Egypt and the Brotherhood is the focus on the role of the MB in politics. This thesis builds on those insights but also includes other considerations in the exploration of the MB's rise and fall between 2011 and 2013. I combine my analyses of their political opportunities with their mobilizing strategies and framing tactics. Such an analysis of the Brotherhood, in the tradition of social movement theory (SMT), has been done before, but only before the revolution.<sup>13</sup> By doing so I answer the following central research question:

How can the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 be explained?

Consequently, in the first chapter, I ask the subquestion:

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<sup>8</sup> Muqtedar Khan, "Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution in Egypt." *Middle East Policy* (2013), 75; Peter C. Weber. "Modernity, Civil Society, and Sectarianism: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups." *Voluntas* (2013), 509.

<sup>9</sup> Daniela Pioppi, "Playing with Fire. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan," *The International Spectator* 48, no. 4 (2013), 51.; Fawaz A. Gerges. "The Islamist Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam?" *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 3 (2013), 425.

<sup>10</sup> Cihan Tugal, "End of the leaderless revolution," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* (2014): 84.

<sup>11</sup> Nasser Abourahme, "Past the end, not yet at the beginning: On the revolutionary disjuncture in Egypt," *City* 17, no. 4 (2013), 426.

<sup>12</sup> Eid Mohamed and Bessma Momani, "The Muslim Brotherhood: Between Democracy, Ideology and Distrust," *Sociology of Islam* 2 (2014), 196.; Richard Heydrarian, "The Arab Summer and Its Discontents: Origins of Revolution, and the Role of Islamic Movements in Post-Revolutionary Middle East," *Sociology of Islam* 2 (2014), 213.

<sup>13</sup> Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005), 897.; Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001), 487.; Janine Clark, "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism: Islamic Social Institutions and the Middle Class in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen," *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 8 (2004), 941.; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* ed. by Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2004), 231.



What is the most appropriate theoretical framework to explore the rise and fall of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood?

I answer in this chapter that by combining a framing, mobilizing and political opportunity analysis as prescribed in SMT I can shed light on the Brotherhood's new position and specifically on what happens when an Islamist organization becomes an influential part of the hegemony. SMT allows me to look beyond the tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood and come to understand the organization within the wider context that they operate in. SMT, however, fails to consider the role of ordinary people within that context, while the period in which the MB came to power specifically asks for such an inclusion. It was within this period from 2011 forward that Egyptians demonstrated a newfound agency capable of toppling governments. I therefore combine SMT with Asef Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary. This concept holds that ordinary citizens can affect change through their everyday actions. Quiet encroachment helps me to make SMT more relevant for the specific case of the Brotherhood in Egypt, firstly because Bayat himself theorized quiet encroachment as appearing in Egypt. It also provides new insights into the mobilization tactics of the Brotherhood and it allows for the inclusion of the MB's more religious tactics and strategies. Together with quiet encroachment SMT functions as a theoretical framework and tool for a comprehensive analysis of the changing role of the Egyptian MB in the years following Mubarak's resignation.

In order to actually research the Brotherhood's rise and fall the second chapter of this thesis sets up the methodology. I ask:

What are the main methodological issues in studying the changing tactics and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood?

I explain that by looking at the Brotherhood as a historical case study, it is possible to reconstruct the events from January 25, 2011 until July 3, 2013. I chose this period specifically because it contains three different positions for the Brotherhood. In the first period the movement was an illegal organization heavily prosecuted by Mubarak's regime. In the second period the Brotherhood

is propelled into a dominant political position with a majority in parliament and a Brotherhood president at the reigns. Conversely in the third period the Brotherhood has lost its major support with the Brotherhood's Morsi ousted and the organization becoming illegal again. To reconstruct these events I use three English-language Egyptian news websites, *Egypt Independent*, *Ahram Online* and *Daily News Egypt* and the Brotherhood's personal English-language website *Ikhwanweb* as sources of data. Each website provides articles from three very different and significant periods in the Brotherhood's history, namely the days following January 25, 2011; the days leading up to Mohamed Morsi being elected on June 30, 2012; and thirdly the days leading up to Morsi being deposed on July 3, 2013. In this same chapter I explain how I obtained these articles, which articles are included considering the scope of this research and in what different ways I am going to analyze them. The second chapter also discloses a concise content analysis of the three news websites under study. Here I argue why the websites are reliable as sources, and at what moments and instances they are less reliable.

Taking this into consideration the final analysis is presented in chapter three and answers the following subquestion:

How have the Muslim Brotherhood's political opportunity structures, resources for mobilization and framing changed from 2011 to 2013; and what role has quiet encroachment played within these developments?

Using the articles from the news websites I present a political opportunity analysis, a mobilization resources analysis and a framing analysis of the Brotherhood's actions during the three periods under study. I discuss these findings through the use of the concepts globalization, space and agency. I find that the rise of the Brotherhood's political opportunities went hand-in-hand with a dwindling presence in the streets and less successful framing and mobilization efforts. At the same time, their major opponent, the army, gained and kept a large following with Egyptian citizens of all classes.

I conclude by answering my central question that because the Brotherhood failed to stay true to their original ingredients of success, namely a large presence among the poorest Egyptians and a willingness to work together

with other political parties and organizations under Mubarak, they focused mainly on their political position. I pose that should the Brotherhood, as of writing again an illegal heavily prosecuted organization, ever again hold an influential position in Egypt society, one of their most important allies are the Egyptian people. As such, including Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment proved to be an important tool to interpret the role of an Islamist organization in Egypt after the Arab Spring for whom Islam, for a while and probably to their own detriment, no longer seemed their solution. To reach this conclusion, however, we need to first start at the beginning: a theoretical framework that I present in the next chapter.

## Chapter 1 Quiet Encroachment of the Muslim Brotherhood

*“Social movements are structured and their subjects constituted not only in organizations and on the street, but also through countless everyday interactions that shape the daily conduct of participants.”<sup>14</sup>*

This quote aptly summarizes the main point of this chapter, namely that when analyzing a social movement, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), it is necessary to look beyond the tactics and strategies of the movement. It is also necessary to look at the interaction between the movement and the everyday practices of its followers. While social movement theory (SMT) in itself is not able to do this, it is a useful tool for understanding the role of a social movement organization within a certain context. It does not, however, cover the important role of ordinary people within that same context. In this chapter I therefore combine SMT with the concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary by sociologist Asef Bayat. Quiet encroachment makes SMT more relevant to the specific case study of the MB in Egypt. The concept will firstly make SMT more specific to Egypt as Bayat theorized quiet encroachment as appearing, among other countries, in Egypt. It provides new insights into mobilization tactics of the MB as an Islamist social movement organization. Lastly, quiet encroachment theoretically means I can also include the MB's more religious tactics and strategies.

In this thesis SMT will therefore be presented as a tool for understanding the MB and how its position in Egyptian society has changed in the time after Mubarak's resignation. The movement has fast-forwarded into a role reversal in this time since it was first the (illegal) opponent of the established hegemony, as the MB was opposed to Mubarak's state; then they constituted the state themselves and were thus firmly entrenched within the hegemony; and lastly they returned to their contested place within society when Morsi was ousted. Together with the concept of quiet encroachment, SMT will provide the theoretical framework for a comprehensive analysis of the changing role of the Egyptian MB in the past year.

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<sup>14</sup> Cihan Tugal, “Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” *Theoretical Society* 38 (2009), 452.

This chapter will first focus on definitions. What is a social movement organization and what encompasses the theory? After establishing this I appropriate a specific approach to SMT. Secondly I will present an analysis of why it is important to research Islamist organizations such as the MB through SMT. The next section succinctly introduces and integrates the concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary within SMT and incorporates de Certeau's concepts of 'tactics' and 'strategies' that are already covertly present within Bayat's own concept. Lastly, this chapter presents the three overarching concepts that unite the upcoming analyses, namely globalization, space and agency. In doing all this, this chapter answers the question:

What is the most appropriate theoretical framework to explore the rise and fall of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood?

### **1.1 Social Movement Theory**

Before setting up the model of social movement theory that will be used in this thesis, it is necessary to problematize the terms 'social movement' and 'social movement organization'. A social movement such as the MB has more goals than simply political ones, as everyday religious work is an important part of its livelihood and ideals. I would therefore like to adopt Christiansen's definition, which holds that:

Social movements ... can be thought of as organized yet informal social entities that are engaged in extra-institutional conflict that is oriented towards a goal. These goals can be either aimed at a specific and narrow policy or be more broadly aimed at cultural change.<sup>15</sup>

This definition not only recognizes more than mere political motives and goals, but also emphasizes the role of informal organizational structures that are similarly a critical aspect of Islamist movements. Why this is important becomes obvious when one considers that the social movement under which I seek to group the MB is what Asef Bayat calls Egyptian Islamism, or the Egyptian Islamic movement, and by this he means a wide range of groups, individuals and organizations. Namely: the radical, reformist and moderate Islamists, among whom are the MB, Islamic welfare associations, Islamic oriented entertainment

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<sup>15</sup> Jonathan Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," *Ebsco Research Starters* (2009), 2.

industry, media, book publishers and universities, evening gatherings (*halaqat*) for religious education and socialization of women and religious intellectuals.<sup>16</sup> In what manner this understanding of a social movement is necessary for SMT with regard to the Islamist social movement will be explained in the next section. Lastly, I will also use Christiansen's definition of a social movement organization as "an organization that is or has been associated with a social movement and which carries out the tasks that are necessary for any social movement to survive and be successful."<sup>17</sup>

Having established this, it is now possible to establish the significance and evolution of SMT as a research tool. In very general terms the goals of SMT are to help understand how movements organize and mobilize in a given political context.<sup>18</sup> The form in which it seeks to do this has been described as "a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements, that transcends the limits of any single theoretical approach to the topic."<sup>19</sup> Only SMT displays such a comprehensive understanding of social movements and therefore makes it the most suitable theory in the field. SMT consists of three different elements: political opportunity structures, mobilization structures and framing, which together form a framework for studying a social movement.<sup>20</sup> These different elements are a clear amalgam from the different approaches of SMT that have been developed over the years.

Since the 1960s SMT has taken many different forms. This means that there are multiple interpretations and many different models available. In order to increase understanding of the importance of SMT in its current form I will present its genesis and development briefly in this section. The first approaches of SMT were limited to a functionalist approach that merely addressed structural and psychological causes for mobilization. It theorized "social movements as mechanisms for alleviating psychological discomfort derived from structural

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<sup>16</sup> Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005), 899-890.

<sup>17</sup> Jonathan Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," *Ebsco Research Starters* (2009), 2-3.

<sup>18</sup> Jennifer Chandler, "The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 5 (2005), 3.

<sup>19</sup> Doug McAdam et al. "Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 2.

<sup>20</sup> Wiktorowicz, "Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research," *Mediterranean Politics* (2002), 206.

strains.” The critique that this approach was too simplistic was answered with a new development in SMT that incorporated dynamic systems, namely resource mobilization theory (RMT). RMT portrays social movement organizations as rational, well-structured organizations providing strategic resources for well-organized mass mobilization.<sup>21</sup> The last major addition to SMT was that of framing, under the influence of post-modernist and social constructionist theories, and the focus moved to “how individuals conceptualized themselves ... how meaning is constructed, articulated, and disseminated and on formation of group identity.”<sup>22</sup> This last development resulted in the aspect of framing becoming part of SMT.

### **1.1.2 Political opportunity, Mobilization and Framing**

Current SMT can thus be divided into three different sections of analysis: political opportunity, (resource) mobilization and framing. These are also the three levels of analysis that I apply to the MB in the analyses in the third chapter of this thesis. These three levels of analysis born out of many different disciplines of research provide the most thorough understanding of social movements. Before being able to do so however, I map out the structure and workings of social movement organizations to show what the different levels of analysis add to this research.

Political opportunity structures can be defined as “consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provides incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation for success or failure.”<sup>23</sup> This is thus the more structural part of SMT that helps mapping out the political context in which social movements and thus social movement organizations operate. McAdam et al. chronicle the development of this section of analysis since the 1970s as trying to either answer the question how the institutional structure and power structure caused the emergence of a social movement or how movements cross-nationally

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 196.

<sup>22</sup> Jennifer Chandler, “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory,” *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 5 (2005), 1.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 446.

differentiated on the basis of their respective institutional structures.<sup>24</sup> This last question, albeit adapted to the situation of the MB is what this thesis will seek to answer, although in this case the dynamically changing political nature of contemporary Egypt as a context is compared over a time period as opposed to the national contexts of different movements.

Resource mobilization, or mobilizing structure, is defined as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”<sup>25</sup> This part of SMT thus allows for an analysis on the meso level of the interaction between groups, organizations and networks that constitute the dynamics of a social movement. In order to narrow the idea down, John D. McCarthy explores the range of these collective vehicles as they are found in previous research. The result is a table including four different kinds of mobilization structures centered around the dimensions of nonmovement, movement, informal and formal. By nonmovement he means “social sites within people’s daily rounds [lives] where informal and less formal ties between people can serve as solidarity and communication facilitating structures when and if they choose to go into dissent together.”<sup>26</sup> Together with movement, informal and formal this allows him to neatly categorize the different kinds of mobilizing structures as they are found within SMT:

Table 1.1 Dimensions of movement-mobilizing structures<sup>27</sup>

	Nonmovement	Movement
informal	Friendship networks	Activist networks
	Neighborhoods	Affinity groups
	Work networks	Memory communities
formal	Churches	SMOs
	Unions	Protest committees
	Professional Associations	Movement schools

McCarthy thus shows that there are both formal and informal mobilization structures. Another noticeable feature of this table is the presence of a

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<sup>24</sup> Doug McAdam et al. “Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 3.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>26</sup> John D. McCarthy, “Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting, and inventing,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 143.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 145.



nonmovement. As this is an important concept within Asef Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment I will discuss this term in that section. This table for now gives an idea of the shapes and forms resource mobilization can take. In the third chapter of this thesis I will show how this table can be appropriated to function as an overview for resources of mobilization for Islamist organizations in an Arabic country.

Lastly, framing is necessary within SMT for it allows a researcher to go beyond the mapping of structural opportunities for action, as political opportunity and mobilization structures do, and help assess why and whether collective action is (likely) to happen based on how people create shared meanings and definitions of a specific situation.<sup>28</sup> It is important to understand that framing always takes place within an environment that already consists of individuals holding their specific values, beliefs and ideas. I am careful here not to group these values, beliefs and ideas under the seemingly all-encompassing concept of ideology. David Snow and Scott Byrd succinctly explain the danger of using the term ideology too generally as it quickly results in the idea of a distinctive Islamic ideology which they explain could never be the case: "While all Muslim believers may assert that there is only one God and only one Islam, there are different combinations and permutations of how this actually works itself out politically in terms of everyday life both within and across Islamic societies."<sup>29</sup> Differences in values and beliefs across different societies can be explained by many more factors such as a country's history, economy, polity and culture.

As such, the MB should be seen as a re-articulator of existing beliefs and ideas that have been formed through many different factors. Therefore to understand the specific Islamic context of Egypt, Talal Asad's concept of 'discursive tradition' is useful. Asad maintains that a discursive tradition links the past, present and future of Islam through teaching its practitioners the

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<sup>28</sup> Doug McAdam et al. "Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 5.

<sup>29</sup> David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, "Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review* 12, no. 1 (2007), 122.

correct form and purpose of practices.<sup>30</sup> This is where the everyday lives of Egyptians, already so important to the concept of quiet encroachment, come in. Asad points out how a discursive tradition is captured:

I refer here primarily not to the programmatic discourses of ‘modernist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Islamic movements, but to the established practices of unlettered Muslims. A practice is Islamic because it is authorized by the discursive traditions of Islam, and is so taught to Muslims.<sup>31</sup>

It is thus in this domain of orthodoxy, practiced by ordinary people, that there is also the possibility for change. Therefore, in the framing analysis in chapter three I recognize that the everyday (religious) practices of common Egyptians are, in addition to the political opportunity and mobilization structures, a context within which the MB is executing its purposeful framing strategies. That same chapter will further map out how the MB can strategize their framing.

The next section elaborates on SMT’s suitability to understand the MB, but also includes what SMT’s shortcomings are when applied to an Islamist movement such as the MB.

### **1.1.3 Social Movement Theory and Islamist Organizations**

Wiktorowicz identifies the general developments of SMT as described above in general scholarly research into Islamist movements. To repeat, by Islamist movement I mean: “a modern, male dominated political movement seeking to reinstitutionalize their conception of Islamic laws (Sharia), institutions (zakat or tithe) and other imagined practices of the first Muslims.”<sup>32</sup> Wiktorowicz points out that early research focused mainly on the psychological and structural reasons for organizing and mobilizing.<sup>33</sup> After that a new, less structuralist view on organization resources in RMT gave scholars a tool to also address the importance of, for example, the mosque in organization and mobilization, or the role of more informal organizational types such as social networks, which play a

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<sup>30</sup> Talal Asad, “The Idea of Anthropology of Islam,” in *The Anthropology of Islam Reader*, ed. by Jens Kreinath. (London UK: Routledge, 2012), 104.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>32</sup> Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts and Social Movements,” *Working Papers, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies* 6 (2001), 4.

<sup>33</sup> Wiktorowicz, “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,” *Mediterranean Politics* (2002), 191.

large role in organization in the Middle East.<sup>34</sup> Wiktorowicz then recognizes a shift in the late 1990s where Islamists are theorized as “strategic thinkers embedded in a political context, which influences choices and decisions.”<sup>35</sup> This is similar to the shift within SMT where exogenous influences such as political, cultural, social and economic factors are included in the analysis. As a last development for those studying Islamist movements – mirroring developments in SMT – the role of meaning making and framing processes by such movements was incorporated.<sup>36</sup>

A few of the many researchers incorporating SMT in their study of Islamist organizations are, for example, Glenn Robinson who applies SMT to Hamas and argues that “Hamas is intelligible as a social movement, similar to other social movements around the world.”<sup>37</sup> Melissa Lerner uses several case studies of Arabic websites for a framing analysis to ascertain that the use of the internet by Islamist social movements shares characteristics with Western social movements.<sup>38</sup> Ziad Munson uses the historical case study of the MB in Egypt in the period of 1932 to 1954 and demonstrates that its political structure is similar to that of democratizing movements in Eastern Europe in the 1980s.<sup>39</sup> Lastly, Diane Singerman uses case studies of several Arabic countries to show that “Islamic activism is not unique but rather has elements common to all social movements.”<sup>40</sup>

While acknowledging the rational nature of Islamist social movements, it is necessary to briefly problematize the term rational as it otherwise diminishes or even eliminates the importance of Islam for such social movements. Emmanuel Karagiannis puts it eloquently when researching an Islamist social movement in Kyrgyzstan: “All social movement theories... share a secular

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 196-198.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 203.

<sup>37</sup> Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as a Social Movement” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* ed. by Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana UP, 2004), 135.

<sup>38</sup> Melissa Y. Lerner, “Connecting the Actual with the Virtual: The Internet and Social Movement Theory in the Muslim World – The Cases of Iran and Egypt,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 30, no. 4 (2010), 556.

<sup>39</sup> Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001), 493.

<sup>40</sup> Diane Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements,” in *Islamic Activism: A social Movement Theory Approach* ed. by Q. Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana UP, 2004), 143

framework of perception and tend to ignore the concept of the inseparability of religion and politics in Muslim societies.”<sup>41</sup> This role of religion Kariagannis argues, is an intrinsic part of this Islamist social movement and does not make it less rational. At the same time social movement theory and a Western understanding of the rational as mere pragmatic calculated reactions to political opportunities is often used to diminish the importance of religion for Islamist social movements. Lisa Anderson, for example, argues that Islamist movements close to reaching a powerful position were more willing to sacrifice their ideological beliefs.<sup>42</sup> Similarly Glenn Robinson presents the same argument on the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen.<sup>43</sup> However, understanding the MB as an Islamist social movement that you can study through social movement theory means that you have to acknowledge religion as an intrinsic part of that movement.

Not only religion is an important aspect to be included within SMT, Oded Haklai, for example, notes that “many Middle East specialists use established theories to illuminate their cases, but fewer use their knowledge of the Middle East to produce new theories that are made available for application in studies of other regions.”<sup>44</sup> Asef Bayat similarly critiques the uncritical appropriation of SMT for Islamist case studies. At the same time he does pose that when specific additions are made to SMT, the theory is suitable for Islamist case studies. He argues, for example, that Islamist social movements have particular ways of solidarity building. He states that with regard to political opportunity analysis, not only is it important to consider the challenging political power, but also symbols and value systems. Bayat goes on to say that such systems may confront political power.”<sup>45</sup> When incorporating Bayat’s own concept of quiet encroachment it is possible to also more thoroughly study the context in which

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<sup>41</sup> Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam and Social Movement Theory: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan,” *Religion, State and Society* 33, no. 2 (2005), 147.

<sup>42</sup> Lisa Anderson, “Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism” in *Political Islam: Revoltion, Radicalism, or Reform?* ed. by John L. Esposito (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 26.

<sup>43</sup> Glenn E. Robinson, “Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan,” *Middle East Journal* 51 (1997), 376.

<sup>44</sup> Oded Haklai, “Authoritarianism and Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Research and Theory-building in the Twenty-first Century,” *International Studies Review* 1 (2009),

<sup>45</sup> Asef Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 6 (2005), 898.

the MB has functioned. When doing this I do take into consideration that some organizational structures of both Islamist and Western social movement organizations are inherently different.

First of all, it is important to be aware of the environment that Islamist movements are developing and functioning in. They mainly function in urban environments that they influence but are also influenced by. Abu-Lughod discusses the existence of a distinct Islamic city. She shows that such a city has come into existence under three guiding processes, namely:

a distinction between the members of the Umma and outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of neighbours the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use.<sup>46</sup>

These processes, specific to the Islamic city, provide the structural context within which the MB and the Islamist social movement in Egypt have come into existence. These distinct aspects have similarly led to a specific social movement organization.

In the case of mobilization, it is important to take the large role of informal arrangements into consideration. As Singerman posits about Islamist social movement organizations in the Middle East in general: "The costs of political participation in the region are high, and thus conventional forms of political expression are unavailable. As an alternative, people turn to informal networks to organize and advance their interests."<sup>47</sup> It is therefore necessary to incorporate an understanding that the mobilization of a social movement organization can include more informal, or even inconspicuous, methods of organization. Added to this should be Singerman's observation that religion often plays a large part in these informal forms of organization. Examples of this are: "Purchasing a cheap pamphlet from a street vendor on proper Islamic dress

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<sup>46</sup> Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City – History Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 2 (1987),

<sup>47</sup> Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* ed. by Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana UP, 2004), 144.

for women, visiting a medical clinic attached to a mosque, attending study circles with clerics, making the pilgrimage to Mecca, veiling, or reading a religious magazine.”<sup>48</sup> These phenomena are part of a larger culture where Islam is part of the daily lives of Egyptians. Because these actions are enacted on a daily basis and by a large number of people they also have the power to create a structural societal change. I consider such a societal or organization change in society at large a political one because it rearranges the rules of the state in an informal manner.

These informal systems and the large role of religion that Singerman identifies should be understood within an overarching Islamic discourse present in Egypt. Lubeck and Britts, for example, identify a discursive shift in Egyptian society towards an Islamist discourse. They pose: “Islamism creates a diverse network of civil society groups delivering goods and services, each sharing an appealing cultural narrative claiming ‘authenticity,’ yet one that corresponds to the meaningful every day life discursive practices of Muslim urban communities.”<sup>49</sup> Gregory Starrett argues that this discourse is inscribed both consciously and unconsciously in the everyday practices of Egyptians. Moreover, he argues, similarly to Singerman, that the changes created by Islamism have changed the way Egyptians practice and represent their religious heritage.<sup>50</sup> In Egypt, specifically, this discourse has been reinforced, disseminated and appropriated especially by the MB. This happened, and happens, through a diverse network of informal and formal Islamic organizations and many initiatives started by the Muslim Brotherhood. Examples of this are: “provision of subsidized clothing and food, health care, regular educational programs ... after-school tutoring for children, religious instruction, subsidies for students, evening courses, social group activities ... hand[ing] out free food, clothing and money.”<sup>51</sup>

This understanding of an Islamic discursive shift is essential for a frame analysis of an Islamist social movement organization such as the Brotherhood in

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 151.

