YOUNG & MUSLIM IN KENYA

Religion, Identity Development and Prosocial Behaviour Strategies among Muslim Youth in Mombasa

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MaThesis

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Religion, Identity Development and Prosocial Behaviour Strategies among Muslim Youth in Mombasa

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the societal issues of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation in Mombasa, Kenya, with the identity development and prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control strategies that Muslim youth describe to employ. Radicalisation processes have been theorised from many angles and the personal story has been stressed. This thesis elaborates on these theories by exploring the issues that are currently relevant for the participant group as well as explore their identity development and religious strategies for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control. Participants generally attempt to adhere to the Islamic standard prescribed by parents, school and the mosque. Different domains that are relevant in the decision making processes regarding exploration and commitment of the Muslim youth of Mombasa are addressed in the light of the current affairs and religion: parents, siblings, friends, school, gender and ethnicity. It concludes that religion is the moral standard that the participants wish to adhere throughout the different domains and strategies, specifically when it concerns drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation, often presenting a foreclosed identity status.

LIST OF SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS and WORDS

Below is a list of all symbols, words and abbreviations used. Words borrowed from languages other than English, such as Kiswahili or Arabic are italicised in the text.

[ ]	Text between block brackets is added or altered from the original transcription in order to increase clarity
( )	Text between rounded brackets is added text to explain where or what participants are referring to
(.)	Pause
(…)	Deleted text from the transcript to increase clarity

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AU	African Union
Bhang	Marijuana
CBO	Community Based Organisation
GoK	Government of Kenya
GSU	General Service Unit. Paramilitary wing of the National Police Service of Republic of Kenya
Haram	Arabic: refers to any act forbidden by Allah
IED	Improvised Explosive Device, commonly used by Al Shabaab for suicide bombings.
Imam	Arabic: Islamic leadership position, often head of the mosque.
KDF	Kenya Defense Force. Armed forces of Republic of Kenya
Kibarua	Kiswahili: Daily paid labourer
Kofia	Kiswahili: Refers to a round, brimless flat crowned hat worn by Muslim men on the East Africa Coast.
Madrassa	Arabic: Islamic School

Matatu	Kiswahili: Public Service Vehicle, 15 seater mini van.
Miraa	Kiswahili: Khat. Flowering plant that is chewed. Amphetamine like stimulant.
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights.
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
Sasa	Kiswahili: interjectory meaning 'now' or 'so'
Sheikh	Arabic: revered old man, scholar, or elder
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States of America
Ustadh	Arabic: teacher

MAPS

Political Map of Kenya showing major cities and Provinces. Source: mapsoftheworld.com



Geographical map of Mombasa Town. Source: maps.google.com

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1.1 Introduction

This research centralises around the role of religion in the identity formation processes, self-control and prosocial behaviour strategies of Muslim youth in Mombasa, Kenya. Adolescents are expected to develop their identity and this thesis examines the various strategies that Muslim youth in Mombasa employ in order to stay 'morally upright' in an often threatening society: drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation are daily issues. This thesis will give an overview and description of how the youth

themselves discuss these issues and their coping mechanisms, as well as the importance of religion and other social and cultural factors in their lives.

This chapter is designed to introduce the various components relevant to this research, as well as to 'set the stage', as it were. Firstly, it will provide the problem analysis, research questions and hypothesis in order to introduce the variables relevant for this thesis. Further, it will give a sketch of the demographics and brief historic outline of Muslims in Kenya, after which it will elaborate on radicalisation and the different movements and organisations currently active in the area. Furthermore, it will give an introduction to drugs, crime and marginalisation as well as introduce the concepts of identity development and prosocial behaviour.

1.2 Problem Analysis

In recent years, Kenya has witnessed the deadly consequences of radicalisation, whether it be Islamic fundamentalist or separatist movements from the Coast province. Attacks[1] have become more frequent, and the increase in violence has been largely blamed on Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisation based in Somalia. However, most attacks are thought to be executed by Kenyan nationals, recruited by Al Shabaab within Kenya. The popularity of radicalised mosques and imams preaching violent jihad has increased dramatically, especially in Mombasa and Nairobi. The marginalisation of the people of the Coast province, lower education levels and socio-economic status are implied to be contributors to the problem. Most of the government's efforts to tackle the issues have had an adverse marginalising effect on the vulnerable groups and have driven some Muslim youth towards a more aggressive form of action.

Identity construction has been a topic of research for decades. However, it has mostly been conducted in the Western world, and relatively little is known about the construction of identity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The research that is available, has largely focussed on post-war youth and how they have coped with the traumas that followed the horrifying events (e.g. Hintjes, 2001; Longman, 2001). This thesis will specifically elaborate on how Muslim youth, within a radicalising society, develop their identity: how they

[1] For an overview of retributive actions from Al Shabaab within Kenya since October 2011, when the Kenya Defence Forces invaded Somalia, see Appendix II.

explore their options, how they form commitments and which domains influence these processes, as well as how self-control and moral behaviour is established. It will shed light on the thus far unexplored realms of identity development and pro or antisocial behaviour in a rapidly developing city and how a section of society marginalised by the government is resorting to increasingly violent actions. By asking the questions to Muslim youth in Mombasa (regardless of their either moderate or radical beliefs) not only will the literature on identity development in Sub-Saharan Africa be explored, but also the decision making processes and identity development of those most likely to join a radical group or mosque will be mapped. Attitudes towards and relevance of the different domains such as school, family, friends, religion, ethnicity and gender will be outlined. This paper does not intend to compare the identity development of the subjects to that of any other study. Rather, its aim is to map the factors influencing identity construction among Muslim youth within an unstable society (drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation) in Sub-Saharan Africa and to illustrate how the youth present religion to be the moral standard for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control.

