Islam as "violent ideology" and immigration policies as "leftist hobbies": nativist trends in the election manifestos of the Dutch Freedom Party

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Abstract

This research investigates the development of nativism and the role of Islamophobia and affect in the manifestos of the Dutch Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV). The PVV is considered to be Populist Radical Right (PRR), a political stream of which nativism is regarded an important component. This research has been conducted with a qualitative content analysis of the party's manifestos from 2006 until 2023, with regard to the themes nativism, Islamophobia and affect. Results show that there has been a shift of interest in the manifestos, from Islam to immigration in general. The emotion 'hate' is found to be employed the most, later manifestos show an increase in the application of the emotion 'pain'. It is argued nativism has changed from a cultural context to an economical context, along with a growing sentiment of injustice.

Keywords: PVV, PRR, nativism, Islamophobia, affective politics

Content

Introduction

On the 23ʳᵈ of November 2023, the outcome of the Dutch national elections had become a subject of interest on an international scale. The considerably populist Partij Voor de Vrijheid (translated as freedom party, abbreviated PVV) had gained the majority of the votes (NOS, 2023a). According to the party's manifestos, the PVV's main goals are the preservation of Dutch culture, a stricter enforcement of law and standing up for the middle class (Crum, 2023; Vossen, 2017). Furthermore, the party is considered to be anti-immigration, anti-Islam and eurosceptical. Taking into account these characteristics, the party is considered to be part of the party family the Populist Radical Right (PRR) (Mudde, 2016). The party's leader, Geert Wilders, is known mostly for his criticism on Islam (Crum, 2023). Though the PVV's victory came as a surprise to many in the Netherlands, over the last years, the PRR paved its way throughout Europe (Rump, 2022; Meléndez & Kaltwasser, 2021).

The PVV's victory has led to concerns among scholars in the political field (NOS nieuws, 2023b). A significant number of electoral plans are at odds with the Dutch constitutional laws, such as the law which prohibits discrimination on religious grounds and the law which states that every citizen is allowed to practice their own religion, both individually and in community (art. 1 and 6 in Grondwet, 2024). Though the influence of the PRR in Europe has been minimal so far, research points out that individuals with a positive attitude towards the PRR are generally more mobilized than those who have a negative attitude towards the PRR. This means that those with a negative attitude towards the PRR are less politically active than those with a positive attitude towards the PRR. Hence, there is still reason for concern over the growing prominence of parties like the PVV (Meléndez & Kaltwasser, 2021).

The presence and growing popularity of the PRR is considered to be threatening to liberal societies. The promotion of illiberal ideas could initiate a process of democratic erosion, which is one of the main reasons for concern with regard to this political shift (Meléndez & Kaltwasser, 2021). Specifically, Wilders's criticism on Islam and immigrants are considered to be additional reasons for concern regarding his role as leader of the biggest party (Wilems & Lecluyse, 2023; NOS nieuws, 2023b). Both the anti-Islam attitude and the anti-immigrant attitude are aspects of the nativistic element of the Populist Radical Right (Mudde, 2016). For this reason, I will focus on the nativist aspects of the party's views. Considering the fact that emotion plays a role in political, especially populist, discourse, the party's views will also be examined with regard to affect.

Much has been written on the PVV and Geert Wilders, for instance by De Bruijn (2011), Lucardie & Voerman (2012), Vossen (2017) and Crum (2023). Rooijman (2013) conducted a content analysis in which the PVV's election manifestos were used as data. However, the political field is always in motion and more election manifestos have been published after these analyses. Additionally, more recent research on the Populist Radical Right can give new insights into the development of nativist ideology in the PVV. Vossen (2017) found that some of Wilders' views have changed over the years, arguably because of strategic reasons. This would suggest that the views of the party have also made a certain transition. Namely, Wilders is the only member of the PVV, which is known to be a unique composition of a political party (Van Wijk et. al, 2019; Vossen, 2017). In practice, this means that supporters of the party may not necessarily have influence on the course of the party and the content of the manifestos. In line with this, it remains unclear who has written the manifestos.

As Vossen (2017) argues, researching the PVV allows us to understand what drives the PVV and what to expect from the PVV's course in the future. Following this argumentation, researching the history of the PVV can inform us about the party's stability and interests and help to predict the future. Since the development of the party's manifestos has not been studied before, there is a gap of knowledge. Also, the manifestos have not been examined with regard to affect. Therefore, I would like to fill this gap with an analysis that spans 17 years of election manifestos of the PVV.

In this research, my aim is to find out how the development of the PVV's election manifestos can be described, focusing on nativism and Islamophobia. Since the focus is placed on the manifestos, other sources related to the PVV, such as election campaigns or debates from the second chamber, have not been taken into account for the analysis.

I chose the themes nativism and Islamophobia because they characterize the PVV specifically and because they connect to the PRR profile. Considering the way in which the themes nativism and Islamophobia are addressed, affective politics come into play (Zembylas, 2019). For this reason, the manifestos have also been analyzed with respect to affect.

This leads to the question: How have nativistic elements developed in the election manifestos of the PVV since its establishment; what is the role of Islamophobia in this and to what affective themes are they linked? To analyze this, several sub questions have to be answered:

1. What is populism, the Populist Radical Right and how does the PVV fit in?

2. How are nativism and Islamophobia related?

3. To what societal problems is Islam or the Muslim identity connected by the PVV?

4. How have Islamophobia and nativism in general developed in the election manifestos of the PVV?

5. What is the relation between Islamophobia and affective politics in the election manifestos of the PVV?

The first three questions will be answered in the first chapter. Then, in the methods section, I will explain what methods I used to conduct this research. In the results section, I will discuss my findings and explain how text fragments were coded and which decisions were made. In the discussion, I will give meaning to the results and provide possible explanations for the results. Here, the fourth and fifth question will be answered. In the discussion section, I will offer interpretations of the results that were found. Here I will also mention limitations of the research and suggestions for future research. I will conclude with a synthesis in which my findings are connected to the available literature in the field.

Chapter 1: Literature review and conceptual framework

The following paragraphs will illustrate an outline of the concepts that are used in this research. By combining the available literature, answers will be given to the first three sub questions, to be 'What is populism, the Populist Radical Right and how does the PVV fit in?', 'How are nativism and Islamophobia related?' And 'To what societal problems is Islam or the Muslim identity connected by the PVV?'. In the following sections, I will provide an overview of the relevant literature available regarding the PVV, PPR, Islamophobia, nativism and connecting themes. Firstly, I will elaborate on the content and origin of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid. Secondly, I will explain the ideology of populism and the Populist Radical Right. Thirdly, I will discuss definitions of Islamophobia and nativism. Because I have analyzed the manifestos with regard to emotion, it is of importance to display the available literature on affect in political discourse. Thus, in the last section, affective politics will be subject of discussion.

§ 1.1: Partij voor de Vrijheid

The PVV has been considered to be the biggest populist party in the Netherlands for years. The party is known for its negative views on immigration in general, and negative views

on Islam specifically. The party was established by Geert Wilders in 2006. With the exception of supporting a cabinet in 2012, the PVV has always been part of the opposition rather than the cabinet (Crum, 2023). Furthermore, the PVV has had reasonable electoral support since its establishment, unlike other right-wing populist parties such as *Leefbaar Nederland* and *Trots op Nederland* (translated as Livable Netherlands and Proud of the Netherlands, respectively), who could not secure electoral success. The considerably more extreme right-wing party Forum voor Democratie (translated as Forum for Democracy, FvD) claimed a large number of votes in the provincial elections of 2019. However, this party could also not maintain its success (Crum, 2023).

Nevertheless, the PVV is not the first populist party in the Netherlands that has gained reasonable electoral support. In 2002, the populist politician Pim Fortuyn established the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (translated as Pim Fortuyn List, LPF), which soon became one of the biggest parties in the country. Fortuyn was known for his flamboyant character, controversial statements and hostile attitude towards Islam. Shortly after the foundation of the party, Fortuyn was murdered by a left-wing animal rights-activist. The party still continued for a few years, but eventually disbanded due to internal quarrels (Vossen, 2017).

The murder of Fortuyn was not the only political murder in the early 2000s. The same fate awaited the well-known film producer Theo Van Gogh, who was "known better for his provocative remarks and black humour than his films" (Vossen, 2017, p. 14). In 2004, Van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim radical (Vossen, 2017). These political murders caused unrest among the citizens of the Netherlands. Both Fortuyn and Van Gogh were openly critical of the Islam, which connects them. Their murders caused the debate on the limitations of freedom of speech to be subject of discussion again. Along with the 9/11 attacks years prior, these murders formed a breeding ground for criticism towards Islam and Muslims (Vossen, 2017). After the LPF dissolved in 2007, a gap emerged in the political spectrum. The absence of a conservative party to carry out critical views on Islam and immigration would help to facilitate the establishment of the PVV (Vossen, 2017).

In line with the views of Van Gogh and Fortuyn, PVV's leader Geert Wilders is also characterized by his criticism on Islam. He is known for his controversial statements, which regularly contain hyperbolic language (Kalkhoven, 2017). These controversial statements often concern Islam and the Muslim community in the Netherlands and abroad, which he views as threatening. The growing presence of the Islam in the Netherlands is one of the reasons Wilders founded the PVV back in 2006 (Lucardie & Voerman, 2012). Yet, the party's 2023 election

manifesto still mentions multiple anti-Islam concepts, such as restrictions on the hijab, mosques and the Qur'an (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p. 8). In 2020, Wilders was called to trial for one of his statements. During a speech at a gathering with supporters of his party, he asked if they wanted more Moroccans, or less. The court considered this to be group defamation (Gerechtshof, 2020). Regardless, the party is still voted for, now more than ever. According to scholars, by framing Muslims as urgent threats, hostility against Muslims has become an electoral strategy (Cervi, 2020).

Wilders is also engaged in international politics. On the online platform X, Wilders mentions his approval and admiration for the Hungarian president Orbán on several occasions:

> Hungary is an example for all EU countries and Orban is a hero and deserves the Nobel Prize. He dared to close the borders for Islamic fortune seekers. He is protecting his civilians against terror and is defending his country's identity. (Wilders, 2018a)[1]

When comparing to current Dutch prime minister Rutte, he claims that Orbán is preferable:

> Telegraaf (newspaper) is parroting leftist critics. Rather ten times Orban than one Rutte, who is ruining the Dutch democracy by open border, EU, mass immigration and Islamization. And why 'constitutional state'? Political process #Wilders, the issue of Poch (Argentinian ex-pilot who had been in custody in the Netherlands for eight years and was then acquitted), Covid-law. The Netherlands is becoming the new dictatorship (Wilders, 2020).[2]

Paradoxically, Wilders has been propagating a direct democracy for years (Vossen, 2017). It is not explained how the promotion of illiberal ideas and the promotion of a democracy coexist, however. Nevertheless, Collantes (2022) notes that it is characteristic for populists in general to point out deficiencies in democracies and at the same time defend totalitarian regimes or democracies that scholars would consider to be illiberal due to rejection of multiculturalism and minority rights (Bonet & Zamorano, 2021).

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[1] Wilders, G. (2018a, translation to English from Dutch original), 'Hongarije is het voorbeeld voor de EU en Orban is een held en verdient de Nobelprijs. Hij durfde de grenzen te sluiten voor islamitische gelukszoekers. Hij beschermt zijn inwoners tegen terreur en verdedigt de identiteit van zijn land.'

[2] Wilders, G. (2020, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Telegraaf papagaait linkse critici na. Liever 10 keer Orban dan 1 Rutte, die Nederlandse democratie om zeep helpt door open grenzen, EU, massaimmigratie en islamisering. En hoezo rechtstaat? Politiek proces #Wilders, kwestie Poch, Coronawet. Nederland wordt de nieuwe dictatuur.'.

Summarized, scholars consider the PVV to be a right-wing populist party and has had reasonable electoral support since its establishment. The party's leader Geert Wilders is characterized by his populist phrases and anti-Islam views. His criticism on Islam and the state could be defined as aggressive and negative (Kalkhoven, 2017). He divides the population between the people and the elite, where the people are pure and the elite corrupt. This is a core characteristic of the ideology of populism, which in combination with authoritarianism and nativism forms the fundamentals of the Populist Radical Right (Mudde, 2016). Wilders pleads against the idea of a pluralist society and votes structurally against measures that could be beneficial furthering such a society (Crum, 2023). To understand the party and its ideology on a deeper level, it is necessary to outline what populism and the Populist Radical Right entail, according to the literature in this field.