<sup>49</sup> Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts and Social Movements,” *Working Papers, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies* 6 (2001), 5.

<sup>50</sup> Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 187.

<sup>51</sup> Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts and Social Movements,” *Working Papers, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies* 6 (2001), 24.

Egypt. It shows the already large-scale Islamic discursive framework in which Egyptians are living. This framework is reinforced and appropriated by both the Islamist movement as well as Egyptian citizens.

To conclude, as Islamist social movements and social movement organizations have developed within a distinct Islamic environment they are not directly comparable to Western social movements. Moreover, not only the city itself and its organization are subject to Islamic processes, so are the discourses within which Muslims and other Egyptians are functioning. A distinctive Islamic discourse both expounded as well as appropriated by organizations, also the MB, results in similarly typical Islamic practices and rituals in everyday life. In order to incorporate this insight into SMT I will introduce Asef Bayat's concept of the quiet encroachment of the ordinary in the next section.

## **1.2 Quiet Encroachment of the Muslim Brotherhood**

I argued above that SMT has an inherent danger of reducing a social movement to mere rational reactions to political situations instead of recognizing the importance of everyday religious work that is part of the Islamist social movement.<sup>52</sup> While I do not want to discredit SMT as a tool to understand and map out the role of religion in an Islamist social movement organization on an instrumentally strategic level, I do contend that this is not the only role of religion. I therefore pose it is necessary to include a theoretical concept to SMT that recognizes the important role of religion and emphasizes the fact that apart from political motives as addressed by SMT, the MB as an Islamist social movement organization has religious motives as well. This approach should also specifically recognize the everyday religious work of the MB and the effect it has on the everyday life and thus actions of its followers.

In order to do this I use Asef Bayat's concept of the quiet encroachment of the ordinary and the ideas of 'nonmovements' and "street politics." Quiet encroachment of the ordinary, in short, means that ordinary people, specifically the subaltern, can bring about

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<sup>52</sup> Cihan Tugal, "Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Theoretical Society* 38 (2009), 434.

social change through their everyday actions.<sup>53</sup> By subaltern Bayat is not speaking of subaltern in the postcolonial sense such as Gayatri Spivak who, in her seminal essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” defined them as those who have limited or no access to the cultural imperialism.<sup>54</sup> Bayat’s and therefore also my understanding of the subaltern includes those who do not benefit from the hegemonic power structure. This includes many of the dispossessed, but also the former middle class, who would not be considered subaltern in the postcolonial sense.<sup>55</sup>

Bayat states that an increasingly growing group of subaltern have come into existence in authoritarian states in the Middle East and have formed a nonmovement engaged in street politics causing social and political change, without purposefully intending to do so. By nonmovement he means “the collective actions of noncollective actors..., [who] directly practice what they claim ... [and] are made up of practices that are merged into, indeed are part and parcel of, the ordinary practices of daily lives.”<sup>56</sup> Consequently, what makes the subaltern a nonmovement is that they are unorganized but do act in a shared manner, almost as one, through their everyday activities. How these everyday activities lead to social change is best captured in the idea of street politics by which Bayat means “a set of conflicts... between an individual or a collective populace and the authorities, which are shaped and expressed in the physical and social space of the streets.”<sup>57</sup> Quiet encroachment of the ordinary thus theorizes how an unorganized subaltern can cause social change through their everyday activities. This can be done, for example, by appropriating land that is not supposed to be lived on, by tapping water and electricity illegally and through street vending in places where it is not allowed.

Quiet encroachment in Bayat’s view only serves to better the lot of the subaltern or merely helps them to survive, but it is not a strategy for them to cause permanent political change. Such change is also not their goal. Larger

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<sup>53</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 17.

<sup>54</sup> Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988).

<sup>55</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 14-15.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.



national movements need to be observed to see substantial political transformation.<sup>58</sup> In this sense Bayat already proposes the possibility of social movements and social movement organizations tapping into that power of quiet encroachment of the ordinary when he states: The subaltern “are unlikely to become a more effective player in a larger sense unless they become mobilized on a collective basis, their struggles linked to broader social movements and civil-society organizations.”<sup>59</sup> While Bayat does point this out, he also stresses that when writing his book in 2010 this was not a viable option for the Egyptian subaltern. What Bayat posits, is in a sense still the case today and the period I study from January 2011 to July 2013. Thus far the subaltern have not been able to organize themselves and present themselves as a powerful bloc to be reckoned with. For example, the slumdweller of Cairo, the poorest group and biggest victims of Mubarak’s policies, did not participate in the uprisings.<sup>60</sup>

However, much has changed since the beginning of 2011 and while the subaltern have not been able to organize, I argue that the MB and the Islamist social movement in general, have in fact tapped into the power of quiet encroachment of the ordinary, and also the quiet encroachment of other groups since then. This idea is similar to that of Tugal, who states: “Whereas we are inclined to see only street action as ‘mobilization,’ Islamist mobilization involves changing the patterns and rhythms of everyday life.”<sup>61</sup> This understanding of the concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary is slightly different from how Bayat presents it. Still the essence of the concept remains the same, namely that there is immense political, social and economic power for change pent up in the everyday actions of a large group of ordinary people. For clarity’s sake I will explain and extrapolate what changes I propose so as to fit Bayat’s concept of quiet encroachment within SMT.

First of all, Bayat identifies the concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary existing outside of anyone’s wilful strategies as quiet encroachment is part of the everyday actions of the subaltern. While I recognize this as one of the

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>60</sup> Talal Asad, “Fear and the Ruptured State: Reflections on Egypt after Mubarak,” *Social Research* 79, no. 2 (2012), 273.

<sup>61</sup> Cihan Tugal, “Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” *Theoretical Society* 38 (2009), 441.

strengths of his concept, I do incorporate it as being used strategically by the MB and thus in that sense as a purposeful way of altering society.

A larger challenge to incorporating his concept in this thesis is the idea that quiet encroachment is being enacted by many more groups than merely the subaltern that Bayat identifies. Furthermore, these are similarly part of the mobilization strategies of the MB. Tugal gives some interesting examples of how the Islamist movement in Turkey continuously changes people's everyday lives. Having done ethnographic research in Sultanbeyli, a large district in Istanbul, he distinguishes different kinds of contexts in which the Turkish Islamist movement strategically changes the everyday practices of ordinary people, namely the street, the workplace, the teahouse, and the conference hall. For example Metin, a street vendor and member of the Islamist movement who "combines regular ritual, commerce and politics" in his everyday routines by rushing off for prayer during his work, by engaging customers in religious discussions and by deriving his political ideas from his religious readings, or Tugal's example of more radical Islamists who, in their daily lives, aim to teach others that Islamic law stands above the state's secular laws.<sup>62</sup>

While these accounts are examples of ethnographic research in Turkey, other ethnographic research done specifically in Egypt shows the kind of quiet encroachment, not only enacted by the subaltern, that could be a mobilization resource for the MB to tap into. De Koning, for example, shows how the specific use of space by upper-middle-class young women in Cairo is a catalyst in new class configurations and contestations in Egypt. By choosing the coffee shop as an acceptable place, these women allocate it as a public space only suitable for men and women of a certain class.<sup>63</sup> In this case not only class is a decisive factor in these new configurations but gender as well. The reason that these upper-middle class people are women results in only certain men being welcome in that otherwise public space. The daily activities of a large group of women from a certain class thus reappropriates space for specific classes and genders in society. This is similar to Bayat's concept of street politics, although it must be pointed out that where Bayat's concept is meant to theorize a form of

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 437 - 439.

<sup>63</sup> Anouk de Koning, "Gender, Public Space and Social Segregation in Cairo: Of Taxi Drivers, Prostitutes and Professional Women," *Antipode* 41, no. 3 (2009).

emancipation of certain social groups through daily activities, de Koning's analysis shows the restructuring of already existing inequality. Nevertheless, the example shows that people from other groups than Bayat's subaltern are able to influence social and spatial practices through their daily activities.

Consequently these examples show that besides the poor, other groups are able to employ quiet encroachment. Moreover encroachment does not necessarily have to be unconscious but can be a wilful action against a dominant power. Establishing this opens up the possibility in the upcoming analysis of resource mobilization that the MB has the possibility and potential of mobilizing a far more eclectic group than merely the subaltern.

However, appropriation of habits and rituals does not necessarily lead to mobilization. In what sense the MB can use this potential for mobilization is pent up in Mahmood's research into the relationship between Islamists and religion. First, she identifies nationalist Islamists who regard bodily practices more as an instrumental symbol of conveying Islamic identity. Second, she describes so-called pietists who believe that the acting out of religious rituals and the use of religious symbols actually makes Muslims more pious.<sup>64</sup> In this sense she adds to Bourdieu's concept of habitus by taking it further to mean habitualization, through the enacting or as called by her "embodiment" of religious symbols and rituals one becomes a pious Muslim. The daily (religious) activities of these groups thus cause internal and possibly, as they become more pious, also external change for the environment.

This last instance presents the possibility that Islamists themselves can appropriate, or embody certain religious symbols and rituals, and can encourage others to do the same. Habitualizing in this manner might result in purposeful, organized ways of trying to change society. In this sense the encouragement of the habitualization of everyday practices, not necessarily religious ones, could be theorized as a mobilization resource for the Muslim brothers.

These examples not only show the potential for resource mobilization, political opportunity and framing that lies hidden among different groups of Egyptians, but also that religion is part and parcel of these daily activities. I also

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<sup>64</sup> Saba Mahmood, "Ethical Formation and Politics of Individual Autonomy in Contemporary Egypt," *Social Research* 70, no. 3 (2003).

maintain that this is the case with a large part of the MB's constituency and among the Islamists of the MB themselves. To argue this I would again like to apply Mahmood's argument that the habitualization of religious symbols and rituals in actuality makes Muslims more pious and that this results in two kinds of Islamists, those acting out of identity politics, recoding nationalist sentiments in religious idioms and those who, through the embodiment of Islam become pious Muslims.<sup>65</sup> This shows that the use of religion in politics, when expounded by those who embody Islam daily, is not necessarily only a rational political tool.

Quiet encroachment is therefore a concept that not only needs to be applied to the subaltern as Bayat suggests but also to many different groups in society, including Islamists. This opens up the possibility for the MB to mobilize an eclectic group of Egyptian citizens through the encouragement and facilitation of habitualization of certain (religious) everyday practices. The concept furthermore allows a different understanding of the MB as merely a social movement organization that uses religion as a rational tool for its goals but as an organization consisting of a dynamic group of Islamists who consist of different types of which a portion might have internalized Islam and whose acts are thus informed by Islam less than that they use Islam as a tool to reach political, economic and social goals.

### **1.2.2 De Certeau's tactics and strategies as part of quiet encroachment**

Before combining the concept of quiet encroachment with SMT I wish to lift out two concepts that resonate strongly in Bayat's work. Namely, de Certeau's concepts of 'tactics' and 'strategies.'. In his work *The practice of everyday life* (1984) de Certeau introduces how ordinary citizens "might escape the passivity and rule-bound models of structuralist analysis through tactics of evasion, and escape."<sup>66</sup>

On the one hand he presents the concept of "strategies," which are the actions of those in power, representing institutions, and aiming to establish and

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 837.

<sup>66</sup> Valentina Napolitano and David Pratten, "Michel de Certeau: Ethnography and the challenge of plurality," *Social Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2007), 3.

maintain their dominant position within the hegemony.<sup>67</sup> On the other hand “tactics” are a tool for the weak. Napolitano and Pratten pose: “Tactics are determined by the absence of power. They must play on and within a terrain imposed upon them and therefore manoeuvre ‘within the enemy’s field of vision’.”<sup>68</sup> This idea of tactics thus holds that by operating covertly within the power structure, or hegemony, ordinary people can gain agency and challenge the dominant state. By agency I mean the perceived and enacted power of an individual to create and transform their environmental circumstances thereby also becoming the producer of their environment.<sup>69</sup> I interpret agency as consciously and wilfully choosing to act in a certain manner. The gaining of agency holds the possibility of actively improving one’s position.

This is strikingly similar to Bayat’s quiet encroachment of the ordinary, although Bayat emphasizes that this gaining of agency happens unconsciously while de Certeau argues that tactics are a conscious effort by ordinary people to ubiquitously yet surreptitiously, challenge the dominant power within the hegemony. An example of de Certeau’s tactics is the worker who appropriates company time by making a private phone call.<sup>70</sup> Similarly Ghannam, in analysing Cairenes’ spatial practices, invokes de Certeau’s tactics to theorize how Cairo’s space is contested through the strategies of the state and the tactics of ordinary people.<sup>71</sup> Examples of this are the ‘modern’ apartments in the neighbourhood el-Masaakin in Cairo that were used to relocate poor Cairenes. These apartments were structured by the state to promote the idea of a nuclear family socializing in a living room, cooking in a separate kitchen and sleeping in separate bedrooms. Those relocated did not accept these distinctions and reappropriated and reconstructed their apartments to fit their own needs. This resulted in such changes as chickens living on the balcony, women cooking in the living room, new walls to separate visiting men from women in the house, houses used as

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<sup>67</sup> Jon P. Mitchell, “A fourth critic of the Enlightenment: Michel de Certeau and the ethnography of subjectivity,” *Social Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2007), 99.

<sup>68</sup> Valentina Napolitano and David Pratten, “Michel de Certeau: Ethnography and the challenge of plurality,” *Social Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2007), 9.

<sup>69</sup> Albert Bandura, “Exercise of Human Agency through Collective Efficacy,” *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9, no. 3 (2000), 75.

<sup>70</sup> Jon P. Mitchell, “A fourth critic of the Enlightenment: Michel de Certeau and the ethnography of subjectivity,” *Social Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2007), 99.

<sup>71</sup> Farha Ghannam, *Remaking the Modern: space, relocation and the politics of identity in a global Cairo*, (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 2002), 22.

shops for the neighbourhood and courtyards appropriated as little farms.<sup>72</sup> While Ghannam uses de Certeau's tactics and strategies to theorize this specific situation, it could have similarly been an example within Bayat's research of quiet encroachment. This shows how tactics and strategies are inherent to Bayat's quiet encroachment.

Tactics and strategies are useful concepts to discuss the changing position of the MB within hegemonic power relations in Egypt. It is expected that, as the MB opposed the state and its dominant institutional structure before Mubarak's fall, they employed tactics. When the MB became the dominant player within the hegemony they presumably resorted to strategies instead of tactics. After Morsi being ousted and the MB lost popularity it is likely they again tapped into the power of strategies.

### **1.3 Backbone Concepts: Globalization, Space and Agency**

In order to properly combine and discuss the separate analyses that follow this chapter, all discussions of the analyses are structured according to the overarching concepts of globalization, space and agency, concepts around which Asef Bayat has similarly constructed his own concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary. This section will introduce and define these themes and how they can be applied to the analyses of the coming chapters so as to fit both SMT as well as the concept of quiet encroachment.

#### *Globalization*

Globalization influences contemporary Egypt on many levels and is therefore a valuable concept for understanding and analysing the role of the MB in Egypt. It enables an overarching view of the political, economic and social situation. Manuel Castells' concept "the new public sphere" helps in understanding the scope of global interconnectedness and the kind of processes that go hand-in-hand with that. The original concept of the public sphere, as defined by Jürgen Habermas in the 1960s, is understood as a "realm of social life where exchange of information and views on questions of common concern can take place so that

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 51 – 66.

public opinion can be formed.”<sup>73</sup> Ideally, the public sphere is thus a space where civil actors meet and deliberate in order to influence political institutions and by doing this they form a civil society. Castells puts forward that there is a new (global) public sphere functioning as a global communication space existing through the formation of a global civil society and a global network state. Within a global civil society Castells envisions that citizens expressing their views no longer constitute civil society by themselves but have been joined by many other national and international players. These new players are NGO’s with an international frame of reference, social movements that aim to control the process of globalization and “the movement of public opinion” (ad hoc mobilization through the use of, for example, the internet).<sup>74</sup> This global civil society interacts and communicates in a global public sphere with the global network state. This state is characterized by the networks it forms with other states, the networks formed between international institutions and supra-national organizations and the decentralization of power.<sup>75</sup> Consequently, the current developments in Egypt should be seen as part of a process of convergence of the national public sphere(s) with global actors.

A second concept enriches the globalization discussions that form the backbone of this thesis, namely “market globalism.” This is a neoliberal narrative that defines globalization as endowed with market-oriented norms, values, and meanings.<sup>76</sup> This concept understands the general processes of globalization as summarized and described by Castells as being appropriated by a neoliberal set of understandings and ideas. This neoliberal concept of globalization arose in the 1990s and was used to promote the idea that the global liberalization and integration of markets was necessary for global prosperity and democratic progress.<sup>77</sup> Joya summarizes how in Egypt Mubarak’s neoliberal policies were enacted after a deep economic crisis in the 1980s and with the help of debt relief

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<sup>73</sup> Peter Dahlgren, *Television and the Public Sphere: citizenship, democracy and the media* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 195.

<sup>74</sup> Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance,” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 83 - 86.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 87 – 88.

<sup>76</sup> Manfred B. Steger, *Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), ix.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, x.

from Western countries and the IMF the country was supposed to repay that debt by a neoliberal restructuring.<sup>78</sup> In this sense Egypt's ruler was acting on an international stage on which not only the processes of globalization such as increased interconnection but also globalization, told as market globalism, were featured.

While not outright claiming to, Bayat sets the scene for the existence of quiet encroachment of the ordinary within the setting of market globalism. It was the context in which Hosni Mubarak enacted many neoliberal policies in his country. It has created a large group of marginalized, or subaltern, such as "impoverished middle classes, the unemployed, casual labor, street subsistence workers and street children."<sup>79</sup> These groups fall outside the hegemony and try to find alternative, often illegal ways of coping. Egyptian schoolteachers are an example of this as they compensate for their inadequate monthly salary by turning to private tutoring.<sup>80</sup> This again suggests that those addressed by the original concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary are not necessarily slum dwellers but also the recently marginalized due to the presence of globalism in Egypt.

The neoliberal understanding of global politics and economics soon led to increasing global social inequality and rising tensions. Steger points out that the protests that resulted from these tensions were met with militaristic measures. In that sense globalism changed from a mere economic ideology to a militaristic and openly coercive market globalism.<sup>81</sup> This development can be similarly found in Egypt where Joya identifies the increasing coercive measures of the state against worker protests. She names the example of striking workers of Kafr al-Dawwar Spinning and Weaving Company in 1994, who were assaulted with live ammunition by the state security forces, killing four and injuring 120.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Angela Joya, "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic politics," *Review of African Political Economy* 38, no. 129 (2011): 370.

<sup>79</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 45.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>81</sup> Manfred B. Steger, *Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), xi.

<sup>82</sup> Angela Joya, "The Egyptian revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic politics," *Review of African Political Economy* 38, no. 129 (2011): 373.



A neoliberal conception of globalization has thus created a substantial marginalized citizenry. Its effects, however, are larger. As Castells points out, this disenfranchising effect of market globalism also results in alternative movements resisting the processes of informationalization, disenfranchisement, disorder and the overall logic of the new global order. These movements challenge the new world order, the current hegemony and the state's ability to deal with the effects and opportunities of global capitalism.<sup>83</sup> Put differently, Steger et al. have analyzed the so-called Justice Globalism Movement: "New global movements on the political Left, which project alternative visions of a global future based on values of social justice and solidarity with the global South."<sup>84</sup> They have extrapolated core concepts that these movements globally tend to use, the seven core concepts are: "transformative change, participatory democracy, equality of access to resources, opportunities and outcomes, social justice, universal rights, global solidarity, and sustainability."<sup>85</sup>

The three concepts discussed – the new public sphere, market globalism and justice globalism - provide the tools for the structuralist analysis of political opportunity for the MB in contemporary Egypt. The new public sphere addresses the importance of networks (both online and offline) for the MB, globalization will put the past and current political policies in a larger context and the existence of the justice globalism movement will put the MB as a social movement in a broader context.

### *Space*

Space is the second important overarching theme that will guide the discussions of this thesis. In his discussion of quiet encroachment of the ordinary Bayat mainly focuses on the street as a space of contestation. He links the process of market globalism to the contestation of space in Egypt, when he argues: "The neoliberal city is the 'city inside-out', where a massive number of inhabitants become compelled by poverty and dispossession to operate, subsist, socialize

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<sup>83</sup> Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity: Economy, Society and Culture*, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 72.

<sup>84</sup> Manfred B. Steger et al., *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 2.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

and simply live a life in the public spaces.”<sup>86</sup> Thus, it is the dominance of the aforementioned ideology of market globalism, a neoliberal framework applied to the processes of globalization, which has created the so-called neoliberal city of which the streets have become a contested space of a larger growing subaltern. This consequently becomes the space where the subaltern’s quiet encroachment is enacted. This view is too narrow however, as also the coffee houses mentioned by De Koning or the religious spaces used by the Islamists mentioned by Mahmood, such as the mosque, are places where the current hegemony is contested through everyday actions.

It is also important to be aware of the connection between aforementioned tactics and strategies in their relation to the spaces they control. Ghannam succinctly summarizes this connection: “Strategies can create, arrange, and control spaces, tactics can only use, manoeuvre and invert these spaces.”<sup>87</sup> In the upcoming discussion the relationship between space and these two concepts will prove helpful in assessing the MB’s influence on the surrounding space. Tugal has already analysed this connection with regard to the Turkish Islamist movement, although not specifically through the use of the concepts of strategies and tactics. He states: “The specific architectural layout forged by Islamic mobilization is a part of identity formation, but (as in the case of many female activists) it also serves as a resource for further mobilization.”<sup>88</sup> This example thus interestingly shows how everyday actions can not only shape space, but also how space shapes everyday activities, similar to Mahmood’s idea of embodiment. This is something which Bayat also identifies as he finds that the streets are not only a space where grievances are expressed, but also one where identities are forged.<sup>89</sup>

Space can be interpreted even more widely to include so-called online space. In an earlier paper I used the Egyptian revolts as a case study to argue that the internet as digital space was used to subvert the Egyptian state. During, but

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<sup>86</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 12.

<sup>87</sup> Farha Ghannam, *Remaking the Modern: space, relocation and the politics of identity in a global Cairo*, (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 2002), 50.

<sup>88</sup> Cihan Tugal, “Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory,” *Theoretical Society* 38 (2009), 443.

<sup>89</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 12.

also long before the revolts, the internet functioned as a space to meet, mobilize, inform and deliberate which was part of daily lives of a significant group of people.<sup>90</sup> The internet was a convenient space for this as it allowed people to bypass the government's restriction on public assembly.<sup>91</sup> Moreover, this digital space allowed women to participate on a grander scale in the revolts, as they are generally less present than men on the streets.<sup>92</sup>

Therefore, even though digital space was merely one of the spaces of the revolts and certainly not its cause or main mobilizer, it did constitute a new space for ordinary people to practice everyday practices that undermined the existing power structures.

Concluding, space is an important overarching concept for the coming discussions. It is not only the area where everyday actions are taking place, but also the place that forms and changes these everyday actions, be they religious, political, social or economic. With regard to the place of the MB and its current position in Egypt it will help in assessing how the MB and its followers interact through their specific uses of space, be it in the streets, in the more abstract political space or online space, to name a few examples.