1.3 Research Questions

In light of the above problem analysis, the following research question has been formulated:

> How do Muslim youth in Mombasa employ religion or religious beliefs in their identity development and in strategies for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control in the context of various societal issues?

In order to answer the research question, the following sub-questions have been formulated:

> What is the historic and current position of Muslim youth in Mombasa?
> What societal factors are currently influencing Muslim youth and how do they discuss these issues?
> How can religion play a role in prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control?

How do the youth talk about their day to day lives, specifically in different identity domains?

How do the youth describe the role of religion within these domains?

How do the youth talk about and present religion when it concerns prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control, specifically in relation to the societal issues?

How do the youth present their identity development within different domains?

How is religion related to identity development, prosocial and moral behaviour, self-control and societal issues?

In order to answer these questions, this thesis will firstly introduce the various components of these questions in the introduction. Secondly, it will elaborate on the societal issues and how the youth of Mombasa discuss and experience these matters. Thirdly, it will elaborate on the role of religion in prosocial and moral behaviour and self control as well as explore the various identity domains and how the youth of Mombasa discuss these matters. The final chapter will conclude how Muslim youth in Mombasa discuss how religion is related to identity development, and strategies for prosocial and moral behaviour, self-control and influential societal issues.

1.4 Hypothesis

Drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation are matters that the Muslim youth in Mombasa, Kenya deal with every day. These issues are closely related and how the youth discuss these matters will be elaborated on separately, because they greatly influence the lives of the participants and therefore their identity development and strategies for prosocial and moral behaviour and self-control (Chapter 3).

This research proposes religion is presented by the Muslim youth of Mombasa as a moral standard to which they wish and often attempt to adhere to, in order to establish prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control whilst dealing with the above issues. It further proposes that this moral standard, as well as the societal issues, are influential on their identity development and hold implications for potential behaviour and decision making processes within their realities of a radicalising society.

This thesis does not attempt to be conclusive in its depiction of radicalisation processes, nor does it claim quantitative truth regarding identity formation among Muslim youth in Mombasa. Instead, it wishes to elaborate on the importance of identity formation and environmental factors in the choices the individual can make regarding prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control within a radicalising and often threatening society.

In order to introduce this thesis and its components as described above further, the remainder of this chapter will firstly give a brief demographic outline of Muslims in Kenya in order to provide the historic and contemporary context in which the Muslim youth of Mombasa find themselves today. In addition, it will introduce the issues of marginalisation and the current perception of Muslims in Kenya. Furthermore, this chapter will then introduce the issues of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation in the Coast province of Kenya. Finally, it will elaborate on the identity development processes and strategies for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control that this thesis will investigate.

1.5 Muslims in Kenya

The estimates of the percentage of Muslims in Kenya vary wildly. The latest census conducted by the Government of Kenya in 2009 reports that out of a population of 38.6 million people, 4.3 million are Muslim (11.1%) (Obonyo et al., 2009) which is in sharp contrast with earlier estimates (20%) and the reports from the Muslim community itself, claiming over 40% at times (Oded, 2000, p.11). However, the 11% Muslim mark is also supported by research conducted by PewForum[2] (2012) and will therefore be assumed in this study (p.20).

Most Muslims are concentrated in specific areas of Kenya. The Somali-Kenyans in North-Eastern province are almost exclusively Muslim, as are the Swahilis in Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu where around 60% of Kenya's Muslims is concentrated, who form almost 50% of the population on the Coastal strip (Rabasa, 2009, p.35).[3] This geographic

[2] "Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions." http://www.pewresearch.org/about/

[3] "Drawing upon decades of experience, RAND provides research services, systematic analysis, and innovative thinking to a global clientele that includes government agencies, foundations, and private-sector firms". http://www.rand.org/capabilities.html

concentration of Swahili-speaking Muslims constitutes a density of specific social networks and connections to the Persian Gulf, which distinguishes this area from the rest of Kenya (p. 35). Other significant Muslim communities can be found in the larger urban areas such as Nakuru, Kisumu and Nairobi (Oded, 2000, p.11-12).

Most of the Kenyan Muslims are followers of the Sunni Shafi'i school (one of the Madhhab/five Sunni schools in Islam: Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, Zahiri and Shafi'i). The PewForum study (2012) revealed that 73% of participants affiliated with the Sunni school, 8% with the Shia teachings and 4% with the Ahmadiyya sect. 8% of the participants indicated to be 'just a Muslim' (p.21). For full details on the different schools and sects of Islam in Kenya, see Appendix 1.

1.6 History of Islam & Politics in Kenya

The following section will elaborate on the historical background of Islam and politics in Kenya by firstly exploring how Islam has come to the East African Coast and how it has evolved over time. Furthermore, it will briefly elaborate on some of the Muslim organisations currently active in Kenya, in order to establish their social position within Kenyan society. This is specifically relevant in the context of (perceived) marginalisation on which I will elaborate in Chapter 3.

1.6.1 Historical background

The origins of Islam on the East-African coast can be traced back to the Arab tradesmen that sailed from the Arabian peninsula to the African continent even before the advent of Islam itself. When some of these tradesmen married the local inhabitants of the East-Africa Coast, the Swahili community was formed. They adopted many Arabian customs during the first centuries of existence, including Islam and the Arab vocabulary (around 30% of the vocabulary of Kiswahili has Arab origins). During the 13th and 15th centuries, the Arab cities on the East-African coast reached their economic and religious peak. The Portuguese invasion during the 16th and 17th century put an abrupt end to this prosperity and wealth, due to the frequent conflicts between the Christian Portuguese and Swahili Muslims. During the 18th and 19th century, Omani rule brought back the Islamic

culture and rule to the Coastal strip. Specifically Sultan Sayid Sa'id ibn Sultan (1832 - 1856) was of great importance. He moved from Muscat to Zanzibar to oversee the flourishing trade of ivory and slaves. Zanzibar had become main trading hub for these commodities, and from here large numbers of trade caravans were dispatched into the East African interior with the support and protection of the Sultan himself. Trading hubs were established all over the interior, and these trade routes and hubs became the main channels by which Islam was disseminated.