§ 1.2: Populism and the Populist Radical Right

The political landscape seems to be taking a turn in Europe. The Populist Radical Right has grown in popularity in recent years (Meléndez & Kaltwasser, 2021). Though norms, beliefs and values can change over time, the normalisation of radical right ideas over the past few years stands out (De Jonge & Gaufman, 2022). Mudde (2016) adds that though the influence of the PPR on parties, people and policies is minimal, its presence has pushed other (mostly mainstream right-wing) parties more to the right.

For the past few years, we are seeing a growing tendency among civilians in Western-European countries to display mistrust against the established politics (Webber, 2023). This is in accordance with the populist view that 'the elite' is not serving the people as they should (Mudde, 2004). At the same time, Islamophobia is becoming more mainstream among society and contributing to an anti-immigrant attitude (Kaya, 2020; Cervi, 2020). It is argued that the PVV encompasses the anti-elitist, anti-Islam and anti-immigrant attitude (Mudde, 2016; Van Wijk et.al, 2019).

Wilders puts an emphasis on the 'ordinary people' and thereby blames 'the elite' for not serving these people. Following, in 2015, he spoke of a 'fake parliament' (Crum, 2023). This anti-elitist standpoint is a recurring element in Wilders' views and corresponds with the core of populism (Van Wijk et. al, 2019). Though there is not a full consensus among scholars on how to define populism, Cas Mudde has laid part of the foundation of the research on populism. Therefore, in this study, I will use his definition of populism:

> [populism is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

According to this definition, populist politicians represent 'the people' as a homogenous and pure group whose will should be heard (Mudde, 2004). Often, the focus is placed on virtues of the 'ordinary men', which can foster a sense of belonging (Bonansinga, 2020, p.97).

Canovan (1984) has laid the foundation for the analysis of the use of the term 'the people'. This term has several connotations that display the appeals of this component of populism. Firstly, the term 'the people' implies that there is a democratic aspect in society. This complies with the idea that decisions regarding the country should be made by its citizens. Secondly, it can refer to an average socioeconomic status, and therefore appeal to the majority of the citizens. With regard to this connotation, Wilders uses the metaphor 'Henk en Ingrid', who represent the common people and how they struggle to pay their bills. This metaphor is used in the narrative that pleads that politics should make life better for the common people, thus 'Henk en Ingrid', rather than benefiting the elite (Rinaldi & Bekker, 2021). In this narrative, the distance between the elite and 'the people' is widened. Thirdly, in combination with a nativist perspective, 'the people' can refer to those who refer to themselves as native-born citizens. In this last perspective, the term 'the people' appeals to those who consider themselves righteous citizens and distinguish themselves from those who are not native-born citizens (Canovan, 1984; Bonansinga, 2020).

Additionally, populism is considered to be a thin ideology, according to Freeden (1998) and Mudde (2004). This view entails that populism is never the sole ideology of a party, but rather an extra layer that is always combined with 'bigger' ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism. Though populism is not intrinsically linked to either right- or left-wing politics, it is often associated with right-wing politics. Combined with other characteristics, the Populist Radical Right (PRR) is a category separate from other populist ideologies.

The Populist Radical Right consists of three components, to be populism, authoritarianism and nativism (Mudde, 2016). Populism thus refers to the ideological distinction between the people and the elite, as the quote earlier in this paragraph describes (Mudde, 2004). Authoritarianism refers to the desire for strict law enforcement and heavier punishment (Mudde, 2016). Nativism refers to the desire for a state that only inhabits citizens

that belong to the 'native group' (Mudde, 2007, p.19). Nativism coincides with an anti-immigrant attitude, because immigration could (eventually) lead to a multicultural society, which threatens the nativist view (Cervi, 2020). Authoritarianism in combination with an anti-immigration attitude could propose the punishment of eviction when a crime is committed by someone with an immigration background (Mudde, 2016).

On the social media platform X, Wilders draws the connection between authoritarianism and nativism in the following tweet: "Get those Moroccan rioters out of here. Criminal scum should leave our country. [Take away their] Dutch nationality and be off to Morocco, demolish that country instead! #Marokkanen #rellen #criminelenhetlanduit" (Wilders, 2022a).[3]

In this tweet, Wilders calls for removing criminal Moroccans citizens from the Netherlands and refers to them as 'criminal scum'. He claims their Dutch nationality should be taken away and they should move to Morocco to 'demolish' that country instead. The message displays both authoritarian and nativist elements and is therefore an example of the interaction between the different components of the Populist Radical Right.

As stated before, support for the PRR is growing. Also, the rise of the Populist Radical Right is not typical for the Netherlands. There seems to be an ideological shift to the PRR in Western-Europe (Witte, 2017; Mudde, 2016; Van Wijk et. al, 2018). This shift coincides with a growing sense of euroscepticism, which is generally driven by the view that the EU is not competent in "keeping the wealthy countries wealthy" (Rump, 2022, p. 158). According to Vossen (2017), euroscepticism can additionally be explained through nationalism. In a nationalist view, the protection of the national interests and autonomy is one of the key values. In order to gain national autonomy, the nation should be self-governing and thus, national values are prioritized above European values or interests.

Witte (2017) adds that the rise in PRR corresponds with what he calls "a climate characterized by mistrust" (Witte, 2017, p. 231). A display of scepticism towards the media and science as a whole is becoming more frequent than before, which is a worrying presence in a functioning democracy (Witte, 2017). Also, globalization could have played a role in the growing popularity of PRR. Mudde (2016) mentions the loser-of-globalization thesis, in which he explains that globalization knows winners and losers. The internationalisation of trade, for

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[3] Wilders, G. (2022, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Wegwezen met die Marokkaanse relschoppers. Crimineel tuig moet ons land uit. Nederlandse nationaliteit afpakken en hup naar Marokko #Marokkanen #rellen #criminelenhetlanduit'.

example, leads to a decline in European industries. Additionally, it has been an influence on movements such as mass immigration. According to the loser-of-globalization thesis, people impacted by globalization in negative ways tend to be more inclined to vote for PRR parties. Hence, the public opinion has shifted to the right (Mudde, 2016). Though this thesis helps to understand people's interest in the PRR, it remains challenging to predict voting behavior through objective measures (Held & Patana, 2023). As Mudde (2016) puts it, the globalization thesis explains both too much and too little, for there is a discrepancy in the amount of losers of globalization and voters for PRR.

It cannot be denied that the media play a role in the popularity of the PRR. De Jonge (2019) points out that in the Netherlands, journalists generally aim to position themselves as neutral as possible. This means they do not approach Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) differently compared to other parties. As a result, the PVV generally has the same opportunities for the spread of its views compared to other parties. This contributes to the development of the radical right that is becoming more mainstream. Additionally, the emergence of the earlier named Forum for Democracy, a party known for its extreme views and conspiratorial remarks, has contributed to the normalization of the PVV's views (De Jonge & Gaufman, 2022).

Building on mostly the works of Cas Mudde (2004, 2006, 2007 and 2016), I have provided a framework surrounding populism and the PRR and how the PVV fits in this framework. As former research has pointed out, mainly the party's negative take on Islam and immigration are characteristic for the PVV. Considering the concerns involving nativism and Islamophobia, I will zoom in on these themes next.

§ 1.3: Nativism and Islamophobia

Nativism can be operationalised into several elements, such as an anti-immigrant attitude, Islamophobia and the desire to preserve national values and/or culture (Mudde, 2016; Silva, 2018). For this research I use the following definition of nativism: "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state." (Mudde, 2007, p.19). In practice, this can lead to the view that citizens who carry the nationality of the country have more rights than immigrants. This sentiment can also be present in the idea that the country in question was built by the ancestors

of the native group, and that thus these native people are entitled to the country's resources (Abadi et. al, 2024).

Though the PVV is often characterized by mostly Islamophobia, there is an overlap between Islamophobia and other nativist elements (Silva, 2018). This overlap manifests itself in, for example, the idea that immigration will lead to multiculturalism. In this respect, multiculturalism is perceived as a threat to people's authenticity. Thus, the growing presence of Islam can coincide with an anti-immigrant attitude (Cervi, 2020).

I will use the term 'Islamophobia' to describe: "(…) an unfounded hostility towards Islam". This definition can be expanded with the portrayal of Islam as:

> (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them; Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist; Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'; Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage (Feldman & Stocker, 2019).

There has been criticism on the term Islamophobia, for the word 'phobia' would imply fear, though often 'prejudice' is meant (Feldman & Stocker, 2019). Kaya (2020) refers to the term 'Islamophobism' instead of Islamophobia because:

> [Islamophobism is] an ideology is being constructed by ruling political groups to foster a kind of false consciousness, or delusion, within the majority society as a way of covering up their own failure to manage social, political, economic, and legal forces and consequently the rise of inequality, injustice, poverty, unemployment, insecurity, and alienation (Kaya, 2020, p.9).

Kaya (2020) argues that the reason why ruling political groups foster hostile attitudes against Muslim immigrants or Islam is to 'cover up' other societal problems. However, with regard to the PVV, it seems to be the case that Muslims and Islam are not a mere distraction, but rather are portrayed as a core societal problem (Van Wijk et. al, 2019). Thus, Islamophobia and nativism are used to mobilize instead of covering up. Additionally, although the PVV has risen in popularity, it cannot be viewed as a ruling political group, for they have been in the opposition most of their time (Crum, 2023). While it is important to mention the ideological dimension of prejudice against Islam and Muslims, for this research I will work with the term Islamophobia in the broadest sense, as quoted by Feldman & Stocker (2019). An addition made

by Abbas (2019) can also be taken into account, namely the 'normalisation of anti-Muslim hatred' (Abbas, 2019, p.68).

Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and later attacks, Islamophobia has increased drastically. In this context, extremism is perceived as a problem that is inherent to Islam. Attacks from 2010 onwards in Western Europe have again led to a renewed focus on Islamophobia in this area. A connection has been found between the rise of Islamophobia and the rise of the PRR (Abbas, 2019).

Earlier research has pointed out that there is a relation between nativism and Islamophobia specifically. This relation can be explained through several dimensions. As noted earlier, nativism often opposes multiculturalism, because multiculturalism implies the presence of a considerably tolerant society that is open to strangers (Lesch, 2020). Thus, when Islam is spreading in generally non-Islamic countries or areas, the religion might be perceived as a threat to the culturally more homogenous society. Moreover, the authentic image of what an 'average Dutch person' should look like is troubled by multiculturalism (Cervi, 2020). In some cases, this coincides with and incites fear, for example the fear that white people as a race would (eventually) become a minority, or the fear of Eurabia, meaning the slow takeover of Europe by Muslim forces (Bangstad, 2014). Lesch (2020) adds that in societies with a Christian background, the growing visibility of a foreign religion such as Islam is more often regarded in a negative way compared to societies with other backgrounds.

Secondly, research indicates that economic strife influences one's voting choices during elections. A link has been found between rising rental prices and a more negative attitude towards refugees and immigration as a whole (Held & Patana, 2023). The PVV adapts to this by using the earlier mentioned metaphor of 'Henk en Ingrid' to illustrate the common man's suffering from decisions made by the government, often referring to the increasing immigration rate (Vossen, 2017). In these cases, the sentiment of status immigrants getting things for free whereas the Dutch have to pay or wait for them, is present. As Wilders tweeted in 2022:

> And in the meantime, fortune seekers are making advertisements on TikTok for our super de luxe luxurious five-star shelter locations on cruise ships. This cabinet's policy is madness, insane and sickening. Our people are getting a crumb, strangers are getting everything (Wilders, 2022b).[4]

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[4] Wilders, G. (2022, October 22, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'En ondertussen maken gelukzoekers op tiktok reclame voor onze super-de-luxe luxe vijfsterren-opvanglocaties op cruiseschepen. Dit

In the manifesto of 2023, another reference illustrates this sentiment: "Asylum seekers enjoy free, delicious buffets, whereas Dutch families have to cut back on groceries" (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p.6).[5]

Lastly, populist leaders tend to blame the 'soft' approach to immigration for societal problems. Supposedly weak policies have enabled more (Muslim) immigrants to come, which would have led to societal problems such as unemployment, violence and crime (Kaya, 2020). The PVV tends to blame left-wing policies for facilitating violence committed by immigrants or violence motivated by Islam (Vossen, 2017). Skonieczny (2018) adds that populism directs feelings of shame towards others, using both the elites and immigrants as scapegoats.