### *Agency*

The third overarching concept, agency, provides the last tool for the analyses of the MB's position in Egypt. By human agency I mean the perceived and enacted power of an individual to create and transform their environmental circumstances thereby also becoming the producer of their environment.<sup>93</sup> As already touched upon in the earlier discussion of de Certeau's tactics and strategies, I showed that Bayat presents agency as an unconscious by-product.<sup>94</sup> If it is a form of agency at all, it is not one that its enactors are consciously

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<sup>90</sup> John D. Sutter, "The faces of Egypt's 'Revolution 2.0'," *CNN*, February 21, 2011

<http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/innovation/02/21/egypt.internet.revolution/index.html>

<sup>91</sup> Sahar Khamis and Katherine Vaughn, "We are All Khaled Said': the potentials and limitations of cyberactivism in triggering public mobilization and promoting political change," *Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research* 4 (2011), 151.

<sup>92</sup> Sahar Khamis and Katherine Vaughn, "Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance," *Arab Media and Society* 13 (2011), 4.

<sup>93</sup> Albert Bandura, "Exercise of Human Agency through Collective Efficacy," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9, no. 3 (2000), 75.

<sup>94</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 64.

employing to improve their own lives. The broader and more inclusive idea of quiet encroachment that I have proposed here includes both Bayat's perception of agency and a conscious conception of agency. This idea of quiet encroachment incorporated within SMT still acknowledges the fact that there are agents who are not conscious of the change they are causing and that they are similarly not consciously trying to change their environment. However, it does open up the possibility of there both being conscious agents such as the Muslim women described by Jouilli, who through enacting their religious practices and donning Islamic garb are consciously changing their environment. However, more importantly the MB has the opportunity of using actors, the conscious and the unconscious ones, as a resource for mobilization.

Not only are the quiet encroachers a resource for mobilization, but within the MB itself there is also space for the power of agency. Tugal exemplified this in discussing the Turkish Islamist movement and showing that Islamist women are able to use the movement's infrastructure in Istanbul to move around and make a difference.

The concept of agency thus draws attention to the different kinds of groups in Egypt gaining and attaining agency and the significance of those groups for the MB's mobilization efforts. In this sense agency as an overarching concept is also useful within the SMT approach of this thesis. As Aldon Morris already argued on current SMT: "These theories continue to slight the role that human agency plays in social movements."<sup>95</sup> Morris' focus on so-called 'agency-laden institutions is interesting for the upcoming analysis:

Those institutions, often long-standing, developed by potential challenging groups that house cultural and organizational resources that can be mobilized to launch collective action...their cultural materials are constitutive in that they produce and solidify the trust, contacts, solidarity, rituals, meaning systems, and options of members embedded in their social networks.<sup>96</sup>

This idea of agency-laden institutions summarizes the strength and presence of agency within social movements as I am also seeking to do with the

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<sup>95</sup> Aldon Morris, "Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals," *Contemporary Sociology* 29, no. 3 (2000), 446.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 447.

incorporation of the concept of quiet encroachment. This idea emphasizes the role a social movement or social movement organization can play in instilling certain rituals and meaning systems in its followers, a process which Tugal has already so aptly described for the Turkish Islamist social movement and which I also seek to map out through my analyses.

To sum up, the concept of agency allows a neat overlap in discussing both SMT and the concept of quiet encroachment and their relation to the MB in contemporary Egypt. Agency draws attention to a generally ignored aspect of both the theory and the concept: that of human agency. Together with globalization and space, agency will help in creating a structure in the different discussions of how, as Tugal so nicely put it: "Islamist mobilization involves changing the patterns and rhythms of everyday life."<sup>97</sup>

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

The goal of this chapter was to answer the sub question: What is the most appropriate theoretical framework to explore the rise and fall of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood? The short answer given to this question can be summarized in one sentence: By incorporating Asef Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary. Integrating this concept into SMT results in a theoretical framework that is an elaboration on previous theoretical frameworks in similar kinds of research. SMT itself provides the structure to map out both the political and organizational context within which the MB is operating. Moreover, the frame analysis will help assess whether the tactics and strategies as employed by the MB resonate with their intended audience.

In all these analyses quiet encroachment adds a new layer that makes the theory more suitable for the specific situation of an Islamist social movement organization active in Egypt. It should not be forgotten that such a movement is functioning within a specific Islamic context and discourse that is distinctly different from the Western setting of original SMT. Quiet encroachment makes SMT more suitable to study the Islamist MB because it incorporates the importance of the religious everyday work of the Brotherhood and the impact this has on the everyday lives of ordinary Egyptians. It thus incorporates

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<sup>97</sup> Cihan Tugal, "Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory," *Theoretical Society* 38 (2009), 441.

important aspects of the MB's tactics and strategies as well as a more thorough understanding of the context in which the MB is employing these.

As the inclusion of quiet encroachment in SMT complicates the already comprehensive theory, the overarching concepts of globalization, space and agency will provide coherence between the three analyses of SMT. By providing structure to the analyses globalization, space and agency will expose both larger structuralist torrents as well as more specific explanations for the current position of the MB. In order to reach such an analysis I present in the upcoming chapter how I will reconstruct the so-called rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood between January 2011 and June 2013. On the data of this period I will be able apply my newly elaborated version of SMT, including quiet encroachment of the ordinary.

## Chapter 2 The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood: A Methodology

“The aim [of case studies] is not to infer findings from a sample to a population, but to engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance.”<sup>98</sup>

So far I have put the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) within the context of social movement theory (SMT). However, to map out patterns and linkages of theoretical importance about the Brotherhood as a social movement organization, I have to empirically research them. To extend this thesis beyond the review of theoretical literature I therefore study the Brotherhood as a case study. This approach allows me to focus on specific characteristics of the movement and helps in mapping out how these changed. I define my case study by reconstructing the period over which a very clear rise and fall of the MB can be discerned: from January 2011 to July 2013. In this timeframe Mubarak was ousted and the Brotherhood quickly gained public approval, culminating in Morsi being elected as president in June 2012, after which the Brotherhood’s quick descent was set in, ultimately ending in Morsi’s ousting exactly a year later. In order to reconstruct these three periods, I study articles by the three leading English-language Egyptian newspapers. Additionally, to understand the framing practices of the Brotherhood I will analyze articles on the Brotherhood’s official English-language website.

With this case study approach I gain empirical in-depth knowledge on the political opportunity structures in which the Brotherhood were functioning; what their resources for mobilization were in that period; and how they presented, or framed, themselves towards their (intended) adherents. By including the concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary I also map out how the Brotherhood tapped into ordinary people’s ability to cause change. The case study is thus a tool to conduct the analyses of SMT mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis. This methodology chapter functions as the set-up of that case study and consequently answers the question:

What are the main methodological issues in studying the changing tactics and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood?

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<sup>98</sup> Alan Bryman, *Research Methods and Organization Studies* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 173

In order to answer this question I give an overview and justification of the use of the case study approach for this inquiry. I subsequently also justify why the sources I use are useful for this kind of research. Together these discussions result in a research design to study the MB and help map out how the Brotherhood as an Islamist social movement has reacted to, and interacted with the changing political, economic, social and religious situation surrounding it. In order to grasp where this new understanding of the Brotherhood stands within other research on Islamist social movements I will now first present previous research on such movements.

## **2.1 The Case Study Approach**

The case study “is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances,” according to Robert E. Stake.<sup>99</sup> This is also the approach that I use for my analysis on the MB. Before going into the specific research design derived from this understanding of the case study I wish to go over the strengths and weaknesses of this method.

The main strength of the case study approach for my analysis is the depth of information it provides on the Brotherhood. Robert Yin suggests that the benefit of choosing the single case design such as the one in this thesis is that it allows a researcher “to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.”<sup>100</sup> Moreover the resources for studying the MB in the past two years are plentiful, meaning that the case study also has the possibility of a wide scope. Such a scope is necessary for a thorough SMT analysis as argued in the previous section. Both the depth and width of the case study approach allow for a real world context mapped out for the MB, which provides me with the necessary in depth information for my analyses of political opportunity, mobilization and framing.

The second strong point of this approach is that it allows me to study a change over time: I can research the different periods within which the MB in Egypt was active and also capture the dynamics of changes within the MB. The

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<sup>99</sup> Robert E. Stake, *The Art of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995), xi.

<sup>100</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 4.



longitudinal case design makes such a study over time possible. Consequently, all three strands of SMT are studied over a period of two years so as to map out the dynamics of these processes.

The third strong point of this method is the possibility it offers for potential theory building. Alan Bryman poses: “Case studies should be evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that can be generated. The aim is not to infer findings from a sample to a population, but to engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance.”<sup>101</sup> This is not only the goal of case studies, Jennifer Bott argues that due to the “inherent flexibility” of the case study approach it is possible to identify unanticipated results to create new hypotheses or even theories.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, the use of the case study as a tool opens up the possibility for enriching the theory surrounding Islamist social movement organizations.

Some researchers, even social science scholars such as Anthony Giddens, state that generalization and theory building from a single case study is impossible and only possible from a large multitude of cases.<sup>103</sup> Bent Flyvbjerg objects to this by arguing that generalization from a single case depends on the strategic choice of case study.<sup>104</sup> For example, Flyvbjerg describes a study on changing class identity. In this study the researchers purposefully chose one case that favored their thesis that those who reached middle class status were losing their class identity. If their thesis would be disproven by the case, it would likely be false in subsequent cases. In the end this is exactly what the case ended up doing.

The MB during the first two years after Mubarak’s resignation, presents itself as a similar critical case study. While it would be of great use to conduct several case studies on Islamist movements that have switched from a place in the opposition to a position within the hegemony of a nation, not many such cases are available. Of the situations where an Islamist movement has come into

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<sup>101</sup> Alan Bryman, *Research Methods and Organization Studies* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1989), 173

<sup>102</sup> Jennifer P. Bott, “Case Study Method,” in *Encyclopedia of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* ed. Steven G. Rogelberg (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2007), 69.

<sup>103</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1984), 328.

<sup>104</sup> Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 2 (2006), 226.

power, such as Iran, Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, Egypt was able to briefly adopt a dominant position within a democratic structure, albeit not without resistance. Such a case can thus add to our knowledge of Islamist social movements.

## 2.2 Research Design

The first basis of a solid research design, according to Robert Yin, is its research questions. This is not surprising as he defines such a design as “the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions.”<sup>105</sup> As such I stated my central and subquestions in the introduction of this thesis.

Yin distinguishes the ‘unit of analysis’ as another important component of the research design.<sup>106</sup> The unit of analysis simply means ‘what the case actually is,’ therefore it means both the boundaries in data gathering and analysis. As the research questions are in a sense the first boundary for the case, Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack propose to ‘bind’ the case further through place, time, activity and definition.<sup>107</sup> The following units of analysis have been constructed through a going back and forth between research questions and data. As Yin proposes, these units “can be revisited as a result from discovery during data collection.”<sup>108</sup>

How I define the MB is the first category to bind the case. First of all, by Brotherhood I mean an Islamist social movement organization as elaborated in the first chapter of this thesis. As a starting point, I will focus my analysis on anyone who identifies him- or herself, as a member of the Brotherhood or is identified as such by others. My analysis will also include the tactics and strategies of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political party affiliated with the Brotherhood. This party is an important way for the Brotherhood to expound new tactics and strategies, and hence important for this analysis. I therefore discount the many offshoots of the Brotherhood.

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>107</sup> Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack. “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers,” *The Qualitative Report* 13, no. 4 (2008), 546.

<sup>108</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009), 30.

The second boundary is place. While the Muslim Brotherhood is active throughout Egypt, I have chosen to focus on its tactics and strategies in Cairo in particular. As mentioned in chapter one, one of the strengths of the Brotherhood is its relationship to the everyday lives and practices of Egyptians. However, it would entail a much larger case study if its specific relationship to rural communities and other big cities in Egypt were to be included. Cairo is one of the major important locations for the ongoing protests that are now directed against the Brotherhood and President Morsi in particular. This does not mean, however, that I discount relationships to areas outside of Cairo, both national and international. Especially the political opportunity analysis includes these relationships as an important context to understand the Brotherhood's relationship to Egyptians and Cairenes in particular.

A third boundary I introduce is time. I have limited the selection of data to three key periods that delineate the Brotherhood's degree of popularity. The first period focuses on the 17 days following the uprisings that started on January 25, 2011 up until Mubarak's subsequent resignation on February 11, 2011. This represents a period in which the Muslim Brotherhood is still an illegal organization, but on the rise. The second period, 18 June, 2012 to 30 June, 2012, denotes the Brotherhood at the pinnacle of their popularity. During this time Morsi was elected as president. On the 18<sup>th</sup> the Brotherhood already announced him as winner, on the 30<sup>th</sup> he was officially declared the victor. The third period, 23 June, 2013 to 3 July, 2013 starts a week before the announced protests against Morsi on June 30<sup>th</sup> and his subsequent ousting by army chief Abdul Fatah al-Sisi. This period therefore embodies the fall of the Brotherhood.

While I am aware that after these three key moments, new significant events have occurred as unrests continue in Egypt, I have chosen to limit this analysis to these three. First of all, this limits the scope of the analysis to the first two years after Mubarak's fall, the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood and their subsequent fall. This gives me the opportunity to analyze three strikingly different positions for the MB. During the first period they were still part of the opposition to Mubarak's state; in the second period they became the state by proxy through their highly successful elected political party and elected president; and in the third period the opposition against the political party, the

president and consequently the social movement became so loud it led to the fall of all three.

Together these three key periods thus provide a salient case study on the changing political opportunity structures, mobilizing resources and framing choices of the Brotherhood. This means that researching those aspects of this social movement organization helps to answer questions of a more general nature about the reactions of an Islamist social movement in a dominant position.

A study over time as I am conducting here through my analysis of the three periods is exactly what Robert D. Benford, one of the founders of SMT, argues for when critiquing his theory. Changes over time showing changes in, for example, framing strategies of a social movement across a historical period add valuable knowledge about such movements or on a more theoretical level on SMT itself.

A fourth and last boundary, is the kind of activity that will be analyzed in this case study. As explained in the first chapter SMT consists of three different kinds of analyses that complement each other.

In combination the definition of the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo as a spatial boundary, the three key periods as a time-boundary and the definitions of the three strands of analysis bind the case study in such a way that its focus is on the changing tactics and strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood over the past two years. So far this research design has enumerated the kind of data to be collected by means of the research questions and the units of analysis. The next section will list and account for the data sources and their characteristics.

### **2.2.2 Sources of Data**

I use both newspaper articles and the Brotherhood's own English-language website *Ikhwanweb* as a primary source to reconstruct the rapid changes of the Muslim Brotherhood's role in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. The newspaper articles will help in reconstructing all three facets of SMT, while the posts on the Brotherhood's website will mainly do so with regard to the framing practices of the Brotherhood.

Firstly, the use of newspaper data “has helped to further the study of social movements, from the development of theory to the testing of empirical questions that are central to the field,” Jennifer Earl et al. argue.<sup>109</sup> Examples of the use of such data are numerous. Felix Kolb used newspaper coverage to reconstruct the coming into existence of the German branch of the anti-neoliberal group ATTAC.<sup>110</sup> Karen Rasler collected newspapers articles in the period around the Iranian revolution to map the mobilization of the Iranian population.<sup>111</sup> Kriesi et al. analyzed articles from the Monday newspapers in four different European countries to ascertain the mobilization patterns of new social movements.<sup>112</sup>

In this case study of the Brotherhood in Egypt newspapers provide two distinct opportunities as already recognized by Earl et al.: the use of newspapers allows for a focus on action instead of only organizational views of SMOs and it facilitates comparative and historical research.<sup>113</sup> Articles on the Brotherhood during my three periods under study show the rapidly changing nature of events in Egypt by portraying the events and views when they were happening. Those views are not influenced by later events. Moreover, these events happened in the past, thus allowing for a clearly defined study of the Brotherhood in specific periods of time that can be compared.

The second source of data, the Brotherhood’s website, enhances my analysis of both the framing and mobilization efforts of the MB. The site helps to show how the Brotherhood framed itself during the three key periods under study. As this is their English language website which they themselves pointed out is mainly intended for western societies, it allows me to lay out their position on important issues for their Western publics, namely Islamic extremism, secularization and the MB’s role in Egyptian politics and international

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<sup>109</sup> Jennifer Earl et al., “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004), 76.

<sup>110</sup> Felix Kolb, “The Impact of Transnational Protest on Social Movement Organizations: Mass Media and the Making of ATTAC Germany,” in *Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions, and Power* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005): 95-120.

<sup>111</sup> Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution,” *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (1996), 135

<sup>112</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi et al., “New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe,” *European Journal of Political Research* 22 (1992), 220.

<sup>113</sup> Jennifer Earl et al., “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004), 65-66.

relations.<sup>114</sup> First I want to present the three newspapers that I gathered my data from.

### *Egyptian English-language Newspapers*

The idea of freedom of the press and thus the opportunity to practice critical, unfettered journalism in Egypt is at times limited. Sahar Khamis observes that the media landscape in Egypt is still in the making.<sup>115</sup> This means that political opposition; private media ownership and multiple voices are still often stifled. Also, under President Morsi journalists and bloggers are still being persecuted. Arabic-language journalism thus seems to especially be confronted with censorship. Moreover, as I'm not able to read Arabic I chose to use English-language news websites.

Egyptian journalist Rahman Hussein, a reporter for several English-language Egyptian newspapers, states that the English-language online press "tends to portray the most accurate narrative of events on the ground, not the pastiche-laden narrative ubiquitous in the Arabic press."<sup>116</sup> Edward Webb who analyzed the amount of censorship in Egyptian newspapers supports this observation. He argues that the English counterparts of Arabic newspapers such as *Al Ahram Online* and *Egypt Independent* "can get away with more."<sup>117</sup> Jeffrey Ghannam takes this even further by posing that such English-language media often function as watchdogs of the official Arab press.<sup>118</sup> Their more critical journalistic stance thus makes English-language newspapers better suited for the analysis of this thesis than their Arabic counterparts. Furthermore, English-language news websites are preferable over international news websites because of the in-depth accounts they provide. Hussein argues that articles on

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<sup>114</sup> Soumia Bardhan, "Egypt, Islamists, and the Internet: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood and Its Rhetoric of Dialectics in Ikhwanweb," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 2 (2014), 236.

<sup>115</sup> Sahar Khamis, "The Transformative Egyptian Media Landscape: Changes, Challenges and Comparative Perspectives," *International Journal of Communication* 5 (2011), 1167.

<sup>116</sup> Dalia Rabie, "English language media play a vital role in telling Egypt's story." *Egypt Independent* February 19, 2013. <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/english-language-media-play-vital-role-telling-Egypt-s-story>.

<sup>117</sup> Edward Webb, "Censorship and Revolt in the Middle East and North Africa: A Multi-Country Analysis," Paper presented at ISA Annual Convention San Diego 1 – 4 April (2012), 26.

<sup>118</sup> Jeffrey Ghannam, "Social Media in the Arab World: Leading up to the Uprisings of 2011," *A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance* (2011), 6.

English news websites are embedded in a real understanding of the social, political and cultural contexts.<sup>119</sup>

Studying these English-language newspapers does mean I am using sources read mainly by expats, diplomats, think tanks and Egyptian and non-Egyptian policymakers.<sup>120</sup> I contend, however, that the reached public in the articles is less important than simply knowing the intended audience of a newspaper. The goal is not to research the way newspapers frame issues but to reconstruct the tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood in the three key periods as portrayed by those newspapers. It is thus merely necessary to be aware of the public for whom these articles are written as that might color the reports under study in a visible way.

This lastly leaves us with the question of one-sidedness. So as to avoid a partisan analysis I chose to analyze all three English Egyptian newspapers and their coverage on the political environment in Egypt at the time. This way multiple viewpoints are included. Earl et al. pose: “Triangulation of multiple sources is used to ensure a broader range of coverage... to capture more events and to provide multiple accounts of each event.”<sup>121</sup> Therefore the following English-language Egyptian newspapers are included in my analysis: *Egypt Independent*, *Ahram Online* and *Daily News Egypt*. Later on in this chapter I present these newspapers in detail and I analyze briefly how they reported on the Muslim Brotherhood during the three key periods. But first I present and explain the data collection protocol applied to the newspapers and *Ikhwanweb*.

### 2.2.3 Data Collection Protocol

The three newspapers each have their own vast online archives. For period 1, for example, *Egypt Independent* alone has archived 459 news articles. Therefore I limited the amount of data by including a data collection protocol. This protocol clearly defines which articles are up for analysis and why. Only articles written between the dates that belong to the three key periods will be analyzed. While it is probable that outside of these key periods worthwhile pieces have been

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<sup>119</sup> Dalia Rabie, “English language media play a vital role in telling Egypt’s story.”

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Earl et al., “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004), 74.

written on the tactics and strategies of the Brotherhood in the key periods, it would be too large a scope to analyze all the articles between 2011 and 2013 on the Brotherhood.

I decided to focus on the articles that were filed under the headings “politics” (*Daily News Egypt*), “top stories” and “news features” (*Egypt Independent*) and “news” (*Ahram Online*). Those categories included articles on contemporary events in Egypt as opposed to, for example, the lifestyle or music sections. The selected categories contained mainly straight reports that are very useful for reconstructing the three elements of SMT. They also included features, which were helpful for finding out how Egyptians were acting and interacting on the streets. Lastly I included the available op-eds on each website as these are presentations of the views of important groups during the key moments under study. Such groups include the MB itself, but also opponents of the MB and foreign commenters. As the position and opinion of op-ed writers are clearly stated, those articles are useful for reconstructing the viewpoints of important groups in Egyptian society during the three key periods.

Of these articles I selected only those that mentioned at least one of the following terms: “Morsi” – including alternative spellings Mursy, Mursi and Morsy - “Muslim Brotherhood,” “Muslim Brother,” “Brotherhood” or “Brother”. In this way only articles that specifically mention the Brotherhood or a member of the Brotherhood are taken into account.

This data in itself, however, does not show the websites’ position within Egyptian society, how they reported on the Brotherhood and how reliable the websites are, I therefore explore the prejudices and/or neutrality of each website in the next section section. This allows for a more complete and accurate analysis in the next chapter, ensuring that certain articles are better suited to reconstruct events than others. Lastly I also ascertain the reliability of the different websites during each of the three periods under study (period 1: January 25 – February 11, 2011; period 2: June 18 – 30, 2012; period 3: June 23 – July 3, 2013).



### 2.3 Justifying the news websites

To position the websites I looked at five aspects within the articles, which I marked within separate tables, an example of which can be seen in Appendix B. These aspects are, firstly, which actors are represented; which sources were used and what was their diversity; is there a noticeable slant; what type of article is it; and lastly, what is the main subject of the article in relation to the Brotherhood? These five aspects allow me to pinpoint why and how each newspaper contributes to this research.

Firstly, a study of the actors presented in the articles helps to ascertain if important groups and parties in Egypt are part of the stories found on that website. Only if this is diverse enough the news websites are fit to reconstruct a complete picture of the situation in the three periods under study. Secondly, the kinds of sources used show whether or not all those different actors that appear in articles have also been used. If for example only elite players in society such as government officials are heard while the website writes about the Brotherhood, such a website, or specific articles are less reliable as a source.

The third aspect, position or slant, helps to discern how to read an article. If there is a noticeable slant or specific argument being made it should be approached differently as a source. The fourth aspect, type of article, also helps with deciding if someone is presenting their opinion, for example in an opinion piece, or if a reporter is trying to just report the facts like in a news article. I want to emphasize that articles with opinions are also very valuable as they show the certain groups' standpoints.