However, the main objectives of the merchants remained trade, and little efforts were made to spreading religion; Muslim influence by the Omani traders on the local Bantu people was weak by the mid-nineteenth century. During the late nineteenth century however, the Arabs from Hadramauth of Southern Arabia followed in the Omanis footsteps. They were more interested in spreading their religion, specifically the Sunni-Shafi'i school of Islam. Most of these teachers did not reach the interior until the early 20th century when the infrastructure was sufficiently developed. This explains the limited expansion of Islam, especially when compared to Western Africa. When the Muslim missionaries started to utilise the existing trading routes, they discovered that the Swahili craftsmen who had been traveling these routes for some time now, had been more concerned with missionary activities than their Arabic tradesmen counterparts.

Islam in Kenya suffered a major blow after the British annexed the Coastal strip, once part of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, and included it in the protectorate of Kenya. The struggle of the Coastal people to retain their authority and respect by rejoining the Sultanate of Zanzibar or by obtaining more independence from the protectorate was not successful. Rather the opposite: it created suspicion among the leadership which consequences are still felt today.[4]

1.6.2 Muslim Organisations in Kenya

Traditionally, the leadership of Muslims in Kenya has been taken up by the Swahili speaking Arabs from the Coast, who feel a strong connection towards the Middle East, from whom they receive funding for their activities such as the running costs of mosques

[4] For an extensive overview of the political integration of Muslims in Kenya after independence, please consult Mohamed Bakari's detailed work: *A Place at the Table: The Political Integration of Muslims in Kenya, 1963-2007*.

and *madrassas* (Rabasa, 2009, p.36). According to the RAND report (Rabasa, 2009), the remaining Muslim community often do not speak Swahili as a first language and belong to other ethnic groups. Therefore, these communities identify themselves along ethnic lines rather than religious. In addition, they are assumed to be not animated by the transnational issues that the Swahili population has concerned itself with (p.36).

One of the most prominent Muslim organisations in Kenya is the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims. Although critical of the government in their treatment of Muslims, they have generally taken a moderate outlook, channeling their concerns through the appropriate channels. In addition, there are more radical groups that vocalise the concerns of a minority of Kenya Muslims. The Muslim Youth Alliance for example is an umbrella organisation housing over 150 CBO's and NGO's, and is seeking to provide an alternative for violent extremist solutions to grievances. They advocate a peaceful and constructive approach and condemn any violent actions taken in the name of Islam. "The potential of the marginalized Muslim youth is nurtured, positively harnessed and transformed for positive contribution in the Kenyan society in line with Islamic values" (MYA web, 2015). The grievances they address include the perceived discriminatory treatment by the GoK on issues of for example obtaining travel documents and more recently the ethnic and faith based arrests of Muslims in response to the attacks Kenya has been facing.

1.7 Radicalisation & Extreme Islam in East-Africa

This section will elaborate on the increase in radicalisation and violent extremism by Al Shabaab in Kenya over the last few years. It will firstly do so by exploring the current situation as well as identifying some of the issues making Kenyan Muslim youth vulnerable to extremism. Finally, it will explore some of the radical movements currently active in the region.

1.7.1 Extremist Islam in the Region: History and Events

The origins of Islamic violent extremism are often thought to lie in the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the consequent forming of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Following these events, the West who had supported the Shah, sought to contain the

influence of the Islamic government of Iran, which was spreading and inspiring Islamic theocracy across the Muslim world. In a move to counter Iran's influence, Saudi Arabia was approached by the US in order to empower it to become the guardian of the Islamic faith. "But since Saudi Arabia is predominantly Sunni, the majority of whom subscribe to the Hanbali school of Islamic thought, the result of the strategy to use Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to Iran was to bring Sunni and Shia Islam into even more intense conflict, resulting in a hardening of attitudes on both sides" (Botha, 2013, p.2). This competition between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran was not contained within the Middle East but spread towards East Africa (p.2).

The ideological infiltrations were bolstered by donations from the Middle East into East African charities, or the provision of scholarships for East African nationals to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries (Rabasa, 2009; Botha, 2013, p.2). In the mid-1980s this allowed many international students to attend advanced religious studies, traveling back to their country to teach in the *madrassas*. In addition, scholars from the Middle East also travelled to the region, spreading new school of thought alongside the traditional Shafi'i practices. Extremism therefore gained influence as a result of the spread of Hanbali school of thought, which is closely related to Wahhabi Islam (Botha, 2013, p.2).

Violent manifestations of Islamic extremism have been witnessed in Kenya and East Africa at large since 1998 when the first suicide attacks were executed: two suicide bombers almost simultaneously detonated two bombs outside the US embassies in both Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing 224 people and leaving over 5000 injured. Even though diplomatic officials claimed the opposite, nationals of both Tanzania and Kenya were involved in the attacks, as well as foreigners from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt (p.4).

Ever since 1998, the attacks claimed by Islamic extremist have not ceased, exemplified by the 2002 Paradise Hotel attack in Mombasa, as well as the Kampala bar attack in 2010. In addition, Kenya had experienced 5 smaller attacks before October 2011, when the KDF intervened in Somalia. By this point, in Somalia Al Shabaab had been born, effectively being the most recent successful branch of Islamic extremism in the region. The KDF intervention in October 2011 was a response to the kidnappings of Westerners from Kenyan territory. Even though the decision for intervention had broad public support, Al

Shabaab made use of the opportunity to recruit within Kenya. After the intervention, numerous attacks have been experienced, a full list of which can be found in Appendix 2.