Islamophobic elements in the PVV's views can be found in various sources, such as election manifestos, X, debates and interviews. The following statement from the manifesto of 2021 illustrates criticism on Islam: "Islam is not a religion in the first place, but rather the most violent ideology in existence" (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p. 7).[6] Moreover, research on the PVV points out that the party has displayed criticism on Islam and Muslims since the beginning of the party (Van Wijk et. al, 2019; Kaya, 2020). Crum (2023) additionally argues that this criticism can be regarded as the party's trademark. Though Wilders claimed in an interview in the early 2000s that Islam in itself was a respectable religion and not all Muslims were prone to be radical, his view seems to have changed throughout the years and his personal stance on Islam, and therefore the party's, became more critical (Vossen, 2017).

This paragraph has given an introduction to both Islamophobia and nativism, with specific regard to the PVV. The paragraph has laid out the problems multiculturalism poses to both nativism and Islamophobia. Concluding, the dynamic between Islamophobia, nativism, multiculturalism and populism has been discussed. To end this chapter, the next paragraph will explicate the influence of affect in political discourse.

§ 1.4: Affective politics

Concerning the way in which Islamophobia is presented in political discourse, affective politics come into play. Much research has already been conducted on the subject of affective

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kabinetsbeleid is gestoord, krankzinnig en ziek. Onze mensen krijgen een kruimel, vreemdelingen krijgen alles.' This quote refers to the temporary shelters made available to a number of asylum seekers. Due to a lack of available shelters, cruise ships were being used to accommodate these people.

[5] PVV. (2023:6, translation to English from Dutch original), 'Asielzoekers doen zich op luxe cruiseschepen tegoed aan gratis heerlijke buffetten, terwijl Nederlandse gezinnen moeten bezuinigen op boodschappen'.

[6] PVV. (2021:7, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'De islam is in de eerste plaats geen religie, maar de meest gewelddadige politieke ideologie die er bestaat.'

politics. The overarching conclusion is that it is not the mere question if affective politics play a role in the political field, but rather how they play a role, especially in populist discourse (Zembylas, 2019; Hamilton, 2023). In her work *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Ahmed (2004) describes the connection between emotions and societal structures and the impact of certain emotions. She does not focus on what emotions *are*, but rather on what emotions *do* and how they are used in political discourse. Central to her work is the complex relation between emotions and (in)justice.

Affective practices can be described as "patterned forms of human activity articulating, mobilising and organising affect and discourse as a central part of the practice" (Wetherell et al., 2015, p. 57). These affective practices thus display mobilizing efforts that are being made in (political) discourse, such as the perceived threat of multiculturalism. In this research, I use the term affect to refer to the broader array of emotions.

The relationship between ratio and emotion is a complex one. The terms are often being framed as opposing. Ahmed (2004) notes that emotion is often, unjustly, posed subordinated to ratio. Jasper (2011) argues that the way individuals feel about a certain issue, often influences the way they think about it. It is therefore not possible to separate these terms, for they are inherently intertwined. However, as noted by Hamilton (2023), emotion seems to be claiming a special position when it comes to populism. Through emotion, individuals who normally do not share an interest in politics, can be drawn to the political field. As Vossen (2017) argues, fear was one of the biggest reasons for most of the PVV voters to choose this party. Fear of a changing economy, terrorism, immigration and Islam are some of the examples. Chapter 5 will show how the use of certain words can provoke specific emotions. Concluding, affective politics refer to the involvement of emotions that is inherently part of political discourse, though especially in populist discourse.

Salmela & Von Scheve (2017) argue that the emotion of repressed shame is specific to right-wing populism. In this context, they describe two mechanisms that touch upon the involvement of affective politics in right-wing populism. The first mechanism describes that negative emotions, such as fear, can transform through repressed shame into anger, resentment and hatred towards perceived 'enemies of the self' (Salmela & Von Scheve, 2017, p.587). Examples of these perceived enemies are as immigrants, refugees, unemployed citizens and political and cultural elites. The second mechanism involves the emotional distancing from identities that cause negative emotions while becoming more favorable of identities that are considered to be more stable and/or exclusive, such as nationality or ethnicity (Salmela & Von

Scheve, 2017). Both mechanisms combined help explain the relationship between emotions and its affinity with certain right-wing populist views.

The evocation of mainly negative emotions seems to be a vital component in populist discourse (Hamilton, 2023; Joosse & Zelinsky, 2022). The emotion of anger can easily be mobilized through discursively identifying patterns of injustice or immorality, notes Bonansinga (2020). According to this research, there is often an underlying dimension of insecurity in many such emotions. Injustice and immorality display an apparent vulnerability, which could fuel feelings of insecurity and anger. Another example of the dimension of insecurity involves the nostalgic sentiment that is often used in populist narratives. In these narratives, a populist refers to earlier times that were more secure and predictable compared to the present. This contrast stresses the current insecurity, which could provoke other negative emotions, such as the fear of a changing economy (Vossen, 2017).

Mansbridge & Macedo (2019) also mention the use of ideas evolving around security. They point out that populists could at all times stress the importance of a healthy economy, because this is of relevance for those who are struggling but also for those who are successful and want to secure their position. Economic security is posed as relevant for every citizen. In this regard, Wilders stresses the importance of economic security mostly for the less wealthy (Vossen, 2017).

Bonansinga (2020) states that we should get rid of the idea that emotion is more important in populist discourse than it is in other political discourse. It is not an "emotional phenomenon in an entirely unemotional and entirely rational world", rather, the success of populism is due to the specific emotion that is used in a setting that is already emotional (Bonansinga, 2020, p.99). Emotions such as fear, nostalgia, anger and pride are interrelated in the populist perspective, however. The feeling of becoming a stranger in one's own land displays both fear and anger about the present and future, but also a sense of nostalgia in thinking about the way things used to be.

The evocation of positive emotions, however, can also play a viable role in the explanation of the appeal of certain ideologies. For instance, the love for one's country can contribute to the appeal of nationalism. In this view, a vision is built of a contemporary strong nationality separated from the identities that inflict negative emotions (Zembylas, 2019). Consequently, both the positive and negative emotions reinforce one another and strengthen the

nationalist view. Bonansinga (2020) concludes that within the same narrative, a complex intermingling of different emotions can take place.

In the PVV's views, the presence of Islam is often used in a narrative where it is portrayed as having a negative effect on Dutch culture. Narratives simplify complexity, and by doing so, a new reality can be created. Nordensvard & Ketola (2021) describe how the application of a populist narrative creates a frame in which emotions are connected with values and interests. They argue that populist frames are used to influence people by affect rather than by ideological or intellectual content.

De Bruijn (2011) discusses frames used by Wilders to convey the party's ideology. For example, one of Wilders' frames can be considered the frame of 'small risk, major disaster'. Wilders poses a picture of what is by many regarded to be an alarming situation, such as the implementation of the Sharia in the Netherlands. The risk is small, but the disaster would be major. Accordingly, the greater the disaster, the more inclined people are towards a zero-tolerance policy on the grounds of for example dangerous Muslim immigrants (De Bruijn, 2011, p.29). In this frame, Muslim immigrants are not merely portrayed as troublemakers, but as "street terrorists" and future soldiers of Jihad (Vossen, 2017, p.31). Another frame addressed by De Bruijn is called the 'totum pro parte' frame, used when a figure of speech refers to a part of the whole (De Bruijn, 2011, p.33). Examples are when stereotypical remarks are made about criminal Moroccans or when attention is drawn to 'us' and 'we', when in fact only a small portion of the population is meant.

Additional to the frames, specific language is used by Wilders, for instance to target Muslims. To name an example, Wilders has multiple times referred to head scarves as 'head rags' (Vossen, 2017). The findings of Kalkhoven (2015) have shown that at least up until 2015, a significant effect is found in the PVV on the use of negative hyperboles compared to the other parties. In this way, populist discourse can be used to provoke certain associations, which can eventually mobilize like-minded people (Skonieczny, 2018).

Affective politics thus encompass the use of emotion in political discourse. Though it is argued that emotion is especially relevant in populist discourse, the notion that politics is otherwise mostly rational, should be revised. With regard to the PVV, a few frames have been described that illustrate the way in which the party's leader Geert Wilders draws on emotion.

In this chapter, I operationalised the concepts populism, Populist Radical Right (PRR), nativism, Islamophobia and affective politics. Along this research, I will use the definitions that

were given in this chapter. I also provided information on the PVV's structure, its characteristics and its leader Geert Wilders. Considering the growing immigration rate and the threat multiculturalism forms to nativist ideology, I hypothesize that the anti-Islam and anti-immigration sentiment have increased over the years. Based on former research into the PVV, I also expect to find a relationship between the degree of safety and Islam. This means that when remarks about insecurity are made, a connection is drawn to Islam or the Muslim community.

Chapter 2: Method

In this research, I am concerned with the question: How have nativistic elements developed in the election manifestos of the PVV since its establishment, what is the role of Islamophobia in this and to what affective themes are they linked? In the previous chapter, the first three sub questions have been discussed, to be: 'What is populism, the Populist Radical Right and how does the PVV fit in?', 'How are nativism and Islamophobia related?' and 'To what societal problems is Islam or the Muslim identity connected by the PVV?'. These questions have been answered by combining existing literature in the fields of PRR, PVV, nativism and Islamophobia.

In this chapter, I will describe the research methods and analytic strategies that I used to answer the last two questions, to be: 'How have Islamophobia and nativism in general developed in the election manifestos of the PVV?' and 'What is the relation between Islamophobia and affective politics in the election manifestos of the PVV?'. Because I am interested in the development of the party with regard to the election manifestos, all of the PVV's published manifestos serve as data.

The research is conducted in the form of a qualitative content analysis by analysing election manifestos. Because this data was already available and did not have to be gathered in this research, the election manifestos can be regarded as secondary data. Qualitative content analysis can be considered a suitable design for answering the research question, because of its descriptive nature and focus on the meaning of the text(s). It also contains an interpretational component, which is important in deriving the findings' meaning (Drisko & Maschi, 2015). Due to the interest in the development of certain aspects of the PVV's manifestos over time, a developmental approach is chosen as research design.

In the context of researching the development of the PVV, a discourse analysis would have been a suitable choice for an analysis as well. Conduction of a discourse analysis could help to give insight into the manners in which the PVV is addressed, whether by supporters or in the mainstream media. An analysis with regard to the frames that are used, mostly by Wilders, can also provide us with information about the workings of the party. However, considering the amount of time available for this research, the choice was made to focus solely on the election manifestos. Therefore, the research question is only focused on the development of the PVV's election manifestos.

The data consists of the election manifestos of the PVV designed for the Second Chamber elections in 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021 and 2023 (*N*=6). Election manifestos can be defined as 'strategic documents written by politically sophisticated party elites' (Garry & Laver, 2000, p. 620). As mentioned before, it is not clear who wrote the PVV's manifestos. However, since they were published under the party's name, they can be regarded as official documents. Election manifestos can be considered election programmes, but since the term 'manifesto' is commonly used in the literature on the subject, I will refer to the texts as manifestos rather than programmes (Volkens et. al, 2009).

The manifestos have been retrieved through the Documentation centre for Dutch Political Parties (Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, https://www.rug.nl/research/dnpp/). Election manifestos shine light on the party's goals and ideals concerning various issues. It has to be stated that they often tap into current political problems (Proksch et. al, 2011). This means that the manifestos are published in a certain context. For this reason, I elaborated on the circumstances in which some of the statements were written when this was necessary for understanding the meanings of the texts.

The manifestos composed for elections on European and regional level were left out of this research to be able to compare the national manifestos more effectively on their content and focus on developments with regard to the discussed themes over time. National election manifestos can thus be regarded as inclusion criteria, whereas European and regional manifestos can be regarded as exclusion criteria. Considering that election manifestos are official documents of a party, they can be regarded as a valid source of information on the party's views (Laver & Garry, 2000). For the reason that they are issued at regular intervals, election manifestos can additionally be regarded as reliable to show a party's development over time (Volkens et. al, 2009).