Lastly, by summarizing each article with one word I created a very quick overview of the substance of the articles on the news website. Such an overview helps with understanding if the website is geared in its reporting to those issues that are important for my thesis. Examples of useful subject words are "politics," and "the people" as I ensured that all articles at least involve the Brotherhood, these words show that articles are combining the Brotherhood in articles with politics or the people's opinion. The following analyses go deeper into the results that came from extracting these five aspects from the articles in *Egypt Independent*, *Ahram Online* and *Daily News Egypt*.

### 2.3.2 Egypt Independent

*Egypt Independent* is derived from the privately owned Arabic language *Al-Masry Al-Youm* daily.<sup>122</sup> It often contains translated articles from this Arabic paper, although it acts independently from its Arabic counterpart. *Egypt Independent* has been in existence since 2009 and prides itself on its “high-quality, in-depth content about the political, economic, social and cultural landscape of the country.”<sup>123</sup> On weekdays it is only available online while on the weekends it produces a printed issue. In the period under study, the newspaper is known for its critical stance toward the then Muslim Brotherhood administration. Its producers declared: “We want to continue reporting with honesty, integrity and a critical voice, especially at a time when the current administration and ruling party are hiding the truth about their commitment to the revolution and its democratic aspirations from the world.”<sup>124</sup>

*Egypt Independent* has a general reputation of independence from the state, more so than its Arabic sister publication. Edward Webb notices that even under Mubarak’s repressive regime *Egypt Independent* could be more critical than *Al-Masry Al-Youm*.<sup>125</sup> While *Egypt Independent* already existed under Mubarak and subsequently suffered from a limited amount of freedom of the press, this freedom was also hindered at times after January 25, 2011. *The Guardian* reports attempts by the army, then in power, to censor the newspaper on a critical article about the military.<sup>126</sup> During the three periods under study, *Egypt Independent* had trouble staying in business due to financial losses of its mother organization. At the beginning of 2013 it was supposed to close down. However, this decision was later revoked so *Egypt Independent* has a chance for “cost-cutting and revenue-generating measures.”<sup>127</sup> As of writing the news website is still in business.

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<sup>122</sup> [www.egyptindependent.com/about](http://www.egyptindependent.com/about)

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> “English-language weekly *Egypt Independent* website at risk of closure,” *Ahram Online* 18 February, 2013, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/65054.aspx>

<sup>125</sup> Edward Webb, “Censorship and Revolt in the Middle East and North Africa: A Multi-Country Analysis,” paper presented at ISA Annual Convention San Diego 1-4 April (2012), 13.

<sup>126</sup> Roy Greenslade, “Press freedom threats mount in Egypt,” *The Guardian* December 15, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2011/dec/15/censorship-egypt>

<sup>127</sup> [www.egyptindependent.com/about](http://www.egyptindependent.com/about)

However, several results of my analysis suggest that those severe cost-cutting measures have affected the type of reporting on *Egypt Independent*. Firstly over the three periods, news articles become the largest proportion of the different types of articles. The proportion of opinion pieces and news features decreases. On the one hand this makes *Egypt Independent* suitable as a source to drily reconstruct events in Egypt. On the other hand less features mean *Egypt Independent* does become less useful for extracting citizen's voices that are mainly found in opinion pieces and news features. Such opinions are essential for my analysis on encroachment of the ordinary that is tapped into by the Brotherhood. Fortunately both opinion pieces and news features are more prolifically present in the other online newspapers used for this study.

A second result shows that cutting costs influenced *Egypt Independent's* reporting through a drop in the number of original sources used. By original sources I mean every person quoted excluding statements, press conferences, social media, sources used in other press, speeches, websites and anonymous sources, drastically dropped.



Figure 3.1 Percentage of original sources used by Egypt Independent

Figure 3.1 shows that the percentage of original sources used over the three periods decreased from 67,5% in period 1 to 38% in period 3. Also other media, such as *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, *Reuters* and *AFP* are more frequently used in the later

periods. This suggests that diminishing resources have forced the news website to find cheaper ways of gathering news. This means *Egypt Independent* is not fully original, but it does still combine some original on the ground reporting with accounts of internationally renowned and trustworthy sources making its reports in all three periods valuable for the analysis in the next chapter.

This conclusion is supported by the finding that in most articles the actors mentioned are also used as sources.<sup>128</sup> Thus those represented in articles have also been heard, making the reporting more reliable. Significantly, in the first period when the Brotherhood was an illegal organisation it was still a source in 31 of the 35 articles that mentioned the group. This suggests that while acting under a dictatorship *Egypt Independent* still succeeded in finding diverse actors and sources, suggesting they did not shy away from the more difficult subjects. This mirroring of sources to match the actors mentioned in articles continues in period 2 and 3.


Moreover, I barely found a noticeable slant in the articles. In all periods the articles reported mainly neutrally on Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>129</sup> The presence of criticism of Mubarak in the first period does point to the news website's reputation of being independent from the Mubarak government. The presence of a few critical articles on Morsi and the MB also support this.

I also found that Morsi, the Brotherhood and the FJP appeared within different contexts. Figure 3.2 shows that the three most popular contexts are politics, protests and religion, those three account for about 80% of articles in period 1, 75% of articles in period 2 and 70% of articles in period 3.

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<sup>128</sup> Appendix D

<sup>129</sup> Appendix E



*Figure 3.2 Context in which MB, Morsi and FJP appear in Egypt Independent*

As can be expected the context of protests is most popular in the two most tumultuous periods under study: period 1 and 3. At the same time the Brotherhood, its political arm the Freedom and Justice Party and Morsi himself consistently appear in a political context. The religious context in which they appear is also of value for my analysis as this means that *Egypt Independent* also presents the religious roles the Brotherhood, FJP and Morsi play in Egypt.

*Egypt Independent's* name seems to have been aptly chosen as the website appears to act independently of authoritarian regimes, without much of a slant and those appearing in their articles are also heard as sources. Moreover, they present the Brotherhood, Morsi and FJP both within a political as well as a religious context. As this is all presented in both news articles and albeit fewer news features, the articles of this news website are suited to reconstruct events in the three different periods so as to apply social movement theory to these.

### 2.3.3 Ahram Online

*Ahram Online* was launched 26 November 2010 and is one of Egypt's largest English-language news websites. It is only published online and is part of Al-Ahram, which is a state-run publishing house. *Ahram Online's* English newsroom works independently from the Arabic Al-Ahram published newspaper. Rumours are that this state-owned website is influenced by allies from the Brotherhood. For example, in January of 2013 its editor Hani Shukrallah, a known critic of the Brotherhood, was sent on early leave. He claims to have been forced from the office by allies of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>130</sup>

Due to its state-ownership *Ahram Online* seems to be far from the level of independence that *Egypt Independent* appears to be enjoying. However, the fact that an editor critical of the Brotherhood has been running the paper during the period that I am researching suggests the newspaper has had some space for a critical stance. Moreover the following analysis shows that even though it is state-owned *Ahram Online* was not skewed toward a necessarily positive Brotherhood perspective in the third period when the Brotherhood was in power. When looking at the slant in the articles, when found at all, it shows that during all three periods under study there was a mix of criticism aimed at different parties in the conflict. In period 1 there were critical articles both of the Brotherhood and Mubarak, in period 2 while most articles were critical of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), or the army, there were also critical articles of the judiciary and the Brotherhood. In period 3 most articles are critical of the Brotherhood but also SCAF, Mubarak supporters and the Tamarod campaign.<sup>131</sup> Thus similar to *Egypt Independent*, in *Ahram Online* most articles are without slant and therefore an appropriate source to reconstruct events in the period under study.

The diverse use of sources also underscores this point. In all three periods sources from opposing parties are heard.

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<sup>130</sup> Patrick Kingsley, "Egyptian editor says he was forced out by Muslim Brotherhood," *The Guardian* February 18, 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/18/egyptian-editor-muslim-brotherhood-hani-shukrallah>

<sup>131</sup> Appendix F

Source position to Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi and Freedom and Justice Party in Ahram Online




Figure 3.3 Source position to MB, Morsi and FJP in Ahram Online

Figure 3.3 shows that in period 1 the Muslim Brotherhood - Morsi was still relatively unknown and the FJP non-existent – is not yet talked of very frequently and if they are, more by sources in favour of them than those opposed. In period 2 there are significantly more positive sources in position to the Brotherhood, Morsi and the FJP. Nevertheless, in a period where Morsi is chosen as President and the FJP and the Brotherhood are powerful and positively regarded by a large constituency. In the third period when Morsi is ousted and the Brotherhood is on its way to become illegal again this relationship has reversed. Important for this study, however, is that those with different viewpoints on the Brotherhood, Morsi and FJP are represented almost equally, thus giving different perspectives for my analysis. Moreover, *Ahram Online* is an interesting source for my analysis in the next chapter as of all three newspapers it depends the most on reports by their own reporters. This certainly adds to the diversity of information for my analysis. Similarly, information from other news sources, both foreign and local, expands the range of information that I can use for my analyses.

The kinds of articles used by *Ahram Online* also contribute to the usefulness of this newspaper as a primary source. As opposed to *Egypt Independent* and *Daily News Egypt*, there is a considerable amount of news features in all three periods.<sup>132</sup> While news articles are dry compilations of events and thus very useful for my social movement theory analysis, news features give a more in-depth view on a subject. The latter does this in part by quoting witnesses, protesters or citizens, thereby supplying valuable information for my quiet encroachment-analysis.

Thus, while *Ahram Online* might have seemed less suitable as an objective source than *Egypt Independent*, its articles show no noticeable slant toward either the Brotherhood or another organization. Moreover the diversity in source-use, the prolific use of own reporters, the mix with reports from foreign and local sources and the presence of several news features make this online newspaper especially suitable as a source for the analyses in the next chapter.

#### **2.3.4 Daily News Egypt**

In existence since 2005, *Daily News Egypt* is the news website affiliated with “Egypt’s only independent English-language daily newspaper.”<sup>133</sup> It has been praised by *Egypt Independent* as an online newspaper covering news that others would not cover for danger of being persecuted.<sup>134</sup> Consequently it is known for its critical stance toward the government, be that Mubarak’s government or Morsi’s. The editor’s goal as stated online, is “to build our reputation for honest and reliable reporting, to make us a point of reference on Egyptian current affairs for readers all over the world.”<sup>135</sup> Its intended audience is thus mainly international, which is not strange as this is an English-language website. At the same time they make use of a lot of on the ground reporters, but also incorporate news from other local news sources, thus broadening the scope of the information they provide.

In April 2012 its investors could no longer finance the paper and it closed down until a new investor, Al Borsa Newspaper and Egypt-based Arabic-language

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<sup>132</sup> Appendix C

<sup>133</sup> [www.dailynewsegypt.com/about/](http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/about/)

<sup>134</sup> Rana Khazbak, “Daily News Egypt leaves a legacy of independent journalism,” *Egypt Independent* April 23, 2012, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/daily-news-egypt-leaves-legacy-independent-journalism>

<sup>135</sup> [www.dailynewsegypt.com/about/](http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/about/)



daily newspaper, invested again in May 2012.<sup>136</sup> Fortunately this does not interfere with any of the periods under study, nor with the slant I found in articles. *Daily News Egypt* seems to be the newspaper with the most articles slanted in a negative opinion of Morsi and the Brotherhood. In period 1 there are only two negative articles, in period 2 there are thirteen and in period 3 also thirteen.<sup>137</sup> These outspoken articles against Morsi and the Brotherhood are a useful source to reconstruct the way Morsi and the Brotherhood are construed by their opponents and why.

*Daily News Egypt's* large use of unique sources also makes it very useful to reconstruct events in Egypt for my analyses. Examples are the blogger in period 1, the Egyptian filmmaker and a librarian in period 2, and the student union president in period 3.<sup>138</sup> These perspectives are interesting especially for my analysis of encroachment of the ordinary. Additionally this newspaper does a lot of original reporting and has talked to many protesters, citizens and activists on the ground: in period 1 they quote fourteen protesters, activists and citizens, in period 2 nine and in period 3 even 27.<sup>139</sup> These sources are invaluable reconstructions of life in Cairo and therefore also very useful for my analysis of encroachment of the ordinary.

This original reporting is mirrored in the rare use of speeches, statements, press conferences and spokespersons as a source. This is something that the other newspapers do much more often, giving the same information over and over again. *Daily News Egypt* is in this sense much more original and therefore a very important additional source to the other two newspapers.

A very noticeable result in period 3 is the fact that SCAF is only used as a source ten times even though it is mentioned as an actor 37 times. The same goes for the Brotherhood in period 1 (27 times an actor, only 11 times a source), 2 (an actor 28 times, a source only ten times) and period 3 (43 times an actor, only six times a source). Closer scrutiny of the data shows that *Daily News Egypt* in many articles has identified SCAF and the Brotherhood as a major player through other

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<sup>136</sup> "Alborsa Newspaper invests in republishing Daily News Egypt," *Daily News Egypt*, May 18, 2012, <http://www.dailynewsegyp.com/2012/05/18/alborsa-newspaper-invests-in-re-publishing-daily-news-egypt/>

<sup>137</sup> Appendix C

<sup>138</sup> Appendix C

<sup>139</sup> Appendix C

sources such as local and foreign press agencies, protesters, opponents or their own reporters. Other articles mentioning SCAF and the Brotherhood use demonstrators, human rights organizations or, for example, political experts as a source. The newspaper thus rightly identifies them as important actors while not always using their own words to represent that role. Such a critical perspective is vital to reconstruct an equally critical idea of the political alliances, framing and mobilizing efforts of the Brotherhood, especially as I can oppose these interpretations of the Brotherhood's framing efforts as opposed to their presentation of themselves in the other newspapers and their own website which I also study.

*Daily News Egypt* therefore is an important addition to the other two because of its original reporting. It hardly uses official information from the actors that it uses in articles. Instead these actors are presented and interpreted by outsiders such as specialists, other newsmedia both local and foreign or even Egyptians themselves in the form of protesters or activists. This significantly differs from the source use of the other two newspapers thus diversifying the content on which I can base my analysis in the upcoming chapter.

The main point to be taken from this justification is that the three newspapers, while reporting in the same periods on the same subject each have their own specific way of doing so. This rich combination of primary source material ranging from the inclusion of important press conferences, speeches and spokespersons to on the ground comments made by protesters, activists and politicians, strengthens my primary source material. Consequently, these articles together with the way the Brotherhood presented itself on their own website, *Ikhwanweb*, allow me to reconstruct three important periods in Egypt for that group. The next section explains the last step of studying this reconstructed case study, namely the analysis.

## **2.4 Analysis of the Case Study**

I constructed my database through the definitions of political opportunity, mobilizing resources and framing. In this sense SMT was the guiding framework for my data gathering. The three strands of analysis of SMT ensured a focused dataset that pertains to the most important aspects of the functioning of a social

movement organization. For the analysis of this data I first reconstruct the three dimensions of SMT, for the specific case of the MB.

In addition to this I account for Bayat's theory of quiet encroachment of the ordinary in my SMT analysis. As I argued in my first chapter, this concept is needed to account for the religious motives with which the Brotherhood is acting as an Islamist social movement.<sup>140</sup> He poses that through street politics this change is set into motion. I argue that the Brotherhood has been able to tap into this powerful source of change. Therefore in the data I also selected those pieces of text that pertain to street power and how the Brotherhood is related to this. Moreover, I focus on how the Brotherhood is employing either strategies - the actions of those in power aiming to establish and maintain their dominant position within the hegemony - and their tactics - the covert operations of the weak within a power structure.<sup>141</sup>

This analysis of the Brotherhood's street politics, tactics and strategies especially deepens the understanding of the religious motives of the Brotherhood within the boundaries of SMT. Tactics and strategies do this by being closely related to both the analysis of political opportunity structures and mobilization resources within SMT. Both concepts capture how the Brotherhood is related to other power structures, but also how they relate to other players in the public sphere and how they might be able to mobilize them. At the same time street politics, as part of the concept of quiet encroachment, is closely related to the Brotherhood's mobilizing practices, as it maps out how they tap into the power of ordinary Egyptians on the street.

Together SMT and the analysis of street politics, tactics and strategies account for an analysis of the structural development of the Brotherhood's power during a very tumultuous time in its existence. To answer my entire research question I will discuss the results of the SMT analysis, including the concept of quiet encroachment, as part of the three backbone theoretical concepts that I extracted from the theory in chapter one: globalization, space and agency. These three are overarching guiding theoretical frameworks within

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<sup>140</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 17.

<sup>141</sup> Valentina Napolitano and David Pratten, "Michel de Certeau: Ethnography and the challenge of plurality," *Social Anthropology* 15, no. 1 (2007), 9.

which I can discuss the results of my data analysis. A combination of the two levels of analysis – SMT and quiet encroachment being the first; a discussion involving the themes globalization, space and agency being the second - will provide two separate kinds of insight. The first, more traditional SMT analysis, yields a time-bound, chronological reconstruction of the context in which the MB was functioning. This gives a first idea of the changing position of the Brotherhood and what this exactly entails. Moreover, it connects that changing position to the MB's changing tactics and strategies thereby effectively answering the main research question. The second analysis gives inferences from the data on a more theoretical level, consequently contributing to the concept and theory building surrounding the research into Islamist social movements. Both can be found in the next chapter.

### Chapter 3 The Rise and Fall of the Brotherhood explained

*"I swear to God that I will faithfully preserve the Republican order, that I will respect the constitution and the law, and look after the interests of the people comprehensively, and that I will preserve the independence of the nation and the safety of its land."<sup>142</sup>*

These words, uttered by Mohamed Morsi just after taking office, summarize the political, legal, economic and social struggles that lay ahead. These are the promises he could and would not keep and that were partly the reason for his and the Brotherhood's downfall. In this chapter I show how those struggles influenced him and his Brotherhood, and how they could have both risen and fallen so quickly in Egypt. I therefore answer the following research question:

How have the Muslim Brotherhood's political opportunity structures, resources for mobilization and framing changed from 2011 to 2013; and what role has quiet encroachment played within these developments?

Using social movement theory combined with Asef Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary I map out the rise and fall of the Brotherhood as a social movement organization, political party and Islamist group. By researching their political opportunity structures, mobilizing resources and framing efforts during three different periods I gain insight and understanding in this rise and fall. I chose three periods in which the MB held three very different positions. During the first, from January 25, 2011 until February 11, 2011, they were just one of the opposition groups against Mubarak. During the second, from June 18, 2012 until June 30, 2012, they were a popular group whose leader, Mohamed Morsi, was voted into office. In the last and third period, from 23 June, 2013 until 3 July, 2013 they fell from their apparent pedestal as large violent protests erupted eventually resulting in Morsi's ousting and the end of the Brotherhood reign.

I discuss the results from the analyses during the three periods and use the overlaying concepts globalization, space and agency to lift these results to more general understandings of Islamist groups and their workings within Arab

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<sup>142</sup> Mohamed Morsi on taking the oath for the presidential office in Egypt, 30 June 2012. Egypt Independent Update: Mohamed Morsy is officially Egypt's president. <http://www.egyptindependent.com//news/update-mohamed-morsy-officially-egypt-s-president>

society. Before being able to reach such more general conclusions, however, I begin by mapping out the political opportunity structures of the Brotherhood.

### **3.1 Political Opportunity Structures Reconstructed**

By studying the Brotherhood's political opportunity structures I can reconstruct the exogenous factors influencing the group. The context in which they operated explains for an important part why they acted the way they did or made certain decisions at certain times. Despite their mobilizing and framing efforts there were many factors outside of their influence that need to be known before it is possible to understand the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood. Before doing that we need to first understand what political opportunity entails. Doug McAdam argues that too broad an interpretation of political opportunity will do away with its 'analytic distinctiveness'.<sup>143</sup> McAdam himself thus compared four leading interpretations of the concept and extrapolated the four main dimensions of political opportunity as follows:

1. the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized system
2. the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
3. the presence or absence of elite allies
4. the state's capacity and propensity for repression<sup>144</sup>

These are therefore also the four dimensions that I will focus on in my analysis of the political opportunity structures of the MB in the past two years, with two side notes. Firstly, the second dimension will also include international elite alignment because those are decisive for the choices and actions of elite Brotherhood members. Secondly, by incorporating the concept of encroachment of the ordinary in those elite alignments I will also include the (indirect) support of the poor through demonstrations and street politics.

#### *Period 1*

Tahrir Square is where the scene is set during this period, from January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011 to February 11, 2011. Egyptians demonstrate against Mubarak's regime,

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<sup>143</sup> Doug McAdam, "Conceptual origins, problems, future directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 26.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

later on, during the demonstrations the Brotherhood also joins. Mubarak concedes to a few demands such as a dialogue with opposition groups, including the Brotherhood. While the demonstrations were relatively void of violence they still led, according to different estimations, to at least 150 deaths up to even 300.<sup>145</sup> While some of those dead were police officers, both the police and army barely intervened. On the last day of this period Mubarak steps down as president.

During this period the Brotherhood only played a marginal openly public role. This had to do with the closure of the institutionalized system. The Brotherhood has always been an illegal organization under Mubarak's regime. The reigning regime's usual repression techniques toward the Brotherhood are still common.<sup>146</sup> At the same time the group is allowed for the first time to join in open dialogue between the government and the opposition. The Brotherhood found itself in the same camp as several progressive youth movements, socialist, liberal and also Salafist political parties. Even the army's Mohammed Hussein Tantawi called for the Brotherhood to join talks. In McCarthy's terms, the Brotherhood had gained unlikely elite alignments by simply participating in the protests. Protests, which in the beginning the group did not even join.

Moreover, the protesters and Egyptian citizens were another elite alignment for the Brotherhood, albeit a weak one. In different articles protesters made clear they were not Brothers; that they were afraid the Brotherhood might hijack the revolution and that they were not in favor of a religious state. Similarly different political groups, part of the alliance fighting Mubarak, were outspoken in their opposition to the Brotherhood.<sup>147</sup> This means that while the Brotherhood had forged alliances during this period – Brothers were even freed from prisons by protesters – they were not stable.

At the same time, many international political players, Israel, the United States and the EU were fairly outspoken in their wish that the Brotherhood should not have too large a role should Mubarak be ousted, while, a usual

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>146</sup> Carol J. Williams, "Egypt: Rights Advocates Report Protest Death Toll as High as 300," 1 February, 2011 *Los Angeles Times* <http://www.latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/02/egypt-rights-advocates-report-death-toll-as-high-as-300.html>

<sup>147</sup> AO: Egypt: only democracy is legitimate; DNE: 'Reluctant' Mubarak faces protest D-day; EI: A revolutionary leadership gap

suspect, Iran, proposes the opposite. Thus, the Brotherhood in this first period has found instable international and national political alliances and a fragile newfound legitimacy, but is also still being repressed by the government and distrusted by its allies.

### *Period 2*

Even though promising early after period 1 that the MB would not field a presidential candidate, this is exactly what does happen. Period 2, from June 18<sup>th</sup>, 2012 to 30<sup>th</sup> June, 2012 describes the run-up to the MB's Mohamed Morsi's election as president and his swearing in on the 30<sup>th</sup>. As president of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Brotherhood, he wins by a million votes more than his opponent Ahmed Shafiq, who ran as an Independent, not attached to any particular political party, but was associated by many with the old regime because he served for a long time as Aviation Minister under Mubarak. While protesters fiercely defended Morsi's win in the streets, closer analysis reveals the Brotherhood's position was not that strong.

The ability to close the political system during this period was firmly in the hands of the army and the courts. This becomes especially clear when considering a few big events leading up to this second period. The first is the addendum to the interim Constitutional Declaration that the army issued that minimized the powers of an elected president and authorized SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) to dissolve the constituent assembly – mandated to draft a new constitution - and draw up a new one in the event that the current assembly failed to carry out its functions.