From this moment forward, Al Shabaab started actively recruiting within Kenya, referring to Kenya as *Dar al Harb* (house of war) and publishing various news papers entirely in Kiswahili (e.g. Gaidi Mtaani magazine). The Muslim Youth Center,[5] also known as Pumwani Muslim Youth, or Al Hijra, is a Nairobi based organisation with various branches throughout the country. It advocates an extreme interpretation of Islam and has been known to prepare members to travel to Somalia to fight jihad. MYC additionally supported the instigation of jihad in Kenya on their now defunct blog. Ever since, various theories on the motivations of Al Shabaab and its Kenyan recruits have been coined: to force the withdrawal of KDF troops from Somali grounds, as well as the potential aim of Al Shabaab to draw Kenya into a religious war between Christians and Muslims. This growing divide between Christians and Muslims became more prominent with the assasinations of various *sheikh*s in Mombasa, the first of whom was Aboud Rogo Mohamed killed on 27th of August 2012, a Kenyan Muslim alleged to be an extremist Muslim as well as to have funded jihad and Al Shabaab in Somalia.

1.7.2 Why is Kenya vulnerable to extremism?

Kenya Muslims have traditionally been seen as mystic practicers of Islam. Therefore it might come as a surprise that Islamic militancy is gaining momentum especially among young and poor members of society. As Professor Moustapha Hassouna of the University of Nairobi has stated in an interview with Danna Harman (2002):

> Kenyans do not have the wherewithal, nor the character, to start up their own homegrown international terror organization … But Muslims here are becoming more 'radical' or political in their outlook – and I can see their sympathies being used by outside terror interests.

Reasons for these increasing sympathies among the Muslim population are the growing resentment of the GoK, which has been cleverly exploited by Al Shabaab in their

[5] Not to be confused with the Muslim Youth Alliance.

recruitment. This resentment does not only come from the (perceived) discrimination that Muslims feel compared to Christians and Coasterians compared to up-country people (Kfir, 2008, p.840; Haynes, 2005, p.499), but also from the fact that since independence in 1963 the GoK has fostered strong ties with both the US and Israel.

According to Harman (cited in Haynes, 2005, p.499), some of these influences of radical Islam have spread mainly through the internet (e.g. MYC website and blog; Gaidi Mtaani magazine) and have encouraged Kenya's moderate Muslim community to sympathise with radical, violent acts to achieve political (and sometimes religious) change. Some have also argued (e.g. Haynes, 2005, p.500) that Kenya has also been targeted by Saudi-Arabian money and has seen an increase in the Wahhabi Islamic *madrassas* and mosques, initially founded to spread literacy among the underprivileged. Some of these *madrassas* have developed into entirely Wahhabi schools, now promoting the war against non-believers which has consequently led to a more militant orientation among the traditionally moderate Muslim communities (Kfir, 2008, p.841).

Another factor that has promoted extremism in Kenya is its shared border with Somalia. Al Shabaab has been active for over two decades and the war raging there, coupled with a largely porous border has resulted in people and arms having free access into Kenya. Professor Hassouna claims that "Somali's are everywhere, if they wanted to set up a network they could" (cited in Harman, 2002). Recent developments and attacks during 2014 strongly suggest that this has indeed happened. Haynes (2007) concludes on the matter:

> The political and economic circumstances of Kenya's post-colonial history have served to make many of the country's Muslim minority believe that they are second-class citizens. The proximity of Kenya to regional hubs of Islamic militancy -notably Somalia- have facilitated the growth of transnational Islamic militant networks, including some linked to Al Qaeda. It is difficult however, to estimate the appeal of an Islamic militancy that appears to regard use of indiscriminate bombs as a legitimate political and religious tool. Partly as a result, the likelihood is that the appeal of such Islamic militancy in Kenya will be restricted to a relatively small stratum of Kenya's Muslim minority. (p.1329-1330)

Dr. Anneli Botha (2013) for the Institute for Security Studies addresses the issue of the vulnerability of Kenyan youth to radicalisation in her paper *Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism*. She identified various drivers for radicalisation: socio-economic factors such as population growth and uneven development, political factors such as the *shifta*[6] wars and rise of the Mombasa Republican Council (see below), religious factors influencing the Islamic landscape in Kenya, the role of a Kenyan national identity which includes the perceived marginalisation of Muslims and the Coast province, the adverse influence of counter-terrorism initiatives, personal and internal factors and the role of the family.

Indeed, Botha stresses that "central to this is a search for identity. It is an unfortunate reality that a person who is unsure of their identity can easily be manipulated. In these cases, the identity of an organisation can become the identity of an individual" (Botha, 2013, p.20). In addition, Taylor and Lewis (cited in Botha, 2013) point to the difficulty of establishing identity in a disadvantaged (socio-economic or otherwise marginal) community:

> (…) young people find themselves at a time in their life when they are looking to the future with the hope of engaging in meaningful behaviour that will be satisfying and get them ahead. Their objective circumstances including opportunities for advancement are virtually non-existent; they find some direction for their religious collective identity but the desperately disadvantaged state of their community leave them feeling marginalised and lost without a clearly defined collective identity. (p.20)

In addition, Botha stresses the role that family has to play within the development of a coherent identity: it teaches prosocial behaviour, it can provide the individual with a personal identity, the child becomes aware of certain ideologies associated with authorities or institutions, and may or may not learn subsequent obedience to these. Finally, the bond or lack thereof between parents and their child is extremely important in identity

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[6] The *shifta* wars took place between 1963 and 1967. It was primarily a secessionist conflict, in which ethnic Somalis from the Northern Frontier District, following the independence of Kenya from the colonial powers, wanted to join 'Greater Somalia'.

development and developing self-esteem as well as prosocial behaviour and self-control, factors that will be examined thoroughly in this thesis.