In qualitative content analysis, coding is a key component. In this research, I used a combination of the conventional and directive approach for deriving codes as described by Hsieh & Shannon (2005). The conventional approach entails that the codes are derived directly from the data. The directive approach entails that the codes are derived from theories found in academic literature. These approaches can be regarded as inductive and deductive coding, respectively (Drisko & Maschi, 2015). The combination of the conventional and directive approach enabled me to start with a set of codes and add new ones along the way. This approach has helped me to engage with the data in a flexible manner.

The codes were used in the analysis of the manifestos with the support of the programme Atlas.ti. This programme enabled me to compare the manifestos and label parts of the text with the codes named in the appendix. Codes were assigned to (parts of) sentences that link to that code. Occasionally, the same piece was labeled with multiple codes if both codes were relevant. This process is considered to be a major component of the Constant Comparative Method, as explained by Boeije (2002). This method is suitable for this design, because in qualitative research, interpretation and comparison go hand in hand. The Constant Comparative Method systemizes the process of analysis and is characterized by several steps, which are:

1. Comparison within a single interview.

2. Comparison between interviews within the same group.

3. Comparison of interviews from different groups (Boeije, 2002, 395).

The Constant Comparative Method counts two more steps, however, these are not relevant for this research. Therefore, steps 4 and 5 have been left out. The first three steps have been applied, but with regard to manifestos instead of interviews. The Constant Comparative Method structures the process of coding and comparing. Due to its transparency, it increases the traceability and credibility of the research. The fact that the data is published and available to everyone, there were no ethical issues to consider with regard to the collection of the data.

As stated in the previous chapter, nativism can be operationalised in the categories anti-immigrant attitude and (the fear of) identity threat. In the case of the PVV, these categories often coincide with Islamophobia. According to literature on Islamophobia, Islam is often claimed to have a negative impact on the domains of safety (Mudde, 2016), economics (Rinaldi & Bekker, 2021) and (Western) culture (Kaya, 2020). For this reason, these domains were chosen as the starting point for further coding and subdivided into more codes. To measure the

development of affective politics in the manifestos, codes were added under the name *emotion* and then subdivided (see appendix).

Since the research is focused on the development of the election manifestos, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the internal motivations of the PVV, or Geert Wilders for that matter. Due to the relatively small dataset, this study is not able to provide insights in the interrelationships of different themes that are generalizable for the PVV. The size of the dataset drew me into a qualitative content analysis focused on individual codes. This research design, namely, enables me to examine the tone of the manifestos, which I found to be more important in answering the research question.

Chapter 3: The PVV's agenda

In this research, I carried out the Constant Comparative Method as explained in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will describe my findings during the qualitative content analysis. First, I will extend on the process of the Constant Comparative Method. Consequently, I will describe the findings with regard to the themes immigration, Islam, safety and identity, respectively. The interpretation of these results will follow in the discussion.

Table 1

Overview of the election manifestos

Title manifesto	Translation	Year of publication	Amount of pages
Verkiezingspamflet	Election pamphlet	2006	6
De agenda van hoop en optimisme	The agenda of hope and optimism	2010	60
Hún Brussel, óns Nederland	*Their* Brussels, *our* Netherlands	2012	56
Nederland weer van ons!	The Netherlands ours again!	2017	1
Toelichting op de speerpunten van de PVV	Clarification of the pillars of the PVV	2017	4

| Het gaat om u | It is about you | 2021 | 52 |
| Nederlanders weer op 1 | The Dutch number 1 again | 2023 | 46 |

After the first round of coding, 56 different codes were used, which resulted in a total of 518 quotations. The manifestos of 2010, 2012, 2021 and 2023 share the same structure, namely a division of themes with each theme starting with a problem statement which is followed by a list of solutions. To avoid double-coding the information in the texts, I duplicated the code tree (see 'CODE TREE PROBLEM STATEMENT' in the appendix). Codes that were applied in the first section, to be the problem statement, were added an additional 'P'. The regular codes were applied in the second section, to be the solutions (so *immigration_rights* was used in the solutions section and *P_immigration_rights* was used in the problem statement). In accordance, code groups were made in Atlas.ti to create a division between codes applied in the problem statement and in the solution section.

After the second round of coding, more codes were added and applied. Some of the predefined codes turned out not to be relevant, for this reason they have been crossed out in the code tree (see appendix). The codes added in the first round were marked the color orange, the codes added in the second round were marked red. The several rounds of coding eventually resulted in a total of 53 codes and 585 quotations. The difference in the amount of pages between the manifestos has been taken into account in the analyzing process. The 2023 manifesto has 46 pages whereas the 2006 manifesto has a mere 6 pages. Thus, the amount of codes does not necessarily display an emphasis on a specific theme. Table 2 shows an overview of the amount of all the codes that were used throughout the manifestos. Table 3 and 4 show the code distribution of respectively the codes in the solutions section and the problem statement. The colors of the codes were assigned randomly.

Table 2

Code distribution of all parent codes

Table 3

Code distribution of parent codes in the solutions section

Table 4

Code distribution of parent codes in the problem statement

In this research, I am interested in the nativist trends and developments of Islamophobia in the PVV's election manifestos. The manifestos of 2010, 2012, 2021 and 2023 all count at least 46 pages and are thematically divided. All share a section on immigration policy and the influence of Islam. Remarkably, the codes concerning immigration and Islam were often used in domains that do not directly relate to immigration or Islam. For instance, in the section healthcare of the manifesto of 2012, the following measure is suggested: "Only immediate assistance for (adult) asylum seekers and illegals" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p. 41).[7] The problem statement of this section does not mention the subject 'immigration' with regard to the healthcare system, however.

§ 3.1: Immigration

In general, a change has been found in the ratio between codes assigned to Islam and immigration. When taking into account the respectively larger manifestos (2010, 2012, 2021 and 2023), the focus on Islam (pink) seems to have shifted to a focus on immigration (gray) (see table 2). Whereas in the manifesto of 2021 counted 36 *P_immigration* codes and 40 *P_Islam* codes, the manifesto of 2023 counted 60 *P_immigration* codes and 12 *P_Islam* codes. However, these two codes only share 15 co-occurrences in all the manifestos combined. This means that only on 15 occasions, a statement was applied with both *P_immigration* and *P_Islam*. Of the 79 statements that were applied with *PRR_authoritarianism*, 19 were also applied with *immigration*. This means that roughly 15% of the suggested measures target immigrants or immigration. In the co-occurrence analysis, both *Immigration* and *P_immigration* did not show remarkable occurrences with other codes.

Among all of the manifestos, the 2023 manifesto contains the most codes related to immigration in the problem statement. Though in the solutions section, the manifestos of 2010 and 2012 contain more codes related to immigration. These findings are in contrast with the hypothesis that both anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiment would have increased over the years.

The code *Immigration_injustice* was added to stress the apparent injustice that is done towards native-born Dutch citizens because of immigrants or immigration. The following quote from the 2023 manifesto resembles that: "Home seekers are at their wits end. Dutch home

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[7] PVV. (2012:41, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Voor (meerderjarige) asielzoekers en illegalen alleen acute hulp'

seekers, at least. The ones that are comfortably off in their social housing, are status holders. They are still massively prioritized" (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p. 20).[8] Note here that a distinction is made between asylum seekers and status holders. According to the Central Bureau for Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS), asylum seekers are defined as persons who apply for the status of a refugee (CBS, n.d. A). They are referred to as status holders when this application has been granted and they have been given a residence permit (CBS, n.d. B). This 'prioritization', as mentioned in the statement, refers to the arrangement of social support for status holders. A residence permit, therefore, comes with social support, including a priority status in social housing.

The code *P_Immigration_injustice* has been applied in total 10 times in all of the manifestos, of which 9 were mentioned in the 2023 manifesto. Thus, livelihood security and injustice caused by immigration were more connected in this manifesto compared to other manifestos. This connection can be shown by the following statement: "Our welfare state is being drained by non-Western profiteers, for whom everything is taken care of down to the last detail. At the same time, the Dutch have to skip meals out of necessity (…)" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p. 10).[9]

Remarkably, the manifestos from 2010 and 2012 are the only manifestos that contain statements that disapprove of the general pardon. The general pardon is an arrangement which people can appeal to if they have been in the Netherlands for a long time but have not received a residence permit (Amnesty International, 2024). This arrangement was approved by the Second Chamber in 2007 and would provide around 10.000 immigrants with a Dutch passport (Vluchtelingenwerk, 2021). Both the manifestos from 2010 and 2012 state the exact same paragraph on the general pardon:

> Every four or five years a general pardon is obviously madness. People refuse to leave after a rejection, which is followed by the state television organising actions to portray these refusers as pathetic, supported by leftist subsidised action groups. [the] Consequence is yet another costly general pardon of billions [of euros]. We want a law

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[8] PVV. (2023:20, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Woningzoekenden zijn ten einde raad. Nederlandse woningzoekenden, althans. Want wie er wél warmpjes bijzitten in hun sociale huurwoning, zijn statushouders. Zij krijgen nog altijd massaal voorrang.'

[9] PVV. (2023:10, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Onze verzorgingsstaat wordt leeggezogen door niet-westerse profiteurs, voor wie wél alles tot in de puntjes wordt geregeld. Ondertussen slaan de Nederlanders noodgedwongen maaltijden over'

to prevent this. A law against the general pardon. (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.13;Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.35).[10]

Though this measure is not mentioned in the manifestos after 2012, Wilders did follow up on this on X in 2018, when replying on a news report that noted that "tens of asylum-families stay in the Netherlands even though they had been rejected [by the Dutch government] multiple times":

Rejected fortune seekers simply return on a tourist visa or stay in the Netherlands. Because they know that there is always a weakling like Cohen or Rutte who will come up with a general pardon. Solution: no more general pardon and immediate deportation with entry ban! (Wilders, 2018b).[11]

Refugee agency 'Vluchtelingenwerk' has mentioned in 2021 that despite the approval of the arrangement by the government, the application of a general pardon is still problematic (Vluchtelingenwerk, 2021). Though, considering that the general pardon is not mentioned in the manifestos after 2012, it can be assumed that the matter has become less important to the party.

§ 3.2: Islam

The code *Islam_measures* was applied when a statement described a measure that was specifically targeted at Muslims. An example can be found in the manifesto of 2010: "[closing] all Islamic schools" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p. 15).[12] This same statement is also mentioned on page 31 in the same manifesto. Interestingly, the application of this code rose from 2006 until 2012 (7, 13 and 16 measures, respectively), but has remained the amount of 4 in all the manifestos after. This code was combined with *Immigration_discouragement* when measures are aimed at future Muslim immigrants or immigrants from Islamic countries, which is mentioned for example in the manifesto of 2010: "Complete immigration stop for people

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[10] PVV. (2010:13, 2012:35, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Elke vier of vijf jaar een generaal pardon is natuurlijk waanzin. Mensen weigeren na een   afwijzing te vertrekken, vervolgens organiseert de staatstelevisie acties om deze weigeraars als zielig te portretteren, gesteund door linkse gesubsidieerde actiegroepen. Gevolg is dan steeds het zoveelste miljardenverslindende generaal pardon. Wij willen een wet die dat onmogelijk maakt. Een wet tegen het generaal pardon.'

[11] Wilders, G. (2018b, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Afgewezen gelukszoekers komen gewoon terug op een toeristenvisum of blijven lekker in Nederland. Omdat ze weten dat er altijd wel een slappeling is zoals Cohen of Rutte die met een generaal pardon komt. Oplossing: geen generaal pardon meer en direct uitzetten met inreisverbod!'

[12] PVV. (2010:15, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Alle islamitische scholen dicht'

from Islamic countries" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p. 15).[13] This specific measure is also mentioned in the manifestos of 2012, 2017 and 2021. The manifesto of 2023 does mention a stop of granting asylum altogether, but not with specific or explicit regard to Muslim immigrants.