Moreover, it remained to be seen whether SCAF would hand over power to the elected president during this period, which they eventually did. At the basis of this reluctance according to one analyst lay the army's unwillingness to give up its "financial clout and privileges, and their powers to make war, conduct foreign policy and maintain internal security, the holy trinity of Egypt's deep state."<sup>148</sup> At the same time the courts, consisting of a judiciary appointed by Mubarak, supported the military's actions. In several articles that I studied anonymous sources confirm that some members of the judiciary are opposed to

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<sup>148</sup> DNE: The elections and their aftermath in the Western press



the Brotherhood and were in the process of reining the group in.<sup>149</sup> Thus, with both the military and the courts trying to close up the system for the Brotherhood, it needed, more than anything else the support of stable allies.

Ironically, the Brotherhood's biggest ally in this period ended up being the army. The army understood it had to deal with the Brotherhood, at least for the time being, so the two made some deals that ensured the army's power and allowed the Brotherhood's FJP into the political arena.<sup>150</sup> Such an alliance is not a very stable one, as it mainly existed for the army to ensure and embed its deep state power. More instable alliances were forged during this period in the form of several groups – identifying as secular, socialist, liberal, Salafist, communist and moderate - that did not necessarily support Morsi, but were united in opposition to SCAF. Their shared goal: a quick handover of power to civilian rule. In order to be sure of their support Morsi promised them a say in his future government.

Even the seemingly most stable ally of Morsi's and the Brotherhood, other Islamists, were divided in their full support. As one journalist notes: "Islamist masses themselves are frustrated with their leadership's incompetence and their inability to achieve deep and structural changes." Salafi preacher Hazem Salah Abu Ismail announced he would start a political party that opposes Morsi and leader of Islamist political party Al-Nour, Nader Bakkar said: "Our goal now is to help Morsi succeed. After that we will be an opposition front against someone we are not convinced with."<sup>151</sup>

This ambiguity in allies is reflected in the support shown for Morsi in the streets. The pro-Morsi demonstrators in the streets are either Islamist and/or believe in the democratic process. One of those protesters said: "Morsi is not my ideal candidate...but it is only through solidarity and the support of all political movements that the newly elected president can gain the clout he needs to implement the much needed political, social and economic reform."<sup>152</sup> Other protesters are not necessarily in favor of Morsi but are anti-SCAF. However,

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<sup>149</sup> EI: In 'Islamist' Egypt generals still have final say; AO: The role of Egypt's judiciary in post-Mubarak political conflicts

<sup>150</sup> DNE: Backroom dialogue to end Tahrir impasse; EI: Brotherhood says nearing deal with SCAF on president's powers; EI: Power sharing agreement with military not a political deal

<sup>151</sup> AO: The New Egyptian president is a 'ghost' stripped of authorities: Abul-Fotouh)

<sup>152</sup> DNE: Cautious optimism as first Egyptian civil president is sworn in

opposition among Egyptians during this period is significant: at least those 12 million voting for Shafiq and 24 million boycotters, those who did not want to vote for either. They were either opposed to elections held under military rule or strongly opposed to both candidates.<sup>153</sup> This meant that 36 million out of about 50 million eligible voters were opposed to Morsi, his Brotherhood and the FJP.

Foreign support varies. Islamist groups in Palestine, Hamas, and Lebanon, Hizbollah are jubilant, just as Iran.<sup>154</sup> Israel on the other hand is wary, similarly to the US. Their support is contingent on the Brotherhood's respect for the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. After his win, US secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the Obama administration was pleased with Morsi's commitment, but will reserve judgment until his government is up and running.<sup>155</sup> Thus, what seems to be the Brotherhood's most triumphant period, was actually one where they were reluctantly allowed into the political arena by very unstable allies.

### *Period 3*

Exactly a year later, from 23 June, 2013 to 3 July, 2013, large demonstrations were initiated against Morsi's government, resulting in his ousting by the army on July 3<sup>rd</sup>. In only a year, the crowds turned against Morsi and his Brotherhood, and so did most of his allies. Opposition against Morsi was united in a bloc represented by Tamarod, translated: the Rebel Campaign. Initiated in May 2013 it consisted of the opposition already united in the National Salvation Front, also including some Islamist parties. The organization called for mass protests and claimed to have gathered 22 million autographs to lend legitimacy to their request.<sup>156</sup>

Primarily Islamist groups are still allied to Morsi in this period, eventually united in a special 'Reunion Movement' pleading for Egyptians to unite and stressing Morsi's legitimacy as an elected official.<sup>157</sup> Pro-Morsi supporters in the

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<sup>153</sup> DNE: Splintered opposition weakens Morsi's popular mandate

<sup>154</sup> EI: Iran considers Morsy's win an Islamic awakening; EI: Hizbullah congratulates Morsy for presidency

<sup>155</sup> EI: Clinton: US pleased so far by Egypt's new president.

<sup>156</sup> AO : VIDEO: Anti-Morsi activists take Egypt's 'Rebel' signature drive underground; AO: BREAKING: Egypt's anti-Morsi petition drive says gathered 22 million signatures

<sup>157</sup> AO: Reunion Movement initiated; AO: Egypt's Watan Party spearheads fresh reconciliation initiative

streets still amount to tens of thousands, also mainly Islamist protesters.<sup>158</sup> Not everyone at pro-Morsi rallies is an MB supporter. “I’m not here for Morsi...I’m here to defend democracy,” stated a retired Egyptian air Force colonel for example.<sup>159</sup> Other fairly stable allies are the foreign ones needed for international political support, financial aid and important trade relations: the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. They had nothing to gain from Morsi’s fall as their interest lay mostly in political and economic stability.<sup>160</sup>

However, allies in favor of Morsi are greatly outnumbered by those opposing him. Among the opposition are many of Morsi’s and the Brotherhood’s former allies from period 2, even Islamists.<sup>161</sup> While officially religious Islamic authority Al-Azhar stands behind Morsi, several members issue their opposition to him.<sup>162</sup> Within the Islamic community a large division is visible between Sunni’s and Shi’ites especially when four Shia’s are brutally murdered accusing Morsi of “inciting sectarianism over the war in Syria as a means of appeasing his own hardline Sunni allies.”<sup>163</sup>

Moreover, Morsi has lost many of the allies from the second period, most noticeably: protesters. Reasons presented for this are numerous; first there is the lack of communication between Morsi and the people in the streets.<sup>164</sup> An analyst notes that “the government’s slow response to the demands of the revolutionaries” has added fuel to the fire.<sup>165</sup> Another poses that people are not fearful anymore to protest and are more aware of their own rights.<sup>166</sup> The protesters interviewed by the different newspapers mainly indicate the economic situation is what brings them to the streets: Protester Atef: “One kilogram of potatoes used to cost 1LE, now it costs 4LE, where do I get this money? Where? There is no good life, no freedom, no democracy, no food.”<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> EI: Islamists vow to continue Nasser City protests

<sup>159</sup> AO: Violence flares in Egypt as rival protests approach 30 June showdown

<sup>160</sup> AO: Obama: “Everybody must show restraint; AO: Pentagon says it won’t speculate on Egypt’s next 48 hours; AO: US declines to criticize Egypt’s military following Morsi ouster)AO: Israel nervously watching Egyptian turmoil; EI: Saudi investments in Egypt under threat

<sup>161</sup> AO: What to expect on 30 June

<sup>162</sup> AO: Egypt’s Al-Azhar issues sharp rebuke to Brotherhood’s insults; EI: Egypt clerics warn of ‘civil war’ as rallies begin; DNE: Azhar movements demand independence

<sup>163</sup> EI: 8 arrested over sectarian killing

<sup>164</sup> DNE: Morsi out of political options

<sup>165</sup> EI: 30 June: A crisis at the doorstep

<sup>166</sup> DNE: Democracy Index

<sup>167</sup> DNE: Tahrir masses react to Morsi’s speech

“People can’t find food and don’t have anything, they’re fed up,” [protester] Mahmoud said. “A lot of businesses have had to close [since Morsi took office] and the country is penniless.”<sup>168</sup> One analyst notes that many of the protesters are the very poor: “This is the majority that was hit by power outages, gas queues, inflation, and an unprecedented rise in prices of basic foods...They see no light at the end of the tunnel...mothers and their children hold small protests under the buildings they live.”<sup>169</sup> This is corroborated by numbers from the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) show that 35% of Egyptians’ greatest concern is rising prices, for 16% the lack of security, 14% cited their inability to find work opportunities, 8% worried about low income levels, 5% about power outages, and 3% the fuel crisis.<sup>170</sup> Some anonymous Brotherhood officials admit that they all underestimated the public discontent among these groups.<sup>171</sup>

Morsi’s and the Brotherhood’s most powerful opposition bloc in this period, however, were the army and the judiciary. They were instrumental to its downfall, firstly demonstrated by their ability to influence the closure of the institutionalized system. As for the courts, they were already hearing different cases on the dissolution of the Brotherhood and criminal cases against Morsi and other Brotherhood members before Morsi was ousted.<sup>172</sup> Constitutional expert Raafat Fouda argues this was in response to Morsi’s actions during his first year. He did not respect their verdicts, criticized them and undermined the judiciary by appointing a prosecutor general through unconstitutional procedures, immunizing the Shura Council and Constituent assembly.<sup>173</sup>

The army showed their willingness to disempower Morsi and the Brotherhood by giving the government a week to reconcile with protesters. Days later it issued a 48-hour ultimatum in which the government had to fulfill the

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<sup>168</sup> DNE: Morsi challenged

<sup>169</sup> DNE: A not so silent majority

<sup>170</sup> DNE: Press release – Baseera Center Opinion poll

<sup>171</sup> AO: What would the fall of Morsi mean to the Islamists?

<sup>172</sup> AO: Morsi prison escape referred to Egypt prosecutors; EI: FJP, Hamas repudiate accusation; AO: Egypt’s Wasat Party leader criticizes prison escape court case; AO: Investigation of Brotherhood’s El-Beltagy for ‘insulting judiciary’ adjourned; DNE: Experts’ views on Morsi and the judiciary

<sup>173</sup> DNE: Expert’s views on Morsi and the judiciary

people's demands.<sup>174</sup> All the while denying sounds of a coup the army reaffirmed its loyalty towards the Egyptian people, and not the Egyptian government.<sup>175</sup> The army's intentions become even clearer when, after first denying to have designed a roadmap for Egypt, the military immediately presented such a map when Morsi was eventually ousted.<sup>176</sup>

Not only did the army and the courts support a closure of the system, they actively repressed Morsi and his Brotherhood through their staged coup, one it cloaked with the rhetoric of protecting the will of the Egyptian people.<sup>177</sup> Once the army staged its coup, the police cooperated with the army in suppressing the Brotherhood and Morsi by imposing a travel ban.<sup>178</sup> Moreover, the police seem to have never been a real tool in the hands of Morsi, as they failed to protect Brotherhood headquarters, and openly protested against Morsi for being used as a repressive tool against demonstrators.<sup>179</sup>

When comparing the three periods, it becomes obvious that the MB never had many political opportunity structures to benefit from. In the first period they were still a repressed group, in the second they had the support of a significant part of the population but mostly because the other choice, Shafiq, was thought to be even worse. And in the third period they had lost all allies except for some other Islamist groups and foreign countries. The group with the most political opportunity was still the army, and it seems to have tolerated the Brotherhood until the MB lost their popular support and the army could grab back power. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the people are the MB's most important ally. When having lost their support, the MB lost their power. Having established the context in which the MB operated, I will now turn to the mobilizing resources analysis to gain a better understanding of how they themselves operated within this context.

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<sup>174</sup> AO: Egyptian military gives 48 hours

<sup>175</sup> DNE: Army denies coup claims

<sup>176</sup> AO: Egypt military unveils transitional roadmap

<sup>177</sup> AO: Military gives Egypt's political powers a week to reconcile; DNE: Army denies 'coup' claims

<sup>178</sup> AO: Egypt security slaps travel ban on Morsi, top Islamists

<sup>179</sup> AO: Prosecution starts investigations into Brotherhood HQ attack; AO: What to expect on 30 June

### 3.2 Mobilizing Resources

As their political environment shaped the context for the Brotherhood's political opportunities, so do mobilizing structures embody their ability and opportunity to mobilize followers. The upcoming resource mobilization analysis thus provides a necessary context on a meso level to understand how the MB organized and mobilized. So then, what are mobilizing structures exactly?

In chapter one I already defined mobilizing structures as "those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action."<sup>180</sup> In that same chapter I also showed John D. McCarthy's table of forms of resource mobilization sources:

Table 3.1 Dimensions of movement-mobilizing structures<sup>181</sup>

	Nonmovement	Movement
informal	Friendship networks	Activist networks
	Neighborhoods	Affinity groups
	Work networks	Memory communities
formal	Churches	SMOs
	Unions	Protest committees
	Professional Associations	Movement schools

This table, however, is based on Western societies and should be appropriated to a more Egyptian context for this thesis. Therefore I have created the following inference of McCarthy's table:

Table 3.2 Dimensions of movement-mobilizing structures in a Middle Eastern context

	Nonmovement	Movement
Informal	Friendship networks	
	Neighborhoods	
	Work Networks	
	Online Networks	
Formal	Mosques	Social Movement Organization
	Political Parties	Legal institutions
	Professional/Student Unions	

<sup>180</sup> Doug McAdam et al. "Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 3.

<sup>181</sup> John D. McCarthy, "Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting and inventing," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* ed. by Doug McAdam et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 145.

Professional Associations  
 Islamic NGOs  
   medical clinics  
   hospitals  
   charity societies  
   schools

Table 3.2 shows that in an Egyptian context there are also both formal and informal mobilization structures. Mosques, Islamic businesses, Islamic NGO's, political parties, professional and student associations fit under the category of a "formal nonmovements" as all of them are existing formal institutions that are not originally intended for mobilization. To function as a mobilization structure they have become a part of the Islamist movement in the form of a nonmovement. Theodor Tudoroiu describes: "Today, there is a parallel Islamic sector that includes private mosques, Islamic voluntary associations and Islamic businesses. There is a high level of Islamization of the entire society."<sup>182</sup> Many Islamic NGO's are active in many aspects of social life by opening schools, clinics for health care, providing financial assistance, organizing pilgrimage trips, religious classes, opportunities to participate in sports, helping in securing a job or a visa.<sup>183</sup>

Political parties similarly provide a mobilization opportunity for Islamic social movements. Wiktorowicz states that while many conservative movements reject democracy as un-Islamic, more liberal movements take advantage of political mobilization opportunities.<sup>184</sup> Added to this can also be student associations and professional unions that Laurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon recognize as key mobilizing structures for the MB.<sup>185</sup> These function as an unofficial political arena in which control of institutional resources and positions are contested.<sup>186</sup> Their formal counterparts are officially organized

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<sup>182</sup> Theodor Tudoroiu, "Assessing Middle Eastern trajectories: Egypt after Mubarak," *Contemporary Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011), 375 - 376.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 383.

<sup>184</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research," *Mediterranean Politics* 7, no. 3 (2002), 197 - 198.

<sup>185</sup> Laurence Caromba and Hussein Solomon, "Understanding Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," *African Security Review* 17, no. 3 (2008), 119 - 120.

<sup>186</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research," *Mediterranean Politics* 7, no. 3 (2002), 197.

social movements and legal institutions, similar to those found in McCarthy's table.

Another important deduction from McCarthy's table is the emphasis on informal nonmovements. As already mentioned earlier Islamist movements "often rely upon informal, personal networks and religious and cultural associability to build movements."<sup>187</sup> These networks are vast and diverse as they provide movements with the opportunity to quietly oppose an oppressive state, which explains the popularity of this kind of resource mobilization in the Middle East. These informal nonmovements can reach Bayat's quiet encroachers. Bayat even uses the term nonmovement to refer to those enacting quiet encroachment. He states: "In the Middle East, the nonmovements have come to represent the mobilization of millions of the subaltern, chiefly the urban poor, Muslim women, and youth."<sup>188</sup> He then only includes the subaltern and urban poor in quiet encroachment, while, in chapter one I also argue for the inclusion of other groups changing society through their everyday actions. I will thus not call those who quietly encroach a nonmovement themselves, but do see them as an important group that can be reached by the Brotherhood's informal nonmovements.

### *Period 1*

During this first period the Brotherhood did not take a large part in the protests. At first they did not even join.<sup>189</sup> When the Brotherhood officially did join on January 27<sup>th</sup> 2011 they were not the leaders, nor the initiators of the revolution.<sup>190</sup> However, later on their organizing power contributed additional numbers to the protests.<sup>191</sup> One significant way of attributing to the protests was

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<sup>187</sup> Diane Singerman, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements," in *Islamic Activism: A social Movement Theory Approach* ed. by Q. Wiktorowicz (Bloomington IN: Indiana UP, 2004), 151.

<sup>188</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP), 14.

<sup>189</sup> AO: Tahrir Square protesters protect their barricades against army attempt to remove them

<sup>190</sup> DNE :Pro-democracy demonstrations planend across Egypt; EI: Egypt dared to defy; EI: Egypt's Islamist prospects

<sup>191</sup> DNE: Muslim Brotherhood organize mass protests in Alexandria on Monday; DNE: Alexandria sit-in demands president step down)



by asking those attending Friday prayers to join the protests afterwards.<sup>192</sup> During this period the mobilization structures at the Brotherhood's disposal were in large part formal nonmovements in the form of their influence in mosques. Moreover, the Brotherhood's influence during this time stretched from "schools, households, the media, bookshops and even clothing shops...and they also dominated most of Egypt's main professional syndicates, have strong presence at universities and run thousands of charities providing health care and education."<sup>193</sup> Therefore, apart from formal nonmovements controlled by the Brotherhood, there were also many informal nonmovements at their disposal. The Brotherhood's contact with the street was very strong and resulted in significant additional numbers in the streets. This allowed them to also organize committees to protect neighborhoods, mosques and churches and were an important factor in protecting and organizing people in Tahrir Square.<sup>194</sup> These last, informal nonmovements, were an integral and important part of the demonstrations and their success.

### *Period 2*

With the stakes higher for the Brotherhood itself – namely their position in parliament and Morsi wanting to take his seat as president – Brotherhood mobilizing power was shown in full force during this second period. The MB mobilized tens of thousands of people to protest SCAF's reluctance in handing over power to the elected president.<sup>195</sup> Many of these are Brotherhood members, just showing how large the group really was at this period, although many sympathizers who were not Brotherhood members also joined them or were mobilized in the streets by Brotherhood members.<sup>196</sup> To really swell the

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<sup>192</sup> DNE: Thousands protest across Egypt on Friday of Anger, one killed as govt. imposes curfew; AO: In Egypt, nationwide protests planned for January 28)

<sup>193</sup> DNE: Tide turns in favor of Egypt's Brotherhood

<sup>194</sup> EI: Egypt's opposition discusses interim government; EI: In discontent, Egypt's Muslims and Christians unite; DNE: Tide turns in favor of Egypt's Brotherhood

<sup>195</sup> DNE: Thousands gather to support Morsi, denounce SCAF; AO: Brotherhood back in Tahrir to protest closure of parliament, constitution addendum; EI: Update: Tahrir protesters reject SCAF statement

<sup>196</sup> AO: The election of Egypt's new president

numbers the Brotherhood bussed in members from governorates outside of Cairo.<sup>197</sup>

Mobilization strategies expanded to the Brotherhood's website Ikhwanweb, but also, for example, to television where a television host rallied people to join the protests.<sup>198</sup> Mosques and Friday prayers were again used to mobilize people.<sup>199</sup> Admittedly, other groups also helped with mobilizing, many groups that were also involved in the revolution the year before rallied people to the different squares in Cairo.<sup>200</sup> However, also in this period, the Brotherhood's mobilizing strength among Egyptians lay in their longtime presence providing charity services to the poorest and lowest classes in Egypt.<sup>201</sup>

The most noticeable difference with period 1 is that the informal mobilizing structures such as neighborhoods, work networks and those mobilized through the Brotherhood's charity organizations have become subordinate to their formal nonmovement, namely mobilization through the MB's political party mostly in the form of people being bussed in, and mobilization through mosques. Quiet encroachment is still an important strategy, but one that is aided more and more through the bussing in of Brotherhood members.

### *Period 3*

In this third period the Brotherhood lost all other political groups as their allies, except for a group of Islamist parties who started a coalition in support of Morsi's legitimacy. These groups provided a lot of protesters in this period.<sup>202</sup> The Brotherhood itself resorted to bussing supporters in from outside Cairo;<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> EI: Update: Hundreds of thousands rally in Tahrir; AO: Thousands still in Tahrir following Friday protests

<sup>198</sup> DNE: 'Honourable Egyptians' turn against SCAF; DNE: In Morsi's camp victory

<sup>199</sup> EI: Taking stock: What comes after the elections for activists

<sup>200</sup> EI: In Tahrir, Islamists and revolutionaries in jubilation over Morsy win; EI: Morsy starts consultations over presidential team and cabinet

<sup>201</sup> DNE: Divided we fall

<sup>202</sup> AO: Morsi's controversial Islamist Luxor governor to quit; AO: 11 Islamist parties launch 'legitimacy support' alliance; AO: Egypt's Rebel campaign gathered 22 mn. Signatures says spokesman; AO: Pro-Morsi marches reported in Cairo, governorates, rival marchers clash in Suez

<sup>203</sup> AO: Pro-Morsi Islamists' sit-in at mosque gets comfortable on 2<sup>nd</sup> day; DNE: A not-so silent majority; DNE: Legitimacy v. Rebellion, Mr. President

and sermons after Friday prayers.<sup>204</sup> They could also still count on some bottom-up mobilization among the poor through their charity work and among students through their presence in university unions.<sup>205</sup>

At the same time the Brotherhood seems to have lost its special connection with a large group of Egyptians of the lowest classes. One analyst notes: “Morsi over the past year was constantly losing contact with the street and relying more and more on the state and its institutions as tools that are more powerful than people.”<sup>206</sup> That dissatisfaction and quiet encroachment among Egyptians was mounting between period 2 and 3 becomes clear when looking at numbers of kinds of protests during that period. During these periods 49 percent of all protests were labor protests, followed by 27 percent backed by grassroots support, 13 percent of the protests were supported by the participation of political and civilian activists. Egyptians found 62 methods to express dissent, ranging from roadblocks, strikes, marches, sit-ins, horn-blowing campaigns, human chains and no-bill-payment campaigns.<sup>207</sup>

During period 3, it was not the Brotherhood that tapped into this dissatisfaction, but the Rebel campaign. This coalition in which the opposition to Morsi was organized, claims to have gathered 22 million votes endorsing the view that Morsi should resign; far exceeding the number of votes he garnered a year earlier.<sup>208</sup> The Rebel campaign was in contact with this important, large dissatisfied group that has huge presence in the streets and mobilized them to protest and act out civil disobedience campaigns to oust Morsi.<sup>209</sup> Most anti-

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<sup>204</sup> DNE: Azhar movements demand independence from endowment ministry; AO: Egypt army secures Cairo’s Media Production City ahead of protests; AO: 7 dead, 606 injured 4 days of political clashes; DNE: Muslim Brotherhood mufti trapped in mosque; DNE: Islamists condemn attempts to ‘overthrow legitimacy; EI: Muslim Brotherhood figure calls on Morsy supporters to sacrifice themselves; AO: Pro-Morsi marches reported in Cairo, governorates, rival marchers clash in Suez

<sup>205</sup> DNE: The greatest act of treason; AO: Ex-Qaeda allies ready to fight for Morsi in Luxor; AO: The speech that eclipsed the people; AO: Demands for President Morsi’s ouster ‘indisputable’: 30 June Students

<sup>206</sup> DNE: Morsi out of political options

<sup>207</sup> AO: Egypt protests hit all-time high during Morsi’s first year

<sup>208</sup> AO: Tamarod launched 30 June Front, proposes post-Morsi roadmap

<sup>209</sup> AO: Demands for President Morsi’s ouster ‘indisputable’: 30 June Students; AO: Dozens hold anti-Morsi rally in Egypt’s Sharqiya; DNE: Tmaarod gives Morsi until Tuesday to step down; AO: Egypt’s 30 June Front calls for immediate civil disobedience

Morsi demonstrators quoted in articles mention that the worsening economic hardships are their motive for wanting him out of office.<sup>210</sup>

It thus seems that what had already been set in motion in period 2, a move from the use of both informal and formal nonmovements to the use of formal nonmovements for mobilization, is almost finished. Informal nonmovements, mainly the effective mobilization of the poorest Egyptians to be in favor of the MB's role in politics, are not part of the MB's mobilizing resources in this period. Instead of tapping into those most dissatisfied through informal networks the Brotherhood mainly used mosques, their political party and its organizational structure and the Brotherhood's website to mobilize people in supporting them this third period. The Rebel campaign on the other hand, managed to gather the support of a large group of disenfranchised Egyptians, the group that was also best equipped to quietly encroach on the Brotherhood's dominant political position. This was also the group that had been successfully mobilized by the Brotherhood in period 1 and 2.