1.7.3 Who are Al Shabaab?

One of the main influences on Kenya's radical Islamic scenery is the Somali branch of Al Qaeda: Al Shabaab.[7] The details of their exact origins are not relevant to this study, however it is important to note that their motivations are highly political, both nationally and internationally. Their recent activities in Somalia and the wider East African region have been chiefly a response to the AMISOM presence in Somalia. Most attacks executed and claimed by Al Shabaab have been as retaliation for the foreign invasion that is supporting the local Somali government in their struggle against both Al Shabaab and the Islamic Courts Union (Hansen, 2013, p.16). In addition, it is important to note that the increasing acceptance of their philosophy in more traditional African-Muslim communities has led to their spread in the broader region of Somalia, including Kenya, where support is notably increasing (Botha, 2013, p.2). Their attacks have been both suicidal and assault-like in the case of the Westgate Shopping Mall attack (2013), the Mpeketoni and Mandera massacres (2014) as well as the Garissa attack in April 2015. Additionally, they have been implicated in smaller assaults where they have used IEDs on public transport, restaurants and bars in the larger cities of Kenya and border towns such as Yumbis and Wajir. These smaller attacks are suspected to have been mostly executed by Kenyan nationals[8] (Botha, 2013, p.5-6).

1.7.4 The Mombasa Republican Council

Even though the MRC as an organisation has only rarely been discussed with the participants of this study, a brief introduction to their origins and grievances is warranted. It will provide additional information and context in which the Coast province and its people find itself, specifically in the light of marginalisation and radicalisation.

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[7] For an extensive overview of Al Shabaab and its history and ideology see: Hansen, S.J. (2013). *Al Shabaab in Somalia. The history and ideology of a militant islamist group 2005 - 2012.* London: Hurst & Company.

[8] For an extensive overview of all Al Shabaab linked attacks and events in Kenya, see Appendix II.

Before independence in 1963, the Coast of Kenya was broadly autonomous, as long as they would remit their taxes to the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Since the Coastal region came under the centralist government of President Jomo Kenyatta it has seen its chances of autonomy and self-rule diminish.

> Their fears of losing control of land and key-economic resources were realized over the next five decades. Post-independence social exclusion and regional development rigged in favor of outsiders and local elites has led to a situation where indigenous population now refer to themselves as 'Coasterians' and to the non-coastal settlers as 'Kenyans'. A surprising sense of unity is replacing the acrimony persisting in the wake of the self-governing *mwabao* and federalist *majimbo* campaigns during the run-up to independence. (Goldstein, 2011, p.3)

This coastal nationalism has since 2008 been chiefly represented by the Mombasa Republican Council. Although established in a environment where many affected parties were keen on the militant approach to address local grievances, they have intentionally distanced themselves from the local politicians and warlords who are challenging the historical arrangements for the Coast province. Due to their secessionist character, they had been banned by the Government several times, and many of their leaders and members have been arrested and charged with violent intentions. The MRC reiterates its non-violent ambitions, but these claims are disputed. They have been linked to Al Shabaab numerous times: "We strongly suspect the MRC has links with al-Shabaab. The leaders of both illegal groups hoodwink women into sacrificing their children pretending that they are going to be employed in Somalia", said former Coast Provincial Commissioner Ernest Munyi in 2011. MRC leaders have consistently denied any of these claims (Mudi & Otieno, 2011).

The MRC grievances stem from an inferior socio-economic status that they have encountered in the Coast Province since independence. In addition, the land situation they find themselves in has not been recognised by any of the previous four governments. This situation is exacerbated by the issues of unemployment and consistent poverty. The land issue dates back to 1908, and is too extensive and complicated to address here. The upshot

of it is that title deeds to plots were never allocated, and are hard if not impossible to obtain for the local population. Deeds are however issued to mainly investors from either overseas or to the Kikuyus, Kenya's largest and ruling tribe. Paul Goldstein (2011) presents the figures that when born in the Coast province, 38% of landowners possessed a title deed, compared to 82.25% of landowners who were born outside the Coast Province possess a title deed (p.11).[9]

It is interesting to note that the support in the Coast Province for the MRC and its methods is near universal. More educated participants did however disagree with the *Pwani si Kenya*, and *Pwani Uhuru* (The Coast is not Kenya and Coastal Freedom) campaigns. Support and knowledge of the movement was highest in the urban areas. The support shown was mainly on the MRC's issues of concern about land grabbing and socio-economic deprivation, which is felt by many Coasterians. Also interesting to note, is that the MRC has no ethnic or religious agenda: all tribes from the Mijikenda are active, and both Christians and Muslims are among its leadership (Goldstein, 2011, p.21).

1.7.5 Conclusion

This section has illustrated the position of extremist Islam in Kenya, its origins and factors making Kenya vulnerable to extremism. It has done so in order to illustrate some of the many complicating factors that the Muslim youth that are interviewed for this thesis find themselves in. The topics are often hotly debated and therefore relevant for this research. For the same reasons, the following section will introduce the topics of drugs, crime and marginalisation.