Because Islamic headscarves were mentioned in 13 proposed measures, a separate code was created, namely *Islam_headscarf*. Fragments with this label were in every case also given the label *Islam_measures*. In 2010, the PVV aimed to tax the burqa: "Prohibit the burqa and Qur'an and tax headscarves" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p. 15).[14] This tax, referred to as *kopvoddentaks* ('head rag-tax') had already caused commotion the year before. The idea was to introduce permits to wear a headscarf, which could be bought for 1000 euros (Trouw, 2009). This 'head rag-tax' has not been mentioned in the manifestos after, nor can it be found on X when searching for the terms 'kopvoddentaks' or 'kopvoddentax'. The term head rag in itself, however, is not used in any of the manifestos. In a debate after the election result of 2023, several politicians in the Second Chambre asked Wilders to take back certain statements or ideas he had propagated before, among them the 'kopvoddentaks'. In response, Wilders declared he would not take back anything he had said before. Nevertheless, he would be fulfilling a different role in the future (as the leader of the winning party instead of opposition) and adapt his behaviour to this role (Kamerstukken II, 2023).

The code *Islam_threat* is mostly used in the 2017 manifesto, which consists of a one-page pamphlet and a separate clarification of four pages. The code refers to statements in which Islam inherently relates to a threat or danger. This is illustrated in the following quotation: "Because that [Islamic] threat is existential: the continuation of our country's existence is on the line" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2017, p.3).[15] The data did not show a development of the specific codes under the parent codes *Islam* and *P_islam*. However, the amount of 8 applications of *P_Islam_threat* in the 2017 manifesto is noticeable, compared to for example the 2023 manifesto with only 1 application and 46 pages.

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[13] PVV. (2010:15, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'volledige immigratiestop voor mensen uit islamitische landen'

[14] PVV. (2010:15, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Verbied de boerka en de koran, belast hoofddoekjes'

[15] PVV. (2017:3, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Want die dreiging is existentieel: het voortbestaan van ons land staat op het spel.'

§ 3.3: Safety

The code *PRR_authoritarianism* (and *P_PRR_authoritarianism*) has been applied to statements that propagate a desire for stricter enforcement of law. The amount that this code has been applied in the problem statement seems to be roughly the same throughout the manifestos from 2010 on (respectively 12, 14, 15 and 14 with the exception of 1 in 2017). Note that the focus on Islam as a threat in 2017 did not result in a focus on a stricter enforcement of law.

An example can be found in the manifesto of 2023: "Also status holders who casually go on a vacation to their country of origin, of which they convinced us that their life is at risk there, [should] lose their residence permit and leave" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p.7).[16] In 2010, the manifesto contained 19 measures that could be classified as *PRR_authoritarianism*. A plea to remove citizens with a double nationality after they have committed an offence is present throughout all of the manifestos. The statements propagating this plea mostly look like the following statement from 2017: "Denaturalise and deport criminals with a double nationality" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2017, p. 1).[17]

As a connection between insecurity and Islam was hypothesized, it was expected that the co-occurrence between any code under *P_Islam* and *P_PRR_authoritarianism* would be high. However, only 3 fragments were coded with both these codes. The same result applies to the codes *Islam* and *PRR_authoritarianism* in the solutions section.

Also the codes *Immigration_safety* and *Islam_safety* provide information about the theme of safety. These codes were applied when remarks were made that connected immigration or Islam to safety issues, as seen for example in the manifesto of 2012: "More and more often, brutal violence is used. That also correlates with the importation of people from cultures where plain violence is often accepted" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p. 30).[18] Occasionally, violence or unsafety is directly connected to Islam: "Jews, Christians, gays,

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[16] PVV. (2023:7, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Ook statushouders die doodleuk op vakantie gaan naar hun land van herkomst, waarover ze ons wijs hebben gemaakt dat ze er hun leven niet zeker zijn, verliezen hun verblijfsstatus en moeten vertrekken.'

[17] PVV. (2017:1, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Criminelen met een dubbele nationaliteit denaturaliseren en uitzetten'

[18] PVV. (2012:30, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Steeds vaker wordt bruut geweld gebruikt. Dat hangt ook samen met de import van mensen uit culturen waar plat geweld vaak geaccepteerd wordt.'

apostates and women are often the first victims of the Islamization: unfortunately, we are also experiencing that in the Netherlands" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p. 7).[19]

§ 3.4: Identity

Overall, the codes under identity in the problem statement have been applied most in the 2012 and 2021 manifesto (15 times), though the differences between the manifestos are small (2, 12, 9 and 13 hits respectively). The theme identity has been subdivided in the themes nationalism, preservation, anti-diversity, religion and language. These themes put an emphasis on Dutch culture in different ways. For instance, in 2010, 2017 (clarification) and 2021, the Jewish-Christian roots of Dutch culture are stressed: "It is of great importance that it is specified in the constitution that our Jewish-Christian and humanist roots shape the dominant and leading culture in the Netherlands" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p. 11).[20]

Among the subcodes of identity, *Identity_nationalism* has been applied the most. It was applied when a statement mentions pride with regard to the Netherlands or Dutch culture. The following statement from the 2010 manifesto serves as an example: "Our welfare state, that has been built with a lot of effort, is a source of pride" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p. 21).[21]

The code *P_Identity_language* has been applied when the use of the Dutch language was encouraged, and/or when other languages were discouraged in the problem statement. Occasionally, this would go hand in hand with *P_immigration_discouragement*: "And we will put a stop to study migration by offering bachelor studies in Dutch only and capping the amount of foreign students in master programmes" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p.7). It has to be noted that this measure was stated in the theme 'asylum and immigration'. It may therefore be likely that the transfer to the Dutch language in bachelor studies is mostly aimed at reducing the amount of immigrants rather than promoting the Dutch language. However, the measure could be suggested with both aims in mind. In the election manifesto of 2021, the preference for the use of the Dutch language instead of another is more clearly stated: "Our language is

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[19] PVV. (2021:7, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Joden, christenen, homo's, afvalligen en vrouwen zijn vaak de eerste   slachtoffers van de islamisering; dat zien we helaas ook in Nederland.'

[20] PVV. (2021:11, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Het is zeer belangrijk dat grondwettelijk wordt vastgelegd dat onze Joods- christelijke en humanistische wortels de dominante en   leidende cultuur vormen in Nederland.'
[21] PVV. (2010:21, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'En de studiemigratie leggen we   aan banden door bacheloropleidingen alleen nog in het Nederlands te geven en   het aantal buitenlandse studenten op masteropleidingen te maximeren.'

Dutch (and Frisian), so [there is to be] no governmental information in Arabic or Turkish" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.13).[22] This same measure is suggested in the manifesto of 2023. With the exception of the manifesto from 2017, all manifestos underline the importance of the use of the Dutch language, whether that is in university, the government or in general.

§ 3.5: Affect

The use of affect is visible throughout the manifestos in various manners and intensities. In 2012 and 2021, the interest of the reader of the manifesto is already stressed in the table of contents. In the 2012 manifesto, named '*Their* Brussels, *our* Netherlands', the themes are arranged in the following set up: *Their* Brussels, *Our* economy, *Our* welfare state, *Our* freedom, *Our* safety, *Our* immigration policy, et cetera. In 2021, named 'It is about you', this is done in a similar manner: Your Netherlands, Your culture and traditions, Your care, Your safety, Your economy, salary and retirement, et cetera. Already before introducing the standpoints, emphasis is put on the interests of the reader. At the same time, a division is created between 'us' and 'them', in which it is implied that the interests of the reader are different than those of the politicians in The Hague or Brussels, for example.

To further analyze the ways in which statements draw on emotions, an extra round of coding has taken place. To do this, an additional main code *emotion* was added, subdivided by different emotions as discussed by Ahmed (2004). This has led to an additional amount of 474 fragments coded with *P_emotion* and 21 fragments with emotion in the solutions section. Table 5 shows the distribution of the amount of times the code *P_emotion* has been used. The focus in the analysis of emotion is mainly on the problem statement, since this section generally comes with a more extensive explanation or motivation for a specific measure. As displayed in the table, the programmes from 2012 and 2021 roughly show the most emotions.

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[22] PVV. (2021:13, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Onze taal is Nederlands (en Fries), dus geen overheidsinformatie in het Arabisch of Turks'

Table 5

Code distribution of the parent code P_emotion

Of all codes in this round of coding, the code *P_emotion_hate* has been used the most by far. The codes for disgust, fear, love and pain were used 82, 80, 86 and 91 times, respectively, whereas the code for hate has been used 172 times. The distribution of the application of the code *P_emotion_hate* specifically is shown in table 6 below.

Table 6

Code distribution of the subcode P_emotion_hate

Oftentimes, when referring to the cabinet or the Second Chamber, words such as 'elite' are used. The word 'elite' has been mentioned in all manifestos. The following statement from 2006 portrays the way in which this often is done: "The Netherlands are a beautiful country. But it is under pressure. For various reasons. The political elite structurally ignores the interests and problems of its citizens" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2006, p.1).[23] An emphasis is put on the

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[23] PVV. (2006:1, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Nederland is een prachtig land. Maar het staat onder druk. Om tal van redenen. De politieke elite in Nederland negeert stelselmatig de belangen en problemen van de burger.'

wrongs done by the 'elite' to the Dutch citizens. Occasionally, statements are made that criticize the current or previous cabinet, though without mentioning 'elite' or 'cabinet', but rather trough criticizing measures or policies:

> That is why we will end the completely radicalised climate madness: the climate law, the climate agreement and all the useless measures will directly go into the bin. All climate- and sustainability subsidies will be dismissed immediately. No more money for useless leftist hobbies, but instead more money in the wallets of our people (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.35).[24]

The use of the phrases 'climate madness', 'useless measures' and 'useless leftist hobby's' carry a negative meaning, for this research coded as *P_emotion_hate*. When a statement is concerned around one issue, the code was applied once. When a statement mentioned different aspects of one or multiple issues, the code was applied multiple times or different codes were combined.

It has to be noted, though, that it is not always clear who is exactly meant by the term 'elite': "Dependency on unemployment benefit, violence against homosexuals and women, honour crimes, early school leaving et cetera are of all times, but would be a lot less if the elites did not convert to cultural relativism" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.13).[25] Furthermore, negative references to specific people ("Rutte and his friends") or groups of people ("that club in Brussels") were found (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.51;Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.13).

Of the emotions mentioned in the work of Ahmed (2004), the emotions pain, hate, fear, disgust and love were picked and added to the code tree under the parent code *emotion*. Ahmed describes emotions as not mere personal feelings, but rather as intertwined with various cultural contexts and power dynamics. Some statements in the manifestos are characterized by a mocking tone or derision. An example can be found in the 2012 manifesto: "Such a First Chamber is, of course, very picturesque, but no one knows why this national bedroom still exists anno 2012" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.27).[26] The use of the words 'picturesque'

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[24] PVV. (2021:35, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Daarom maken we een einde aan de totaal geradicaliseerde klimaatgekte: de Klimaatwet, het Klimaatakkoord en alle onzinnige maatregelen gaan onmiddellijk de prullenbak in. Alle klimaat- en duurzaamheidssubsidies schaffen we direct af. Geen geld meer voor onzinnige linkse hobby's, maar méér geld in de portemonnee van onze mensen.'

[25] PVV. (2010:13, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Uitkeringsafhankelijkheid, geweld tegen homo's en vrouwen, eerwraak, schooluitval etc. zijn van alle tijden, maar zouden een stuk minder zijn als de elites zich niet hadden bekeerd tot het cultuurrelativisme.'

[26] PVV. (2012:27, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Zo'n Eerste Kamer is natuurlijk hartstikke pittoresk, maar niemand weet anno 2012 nog waarom deze nationale slaapkamer bestaat.'

and 'national bedroom' display a form of mockery. Another example is mentioned in the same manifesto: "We will also stack punishments. So: whoever commits two murders, will be punished twice and finish both sentences, one after another. Whoever wants a customer discount, should go to the Albert Heijn (supermarket)" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.31).[27] Both these examples display a sense of derision, however, they do not fit in the selection of emotions made by Ahmed. Therefore, only statements that actually display or provoke one of the forenamed emotions were applied a code. This round of coding has resulted in an additional 474 codes in the problem statement and 21 in the solutions section.