Summarizing, the Brotherhood's mobilizing resources diminished quickly from period 1 to period 3. In the first period, while not leaders or initiators of the revolution, the Brotherhood contributed to the number of protesters significantly. They could do this through their intricate neighborhood, student, charity and labor networks. The people they reached through these networks were mainly people likely to have the power to quietly encroach on those in power: disenfranchised Egyptians. This group that together can be called an informal nonmovement was thus essential to the Brotherhood's mobilizing efforts. In the second period the MB was still able to tap into this important group, but in the third period they had lost this special connection to the street. Quiet encroachment of the ordinary was no longer part of their mobilizing toolkit. While quiet encroachers contributed in large part to their rise, they also played an important part in the MB's downfall. In the next section I will show how the MB's framing efforts moved in tandem with the diminishing ability of the Brotherhood to connect to poorer Egyptians.

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<sup>210</sup> AO: Tamarod launches 30 June Front, proposes post-Morsi roadmap; AO: Dozens hold anti-Morsi rally in Egypt's Sharqiya; EI: 250 fishing boats sail in Damietta, protest Morsy;

### 3.3 Framing efforts

The following framing analysis shows how the MB used framing as a strategic activity. This analysis seeks to provide a blueprint of the reactions of the MB to the changing political opportunity structures and mobilizing resources. Providing the tools for this analysis are David Snow and Robert Benford who developed and redefined the research of a social movement organization's frames as a strategic activity. They provide the tools not only to ascertain whether a movement's frames are similar to that of their following, but also whether they sufficiently rouse the interest of their audience to participate in the cause of that movement. They provide this through the concepts of 'frame alignment' and 'frame resonance'.

Snow and Benford distinguish four strategies to reach frame alignment: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. Frame bridging is the effort to connect an organization's mobilization frame to a large group of individuals who share common grievances. It is thus a connecting of already existing sentiments in society to a specific goal of the social movement organization. Such bridging is reached through organizational outreach such as information dissemination, interpersonal networks, the mass media and the internet.<sup>211</sup> Frame amplification means putting emphasis on a certain belief or value. Thirdly, frame extension involves a social movement organization to extend its own frames so as to try and also encompass those of its intended adherents.<sup>212</sup> This in effect means the organization broadens its frame so as to be more appealing. Lastly, frame transformation is the most invasive frame alignment strategy as it entails the effort to transform the intended audience's frame. Snow and Benford name Greenpeace as a classic example of this strategy as they try to educate and change the general frame of mind on environmental issues.<sup>213</sup>

Snow and Benford's concept of frame resonance holds that frames not only have to align with those of the intended public, they also have to resonate with that public so that they are mobilized into action. A frame alignment

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<sup>211</sup> David A. Snow et al., "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (1986), 468. (464 - 481)

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 472.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, 474.

analysis might already expose dissonance between the movement's frames and that of their audience. Firstly, the frame has to resonate with the lifeworld of the intended constituency, but there are three constraints. The first is empirical credibility: there has to be some evidential basis to a frame. Secondly, so-called experiential commensurability holds that the frames presented, including their diagnosis and prognosis of a problem or issue, should offer solutions that are in agreement with individuals' daily experiences. When a frame is too far removed from a person's personal experiences it is thus less likely they will support it or be mobilized by it. The last phenomenological constraint on framing activities of social movements is narrative fidelity. This means that the frame has to be congruent to other cultural narrations such as folk tales, stories and myths.<sup>214</sup>

### *Period 1*

During this period the Brotherhood emphasized they supported and eventually joined the protests because of "the people."<sup>215</sup> Their connection with, and efforts to be part of "the people" is strong in this period. They frame their participation as "responding to the call by this country's youth...who have asked us to join them in their struggle for freedom."<sup>216</sup> Similarly they emphasize their connection to Egypt.<sup>217</sup> At the same time they also continue to point out their minor role in the protests.<sup>218</sup> This is partly in answer to the accusations of Mubarak's regime that the Brotherhood is behind the protests in their efforts to delegitimize the number of people in the streets. However, it is probably also part of the careful strategizing of the Brotherhood, the way they have been used to for decades, in keeping themselves out of the line of fire.<sup>219</sup>

The MB is barely openly critical of the regime and when they are, they do not present it as their own opinion but as that of the people.<sup>220</sup> In concurrence with this careful stance toward the government, after promising not to, the MB

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<sup>214</sup> David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988), 208 - 210.

<sup>215</sup> AO: Choosing to protest on police day, coincidence or reminder; all article fragments under 'Identifying with/rooting for 'the people' in Period 1 Framing Appendix B; all article fragments under Brave Egyptians (during protests)/the people in Ikhwanweb period 1, Appendix B

<sup>216</sup> AO: In Egypt, nationwide protests planned for January 28

<sup>217</sup> I: MB statement on the dialogue between youth, political and national forces with Egypt's VP

<sup>218</sup> EI: Egypt ruling party offers no concessions; DNE: NDP denies complicity in Tahrir massacre

<sup>219</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood* (Princeton, UK: Princeton UP, 2013), 120.

<sup>220</sup> I: MB chairman: the people no longer trust the regime

does enter a dialogue with the regime during period 1.<sup>221</sup> They bring this participation as being in the best interest of the people and necessary to avoid chaos.<sup>222</sup> In the talks they insist on the youth's participation and their own small role in the protests.<sup>223</sup> They also point out the importance of other opposition groups in the protests.<sup>224</sup> They top this off with the promise to never take a large part in post-Mubarak politics.<sup>225</sup> During the protests they keep reiterating that they "have no intentions in nominating any of its members to run for presidency nor do they intend to be part of a possible interim government."<sup>226</sup>

All the while the Brotherhood emphasizes its focus on a democratic civil state.<sup>227</sup> They couple Islam directly with democracy.<sup>228</sup> They advocate their alliances with those outside the Islamist camp.<sup>229</sup> The group thus tries to present an inclusive image of itself as part of 'the people' and opposition parties, with a minor alliance to Islamic culture and ideology. Instead they focus on the (future) role of democracy and their future part in it.<sup>230</sup> Also, the peaceful progression of the protests is a priority to them.<sup>231</sup>

During this period frame alignment was easy for the Brotherhood. Their frame was relatively simple: we need to fight an oppressive regime, our role will remain small, it is about the revolutionaries fighting. This frame already aligned with what the majority of protesters thought as well. The MB did not have to argue for their powerful position, but they took in a rather subordinate one. Therefore they did not have to put much effort in frame alignment. Similarly, frame resonance was also an almost automatic given this period. Everybody protesting, including the MB, were people who had been wrongfully treated by

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<sup>221</sup> EI: Brotherhood says ready for serious dialogue once Mubarak leaves

<sup>222</sup> EI: Brotherhood to join talks with vice president; DNE: Muslim Brotherhood starts dialogue with government

<sup>223</sup> AO: Muslim Brotherhood talks with government starts Sunday; AO: Towards a single revolution

<sup>224</sup> DNE: Opposition groups divided on ElBaradei; DNE: Muslim Brotherhood starts dialogue with government; DNE: Egypt gov't talks with reformists about Mubarak

<sup>225</sup> EI: Brotherhood says no plans for Egypt presidential bid; EI: Brotherhood says ready for serious dialogue once Mubarak leaves; DNE: Muslim Brotherhood starts dialogue with government; EI: Brotherhood to join second round of dialogue with VP

<sup>226</sup> I: MB: We have no intentions of nominating members for presidency or interim gov't

<sup>227</sup> I: MB: We have no intentions of nominating members for presidency or interim gov't

<sup>228</sup> I: MB: We call for a civil state to serve all of Egypt

<sup>229</sup> I: Clarifying the Muslim Brotherhood

<sup>230</sup> All articles under 'For democracy' in Ikhwanweb period 1 analyzed, appendix B.

<sup>231</sup> All articles under 'Peaceful' in Ikhwanweb period 1 analyzed, appendix B.

Mubarak's regime for decades. Everybody's solution: his ousting and new elections, were on both the MB's and the protesters agendas. In short, protesters and the MB were fighting for the same thing and were strong allies during this period. Frame alignment and resonance of their shared goal was easily reached and therefore successful.

### *Period 2*

During this period, while having come back on many things they said during the first period – namely that they would not take a large part in politics and would not field a presidential candidate – the Brotherhood finds itself in need of allies. This is reflected in their efforts to include nearly anyone in their constructed frame of delivering a fight for democracy and fighting SCAF against a coup.<sup>232</sup>

Even though they are fighting SCAF, their communication about and to the army is erratic at best. They blame it for a coup as often as they praise it for the way it handled the country between the revolution and now.<sup>233</sup> The reason for such rhetoric is probably that they acknowledge SCAF as an important ally for the future and try to maintain an alliance, which is apparent when the MB first denies but then does concede they are in talks with SCAF.<sup>234</sup>

Alliances are nearly all the Brotherhood and its political arm the FJP seek during this period. Firstly, appealing to a large group, the MB emphasizes its fight for democracy and all the contingent values following upon that such as inclusiveness, freedom and peacefulness.<sup>235</sup> Similarly they connect these values to the civil state that is based on Islamic values they seek to make of Egypt. They emphasize that Egypt will not be a Brotherhood-state but an all-inclusive democratic state for all Egyptians.<sup>236</sup> They continuously propagate inclusion of everyone, those of all religions, women and citizens from all classes.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>232</sup> All articles under 'SCAF and coup' in Period 2 Framing, appendix B; All articles under 'Accusing SCAF (of coup) in Ikhwanweb period 2, appendix B.

<sup>233</sup> All articles under 'Complimenting SCAF' in Period 2 Framing, appendix B.

<sup>234</sup> All articles under '(Not) in talks with SCAF' in Period 2 Framing, appendix B.

<sup>235</sup> All articles under 'Stressing democracy' in Period 2 Framing, appendix B; All articles under 'Connecting to the revolution in Ikhwanweb period 2 analyzed, appendix B.

<sup>236</sup> EI: morsi meets with political leaders, assures civil state; Morsy to newspapers: Egypt won't be a Brotherhood state

<sup>237</sup> All articles under 'Appealing to all Egyptians' in Period 2 Framing, appendix B; All articles under 'Everyone included' in Ikhwanweb period 2, appendix B.



Reflecting this need to make sure that everyone knows that Morsi, the MB and the FJP seek to be inclusive, they again, just like in period 1 emphasize their connection to those protesting in the streets. In an effort for frame bridging they argue often that things damaging them as a (political) group are against “the people’s will.”<sup>238</sup> Moreover they also join them in the streets.<sup>239</sup>

Similarly they link their cause to the 2011 revolution, saying for example: “The battle was and still is over the rights and dignity of the people. We won’t allow the return of the former regime after the revolution toppled it.”<sup>240</sup> “We are fighting a popular struggle in the streets.”<sup>241</sup> Lastly, they also seek the cooperation and inclusion of as many political parties as possible, not especially with Islamist parties.<sup>242</sup> For this they emphasize several times they are seeking “dialogue.”<sup>243</sup> The only ones not allowed into their alliance are those who associated themselves with the old regime, or what the Brotherhood calls the “deep state.”<sup>244</sup> They see this deep state still represented in the media, the army and thugs on the streets.<sup>245</sup>

While most of the MB’s and FJP’s rhetoric is on inclusion and fighting SCAF, injustice and the deep state, they also elaborate slightly on what the MB and the FJP will actually do for Egypt. They state to work on the economy;<sup>246</sup> that they will seek cooperation with foreign nations such as Israel.<sup>247</sup> When finally accepting his seat as President, Morsi emphasizes he will “connect with everyone” and that he will work to reduce the suffering of ordinary Egyptians.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>238</sup> All articles under ‘People’s will/the people’ in Period 2 Framing; All articles under ‘The will of the people’ in Ikhwanweb period 2 appendix B.

<sup>239</sup> Muslim Brotherhood statement on the complementary constitutional declaration

<sup>240</sup> EI: Update: Tahrir protesters reject SCAF statement

<sup>241</sup> AO: Egypt won’t see ‘Algerian civil war’: El-Katatni

<sup>242</sup> All articles under ‘Cooperating with other political parties’ in Period 2 Framing, appendix B; All articles under ‘Partnering up with other political parties’ in Ikhwanweb period 2, appendix B.

<sup>243</sup> I: Beltagy: Extended dialogue among revolutionary forces to real all-embracing partnership; I: Egyptian president-elect meets with youth and revolutionary representatives

<sup>244</sup> I: Ashri; Postponement of presidential elections announcement troubling; confuses political scene; I: Al-Shater: Morsi win an important step towards new political system

<sup>245</sup> I: Ghozlan: Tendentious campaigns aim to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood; All articles under ‘Critiquing the media’ in Ikhwanweb period 2, appendix B.

<sup>246</sup> I: Freedom and Justice Party supports tourism; will not restrict tourists’ freedom; I: Morsi discusses cooperation with Islamic Trade Finance Corporation; I: Morsi’s speech at Cairo University, 30 June, 2012

<sup>247</sup> AO: Brotherhood will fight peacefully for democracy; AO: Egypt’s president salutes martyrs, says army will return to barracks; I: Morsi’s speech in Tahrir, June 29, 2012

<sup>248</sup> I: Morsi’s speech in Tahrir, June 29, 2012

This period the MB had much more to defend, first of all coming back on their promises not to play a big role in politics. This also means they have to convince their allies. They do this rather effectively, mainly because they share a common enemy: the army who might or might not hand over power to civilian rule. This means that their frame bridging efforts were helped, as they and protesters in the streets had the same grievances.

The MB also successfully employed frame amplification; they emphasized that the elections they won are connected to the revolution where many fought and died so valiantly in the streets. The MB and Morsi are thus fighting for the “people’s will.” Not only do they connect to the revolution but also democracy of which the elections are an integral part, something which the army should not thwart. They even take it a step further with the frame transformation attempt where they try to convince their allies, both in the streets and within different political parties, that their policies will be all-inclusive. They subsequently downplay their own Islamist background, arguing that at the basis of Islam lie the same ideals as at that of a democracy.

As for frame resonance, the MB is backed up by the empirical credibility that the army delayed the handover of power. The fact that the elections and subsequent protests in the streets are eventually followed by a power-handover back up the frames propagated by the Brotherhood. Moreover by emphasizing the need for economic reforms to help the many poor in Egypt they connect to the lifeworld of the large group of disenfranchised in the country. Overall the Brotherhood, as in period 1, was at the right place at the right time. Their framing efforts were greatly helped by that and enabled them to extend their frame even farther for, possibly, more support in this period.

### *Period 3*

This period the Brotherhood, the FJP and Morsi are mostly defending themselves, although they do see some opportunity to talk about their ideas for Egypt’s future.<sup>249</sup> When the protests start in earnest and the Rebel campaign has announced it has gathered 22 million votes in support of Morsi’s retreat, the real defense is mounted. A keyword used many times by the MB, Morsi, the FJP and

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<sup>249</sup> All articles under ‘Make Egypt flourish’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

its supporters is “legitimacy.” Instead of reacting substantively to the protests in the street they keep reiterating that as the people voted Morsi into office, he now has the legitimacy to rule them for four years.<sup>250</sup> Other key-terms are “peaceful” and “dialogue.” Morsi and allies emphasize that the protests should be peaceful and that peace, not protests, is what is best for Egypt. They pose that peacefulness is an integral part of Islam, one of the reasons they are propagating it.<sup>251</sup> Similarly they keep calling for a dialogue; even the day of Morsi’s ousting they keep reiterating this.<sup>252</sup> They connect these buzzwords as an integral and important part of the democracy that Egyptians have chosen for since the revolution in 2011.<sup>253</sup> Lastly, they frame their being in office as the result, and even, part of the 2011 revolution, similar to what they did in period 2.<sup>254</sup>

In the meantime the MB and Morsi respond to the mounting discontent among the opposition by denying their claims. The opposition posits that Morsi and the Brotherhood do not respond to the street, that they are part of the counterrevolution and hurting the 2011 revolution.<sup>255</sup> Morsi and the MB respond to these complaints by stating that the opposition is not serving the will of the people like Morsi is.<sup>256</sup> They state that ordinary people in the street are actually happy with the way Morsi is handling things and are behind the regime and not the opposition.<sup>257</sup> They state that the opposition, consisting of thugs, is killing innocent people in the protests and that Morsi’s performance in his first year was remarkable and that he defends the will of the people.<sup>258</sup>

As another response the MB is trying to frame others as scapegoats for the situation in Egypt in period 3. They blame the media for slanderous

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<sup>250</sup> All articles under ‘legitimacy’ in period 3 Framing, appendix B; All articles under ‘Legitimacy’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>251</sup> All articles under ‘Islam’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>252</sup> All articles under ‘peaceful’ and ‘dialogue’ in period 3 Framing, appendix B; All articles under ‘peaceful’ and ‘dialogue’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>253</sup> All articles under ‘democracy’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>254</sup> All articles under ‘Linking to revolution’ in period 3 Framing and under ‘Invoking the revolution’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B; AO: Calls for military coup do not represent ‘patriotic’ opposition: Morsi advisor; AO: Military statement was not checked by Morsi: Presidency; DNE: Army’s statement was not reviewed by the presidency

<sup>255</sup> AO: Egyptian Islamist groups to hold open-ended Cairo sit-in on 28 June

<sup>256</sup> AO: Calls for military coup do not represent ‘patriotic’ opposition: Morsi advisor; DNE: Eight dead and 70 injured at Muslim Brotherhood’s Moqattam headquarters; AO: Military statement was not checked by Morsi: Presidency

<sup>257</sup> AO: President’s Wednesday address allayed public discontent – Egypt’s FJP

<sup>258</sup> All articles under ‘In denial’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B; All articles under ‘Accusing opposition of violence’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

reporting; old supporters of Mubarak – *feloul* – for sending so-called “thugs” into the streets to corrupt the demonstrations; the judiciary, who they also accuse of foul play and partly of being *feloul*; and of course the opposition for unnecessary violence and killings during the protests.<sup>259</sup> Lastly they accuse the police of failing to protect the MB and the FJP and helping the “thugs” in the streets.<sup>260</sup>

At the same time the Brotherhood continues to both approach SCAF as an ally but also as an enemy. The Brotherhood praises SCAF for their call for dialogue, claims they have partnered up with SCAF saying that the army is also in support of Morsi’s legitimacy and lastly, proclaiming that the army is seriously enabling a consensus between Morsi and protesters.<sup>261</sup> But they also keep denouncing SCAF’s efforts as a coup.<sup>262</sup>

A big difference with the two other periods is that the Brotherhood has now become the enemy of the protesters. No longer do their frames of reference almost automatically align or can they be aligned easily. In this period the Brotherhood therefore fails trying to do so. They keep up the same framing strategy as in period 2, this means they are saying: We were legitimately chosen in an election that was the result of the revolution we all fought so hard in. Now as part of this democratic process we are all part of, let us engage in peaceful dialogue instead of violent protest. At the same time protesters and the opposition are protesting the atrocious conditions many of them have to live in. Morsi barely reacts to these claims. Instead he lets himself be praised by allies on the way he has handled Egypt in his first year and blames other for the problems in the country. This thus means: failure on the level of frame alignment.

Frame resonance is just as difficult for the MB in this period. Because they have failed to improve political, economic and social conditions in Egypt in the year before the protests, they have no evidence base for the fact that they can actually improve the situation. Moreover, they are not reacting adequately/effectively to the actual lifeworld situation that many Egyptians live

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<sup>259</sup> All articles under ‘Blaming media,’ ‘Blaming feloul,’ ‘Blaming judiciary’ and ‘Blaming opposition’ in Period 3 Framing, appendix B; All articles under ‘Blaming feloul, calling them thugs,’ ‘Critical of judiciary in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>260</sup> All articles under ‘Blaming police’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>261</sup> All articles under ‘Praising SCAF,’ ‘Partnering up with SCAF,’ ‘Army – reconciliation’ and ‘A coup’ in Period 3 Framing, appendix B; All articles under ‘The army’ in Ikhwanweb period 3, appendix B.

<sup>262</sup> All articles under ‘Coup’ in Period 3 Framing, appendix B.

in. Both of these are necessary for empirical credibility. As I have shown this is not something they manage to do. Moreover, the experiential commensurability, or a solution to the problems of this period, is never offered by the Brotherhood. They give no (possible) solutions to the problem, in this case the horrible living situation of many Egyptians.

To summarize, in the first two periods the Brotherhood, Morsi and thus also the FJP had strong frame alignment and resonance with their intended audience. The most important group in this audience was Egyptian citizens, although the Brotherhood also seemed to want to gain ground with the army, an important political ally. In the first two periods their message and goals largely corresponded with that of Egyptian citizens and protesters in the street. Frame bridging was thus their most important frame alignment strategy. Resonance almost automatically followed suit. However, in period 3 the Brotherhood's frame no longer corresponded with that of their audience. The MB by this time had failed to act on many of their promises, as a result their frame of them as an important and legitimate part of Egyptian politics had become a hard sell. They failed to adequately align their view of their position in society – a democratically chosen group necessary for the peaceful democratic future of Egypt with how Egyptians saw them – a group not acting upon complaints from the street and driving Egypt further down economically, socially and politically. As a result frame resonance was also an impossible feat.

In the next paragraphs I discuss how these results interact with the political opportunity structures and mobilizing resources that were at the Brotherhood's disposal during these three periods.

### **3.4 Discussion: Quiet encroachment**

As presented in the first chapter of this thesis, I use the backbone concepts globalization, space and agency to connect and discuss the three different analyses that are already worked out in this chapter. I chose these three, because they are integral themes within the concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary and are thus particularly suitable to connect the three analyses as quiet encroachment binds all the actions of the Brotherhood.

Before I get to the three backbone concepts I will show how quiet encroachment of the ordinary is an integral factor in everything the Brotherhood and later on the FJP and Morsi have done in Egypt. In my discussion of the analyses I use Morsi, the FJP and the Brotherhood interchangeably. I do this because Morsi represents both: the FJP as a presidential candidate and later as president, the Brotherhood as a prominent member. When elected president he officially resigns as a member of the MB, however the FJP keeps its strong link to the Brotherhood. This manifests itself clearly through shared positions, statements and signals.<sup>263</sup> Therefore combining the three as search words for articles yields a thorough sample of data covering the actions, statements and contexts the Brotherhood found itself in during the three periods under study.

Another important note is what I count as quiet encroachment. As I already argued in the first chapter of this thesis, I broaden Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary with agency. I pose that quiet encroachment of the ordinary can willfully take place. A disenfranchised Egyptian can decide to participate in protests by appearing on the street. When many disenfranchised decide to do so this can result in enormous political, social and economic changes. While you could thus call these people protesters, they are, because of their background and reasons for going onto the streets also quiet encroachers. Moreover, during the protests of the three periods under study, a lot of people who took to the streets not only took in a position as protester, but were there as vendors, parts of human rights groups helping others on the streets or they functioned, for example, as protector of their neighborhood. Protesting therefore is not necessarily quiet encroachment, but at the same time quiet encroachment is a form of protest that can be willfully enacted by disenfranchised people who take to the streets to protest.