1.8 Drugs, Crime, Marginalisation and Radicalisation in Mombasa

Over the last decades, Mombasa has developed into a significant transit hub for narcotics, heroine, cocaine and other drugs, according to the US Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. These drugs primarily come from Southwest Asia and South America, destined for European and United States markets. In accordance with this pattern, there is a growing domestic market for heroin, and to a lesser extent cocaine

[9] For an extensive overview of the land disputes see Paul Goldstein's assessment of the MRC which resulted from in depth research into the political and social climates surrounding the movement.

within Kenya, especially along the Coastal strip and Nairobi (U.S. Department of State, 2006). The increase of drug transiting through Mombasa and Kenya at large is mainly due to the network of sea and airports, necessary for moving large drug shipments. In addition, "a climate of weak regulatory and judicial controls, inadequate law enforcement resources, and endemic official corruption have enabled drug traffickers to operate with near impunity" (Deveau, Levine, & Beckerleg, 2006, p.96).

Even though various arrests and seizures have been made and media reports claim that the authorities are clamping down on drugs, drug abuse in Mombasa is rampant. Barasa Masivai (2013) reports an increase in drug abuse in high schools in Mombasa, citing various causes to the problem such as the influence of mass-media, family conflict, availability of drugs and peer-pressure (p.61). The types of drugs used among the school-going youth are mainly *miraa*, *bhang,* cigarettes and alcohol. In addition, in Mombasa the mixture of illicit drugs with prescription drugs is on the rise. Kahuthia-Gathu, Okwarah, Gakunju and Thungu (2013) report the evolving drug scene, and its tendency of dealers and users alike to turn to less known, more accessible and often legal substances (p.5309). Kahuthia et al. (2013) report on the increase of the mixing of drugs, which in combination with the report on increasing drug use in public schools is cause for concern. In addition, personal experience and first-hand reports confirm increased drug use in Mombasa over the last years.

The increase of drug use in Mombasa, along with rampant unemployment and school drop-outs has consequently caused a steady rise in crime in Mombasa. Even though senior police officers are unwilling to admit or comment on the issues, a steady stream of crime reports indicates that specifically the city center and some of the residential areas have been seriously affected by murders, burglaries, thefts, stabbings, drug peddling and muggings ("New Wave of Violent Crimes," 2015). Reports from residents indicate that various gangs both local and from outside the areas have been increasingly terrorising the neighbourhoods. The youths have been identified to be aged 14 to 17, often led by an older peer. One of the major issues identified by media and residents alike is the lack of policing and ignorance of the relevant authorities.

Historically, the Coast Province of Kenya was the most developed part, facilitating trade and transit centers between the hinterland and overseas lands such as the Middle East and the wider East African community. During the colonial period however, the administration shifted to Nairobi, leaving the Coast province to its own devices, and Mombasa as a transit point. Ever since, the Coast Province is thought to be neglected by the central government, which is reflected by the poor infrastructure, high unemployment, and low education rates.

In addition, as a response to the increase of radicalisation and terror attacks in Kenya by Al Shabaab, the GoK has implemented a security policy aimed at the arrest or killing of radical Muslims all over Kenya. Considering around 50% of Mombasa is Muslim, these policies have affected a large section of the community. The profiling of Muslims by security agencies, police and other government officials is perceived to have started with the killing of *sheikh* Aboud Rogo Mohamed, which sparked weeks of riots in September 2012. The subsequent killing of other Muslim officials has angered the community even further, as well as raids on various mosques in Mombasa, in which scores of (innocent) youth were arrested or dispersed with rubber bullets and tear gas. In addition, the security agencies have organised mass raids, house arrests and implemented a shoot-to-kill policy. Chapter 3 will elaborate on how Muslim youth, the participants of this study, perceive and experience the issues of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation.

1.9 Identity Formation

One of the central themes in this thesis is identity formation. This section will elaborate on the various theoretical frameworks that have been referenced in this research.

Within the academic debate there is little consensus about the meaning of identity development. It has a strong sense of 'self' and 'individual': that 'thing' that makes a human being unique. Identity also entails a sense of a changeable static: one will always remain the same unique individual, but time and experiences can change the qualities one has. A more theoretical approach teaches us that at least three aspects of identity should be distinguished: 1. social characteristics of a person, such as gender and age, 2. the unique

personality structure of an individual and ideas others have about this and 3. the feeling of identity in the individual, the feeling of uniqueness, "a person's image of his or her physical and psychological characteristics, a person's autobiography" (Bosma et al., 1994, p.9). Erikson called this *ego-identity*. Ego-identity more specifically refers to an individual's realisation that one can stay 'the same' and develop into a self-reliant and unique individual (cited in Bosma et al., 1994, p.9-10): the recognition of sameness and continuity, the interplay between the individual and the context.

Erikson considered adolescence as the most important phase in identity development. "Childhood becomes the remembered past, and adulthood the anticipated future" (cited in McAdams, 2001, p.102). Erikson's psychological model of identity development describes how this phase is supposed to be a psychosocial moratorium: a period in which an individual is free to explore his or her own position and function within society. By freely exploring positions and options one may fulfil, the adolescent asserts his or her position in society and develop his or her own identity (cited in Ketner, 2008, p.11). The two most important concepts from Erikson's identity development theory are exploration and commitment. Exploration refers to experimenting with different options an adolescent may encounter. Exploration is supposed to provide the individual with the flexibility to deal with future changes and challenges. Commitment refers to a choice that an individual makes in relation to for example school, relations and ideology. These commitments often reflect the internal processes an adolescent has gone through, and societal expectations (cited in Ketner, 2008, p.11).