A co-occurrence analysis has been conducted in the programme Atlas.ti, of which the output is shown in table 7. This table shows which emotions were used when statements were made regarding identity, immigration or Islam. The table therefore only shows co-occurrences, which explains why the amount of codes is lower compared to table 5.

It has become apparent that when a code under the parent code *P_islam* was applied, in 27 of these cases the emotion fear was provoked. Compared to 8 co-occurrences between *P_immigration* and *P_emotion_fear*, it can be concluded that the theme Islam is generally used more to provoke fear than immigration. Under *P_immigration*, the code *P_emotion_fear* was used 18 times. Compared to the 3 times under the code *P_islam*, it can be concluded that immigration and pain are more often associated with one another than Islam and pain. In the next section, I will give an overview of the emotions in the context of the work of Ahmed (2004) and how they have been applied to the PVV's manifestos.

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[27] PVV. (2012:31, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Ook gaan we straffen stapelen. Dus: wie twee moorden pleegt krijgt twee keer een straf en zit die ook beide uit, achter elkaar. Wie klantenkorting wil, gaat maar naar de Albert Heijn.'

Table 7

Co-occurrence analysis

	Total emotions	Disgust	Fear	Hate	Love	Pain
P_identity (total 104)	88	7	9	16	64	6
P_immigration (total 123)	46	8	8	16	1	18
P_islam (total 103)	47	9	27	9	3	3

§ 3.5.1: 'we have been set up', and other sentiments of pain

Ahmed writes that the emotion 'pain' is in essence an individual emotion, but can be made collective. When pain is framed as a collective form of suffering ('our loss'), rather than a personal feeling, the narrative gains a different value. In some cases, one's 'injury' can transform into an entitlement that secures privilege (Ahmed, 2004, p.32).

Ahmed (2004) writes that the emotion pain can manifest itself as the feeling of being subordinated. In line with this description, the emotion 'pain' is mainly present in the manifestos in statements that describe how Dutch citizens are being subordinated. The following quote from 2023 is exemplary: "Native-born Dutch citizens are not protected. They are deprived and discriminated against" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p.29).[28] In the following statement from 2010, the pain felt by the PVV is stressed: "the IKON (Interchurch Broadcaster of the Netherlands) abuses its airtime for the churches to portray the PVV as NSB (Dutch National Socialist Movement during WWII)" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.33).[29]

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[28] PVV. (2023:29, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Autochtone Nederlanders worden niet beschermd. Zij worden achtergesteld en gediscrimineerd.'

[29] PVV. (2010:33, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'de IKON misbruikt haar zendtijd voor de kerken om de PVV neer te zetten als NSB.'

The emotion pain can also be provoked when the pain of the Dutch people in general is stressed, often claimed to be caused by 'the elites': "We have been set up by progressive elites who promised us prosperity and scared us by the alternative: economic deprivation and war" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.10).[30] For the reason that this is referred to as 'being set up', the emotion 'pain' comes into play. In this case, the code *P_emotion_hate* was also applied, because of the 'progressive elites' who have 'set us up' by making promises. *P_emotion_fear* was not applied because the emphasis seems to be on the idea of being set up and the elites misbehaving. Note that by stating '*we* have been set up', the statement appeals to a collective emotion rather than an individual one, thereby empowering the statement. This aligns with the 'totum pro parte' frame, as described by De Bruijn (2011, p.32).

The provocation of the emotion of pain can also be displayed in a more discrete manner, such as by the usage of certain words or phrases that raise the emotion of pain. An example of this can be found in the manifesto of 2012, when discussing the partnership with the European Union: "(…) we have a rope tied around our neck that connects us to countries with a completely different culture" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.13).[31] The phrase 'having a rope tied around our neck' serves as a metaphor for the strangulation that is done to 'us' by the EU. No direct implications are mentioned, but collective pain is implied nevertheless.

Though the manifesto of 2023 is respectively more focused on the wellbeing of immigrants at the expense of Dutch citizens, the code pain has been used the most in the manifesto of 2021 with 34 times (compared to 25 in 2023).

§ 3.5.2: 'the green terror': hate speech and the rippling effect of emotions

Ahmed states that the emotion 'hate' can be found in between notions of the self and the outside world. In narratives of hate, others in the outside world are perceived as a threat. Through hatred, one can turn away from this threat. Therefore, hate does not exist on its own but is depending on context (Ahmed, 2004, p.51). Hate is a strong emotion in the sense that it can help to maintain certain power dynamics, for example a further discrimination of those who are already discriminated against. 'The ordinary' is being reproduced (Ahmed, 2004, p.43). In

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[30] PVV. (2012:10, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'We zijn erin gelokt door progressieve elites die ons welvaart beloofden en ons bang maakten voor het alternatief: economische ondergang en oorlog.'
[31] PVV. (2012:13, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Omdat we met een touw om onze nek vastzitten aan landen met een totaal andere cultuur.'

the context of reproducing sentiments, Ahmed mentions what she calls 'the rippling effect of emotions'. Like ripples, emotions move sideways through associations, and back- and forwards, meaning that the past leaves its trace in the present (Ahmed, 2004, p.45).

The emotion of hate can be visible in excerpts of statements, such as by using the metaphor "the green terror" for sustainable measures, projects or aims (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.36). This phrase has been labeled with the emotion hate because of the association of 'terror' with sustainability. It was not labeled with the emotion fear, because the word 'terror' does not seem to pose a threat or provoke fear.

The *code P_Emotion_hate* has also been applied to phrases that display hate speech: "(…) many local governments are being burdened with an extinguished politician from the labour party" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.17).[32] In this case, the use of the phrases 'being burdened' and 'extinguished politician from the labour party' display hatred.

Oftentimes, this hatred is aimed at the Second Chamber in The Hague, or its government: "Of course The Hague did not care for it and pushed the gas pedal towards destruction a little more" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.11).[33] These hated policies evolve mostly around migration and sustainability. The hatred about the enabling of immigration or implementation of sustainability measures seems to have remained consistent. "The government has failed tremendously" is a phrase used in the 2023 manifesto, but represents the sentiment of the PVV's manifestos throughout all the years (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p.19).[34]

The emotion hate is the only one of the emotions that has been applied in the solutions section in addition to the problem statement. *Emotion_hate* was applied 16 times (c.f. 1 or 2 times of the other emotions), of which the most in 2012 and 2021 (5 and 6 times respectively). It was applied when a statement contained a form of hate speech, which manifested itself in the use of certain words or phrases. It was applied when the word "politiebobo's" was used (translated as 'police bigwigs'), but also when referred to 'climate hysteria': "Stop

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[32] PVV. (2010:17, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'menig gemeente wordt opgezadeld met een afgebrande PvdA-politicus'
[33] PVV. (2012:11, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Natuurlijk trok Den Haag zich er niets van aan en drukte men het gaspedaal richting de ondergang nog wat dieper in.'
[34] PVV. (2023:19, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'De overheid heeft keihard gefaald.'

governmental propaganda (against smoking, climate hysteria)" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.21;Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.19).[35]

§ 3.5.3: 'they turned out to be lies, again and again': displays of disgust

Similar to hate, disgust involves a negative association with a specific subject, which Ahmed refers to as 'stickiness' (Ahmed, 2004, p.89). Repetition of a negative association causes the negativity to stick to a specific concept.

The label disgust is applied when a certain state of affairs is being ridiculed. In the manifestos of the PVV, the emotion disgust is oftentimes aimed at (left-wing) politicians, who are responsible for certain problems or spend state money at the wrong causes: "Kunduz bathes the *climate crazies* in subsidies again" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.50).[36] Here, the phrases 'bathing in subsidies' and 'climate crazies' contain a sense of disgust. The notion of 'again' implies repetition, meaning that the 'climate crazies' were already 'bathing in subsidies', or had done so. This fragment could also be labelled as the emotion hate, but because it implies repetition of negativity, I have chosen to label it as *P_Emotion_disgust*.

Though the code *P_emotion_disgust* was applied 82 times in total, only 8 of these fragments were also coded with one of the *P_islam* codes. Most fragments under the code *P_emotion_disgust* express disgust towards "leftist elites" in general: "The progressive bigwigs confused their pink dreams with reality once again" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.46).[37] Note that by using the word 'again', repetition of this negative fact is implied.

The emotion disgust is also often used in fragments that target other persons in leading positions, such as managers, judges and chiefs of police: "(…) chiefs of police are usually politically correct bureaucrats who plead for tolerance and money-consuming, ineffective Multikulti- and prevention projects" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.19).[38] The code was also used when no one specifically is targeted, but still displays the emotion disgust: "But they

[35] PVV. (2010:19, my translation to English from Dutch original), '

[36] PVV (2012:21, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Kunduz laat de milieugekkies weer baden in de subsidie.'. With the term 'Kunduz', the coalition of 2012 is meant, consisting of VVD, CDA in combination with D66, GroenLinks and ChristenUnie.

[37] PVV. (2012:46, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'De progressieve opinie-bobo's verwarden hun roze dromen weer eens met de werkelijkheid.'

[38] PVV. (2021:19, my translation to English from Dutch original),'hun korpschefs zijn meestal politiek correcte bureaucraten die pleiten voor gedogen en geldverslindende, niet-werkende multiculti- en preventieprojecten.'

turned out to be lies, again and again" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.23).[39] In this fragment, the current state of affairs is looked down upon, though no actor is appointed.

§ 3.5.4: 'another threat is the advancing of Islam', and the provocation of fear

Emotions of fear can be provoked when a threat is presented. This fear can both lead to people conforming to the system as well as opposing it, which means that fear can be used as a tool to mobilize people (Ahmed, 2014). In the manifestos, the label fear was given when a statement mentions a threat, but also when a statement aims to trigger emotions of fear. This can be explained with the following fragment from 2010, after stating the high number of immigrants in the Netherlands: "In time, this will mean the end of the welfare state" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.21).[40] This statement implies that something has to be done to protect the welfare state. Thus, fear is used as an incentive to mobilize people.

Occasionally, statements explicitly state that the Netherlands are threatened or endangered: "Another threat is the advancing of Islam" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.26).[41] Remarks with regard to the need for defense of certain values were also labeled with fear, because then a threat or danger is implied. The same applies to statements that mention that certain values are under pressure, which is visible in the following statement: "That is why the PVV chooses the defense of our welfare state" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.22).[42] A threat is not mentioned explicitly, but the term 'defense' implies a threat and thus the fragment has been coded as *P_emotion_fear*.

The codes *P_islam_threat* and *P_islam_idenitythreat* were created to display whenever *Islam* was specifically posed as a threat. However, because the code *P_Islam_identitythreat* was only applied four times, it was merged into *P_Islam_threat*. Because the concept of threat already contains the aspect of fear, the co-occurrence analysis shows a high amount of overlap. Though it was not always clear if the emotion of fear can be derived when a threat is mentioned, as shown by the following statement: "Apart from the problems with Islam we have imported already, we are seeing an overrepresentation of non-Western immigrants in the domains of

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[39] PVV. (2021:23, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Maar het bleken keer op keer leugens te zijn.'
[40] PVV. (2010:21, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Op termijn zal dit het einde betekenen van de verzorgingsstaat.'
[41] PVV. (2012:26, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Nog een bedreiging is de oprukkende islam.'
[42] PVV. (2012:22, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Daarom kiest de Partij voor de Vrijheid onomwonden voor de verdediging van onze verzorgingsstaat.'

benefit dependency, antisemitism, homophobia, discrimination against women, crime, disturbance, early school leaving and honour crimes" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2012, p.35).[43] This statement does not contain specific words that provoke fear, however, overrepresentation of non-Western immigrants is followed by a list of 8 different phenomena. It seems that in this case, not the content but the form of the phrase evokes fear. For this reason, I chose to label it as such.

§ 3.5.5: 'a country to be proud of': sentiments of love

"Because we love, we hate, and this hate is what brings us together" (Ahmed, 2004, p.43). As this quote displays, the emotions love and hate can be interdependent. Ahmed notes that in hating another, one is reinforcing love for oneself (Ahmed, 2004, p.52).