In period 1 the Brotherhood's political opportunity position was simply looking to take part in Mubarak's downfall. As for their mobilizing resources, they organized and gathered dissatisfied Egyptians through their community and neighborhood networks, mosques and student and labor associations to increase the number of people in the streets. They thus used the effect of quiet

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<sup>263</sup> Khalil El-Anani, "Separating the FJP from the Brotherhood," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online* no. 1082 2012. <http://www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1082/op232.htm>.

encroachment. On a framing level, the Brotherhood downplayed their Islamist background and framed themselves as being in the same camp as all the other opposition because they had a common enemy (Mubarak), a common goal (ousting him) and a common method (protests) as many of the people in the streets.

In period 2 the main way the Brotherhood could gain their place in the political arena, was through their commitment to the people in the streets and their mobilization efforts of adding their own people to the already existing numbers in the streets. Again the encroachment of protesters on the army's hold on power ensured that Morsi could eventually take his seat as president. This is also the way they frame themselves, as the group that listens to the people's will, and the people's will in this period is again enacted through the quiet encroachment – and admittedly the sometimes not so quiet encroachment of violent protest – of ordinary people in the streets. They were partly mobilized by the Brotherhood, partly by those who the Brotherhood managed to gain as an ally to their cause. Again in this period the Brotherhood share with most Egyptians in the street a common enemy (the army), a common goal (getting Morsi in his elected seat) and a common method (protesting). Therefore their framing efforts easily align with the lifeworld of the people they try to get in their camp.

In period 3 the Brotherhood has lost touch with those enacting quiet encroachment, the people in the street, and that loses them their political power. While it seems like the army was always in charge of whether or not the Brotherhood was allowed to stay in power, in this period the Brotherhood's attitude toward normal Egyptians makes it especially easy for the army to come to power. Instead of prioritizing poor Egyptians who are suffering from the same economic hardships as they did under Mubarak, the Brotherhood plays the political game in courtrooms and parliament, consequently losing touch with the street. Not only on the level of political opportunity, but also as a mobilizing power and lastly they failed to frame themselves as being one with those in the streets.

Quiet encroachment and especially those enacting it: poor Egyptians, were therefore in each period an important factor for the Brotherhood's success

or failure in the political arena. Now with the use of the concepts of globalization, space and agency I will further explore the implications of the Brotherhood's actions during the three periods under study.

### **3.4.2 Globalization, space and agency**

#### *Globalization*

This backbone concept serves to put the MB within the much larger context it was enacting its power in. Firstly the term market globalism, by which I mean "globalization endowed with market-oriented norms, values and meanings resulting in disenfranchisement,"<sup>264</sup> serves as an idea to explain many of the political opportunity structures and other influences that partly determined the rise and fall of the Brotherhood in the three periods under study. As already argued in the first chapter of this thesis: Egypt has strongly become part of an international community ruled by market globalism. In this context Mubarak enacted many of his neoliberal policies, creating a large group of marginalized Egyptians.

Within this same context the Brotherhood came to power. Part of this context means there are groups in Egypt still profiting from the framework set up by Mubarak. Two that came forward during my analyses were the army and the judiciary. Particularly the first strongly influenced the MB's position in Egypt. Taking a bird's eye view of the political opportunity structures under study, it becomes clear the political system was relatively closed to the Brotherhood and actually in hands of the army. In all three periods the army sought to keep the status quo in order as much as possible as this guaranteed them to keep the wealth they gathered under Mubarak. The power of money and the seated army is so strong that in the end it is by the graces of the army that the Brotherhood is able to govern, for a while.

This conclusion is supported by Daniela Pioppi's research. She argues that the Brotherhood was welcomed by the military as a stabilizing force in 2011. They were similarly reigned in by the military when they came to power, not able to implement a single political or economic program. Lastly, Pioppi states,

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<sup>264</sup> Manfred B. Steger, *Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), ix.



the MB made incompetent, arrogant and authoritarian decisions, making them the ideal scapegoat for the deteriorating living conditions in Egypt.<sup>265</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges adds to this last idea, stating that poverty in ideas on policy to tackle Egypt's problems has disappointed those – also non-Islamists – who voted for Morsi in the first place.<sup>266</sup> Gerges says this is a product of the Brotherhood not being experienced in working close with different political forces to tackle Egypt's challenges, unable to make good on their claim to improve the lives of ordinary Egyptians.<sup>267</sup>

These arguments bring me to another important conclusion to be gathered from my analyses: the power of the people was decisive. While I strongly argue the army was the one greatly influencing whether or not the Brotherhood was in power, the Brotherhood could not have done so without the good graces of the Egyptian people. This important group could only exist in a context of market globalism, for neoliberal policies fostered an enormous group of disenfranchised Egyptians who only had the streets left to influence Egypt's future.

Moreover, only in a context of globalization that also includes justice globalism, could these large groups be mobilized to oust their political leaders through quiet, and often not so quiet, encroachment. By justice globalism I mean new global movements on the political left, which project alternative visions of a global future based on values of 'social justice' with core concepts transformative change, participatory democracy, equality of access to resources, opportunities and outcomes, social justice, universal rights, global solidarity and sustainability.<sup>268</sup> Egypt's Rebel campaign, an important player in the third period, is such a group, able to mobilize many disenfranchised Egyptians into ousting Morsi, expounding values of democracy, equality and universal rights. At the same time I must still concede that both in the case of the Rebel campaign and that of the Brotherhood, it was in effect the army who had the last say. With

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<sup>265</sup> Daniela Pioppi, "Playing with Fire. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan," *The International Spectator* 48, no. 4 (2013), 67.

<sup>266</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Islamist Moment: From Islamic State to Civil Islam?" *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 3 (2013), 397.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, 406.

<sup>268</sup> Manfred B. Steger et al., *Justice Globalism: Ideology, Crises, Policy* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2013), 44.

their military power they can overrule any citizen protest or quiet encroachment.

However, as the army let the MB have its space, many of the MB's framing, mobilizing and political opportunity strategies were very effective in a globalized Egypt. For example, their actions corresponded to many of the values that I mention above belonging to justice globalism. This partly explains their short-lived popularity. Especially in the first, and to a lesser extent in the second period the Brotherhood managed to tap into the quiet encroachment of poor Egyptians. Their work in neighborhoods through education, charity and mosques enabled them to be a very effective mobilizer. They were an important group in advancing the situation of many poor Egyptians. Moreover, coming into power their framing efforts also corresponded to many of the values associated with justice globalism. They expound the terms democracy, freedom and equality for all continuously. They request dialogue and reject violence. This way they emphasize their goal to be part of a democratic civil state. This also manifested itself in playing down their Islamist identity. During the three periods under study they changed their slogan from 'Islam is the solution' to 'The interests of Egypt.'<sup>269</sup> This more inclusive strategy was very successful in the second period, but no longer mattered in the third as Morsi wasn't able to actually serve those Egyptian interests very well.

At the same time, several scholars note that while the Brotherhood downplayed its Islamist role in their rhetoric they radicalized and became more traditional when their power grew. Robert Woltering, for example, notes that during its year in power the Brotherhood slowly purged itself from more reformist members, moving to a harder Islamization, in part influenced by stricter Islamist rural Muslim Brothers who in their turn have been greatly influenced by Salafist Saudi Arabians.<sup>270</sup> He finds that this hardline position alienated the Brotherhood from their support base, unable to respond

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<sup>269</sup> Roel Meijer, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Democratic Experience in Egypt," in *Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism Dynamics in the West and in the Middle East* edited by Erkan Toguslu and Johan Leman (Leuven, Leuven UP: 2014), 132.

<sup>270</sup> Robert A.F.L. Woltering, "Post-Islamism in Distress? A Critical Evaluation of the Theory in Islamist-Dominated Egypt," *Die Welt des Islams* 54 (2014), 115.

adequately to its constituency, resulting in Morsi's ousting.<sup>271</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham identifies a similar move to a more traditional, stricter Islamist stance in the Brotherhood.<sup>272</sup> Similarly Muqtedar Khan argues that this shift was in reaction to the authoritarian Westernized elite in Egypt.<sup>273</sup>

Thus, the Brotherhood started out as a legitimate part of the global justice movement, managed to frame itself as being so, but eventually acted in a much more traditionalist Islamist manner. This move can be seen in light of Manuel Castells concept of the new public sphere, which is a global communication space existing through the formation of global civil society and a global network state.<sup>274</sup> Within this new public sphere the Brotherhood is thus not only confronted with players inside Egypt, but many outside of it as well. As can be seen they reacted to this by moving to a more traditional position, ironically opposing those values that helped them to get elected.

### *Space*

In the globalized sphere the Brotherhood was acting in during the three periods their actions were also heavily influenced by their use of space. As Asef Bayat points out: "The neoliberal city is the city inside-out...where a massive number of inhabitants become compelled by poverty and dispossession to operate, subsist, socialize and simply live a life in the public spaces."<sup>275</sup> It is the amount and kind of control of space that the Brotherhood had that marks their success or failure in a period.

As a starting point of this discussion on space it is good to hark back on Fahra Ghannam's assessment that "strategies can create, arrange, and control spaces, tactics can only use, maneuver and invert these spaces."<sup>276</sup> As assessed

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<sup>271</sup> Khalil al-Anani and Maszlee Malik, "Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafism in Post-Mubarak Egypt," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 22, no. 1 (2013), 118.

<sup>272</sup> Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2013), 287.

<sup>273</sup> Muqtedar Khan, "Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution in Egypt," *Middle East Policy* 21, no. 1 (2014), 82-83.

<sup>274</sup> Manuel Castells, "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 83 - 86.

<sup>275</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 12.

<sup>276</sup> Farha Ghannam, *Remaking the Modern: space, relocation and the politics of identity in a global Cairo*, (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 2002), 50.

earlier in this chapter the MB made use of tactics in the first two periods and used strategies in the third. So in the Brotherhood's hand, space could be more effectively controlled when they were using tactics than when they were using strategies. In the first period they were part of the large presence in the streets, something they were used to from decade long silent protest to those in power. Jaime Kucinkas states that the Brotherhood gained power during the Mubarak years by burrowing into secular institutions such as professional associations and student unions.<sup>277</sup> Such tactics, a quiet encroachment on its own, were very successful for the Brotherhood for very long. Through this presence they even helped with the emancipation of the Egyptian poor, Roel Meijer poses. He argues that the Brotherhood gained in power because their tactics contributed to the political consciousness of Egyptians. The MB's tactics helped Egyptians realize the connection between the deterioration of public services and poverty and the growth of the police state and the enrichment of Mubarak's close circle.<sup>278</sup>

Presence in Egyptian society, both in the streets, but also many secular places thus boded well for the MB. However, their influence and acceptance as a group declined once they started resorting to strategies in the third period. They tried to control the street and spaces through politics, asking influential opposition to sit down and talk everything over. They also occupied space in the third period. Mona Abaza describes how during this period the opposition took on more and more power as protesters occupied larger pieces of the city, and no longer just Tahrir Square. Similarly the Muslim Brothers also wanted to use the space in the city to show off their popularity and occupied other parts of the city around Cairo University and in the eastern part of the city. Even after Morsi's ousting they could still be found here, slowly turning their spaces into a "parallel state," "sprawling town" and "city state" with its own rules and terror-reign.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>277</sup> Jaime Kucinkas, "The Unobtrusive Tactics of Religious Movements." *Sociology of Religion* 75, no. 4 (2014), 542.

<sup>278</sup> Roel Meijer, "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Democratic Experience in Egypt," in *Modern Islamic Thinking and Activism Dynamics in the West and in the Middle East* edited by Erkan Toguslu and Johan Leman (Leuven, Leuven UP: 2014), 130.

<sup>279</sup> Mona Abaza, "Post January Revolution Cairo: Urban Wars and the Reshaping of Public Space," *Theory, Culture & Society* 31, no. 7/8 (2014), 170.

The only space they were thus able to control in period 3 were those where they were present, using violence, derisively being called 'bearded men.'<sup>280</sup>

This last use of space by the MB before Morsi was ousted also points to an alarming development in Egypt: the prolific use of violence to those trying to use spaces for quiet encroachment. Abaza notes that under the reign of both Morsi and currently the army it has become apparent that through armed militias killing protesters, the spreading of terror seems to becoming more popular, possibly, sometimes quite literally, killing off protests and contestation of power.<sup>281</sup> The streets have literally become battlefields severely impairing the power of poor Egyptians. This neatly ties in with the third backbone concept I am using to discuss the Brotherhood's rise and fall: agency.

### *Agency*

By agency I mean the perceived and enacted power of an individual to create and transform their environmental circumstances, becoming the producer of their environment.<sup>282</sup> As has come to the fore many times in this chapter, the people in Egypt are agents, taking their own future in their hands by taking to the streets. As I argue in my first chapter this agency can be seen as quiet encroachment because it still leads to everyday actions that when combined can lead to immense political, social and economic power for change. It was this agency, that the Brotherhood was able to tap into for so long, that helped the Brotherhood to gain power. As stated above, it was the Brotherhood that helped Egyptians to emancipate, battling a corrupt regime together for decades. This meant for the agency of Egyptians that they were practicing to defend themselves and fight for causes that are important to them. Mona El-Ghobashy argues Egyptians had been practicing collective action in the form of street action for so many years that they had become experts by the time of January 25, 2011. "Egypt's streets had become parliaments, negotiating tables and battlegrounds rolled into one," she

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<sup>280</sup> El: Coptic activists march to presidential palace; AO: Egypt's Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya reiterates its rejection of violence; AO: Clashes continue in Egypt's Mahalla and Kafr El-Sheikh

<sup>281</sup> Mona Abaza, "Post January Revolution Cairo: Urban Wars and the Reshaping of Public Space," *Theory, Culture & Society* 31, no. 7/8 (2014), 175.

<sup>282</sup> Albert Bandura, "Exercise of Human Agency through Collective Efficacy," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9, no. 3 (2000), 75.

states.<sup>283</sup> This thus helped them to depose Mubarak, again with the important mobilizing power of the Brotherhood on their side.

However, this newfound agency by Egyptian citizens also turned against the Brotherhood when they were unable to change the hardships of most Egyptians quickly enough. People went to the streets by themselves or because they were mobilized to do so. They were acting consciously and willfully intending for things to change. Unfortunately this is also where their intentions ended. For they succeeded in ousting the Brotherhood from its political seat, but after that the army took the reigns again. Cihan Tugal states that the protests of June 30<sup>th</sup> were hijacked by the military and that this was possible because the protesters in the street had no leaders, agenda or ideology. It is these three things that are, according to Tugal, necessary for the revolutionary process in Egypt to succeed over the military coup of 2013.<sup>284</sup> The one with the most power in Egypt can thus appropriate the newfound powerful agency of Egyptians, previously this was the Brotherhood, and currently it is the army.

### 3.5 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to gain a comprehensive understanding of the Brotherhood's quick rise and fall in post-Mubarak Egypt with the help of the concept of quiet encroachment. By incorporating this concept into a classic social movement theory analysis I could draw important connections between the political opportunity, mobilizing and framing analyses of the Brotherhood. It also allowed unique insights into their functioning in a decisive period in their history.

On their own, the political opportunity, mobilizing and framing analyses showed, overall, that the Brotherhood's framing and mobilizing strategies when effective went hand in hand with strong political opportunities. As long as the Brotherhood's framing efforts aligned with the interests of the Egyptians in the streets and as long as their mobilizing efforts entailed a strong connection to ordinary, often disenfranchised Egyptians, they were assured a prominent

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<sup>283</sup> Mona El-Ghobashy, "The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution," in *The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East* ed. by David McMurray and Amanda Ufheil-Somers (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 2013), 62.

<sup>284</sup> Cihan Tugal, "End of the leaderless revolution," *Berkeley journal of Sociology* (2014), 87.

position in politics. Adding in the concept of quiet encroachment I can conclude that as long as the Brotherhood, but also the army or the Rebel campaign managed to make use of the quiet encroachment of ordinary citizens, political power was guaranteed (temporarily). At the same time I had to make the side note that while the will of the people was an important and strong force, the deep state power of the military and the judiciary was always able to overrule that.

Having come to those few general conclusions I was able to lift the results from the analyses to a discussion guided by backbone concepts globalization, space and agency. Firstly, in a context dominated by market globalism, the Brotherhood was able to rise to power because as an Islamist group they had practiced quiet encroachment themselves for decades. Moreover, because of their charity work, influence in mosques and educational systems they contributed to the emancipation of poor Egyptians. This eventually made the Brotherhood very effective in tapping into the quiet encroachment of ordinary Egyptians demanding a better life in an Egypt ravaged by neoliberalism.

Unfortunately the MB's presence in that important space, the streets, where quiet encroachment was playing out, diminished as their own political power grew. Therefore their ability to successfully tap into that encroachment also waned. Moreover, the agency experienced by protesters through their quiet encroachment was so strong that they were also powerful enough to come into the streets in such large numbers that the army felt justified enough to depose Morsi. Their reasons for doing so were strongly embedded in the idea of justice globalism which, to reiterate entails concepts such as "transformative change, participatory democracy, equality of access to resources, opportunities and outcomes, social justice, universal rights, global solidarity and sustainability."<sup>285</sup>, This was something which the Brotherhood was not able to provide, in part because its own internal Islamist organization was not in keeping with the ideals of a democratic civil state. They were unable to improve economic hardships and foster equality, justice and peace.

Moreover and unfortunately for the Brotherhood, quiet encroachment of the ordinary also seems to have been a tool in the hands of a more powerful

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<sup>285</sup> Ibid., 44.

force in Egypt: the army. While the army managed to get the people on their side, admittedly mainly through the efforts of the Rebel campaign, they could relatively easily stage a military coup. At the root of this ability lay their still present strong deep-state power. The army could keep its coveted powerful position, wealth and power they had gained in Mubarak's time and when the people appeared in the streets in such large numbers the army had a powerful enough public mandate to depose Morsi without much suspicion at that specific moment.



## **In Conclusion: A Look at the Egyptian Brotherhood's Future Potential**

*"Those who expect rupture and resistance would no doubt be dispirited by the inertia of the everyday. But one should not be fooled nor disheartened by this seeming normalcy."<sup>286</sup>*

Asef Bayat wrote this quite recently about the current state of Egypt, a country under military rule where many groups and people, among whom many Muslim Brothers, are being prosecuted. This is in large contrast to 2012, when the Muslim Brotherhood was the first Islamist organization to ever come to elected political power. As I pose in this thesis, the support of many Egyptians was necessary for them to reach this position. It is with the help and insights of Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary that I could come to this conclusion. It is also this concept that he is referring to in the abovementioned quote. He holds, in this concept that ordinary people can effect political, social and economic change through their everyday actions.<sup>287</sup> Bayat argues that this is the reason that one should not despair about the current seeming normalcy in Egypt for it is a situation in which the subaltern do their best work.

Not only do the subaltern thrive in situations where they can inconspicuously effect change, the Muslim Brotherhood did so also. At least that is what I argue in this thesis. Addressing the MB's position from January 25, 2011 until July 3, 2013 as a historical case study allowed me to study an important part of their history that is significantly different than other periods in their existence. By using social movement theory I could look at their own political actions, mobilizing efforts and framing tactics, but also how they were influenced by extraneous factors. Moreover, as I stated already, by using Bayat's concept of quiet encroachment of the ordinary I could incorporate the important position of citizens in the MB's position. Letting loose this theoretical framework and tool in one I could answer the following central research question:

How can the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 be explained?

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<sup>286</sup> Asef Bayat, "Revolution and Despair," *Mada Masr* 25 January 2015.

<sup>287</sup> Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary people Change the Middle East*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2010), 17.

The analyses led to three important overarching and interconnected answers by discussing them in the context of three more abstract concepts namely globalization, space and agency. My first main conclusion is that in a neoliberal Egypt with many disenfranchised citizens the Brotherhood as an Islamist organization had a chance to come to power. Especially because many of their words and deeds corresponded to core concepts of justice globalism such as democracy, equality, social justice and universal rights.<sup>288</sup> While Islamist organizations are perhaps judged by outsiders mainly on their position of wanting to create “a modern, male dominated political movement to reinstitutionalize their conception of Islamic laws (Sharia), institutions (zakat or tithe) and other imagined practices of the first Muslims,”<sup>289</sup> the Brotherhood have under Mubarak’s repressive regime been primarily focused on helping and cooperating with many, often poor, Egyptians. This tapping into the power of quiet encroachment of the ordinary, many years before Mubarak was ousted, partly helped them into power.

This brings me to my second important conclusion; it was only when the Brotherhood was successfully tapping into this power of encroachment of the ordinary that they were able to come and stay in a position of power. From the moment that they started shifting their position from more liberal to a more traditionalist Islamism, they lost their contact with the street and the values of justice globalism. Their previously inconspicuous presence in the streets, an important space for the disenfranchised, was given up for a high profile spot in a political space.

Losing their important connection to ordinary Egyptians leads to a third major conclusion of this thesis, namely that the newfound agency of Egyptian citizens could be appropriated by anybody. Even though the Brotherhood had built such a seemingly strong relationship with the people in the streets, they managed to lose it quickly when they were no longer in the streets themselves. Their position was quickly taken over by the Rebel campaign, whose cause was incorporated by the army. This resulted in the situation Egypt is in today: a

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>289</sup> Paul M. Lubeck and Bryana Britts, “Muslim Civil Society in Urban Public Spaces: Globalization, Discursive Shifts and Social Movements,” *Working Papers, Center for Global, International and Regional Studies* 6 (2001), 4.

country struggling economically, politically and socially while being ruled by the army.

These three conclusions drawn from my research are specific to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, because of the concepts of globalization, space and agency it is also possible to make a general inference for other Islamist organizations in other countries. I posit that Islamist organizations that are able to play a large role in the lives of the disenfranchised of a country can have a lot of influence through tapping into quiet encroachment of the ordinary.

These three conclusions are in themselves also a gateway to new research. Firstly, the Brotherhood's history between 2011 and 2013 holds much other input for future research. In my research, for example, I could not go in depth into the mobilization resources of the Brotherhood. Anthropological approaches, for example in the form of interviews with Brotherhood members could shed a more thorough light on their position. Moreover, an Arabic speaking and reading researcher could also do a far more thorough framing analysis of the Brotherhood during this period by studying their Arabic output.

The current position of the Brotherhood also offers plenty of research material. A new SMT analysis could shed light on how an Islamist organization that previously had a powerful political position is now positioned within society. Moreover, going deeper into the role of quiet encroachment of the ordinary, anthropological research into the Brotherhood's relationship with the disenfranchised would be very interesting.

Lastly, this thesis leads to the question in what manner the Brotherhood's Islamism can take a powerful political, economic and social position. The way they gained power during the period under study, namely slowly moving towards a very traditionalist position on Islamism, did not seem the solution. A theoretical exploration into the manner an Islamist organization, perhaps specifically the Egyptian Brotherhood, can be a valued and important part of the hegemony would be a good addition to previous research.

Building on the results from this thesis, I make some tentative inferences onto the current situation of the Brotherhood. I maintain that while they are being heavily and violently prosecuted they can still hold an important position in society. As Bayat's quote at the beginning of this conclusion testifies: we

should not be fooled or disheartened by the normalcy of the current state of Egypt. Citizens still have the ability to quietly encroach on the government's rules. He even states that the 2011 revolution can only succeed when it moves "into the backstreets, local communities, neighborhoods, villages, unions, schools, and households, in order to learn, educate, mobilize, and organize."<sup>290</sup> As I pose in this thesis, these are exactly the realms the Brotherhood in the years leading up to the revolution showed its main strengths.