Identity development, according to Erikson, is the result of the interplay between exploration and commitment. By studying the level of exploration an individual may display and the type of commitments one may make, we can analyse the psychosocial functioning of an individual. Marcia developed a classification of identity development in which he distinguishes four identity statuses which are outcomes of the identity formation process (Marcia, 1994, p.73). These statuses are derived from the processes of exploration and commitment which are explored by the identity interview which addresses relevant themes or domains in the adolescent's life. The individual eventually is classified as either being in a state of (p.72-78):

1) Diffusion - There may be some form of exploration, but no commitments have been made. Interviews are usually brief.
2) Foreclosure - There may be hardly any exploration, but there are strong commitments. These commitments are often directly derived from parents or other influential individuals in the adolescent's life.
3) Moratorium - Commitments are often unclear, but the individual does show active exploration. The interview often shows the 'search' for answers.
4) Achievement - The adolescent has explored different options in life and the ultimate commitment is clear. The individual can clearly explain how and why he or she does what he or she does, and how he or she came to this decision.

According to Marcia (1994), individuals should be given all the opportunities and options by society to explore and develop their commitments. However, not every society is capable of giving this, nor is every individual capable of accepting the freedom he or she might be given. Adolescents have to negotiate between individual wishes and the expectations society has of them (p.78).

Lastly, Marcia (1994) notes that the level of freedom an individual is given by society influences the manner in which he or she can explore new possibilities. When such freedom is limited or even non-existent, as for example in a society with a patriarchal or authoritarian tradition, a permanent state of foreclosure could be the result (p.70). This could have implications for the social role that young adults may play in society. Also, if such an individual is then highly discontented with his or her situation, the commitments that he or she may make could be less nuanced as the commitments of an individual high in exploration. These matters will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4.

1.10 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the various components that are relevant to the problem analysis and therefore research focus of this thesis. It has firstly elaborated on the demography and historic origins of Muslims in Kenya, the population size as well as their

religious composition. Furthermore, in order to illustrate the current political climate that Muslims find themselves in, it has elaborated on the history of Muslims as well as the different organisations that are currently relevant in Kenya. The prominence of radicalisation and extreme Islam in Kenya has been examined as well as an explanation for Kenya's vulnerability to extremism. Furthermore, an introduction to drugs, crime and marginalisation has been provided. Lastly, an introduction on identity development has been given, themes around which this thesis will centralise.

CHAPTER 2 : METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction
2.2 A Qualitative Research Method
2.3 Data Collection
2.4 Interviewees
2.5 Meeting the Interviewees
2.6 Interviews
2.7 Trending Topics - Group Commonalities
2.8 Similar Question, Different Answer
2.9 Garissa Attack
2.10 Limitations
2.11 Data Analysis
2.12 Conclusion

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will outline some methodological aspects encountered before, during and after the field work and data collection of this research. It will do so by firstly elaborating on some qualitative methodological considerations and the approach this research has taken. Secondly, it will discuss the process of data collection as well as the interviewees and the process I went through to meet them. Furthermore, it will describe some considerations on the content of the interviews as well as the motivation for their construct. Fourthly, it will outline some of the issues and their relevance encountered during the interviews in the sections 'Trending Topics - Group Commonalities' and 'Similar Question, Different Answer'. Fifthly, it will discuss the relevance and influence of the Garissa attack on the 2nd of April during the time field work was conducted. Sixthly, it will elaborate on any limitations not previously addressed in this chapter such as the interviewer effects. Lastly, it will give a brief description of the data analysis process.

2.2 A Qualitative Research Method

This study is aimed at exploring how the Muslim youth of Mombasa develop their identity and which strategies they present for prosocial and moral behaviour, as well as to map how the youth talk about and deal with threatening issues in day to day life such as drug abuse, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. Hennink, Hutter and Baily (2011) in their introduction to qualitative research note that "the [qualitative interpretative] approach allows you to identify issues from the perspective of your study participants, and understand the meanings and interpretations that they give to behaviour, events or objects" (p.9), and it is this approach that this thesis has taken. This section will briefly elaborate on some methodological considerations, before returning to the specifics of this research.

As mentioned above, this research was conducted from the qualitative interpretative paradigm perspective. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2008), a paradigm can be defined as "a net that contains the researchers' epistemological, ontological and methodological premises" (p.31). Even though a thorough review of methodological literature is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth considering the methodological background in order to realise how it may have shaped the course of this research. Therefore, I will briefly elaborate on the realities of the interpretative paradigm.

Hennink et al. (2011) note that the interpretative paradigm was largely a response to positivism, which focusses on conducting research as objective as possible through quantitative data collection: an objective measurement of social phenomena. The underlying assumption is that reality consists of objective facts and truths which can be measured. Its greatest critique has been that it *assumes* the existence of objective measurement, failing "to acknowledge the interactive and co-constructive nature of data collection with human beings" (p.14), and simultaneously failing to acknowledge the contextual nature of social reality and peoples' lives. The interpretative paradigm has therefore been a reaction to this approach, stressing the understanding of people and their perspectives, which is referred to as the inside or 'emic' perspective. The interpretative paradigm seeks to understand experience within the social world through observation and "recognises that reality is *socially constructed* as people's experiences occur within social,

cultural, historical or personal contexts" (p.15). The interpretative approach also recognises the fact that there may not be one truth, rather, there can be multiple perspectives on reality. Furthermore, it stresses the subjectivity of humans, both of the participants as well as the researcher; data collection is influenced by both.

This thesis focusses on the perspectives and subjective realities of the Muslim youth in Mombasa. It attempts to discover how they develop their identity as well as describe how they present their strategies for prosocial and moral behaviour. It describes their views and their presentation of their lives, as well as their opinions and coping mechanisms with drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. Therefore, 19 in-depth qualitative interviews have been conducted, questioning the participants on eight different domains: parents, siblings, school, friends, gender, religion, current affairs and ethnicity. These domains have been briefly introduced in Chapter 1 and will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4. No quantitative data has been collected because the primary aim of this research was to gain understanding of the youths' perspectives and presentation, rather than to gain insights in actual behaviour or so-called objective truths surrounding them, which are more commonly discussed when approaching research from a quantitative positivist angle. The following section will elaborate further on how and what data was collected and why it was relevant and representative for this study.