The emotion of love is described by Ahmed (2004) as an emotion that reinforces hierarchy, for it attaches value to certain ideals. Ideals of love can be used to justify other measures, such as using the ideal of the love for one's country as a valid reason for excluding certain groups (Ahmed, 2004, p.122). A sentiment that is visible throughout all the manifestos can be summarized in one fragment from 2021: "A country to be proud of" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.35). [44]The love for the Netherlands often coincides with the codes *P_identity_nationalism* and *P_identity_preservation*, as illustrated in the following statement: "This is our country, our culture, our identity. The Netherlands, this beautiful country, this great nation, this flaming beacon of freedom, it is ours and it will remain ours!" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2017 toelichting, p.3).[45]

Occasionally, the emotions of love and hate coincide. An example that stands out is a passage that can be found in both the manifestos from 2021 and 2023 concerning foreign affairs:

> The PVV is a good friend of the one and only democracy in the Middle East: Israel. Also culturally, the Netherlands are tightly connected to Israel. The connections with Israel will be strengthened, for example by moving our embassy to Jerusalem. The

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[43] PVV. (2012:35, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Buiten de problemen met de islam die we nu geïmporteerd hebben, zien we een oververtegenwoordiging van niet-westerse allochtonen op het gebied van uitkeringsafhankelijkheid, antisemitisme, homohaat, vrouwendiscriminatie, criminaliteit, overlast, schooluitval en eerwraak.'

[44] PVV. (2021:35, my translation to English from Dutch original), '[Nederland is een schoon land. Een land met een prachtige natuur, een schone lucht en een goed milieu.] Een land om trots op te zijn.'

[45] PVV. (2017:3, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Nederland, dit prachtige land, deze grote natie, deze vurige baken van vrijheid, het is van ons en het zal van ons blijven!'

Dutch representation in Ramallah at the corrupt Palestinian Authority will be closed immediately. After all, the Netherlands already have an embassy in Amman, the capital of the one and only Palestinian state: Jordan (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p.48;Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p. 42).[46]

The above passage seems to be an intermingling of both the emotions love and hate. By referring to Israel as a 'good friend' and 'the one and only democracy', emotions of love are mobilized. When referring to 'the corrupt Palestinian Authority', emotions of hate are mobilized.

Another manner in which the emotions of love and hate are combined, is when a statement is made with regard to the beauty of the Netherlands and how it is negatively affected by external factors, such as certain imposed policies: "Our mussel farmers, the symbol of traditional Dutch entrepreneurship par excellence, our culture and tradition, have been entirely restricted" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.53).

The codes *emotion_love* and *P_emotion_love* were applied in the context of showing admiration, pride or nostalgic remarks. It was also applied when an emphasis was placed upon Dutch nationality in a positive sense, for example with the use of 'wij Nederlanders', meaning 'us, Dutch citizens'. *P_emotion_love* was used most in the manifesto of 2021, namely 26 times. The greatest difference between the use of this code, while taking into account only the bigger manifestos, is between 2021 and 2010. The manifesto of 2010 counted only 10 applications of *P_emotion_love*.

In this chapter, an overview has been made of the presence of the themes immigration, Islam, safety and identity. Information on the presence and development of these themes was found in the problems section as well as the solutions section. Most of the manifestos, however, also contain a foreword. These forewords were not taken into account, because they are not specified into themes and had therefore seemed too general to analyze. However, because the forewords also draw on emotion, it was decided to add another round of coding to analyze the forewords.

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[46] PVV. (2021:48, 2023:42, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'De PVV is een grote vriend van de enige echte democratie in het Midden-Oosten, Israël. Ook cultureel is Nederland zeer verbonden aan Israël. De banden met Israël zullen onder meer worden versterkt door onze ambassade te verhuizen naar Jerusalem. De Nederlandse vertegenwoordiging in Ramallah bij de corrupte Palestijnse Autoriteit wordt onmiddellijk gesloten. Nederland heeft immers al een ambassade in Amman, de hoofdstad van de enige echte Palestijnse staat: Jordanië.'

§ 3.5.6: 'Henk and Ingrid are paying for Ali and Fatima', a foreword analysis

To make sure that the codes applied in the forewords would not intermingle with the codes in the problem statements and solutions, another set of codes was created under the parent code *F_emotion*. The emotions that were also used in the previous analysis, to be hate, love, pain, disgust and fear, are added under this new parent code.

In this analysis, the manifestos from 2006 and 2017 (and the addition of 2017) have been left out. Both these manifestos do not contain an introductory text that could be classified as a foreword. To prevent interference with the former forms of coding and analysis, I decided to leave these manifestos out of this separate analysis and focus on the manifestos from 2010, 2012, 2021 and 2023.

The analysis of the forewords of these four manifestos has resulted in an application of another 81 codes, of which the most are applied in the 2010 manifesto (see table 8). The foreword of the manifesto from 2010 counts 3 pages, compared to 1, 2 and 2 pages in the years after. Similar to the results found in the former analyses, the emotion hate has been coded the most in comparison to the other emotions, to be 17 times in the manifesto of 2010. In the following manifestos, this code has been applied 3, 7 and 8 times respectively.

Table 8

Code distribution of the parent code F_emotion

The forewords seem to contain phrases similar to those in the problem statement. The fear of "becoming a stranger in one's home country" seems to be a recurring sentiment (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2021, p. 4).[47] In 2023, this sentiment is also referred to in the following words:

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[47] PVV. (2021:4, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'Mensen die geen vreemden in hun eigen land willen worden (...) [Dát Nederland wil ik terug.]'

"(…) The Netherlands are no longer the Netherlands" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2023, p.3).[48] This sentiment is in line with the findings of Bonansinga (2020), as described on page 16.

In the manifesto from 2010, the anti-Islam attitude predominates. Islamization is described as one of the biggest threats that the Netherlands are facing, which is also described in the foreword: "[the welfare state is] no longer a shield for the weak, but a takeout window for a disproportionate amount of loitering Muslim immigrants instead. Henk and Ingrid are paying for Ali and Fatima" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.5).[49] Who is to blame for the problems in relation to (Muslim) immigration, is clear: "The fault lies with the leftist elites who think the world looks like Woodstock" (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2010, p.7).[50] All emotions, except for disgust, were present the most in the 2010 manifesto. The other three forewords also mention criticism of the established order, though less characterized by hatred and other emotions.

This chapter has shown the results found through the qualitative content analysis. I aimed to find answers to sub questions 4 and 5, which are 'How have Islamophobia and nativism in general developed in the election manifestos of the PVV?' and 'What is the relation between Islamophobia and affective politics in the election manifestos of the PVV?'. The results suggest that though displays of Islamophobia have decreased over the years, the manifestos still show nativist traits. The discussion will elaborate further on the interpretation of the findings of this chapter.

Chapter 4: Discussion

In this research, the manifestos of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) have been examined in order to analyze the development of nativism and Islamophobia throughout the manifestos and the role of affect. Literature on the PVV has pointed out that the party can be defined as a member of the party family Populist Radical Right (PRR), of which nativism is the core component. Moreover, literature on affect in political discourse has shown that emotion is often

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[48] PVV. (2023:3, my translation to English from Dutch original), '[Want] Nederland is Nederland niet meer.
[49] PVV. (2010:5, my translation to English from Dutch original), '[Onze trots waar Nederlanders met overtuiging decennialang een gedeelte van hun salaris aan hebben overgemaakt, de verzorgingsstaat, is verworden tot een magneet voor gelukszoekers uit islamitische landen.] Niet meer een schild voor de zwakken, maar een afhaalloket voor onevenredig veel lanterfantende moslimimmigranten. Henk en Ingrid betalen voor Ali en Fatima.'
[50] PVV. (2010:7, my translation to English from Dutch original), 'De schuld ligt bij de linkse elites die denken dat de wereld er uit ziet als Woodstock.'

present, in populism especially. However, since research on the development of the PVV has never consisted of manifestos with regard to nativism and affect, a gap in the knowledge on the PVV emerged which I have aimed to fill in this research.

The literature also gave a first indication of the themes that were considered to be relevant to pay attention to in the analysis. Thus, a code tree was formed. During the analyzing process, codes were added based on the manifestos' content. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of general outcomes of this research and possible explanations for these outcomes as well as implications for the future. As stated in the second chapter, no absolute conclusions can be drawn from the amount of times a code has been applied. However, when the amount of times a code has been applied is remarkable or illustrates a key finding, I will mention this amount. At the end of this section, I will provide reflections on the study and note its limitations. I will conclude with suggestions for further research.

Findings show that the manifestos of 2010 and 2012 contain more applications of codes regarding Islam, whereas the manifesto of 2021 and especially 2023 contain more applications of codes regarding immigration. These findings suggest that there has been a shift in the main themes of the PVV, namely from Islam to immigration. It should be noted, however, that this shift is only revealed when examining the codes applied in the problem statement. Namely, the amount of suggested measures in the solutions section regarding both Islam and immigration has decreased over the years. Thus, mainly the way in which the themes Islam and immigration are addressed has changed throughout the years, containing a shift of focus from Islam to immigration.

The shift of focus can be explained by the increase in immigration between 2010 and 2022. According to research by the CBS, the total number of immigrants moving to the Netherlands has risen from 154,432 in 2010 to 403,108 in 2023. The amount of immigrants moving to the Netherlands was 252,528 in 2021, which means that especially in 2022, the number of immigrants was rapidly growing. There is also an increase in the number of emigrants visible, namely an amount of 121,351 in 2010 to 179,310 in 2023. Though this increase is disproportionate compared to the amount of immigrants, creating a net migration of 223,798 in 2023 (CBS, n.d. C). Note that in 2023, of those 403,108 immigrants, only 48,500 were considered asylum seekers (CBS, n.d. D). The percentage of Muslims has remained the same throughout the years, which is about five per cent of the population. However, as the population has increased, the number of Muslims has also increased (Schmeets & Houben, 2023).

Ipsos, a company specialized in conducting market research, found that voters generally considered migration and asylum the most important theme in the elections of 2023. Migration was found to be a theme of interest especially to citizens who usually vote for centre or right-wing parties (Nieuwkerk, 2023, July 28). A possible explanation for the shift of interest from Islam to immigration in the manifestos could be that the immigration rates have risen to such an extent that it has become a concern for many citizens.

Zooming in on immigration, the PVV's manifestos often illuminate asylum seekers. However, as the statistics of the CBS show, asylum seekers only make up a small percentage of the total number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands. In the PVV's manifestos, asylum seekers are often portrayed as a relatively large group. This can be derived from phrases such as 'asylum tsunami'[51]. The fact that this group is only a small portion of total immigration, shows the influence that framing has had on how migration is perceived. Another possible explanation for this shift of interest, thus, could be that the framing of asylum seekers has contributed to the way they are perceived by the general public. This perception, then, the PVV anticipated and possibly co-created.

The emphasis on immigration in the later manifestos, as stated, does not translate into more measures that target immigrants. In fact, the total of codes under *Immigration* was higher in 2010 and 2012 than in the manifestos of 2021 and 2023 (see table 2). This finding suggests that in recent years, more explanation and examples are provided to defend a smaller amount of measures compared to 2010 and 2012.

As stated in the results section, a reference to the injustice that is done to Dutch citizens caused by the elites favouring immigrants, is hardly mentioned in the manifestos beside the manifesto of 2023. Considering this, it can be concluded that the manifesto of 2023 contains a stronger sentiment of the favouring of immigrants at the expense of the Dutch citizens compared to the manifestos in the years prior. This is in accordance with the development of the application of the code *P_emotion_pain*. This code was applied the most in the manifestos of 2021 and 2023 (34 and 25 hits, compared to 19 hits in 2012 and 10 in 2010). Thus, more efforts are being made in the later manifestos to draw attention to pain that Dutch citizens experience.

It can be argued, looking at the coding analysis, that the 2012 manifesto is the most negative one. In this manifesto, codes related to hate are applied most. In the manifesto of 2021, the codes *P_emotion_pain* and *P_emotion_disgust* are applied most compared to the other

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[51] PVV. (2023:6, translation to English from Dutch original), 'asiel tsunami'

manifestos. This finding suggests that the tone that is used in the manifestos has not become less hateful over the years, but rather contains an emphasis on other emotional aspects related to hate.