These strengths were in large part intrinsic to their Islamist identity, for they reached a lot of results with large groups of people by influencing their everyday lives. Jaime Kucinkas shows this when she says that the Brotherhood changed the daily habits of the people they were helping. "The Muslim Brotherhood has required that female students using their transportation services to universities wear a hijab. The Brotherhood has also provided Islamic clothing to poor students who could not otherwise afford to buy their own garments."<sup>291</sup> They thus copied their own Islamist habitus on those of disenfranchised Egyptians, in part to help them, in part to instill their ideals. It could therefore be that by continuing these practices, the Brotherhood gains back their important position in society, despite the violent repression of the army.

I thus end this thesis as I started it, by posing that Islam is the Brotherhood's solution, with the main addition that in pursuing this path the Brotherhood has to ensure that this Islamic identity and their Islamic goals keep resonating with the Egyptian people, so as to keep influencing the major contributor to their success: ordinary Egyptians quietly encroaching.

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<sup>290</sup> Asef Bayat, "Midwife for a pregnant Egypt," *Ahram Online* 11 June 2013  
[english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/76162/Opinion/Midwife-for-a-pregnant-Egypt.aspx](http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/76162/Opinion/Midwife-for-a-pregnant-Egypt.aspx)

<sup>291</sup> Jaime Kucinkas, "The Unobtrusive Tactics of Religious Movements," *Sociology of Religion* 2014, 543

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## Appendix A – Coded Documents

In the coding stage I color-coded each newspaper article individually after I had saved them as a PDF. Yellow pertains to mobilization resources; pink to political opportunity structures; purple to framing efforts and green to quiet encroachment. The following is an example of an article from Daily News Egypt that I highlighted and contains an example of each color. The complete data set has been archived by me between April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2013 and July 18<sup>th</sup> 2013 and may be reviewed by committee members upon request.

Saturday December 21st, 2013 Follow Us:      

# DAILY NEWS

## EGYPT

Egypt's Only Daily Independent Newspaper In English

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## One dead in Mansoura ahead of Morsi speech

Hend Kortam / June 25, 2013 / 0 Comments / 2091 Views

Clashes erupt between Muslim Brotherhood protesters and opposition

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The Ministry Of Health confirmed one death and 130 injuries following clashes in Mansoura Wednesday evening, reported state-run Al-Ahram.

A march by President Mohamed Morsi supporters in Mansoura, Daqahleya took a violent turn on Wednesday afternoon, resulting in four serious injuries and a death.

At the time of publishing, clashes between protesters were ongoing in Port Said Street, where a large Islamist rally had taken place.

The Freedom and Justice Party in Daqahleya had announced on its Facebook page that it would hold a march in support of Morsi's "legitimacy" after Al-Asr prayers.

The march included members of the Islamist parties, the Freedom and Justice Party, Al-Asala Party, Al-Watan Party, Al-Wasat Party, Al-Sha'ab Party, Al-Raya Party, and the Building and Development Party.


The march started at Al-Jam'eya Al-Shar'eya Mosque on Port Said Street. Mohamed Al-Mohandes, a member of the Tamarod campaign in Daqahleya said the clashes were on the street, adding that opposition members gathered outside the governorate building, and seemed likely to march to Al-Nasr Mosque, the site of the Islamist rally.

Abdel-Hamid Rashed, a member of the Popular Current in Daqahleya said the rally was massive. He claimed Islamist protesters initiated the violence and that some carried shotguns and sticks, prompting residents of the area to retaliate.

He said the two sides were fighting running battles.

The Freedom and Justice Party in Daqahleya released a statement, saying dozens of protesters on Port Said Street were injured after being attacked by "thugs" who fired birdshot at them and brandished other weapons. "Dozens have been taken to the Mansoura International Hospital with serious, minor and birdshot injuries," the statement read.

Related posts:



Clashes erupted between Islamist protesters and opposition protesters in Mansoura after Islamists started a huge rally in support of the president's legitimacy  
(Photo From 6 April Movement's Facebook page)

### Appendix B – Tables on articles

I organized all the articles from the three news websites by period and wrote down in a table the following five characteristics: the actors who appeared in the article, the sources used, if I could find a certain slant, what type of article it is and lastly, I summarized the article in one word. The following is an example of such a table from *Ahram Online* period 1. All 195 pages worth of tables may be reviewed by committee members upon request.

<b>Peres: 'Mubarak's contribution to peace won't be forgotten</b>	Mubarak Shimon Peres MB	Jerusalem Post		news article	international relations
<b>Pope Shenouda III supports Mubarak, Egyptian state TV</b>	Pope Shenouda Mubarak protesters opposition (incl. MB)	Egyptian state TV	/	news article	religion
<b>Clinton hints at unease over early Mubarak exit</b>	US MB Mubarak Suleiman Egyptian people	US officials: Clinton Obama Wisner Cheney	/	news article	international relations
<b>Analysis - U.S. looks 'over horizon' on Egypt crisis</b>	US MB Mubarak Suleiman	US officials	Critical of US "putting the Obama administration out of step with protesters"	analysis	international relations
<b>US 'desertion' of Mubarak dismays Israel</b>	Mubarak US Israel	AFP senior Israeli official Dore Gold former UN ambassador American poli sci prof	/	news article	international relations
<b>News Analysis - Egypt between revolution and</b>	Mubarak Suleiman opposition parties	HRC's Kamal Abul-Magd Mamdouh Hamza	Critical of Mubarak "President Mubarak's obviously crumbling order"	news feature	protests

## Appendix C – Counting the results from Appendix B

To gain an overview and make inferences from the results from the tables presented in appendix B I also counted those results. The lists of those results are part of this appendix.

## Ahram Online period 1

**Actors**

Mubarak (gov.)	20
MB	15
Protesters	12
Opposition	11
Suleiman	8
US	4
The people	2

NDP

Police

Army

Britain

Shimon Peres

Religious authority

Israel

Al Qaeda

Eu

**Sources**

Foreign press 7

MB 4

Clinton 3

Foreign expert 2

Opposition 2

Government spokesperson 2

Allies to Morsi 2

NDP

Rights group

Security official

Suleiman

Foreign news source

Local press

Israeli official

UN ambassador

EU official

Facebook youth movements

**Slant**

Non-opinion

critical of MB 1

critical of pro-Mubarak 1

critical of US 1

critical of Mubarak 1

Opinion

Critical of Mubarak 1

Positive of MB 1

Critical of MB 2

**Type**

News article 15

News feature 5

Opinion 3

Analysis 1

(total: 24)

**Subject**

Protests 12

International relations 6

Politics 3

Religion 2

Elections 1

Death 1



## Ahram Online period 2

		Religious authority	
<b>Actors</b>			
MB	43	Foreign politician	
SCAF	37	Amnesty International	
Morsi	27	Kefaya press. Conf.	
Court	18		
Shafiq	15	<b>Slant</b>	
Protesters	11	Non-opinion	
FJP	8	- critical of SCAF	5
Opposition	8		
Politicians	7	Opinion	
Mubarak	6	- critical of judiciary	2
El Baradei	4	- critical of MB	3
The people	3	- positive of MB	1
Shafiq supporters	2	- critical of SCAF	4
Islamists			
Nour			
US		<b>Type</b>	
China		News article	42
Turkey		Opinion	7
Morsi supporters		Analysis	1
Rights activists		Interview	1
Rev. Board of trustees			
Rights group		(total: 51)	
<b>Sources</b>		<b>Subject</b>	
MB	22	Politics	12
SCAF	8	Elections	10
Opposition to MB	7	Protests	9
Judicial sources	6	MB	8
Shafiq members	4	Military	5
Foreign news source	4	Opposition	3
Demonstrators	3	The judiciary	2
Own reporter	3	Shafiq	1
El Baradei (tweet)	2	Morsi	1
Morsi press conference	2	Human rights	1
Egyptian newssource	2		
PEC spokesperson	2		
Anonymous source	2		
Analyst	2		
FJP	2		
Politician	2		
Declaration by Sabbahi			
Research centre			
AUC			
Al Ahram			

## Ahran Online period 3

**Actors**

MB	74
Army/SCAF/the military	71
Protesters	67
Morsi	38
Islamist groups	37
Tamarod	26
The Egyptian people/citiz.	23
Political opposition	22
Supporters	19
Opponents	18
FJP (members)	17
The US	17
Politicians	11
NSF	10
The judiciary	7
Action group/activist	7
Al Nour	6
Hizbollah/Hamas/Al Qaeda	6
Youth groups	6
Religious authority	6
Mubarak	4
Political parties	4
Western countries	4
Shias	4
Sunnis	3
National Sec. Council	3
The police	3
Amnesty International	3
Egyptian media	3
Egyptian government	3
Qandil	2
United Nations	2
Israel	2
media	
Health ministry	
Interpol	
Rights organizations	
Medical volunteer	
Presidential guard	
Shafiq	
PEC	
Suleiman	
Journalist syndicate	

**Sources**

Local media	25
Morsi spokesperson	23
Allies to Morsi	21
Rebel statement/member	18
Opposition group	14
Human rights group	12
Protesters	12
FJP	12
SCAF speech/stat/memb.	12
Am. Embassy statement	11
<i>Own reporter</i>	<u>11</u>
MB statement	10
Reuters	8
Al-Ahram	8
Foreign news source	5
NSF statement	5
Security source	5
Anonymous SCAF source	4
Health officials	4
NSF member	4
Activistis on Twitter	4
Religious authority	4
Opposition members	3
Court info	3
Politicians (local)	3
Anonymous security sour	2
Interior ministry	2
Nour statement	2
Israel statement	2
Palestinians	2
Lawyers	2
Salafist	
Qandil statement	
Suleiman press conf.	
United nations	
Anonymous pres. Source	
Hamas statement	
Prosecutor gen. Statem.	
Islamist leaders	
Journalist Synd. Statem.	
Judicial sources	

Speech	2
Supporters	1
The people	1

**Slant**

Non-opinion	
Critical of Morsi	8
Critical of MB	3
Critical of army	1
Critical of Islamists	1
Positive of army	1

**Opinion**

Critical of Morsi	6
Critical of MB	6
Critical of Morsi's oppos.	1
Critical of Mubarak sup.	1
Critical of Tamarod	1
Critical of army	1

**Type**

News article	166
Opinion	15
News feature	13
News article w/opinion	7
Analysis	7
Interview	1
Liveblog	1

(total: 210)

**Subject**

Protests	53
Politics	30
Morsi	19
MB	15
International relations	14
Islamists	13
Violence	10
Death	8
SCAF	8
Opposition	8
Tamarod	6
Revolution	4
Islam	3
Human rights	2
Religion	2

## Daily News Egypt period 1

**Actors**

Muslim Brotherhood	27
Mubarak	24
Protesters	14
Opposition to Mubarak	14
US	12
Suleiman	10
Western countries (excl. US)	7
El Baradei	3
NDP	3
Israel	3
The people	3
Hamas	2
Human rights groups	2
Police	2
Ministry of interior	
UN	
Copts	
Bloggers	
Religious groups	
Islamists	

**Sources**

Foreign news source	14
Protesters	11
MB	11
Mubarak (NDP + Suleiman)	8
US	5
Opposition groups	4
Own reporter	4
Hisham Mubarak Law Ctr.	2
SCAF	2
Activist	2
Ministry of interior	
Citizens	
Vice president	
Peolpe assembly speaker	
Khomeini	
ElBaradei	
Mrosi	
Human rights activits	
Coptic officials	
Scientist	
Israel	
Medical source	

**Blogger**

EU officials

**Slant**

Non-opinion	
Positive of MB	1
Critical of Mubarak	2

**Opinion**

Critical of US	2
Critical of Mubarak	4
Critical of MB	2

**Type**

News article	28
Opinion	6
Analysis	5

**Subject**

Protests	19
Negotiations	8
International rel.	3
Islamists	2
Daily life	
MB	
Opposition	
The people	
US	

## Daily News Egypt period 2

**Actors**

Morsi	47
SCAF	36
MB	28
Shafiq	19
Politicians/political part.	12
FJP	11
The people/citizens/ Egyptians	10
Protesters	7
PEC	7
Activists/ Protesters Revolutionaries/	7
SCC	6
Islamists	5
Supporters Shafiq	4
Israel	4
US	3
Supporters Morsi	3
Mubarak supporters	3
Local news source	2
Salafists	2
Cultural centers	
Mubarak	
Bahrain	
UAE	
Kuwait	
Turkey	
UK	
Iran	
Hamas	
NGOs	
Foreign news source	
Christians	
Chief General Intelligence	
Political critics	
Prisoners	
Human rights organizations	

**Sources**

FJP	13
MB (member)	10
Politicians	8
Morsi	8
Activists/protesters	6
SCAF	6
Local news source	6
Shafiq	4
President bank assoc.	3
Israel sources	3
Voters	2
PEC	2
Morsi supporters	
Chief librarian	
Judges for Egypt stat.	
Member of judiciary	
Own reporters	
Representative for. Country	
Egyptian citizens	
Foreign news source	
NGO representatives	
Politics professor	
Egyptian filmmakers	
US	
Human rights group	

**Slant**

Non-opinion	
Critical of SCAF	2
Critical of Morsi	2
Critical of MB	1
Opinion	
Critical of SCAF	10
Critical of MB	7
Critical of Morsi	4
Positive of Morsi	3
Critical of PEC	1

**Type**

News article	30
Opinion	21

Analysis	8
News feature	5
Interview	3
News article w/opinion	2
<b>Subject</b>	
Politics	16
Elections	15
Morsi	12
Protests	5
MB	4
SCAF	4
Intern. Relations	3
Islamists	3
Culture	1
Economy	1

## Daily News Egypt period 3

**Actors**

Morsi	93
Protesters	67
MB	43
Tamarod	40
SCAF	37
FJP	30
Political party	22
Human rights organizat.	17
Allies to Morsi/Islamists/ Tagarod/NCL	17
Citizens	12
Politician	12
Police/security forces	11
US	10
Minister/ministry	9
NSF	6
Morsi supporters	4
Religious authority	4
Judiciary	3
Mubarak	3
Prosecutor general	3
Germany	3
Old regime/feloul	3
Foreign protesters	2
Shi'ites	2
Sunnis	2
Prime minister Qandil	2
Media (companies)	2
Thugs	2
Workers union	
SEC	
Shafiq	
Kuwait; Syria; Turkey;	
UAE; Iran; Palestine; UK	
Suleiman	
Trade unions	
Tv host	
Reporter	
Foreign news source	
UN	
Local news media	

**Sources**

Political parties	34
Human rights organiz.	32
Local news source	29
Tamarod	26
Politicians	24
FJP	23
Protesters	16
Morsi	15
Minister/ministry	14
Own reporter	11
SCAF	10
Foreign news source	9
Religious authority	8
NSF	7
MB	6
US	6
Activists	6
Police	6
Islamists	6
Citizens	5
Expert	5
Court decision	3
Lawyer	3
Morsi supporter	2
Local journalists	2
Germany	2
Trade union	
Iran; UK	
UN	
Media personality	
Student union president	

**Slant**

Non-opinion	
- critical of Morsi	5
- positive of Morsi	1
- critical of media	1
- critical of Brotherhood	1
Opinion	
- critical of Morsi	5
- critical of Brotherhood	2

- positive about Morsi	1
- critical of Tamarod	1
- positive of 'the people'	1

News feature	3
Interview	2

**Type**

News article	116
Opinion	13
Analysis	4

**Subject**

Protests	28
Violence	23
Politics	19
Islamists	14
MB	8
Opposition	8
International allianc.	6
The army	5
The people	5
Elections	
Human rights	
Oppression	



## Egypt Independent period 1

**Actors**

MB	35
Mubarak/govern/ NDP/the regime/ the state	30
protestors	22
opp. to Mubarak	21
Islamist parties	7
The army	6
Religious authority	4
The US	4
Police	3
Business	2
Tunesia	2
Hamas	2
Israel	2
NGO's	
Public prosecutors	
Protest movement	
Judiciary	
Foreign press	
Local press	
The people	
Copts	

**Sources**

MB	31
Opp. to Mubarak	9
NDP/Mub./ gov.	8
Protesters/eyewit.	6
Foreign expert	5
Foreign politician	5
Islamist parties	4
Local press	3
Business	3
Army	3
NGO	
Judicial source	
Religious authority	
CIA	
Human rights org.	

**Slant**

Non-opinion	
Critical of Mubarak	4

Critical of MB 7

#### Opinion

Critical of Mubarak 6

Critical of MB 4

Critical of army 1

Positive about MB 2

#### Type

News article 31

News feature 9

Interview 3

Opinion 10

#### Subject

Protests 31

Politics 6

The people 3

Elections 2

Islamists 2

Negotiations 2

Oppression 2

Opposition 1

MB 1

Economy 1

International rel. 1

Violence 1

Egypt Independent period 2

#### Actors

Morsi 82

MB 57

SCAF 54

Protesters/  
Revolutionaries 26

Opposition groups 22

Shafiq 21

FJP 14

US 9

Morsi supporters 9

Elections commiss. 9

Islamist parties 8

Judiciary 8

Egyptians/  
the people 8

Israel 7

Copts/Christians 5

Rel. Authority 4

Iran	3
IMF	2
Hamas/Palestinians	2
Parliament	2
Lawyers	2
Local press	2
Shafiq supporters	
Constituent assembly	
Suleiman supporters	
Hizbollah	
EU	
Police	
Mauritania	
Syria	
Saudi Arabia	
Mubarak supporters	
thugs	

### Sources

MB	29
FJP	20
Foreign press	18
Local press	14
Opposition	14
SCAF	10
Morsi	10
Social media	8
PEC	6
Judiciary	6
Islamist parties	6
Protesters/activist	7
US	5
Rel. Authority	5
Shafiq	3
Anon. Source	3
Shura council memb.	3
Parliam. Member	3
Police	3
Eyewitness	2
IMF	2
Polisci professor	2
Mubarak supporter	2
Israel	2
Hamas	2
State official	
Syrian opp. leader	
Egyptian financial authority	
Hizbollah	
Interior ministry	

Suleiman  
 Artist  
 Lawyer  
 Western diplomat  
 Arab intelligence official

### **Slant**

Non-opinion  
 Critical of SCAF 6  
 Critical of MB 3  
 Positive about Morsi 4

### **Opinion**

Positive about Morsi 2  
 Critical of SCAF 1

### **Type**

News article 116  
 News feature 14  
 Opinion 4  
 Analysis 3

### **Subject**

Politics 40  
 Elections 26  
 Protests 16  
 International all. 13  
 Islamists 10  
 Religion 9  
 Economy 5  
 Opposition 4  
 Revolution 3  
 Social behavior 2  
 The media 2  
 The people 2  
 Violence 1  
 War 1  
 Rights 1  
 Litigation 1

Egypt Independent period 3

### **Actors**

Morsi 39  
 Protesters/revol./  
 Opposition to Morsi 35  
 MB 19

SCAF	17
Police	14
Morsi supporters	10
Tamarod	10
Islamists	7
FJP	5
PM Qandil	4
Islamist parties	3
Judiciary	3
Shias/Sunnis	3
US	3
Religious authority	3
Egyptians/the people	2
ElBaradei	2
Ministers	2
Ministry of health	2
Hamas	
Iran	
Local press	
Republican Guard	
Prosecutor	
Mubarak	
Human rights org.	
UN	
Qatar	
Syria	
Saudi Arabia	

### **Sources**

Foreign press	15
Police	8
Local press	8
MB	6
FJP	6
Tamarod	6
Eyewitness	5
Morsi	4
Islamist parties	4
Activist/protester	3
SCAF	3
Judiciary	3
Polisci professor	2
Anon. Source	2
Health ministry	2
US	2
Religious authority	2
PM Qandil	2
ElBaradei	
Social media	

Iran  
Shia  
Minister  
Human rights org.  
UN  
Doctor  
Interior ministry  
Qatar  
Syria

**Slant**

Opinion  
Critical of Morsi 1

**Type**

News article 62  
Analysis 1  
Feature 1  
Interview 1

**Subject**

Protests 27  
Politics 13  
Violence 9  
Islamists 5  
Death 4  
Religion 3  
International all. 1  
Economy 1

### Appendix D – Use of original sources Egypt Independent

The data supporting figure 3.1.

The use of original sources in Egypt Independent as counted from the tables in Appendix B. Here I counted under the heading ‘sources’ in the table those sources that were not statements, press conferences, speeches, messages on social media or messages from spokespersons. Instead, the news had to come from a specific person that the newspaper had found the time to contact.

	Original sources counted	Percentage of total sources
Period 1	54 out of 80	67,5%
Period 2	122 out of 248	49,2%
Period 3	35 out of 92	38,0%

## Appendix E – MB, Morsi, FJP in context in Egypt Independent

Data supporting figure 3.2 This table shows the number of times that I counted that either the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi or Freedom and Justice Party was mentioned in the contexts of politics, religion or protests in *Egypt Independent*. I extracted these from the tables in which I coded (found in Appendix B) every article as having one particular main subject. Whenever that subject was politics, religion or protests I counted it to one of the categories.

N.B. in the category protests articles with the subject elections, international relations, opposition and economy were also counted. In the category religion articles with the subject Islamist or Islamists were also counted.

	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3
MB, FJP or Morsi linked to politics	11 out of 55 = 20%	76 out of 138 = 55%	15 out of 66 = 23%
MB, FJP or Morsi linked to religion	2 out of 55 = 4%	18 out of 138 = 13%	7 out of 66 = 11%
MB, FJP or Morsi linked to protests	31 out of 55 = 56%	16 out of 138 = 12%	27 out of 66 = 41%
The rest	20%	20%	25%



## Appendix F – Diversity of sources in Ahram Online

The Data supporting figure 3.3. In order to measure whether there is a diversity of sources used by online newspaper *Ahram Online*, I counted the sources in all periods and grouped them within three categories: a positive attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party, a negative attitude, or a neutral one. When a source had no opinion on the Brotherhood, Morsi or FJP I grouped them in a fourth category: unclear.

**Period 1**

Positive		Negative		Neutral	
MB	4	Government spokesperson	2	Foreign press	8
Opposition (to Mubarak)	2			Clinton	3
Allies to Morsi	2	NDP	1	Foreign expert	2
Rights groups	1	Security official	1	Local press	1
Israeli official	1	Suleiman	1	UN ambassador	1
Facebook youth movements	1			EU official	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>		<b>5</b>		<b>16</b>

**Period 2**

Positive		Negative		Neutral	
MB	22	Opposition	7	Judicial sources	6
SCAF	8	Shafiq member	4	Foreign news source	4
Morsi	2	Demonstrators	3	Own reporter	3
FJP	2	ElBaradei	3	Local news source	2
		Sabbahi	1	PEC spokesperson	2
		Amnesty International	1	Analist	2
		Kefaya	1	Research centre	1
				AUC	1
				Al Ahram	1
				Foreign politician	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>34</b>		<b>20</b>		<b>23</b>

Unclear: anonymous source (2), politician (2), religious authority (1) = 5

### Period 3

Positive		Negative		Neutral	
Morsi spokesperson	24	Rebel	18	Local media	25
Allies to Morsi	21	Opposition group	14	American embassy	11
FJP	12	Human rights group	12	Own reporter	11
MB	10	Protesters	12	Reuters	8
		SCAF	12	Al-Ahram	8
NSF	5	Security source	7		
Interior ministry	2	Activists	4	Foreign news source	5
Israel	2	Opposition members	3	Court info	3
Palestinians	2	Nour	2	United Nations	1
Salafists	1	Suleiman	1		
Qandil	1	Prosecutor general	1		
Hamas	1	Journalist syndicate statement	1		
Islamist leaders	1				
<b>Total</b>	<b>82</b>		<b>87</b>		<b>72</b>

Unclear: religious authority (4), local politicians (2), lawyers (2), judicial sources (1) = 9