The amount and tone of the themes nationalism and authoritarianism can be considered roughly similar throughout the manifestos. It should be noted, though, that the manifesto of 2017 (including the clarification) only contains a few pages. Thus, this manifesto contained relatively more nationalistic traits compared to the other (bigger) manifestos. The themes Islam and identity are central to this manifesto. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this manifesto also contained the most applications of *P_islam_threat.* Islam-inspired violence had been in the news the years prior, for example the series of attacks at the offices of French magazine Charlie Hebdo and shootings at the Bataclan theatre in Paris in 2015 (BBC, 2020). In 2016, both a Christmas market in Berlin and the city of Nice were the target of a deadly terrorist attack (BBC, 2016). As argued by Abbas (2019), attacks carried out by Muslim terrorists fuel Islamophobia, as it can contribute to an association between Islam and radicalisation.

The foreword analysis shows findings similar to the results gathered in the analyses of the other sections. Particularly the foreword of the manifesto of 2010 displays hatred, often aimed at Muslim immigrants and the negative consequences of Islam in the Netherlands. The results of the foreword analysis suggest that the tone of the forewords is in line with the manifestos.

Earlier research on the PVV has pointed out that this party can be considered Populist Radical Right, contains Islamophobic and anti-multicultural standpoints and criticism of the EU and 'elite' of The Hague (Vossen, 2017; Van Wijk et. al, 2019; Crum, 2023). In line with these findings, this study confirms that critical remarks about Islam, multiculturalism and immigration are present. What is more, the use of emotion has shifted from mostly hatred to a variety of emotions, such as pain, disgust and love. Note that though the emotion hate is used less in the later manifestos, this does not mean that these manifestos are less negative. The emotion love is more applied in the later manifestos compared to the former, yet, the same goes for pain and disgust, which contain a negative connotation.

Bonansinga (2020) has pointed out that the use of emotion is not uncommon in the political field, though its variety and intensity in populist discourse is noticeable. This variety combined with the emphasis on a theme citizens thought to be of importance, seems to have

contributed to greater electoral success. This could be of use in future research on PRR parties and help to predict the political landscape in The Netherlands and/or Europe.

The role of the media has to be taken into account when researching the PRR. As De Jonge (2019) argues, media behavior helps to shape the electoral advance of the PRR parties. Thus, not only the election manifestos and ideas are of importance for the PVV's advancement, but to a great extent also the way the party is spoken about. It should be noted that for this research, the focus was placed only on the manifestos themselves. In the cases where a tweet resembled a certain sentiment or could illustrate an example, the social media platform X was used to explain this sentiment or example.

Some limitations of this study have to be pointed out. Firstly, it is not always possible to draw conclusions from a code's frequency of appearance, or when a code has been mentioned more often in one manifesto or section compared to another. Especially when considering the difference in the number of pages, it can be challenging to derive meaning from the coding analysis. Co-occurrence analyses were carried out in order to examine which connections and associations are made between specific codes. However, this analysis only shows an occurrence between codes on the exact same statement. Following, it could be argued that two separate statements after another are connected, but this connection is not found in the co-occurrence analysis.

Another limitation is that other codes may be as fitting as the codes applied in this study. As a result, a replication of the study could lead to different results. Though the criterium of reliability in replicability is more common in quantitative rather than qualitative data (Flick, 2018), some measures could be taken to improve the study's reliability. A suggestion for future research would be to set up a design in which multiple researchers analyze the manifestos with the same code tree. Then, the reliability of raters could be calculated in order to discover if it is justified to apply certain codes to certain fragments. The work of Brene Brown (2021) on emotion could also be of use in the creation of a new code tree with fine-grained distinctions. In this scenario, additional emotional remarks such as mockery or derision could also be taken into account. Considering the length of this study, only the work of Ahmed (2004) was used as a framework, which only discusses a few main emotions.

As mentioned in the methods section, a discourse analysis could also have provided useful information on for example the frames that were used by the party or Wilders. The content analysis that has been carried out in this research does not provide information on the

discourse outside of the manifestos. An examination of the political discourse of the PVV would be useful in understanding the party, especially since the understanding of the internal logic of the manifestos rests on speculation. Additionally, the influence of the media cannot be ignored. For example, as discussed, the suggested measure of the 'head rag-tax' has caused upheaval in the media and is remembered by many. Despite this, the term cannot be found in any of the manifestos or on X. The media thus decide what to illuminate.

Lastly, in this study, the focus was placed solely on the development of the PVV. With more time available to conduct research, other parties could be examined, also making comparisons between different parties possible. Then, it could be examined if the frequent use of the emotion hate, for instance, is specific for the PVV or also common among other parties. An analysis featuring other PRR parties in Europe could also be useful in researching the development of the Populist Radical Right movement and comparing the state of the art of the political situation of different countries.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

This research aimed to find answers to the question: How have nativistic elements developed in the election manifestos of the PVV since its establishment; what is the role of Islamophobia in this and to what affective themes are they linked? Election manifestos were examined with regard to themes in the domains of Islamophobia, immigration, identity, authoritarianism and emotion. Based on a qualitative content analysis, it can be concluded that there has been a shift of focus from Islam to immigration. This shift can be explained by a shift of interest of voters, influenced by the media, as well as by the increasing immigration rate. This shift of focus does not result in an increase of measures regarding either Islam or immigration.

This analysis shows that the election manifestos draw on emotion, of which 'hate' is the most common. This was most clear in the manifesto of 2012, later manifestos generally draw more on other negative emotions such as pain and disgust. The manifesto from 2017 stands out, due to the number of codes regarding Islam and identity that were applied compared to its length. The impactful events of the years prior to 2017 can be assumed to have had their influence on this particular manifesto.

The older manifestos of the PVV displayed an aversion towards Islam and Muslims in which Islam is associated with the risk of terrorism and cultural differences, whereas the more recent manifestos display an aversion towards immigrants as a whole because 'they' take 'our' money and houses while causing upheaval. Thus, nativism is present in the older as well as the more recent manifestos.

Hence, the form of nativism has changed throughout the years. As noted in the first chapter, nativism can be defined as the ideology that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group, which causes non-native persons and ideas to be perceived as threatening. From the data, it can be concluded that the earlier manifestos contain nativism in a cultural context, in the sense that Islam is perceived as foreign and thus threatening to the Dutch identity. Islam is also more often connected to the emotion of fear compared to immigration (see § 3.5, table 7).

The later manifestos contain nativism in a more economical context, in the sense that the Dutch are described to be more entitled to the country's resources than immigrants are. In this context, in order to secure the livelihood of the native Dutch, economic interests have to be defended. The manifestos have come to place more emphasis on the suffering of the Dutch, supposedly caused by the 'elites' who have enabled immigrants to come to The Netherlands by maintaining open borders. This emphasis illustrates the sentiment of pain and injustice that has grown to be more important over the years, in 2023 specifically. As the previous chapter has shown, this sentiment is possibly influenced by a combination of an increase in the migration rate and framing of this situation by drawing on emotion. This finding adds to the knowledge on the PVV, though future research is needed if this sentiment is also present in other PRRP's.

The analysis of the manifestos has also displayed the relation between Islamophobia and nativism, and multiculturalism as a perceived threat according to the PVV, which is in line with the findings of Van Wijk et. al (2019), Crum (2023) and Vossen (2017). In the media, there has been talk of the idea that Wilders has become 'milder' throughout the years. This may be true regarding the degree of Islamophobia, but it is not the case when taking into account the anti-immigration sentiment and the consequential nativism.

Former research pointed out that within the populist discourse, politicians tend to blame Muslim immigrants for societal problems (see paragraph § 1.3, Kaya, 2020). Also, Wilders is known for his statements that call for specific measures for Muslims (see § 3.2, 'kopvoddentaks'). Following this, I hypothesized that there would be a connection between

statements about Muslims and measures in the domain of safety. However, the co-occurrence analysis has shown that suggestions for a stricter enforcement of law rarely targeted Muslims. Though, as the results have shown, Muslim immigrants (and non-Muslim immigrants) have been blamed for societal problems. This means that in contrast with my expectations, the blaming of Muslim immigrants for societal problems has not resulted in a notable amount of measures targeting Muslim immigrants in the context of safety.

Concerning affect, my research indicates that the tone of the manifestos has remained predominantly negative over the years. As pointed out in the first chapter, especially populist politicians draw often on emotion. Negative emotions seem to be employed the most in right-wing populist discourse according to previous research. Accordingly, this analysis also shows that mostly negative emotions are employed (compare table 5 and 6). No specific conclusions can be drawn about the development of the emotion love. Following, this research has given insights in the manifestation and development concerning emotion in the manifestos. The analysis has illuminated various emotional sentiments, of which pain caused by injustice is the most recent. Considering that the PVV's manifestos have not been examined with regard to emotion before, this research adds to the knowledge of the PVV.

This study has provided insights in the context and development of the manifestos of the PVV, with particular regard to Islamophobia and nativism. With this research, I offer contributions to the academic field of politics and the PVV in particular. As stated before, the political field is always in motion. This means that more recent studies are able to provide us with the latest developments in this field. In the previous chapter, I have made several suggestions for further research, such as a design in which the PVV is compared to other Dutch political parties. In the light of the rise of the Populist Radical Right in Western-Europe, research in this area is of vital importance to better comprehend this political phenomenon and offer ways to respond to this.

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Appendix

Legenda:

Old: blue

New: orange

2nd round: red

Affective politics: green

CODE TREE SOLUTIONS

ISLAM

Islam_safety

Islam_safety_crime

Islam_radicalisation

Islam_economics

Islam_identity threat

Islam_measures (used when a measure is targeted directly at Muslims or Islam)

Islam_illiberal (used when a statement focuses on the idea that Islam is illiberal)

Islam_islamization (used when growing Islamic influence is mentioned ('islamisering') or domination is portrayed)

Islam_general (used when a statement is made with regard to Islam or Muslims but cannot be specified to another code)

Islam_ideology (used when statements refer to Islam as an ideology instead of a religion)

Islam_headscarf (used when a statement mentions the Islamic headscarf)

IMMIGRATION

Immigration_negative

Immigration_safety

Immigration_economics

~~Immigration_identity threat~~

Immigration_ethnicity (used when a specific ethnic group is targeted)

Immigration_discouragement (used when measures are taken to make immigration more strict, exclusive or discouraged and thereby making it less appealing for future immigrants to come)

Immigration_rights (used when measures are suggested that take away certain rights from immigrants that are already in the Netherlands)

~~Immigration_injustice (used when immigrants or immigration is connected to suffering of native-born citizens)~~

~~Immigration_amount (used when the (excessive) amount of immigrants is mentioned)~~

IDENTITY

Identity_nationalism (used when a statement shows pride of Dutch culture/the Netherlands or has nationalistic elements)

Identity_preservation (used when a statement aims to preserve part(s) of the Dutch culture or values ('behoud' or 'verdediging van')).

Identity_language (used when the national language(s) are promoted)

Identity_religion (used when the Judeo-Christian values are promoted)

Identity_anti-diversity (used when criticism on multiculturalism is shown, or when efforts are made to avoid multiculturalism or diversity, such as statements propagating against positive discrimination)

PRR

PRR_authoritarianism (used when statements are made with regard to the desire for harsher law enforcement)

EMOTION

Emotion_pain

Emotion_fear

Emotion_hate

Emotion_disgust

Emotion_love

CODE TREE PROBLEM STATEMENT

P_ISLAM

P_Islam_safety

P_Islam_safety_crime

P_Islam_safety_radicalisation

P_Islam_economics

P_Islam_identity threat

P_Islam_measures

P_Islam_illiberal

P_Islam_islamization

P_Islam_general

P_Islam_ideology

P_Islam_headscarf

P_IMMIGRATION

P_Immigration_negative

P_Immigration_safety

P_Immigration_economics

P_Immigration_identity threat

P_Immigration_ethnicity

P_Immigration_discouragement

P_Immigration_rights

P_Immigration_injustice

P_Immigration_amount

P_IDENTITY

P_Identity_nationalism

P_Identity_preservation

P_Identity_language

P_Identity_religion

P_Identity_anti-diversity

P_PRR

P_PRR_authoritarianism

P_EMOTION

P_Emotion_pain

P_Emotion_fear

P_Emotion_hate

P_Emotion_disgust

P_Emotion_love

CODE TREE FOREWORD

F_Emotion_pain

F_Emotion_fear

F_Emotion_hate

F_Emotion_disgust

F_Emotion_love