2.3 Data Collection

Data for this thesis was collected through structured and semi-structured qualitative interviews. 19 interviews were conducted with male Mombasa youth, age 15 - 25, regarding their identity development and views on current affairs, all of which have been recorded.[10] Furthermore, a number of semi-structured informal interviews has been conducted with community members, CBO and NGO members as well as other interested parties who wished to elaborate on the objective of this study. Some of these have been recorded, for others only notes were made. These interviews however will not be presented in this thesis as data, rather, they were useful for the researcher to focus the data collection and contextualise the data during and after the field work.

[10] I will elaborate on the details of the participant group and methodological choices later.

This data is relevant for this research because it provides insight in the perspectives and presentations of the Muslim youth of Mombasa on their identity development and strategies for prosocial or moral behaviour and self-control. In addition, the qualitative nature of these interviews allowed the participants to share their views and opinions on pressing issues in their lives such as drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. The following section will elaborate on the characteristics of the participant group and why they were selected.

2.4 Interviewees

All 19 qualitative interviews were held with male participants aged between 15 and 25 years in order to obtain broad data on the issues that the youth are dealing with. This age range incorporates the youth who are most vulnerable to the negative effects of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. For example, the Christian Science Monitor reported in 2013 that evidence suggested that the "radical jihadi message of the Somali-based group [Al Shabaab] is being promulgated much closer to home: in local *madrassas* and even in some prominent mainstream Kenyan high schools" (Nzwili, 2013). In addition, drug problems have been known to start from an even earlier age. Therefore, this study decided to interview youth from the whole age bracket as to not exclude any issues or matters arising from this age group.

I have interviewed four students at a *madrassa* in the Old Town, which is affiliated with one of the mosques. In addition, five participants were from an integrated primary school[11] in one of the poorer areas of town.[12] Lastly, I interviewed five youth who were attending a secondary school located in the center of Mombasa town. All interviewees from these schools were Sunni Muslims. The remaining five interviews have been conducted with two members of the Shia community (one finished tertiary education, the other was a drop-out currently working), one Sunni who had finished tertiary education and was now working, and two Sunni who were school drop-outs and also currently

[11] Both secular and religious education in one school

[12] Since there is only one integrated school in that area, for anonymity reasons I will not qualify which.

working. One of the last two was first interviewed alone, and then together with the last one. The following table summarises the participant group:

	Primary	**Secondary**	**Tertiary**	**Drop out**
Total no.	5	8	3	3
Age	15 - 16	16-19	19, 24-25	21, 25
School	Sunni	Sunni	1 Shia, 2 Sunni	1 Shia, 2 Sunni

The education levels are not representative for Mombasa; as mentioned before, education levels are notoriously low in the Coast Province: 250,380 students attend pre-primary school, 758,062 attend primary school, 108,401 pupils were enrolled in secondary education. In addition, 8,941 students from the Coast Province were pursuing a degree in higher education, according to the 2009 census (Obonyo et al., 2009). However, it was due to language and security issues that I could not interview the so-called high-risk group of drop-outs. I was mostly confined to schools and *madrassas* for the collection of data.

All participants were male. Due to size limitations of this research, I decided to only interview boys for this master thesis. The reason for this was that boys are thought to be a higher risk group when it concerns drugs, crime and radicalisation (Barasa Masivai, 2013). The socio-economic status of the interviewees is hard to determine. None of them were eager to share explicit details on the matter. However, some answers and characteristics did give an indication of their (parents') wealth, such as parents' professions and the participants' education levels. Firstly, all of the students who were currently attending school or had attended school in the past were paying some form of tuition. Especially the secondary and tertiary students would have to pay somewhere between KES20,000/- and KES100,000/- (€200,00 and €1000,00) per annum, which is all but an option for most families. However, this does not necessarily mean that these youths and their families are considered middle or even lower-middle class. Some indicated that their parents were working as *kibarua*, a daily paid labourer, or a driver, which are considered some of the lowest income jobs. Most mothers were housewives. One of the students currently in

tertiary education indicated that he was pursuing his bachelor's degree on a scholarship, and the other said his parents were providing for him.

The participant group as described above is functional for this research because it represents a cross-section of the school-going Muslim youth of Mombasa: *madrassa,* primary, secondary and tertiary education as well as a small number of school drop-outs. The limitations of this group have been considered in this research and described above. The following section will elaborate on how I met the interviewees before and after I arrived in Mombasa.

2.5 Meeting the Interviewees

Most of the data collected and interviewees met, was through my old workplace in the port of Mombasa. One of my former colleagues is a well respected member of the Muslim community in town. The data collection started before I set off to Kenya, as I had emailed him with the request if he could introduce me to either imams or youth groups from various mosques and *madrassas*. I was aware that I needed an introduction into these communities. Considering the tightened security and discrimination of Muslims, the risk that the youth and community members would consider me an intelligence agent and therefore not trustworthy, was real. However, asking questions to a community threatened by police and government is delicate but in this case, possible. As stated before, my contact was more than happy to help and he introduced me to two *ustadhs* and one of my former colleagues. One of the *ustadhs* was the imam of a mosque in the Old Town, the other was the head of an integrated school. Another former colleague put me in touch with his previous high school, where he himself had experienced the difficulties of adolescence, drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation not long ago. Lastly, three interviews were conducted with drop-outs who were met through my old work place as well as other contacts I still had.

This section has described the goings and practicalities of meeting the participants for this research. It has described the considerations and issues I came across once I had arrived in Kenya in order to explain some of the methodological challenges this research

has faced. The following section will elaborate on the contents and possible limitations of the interviews.

2.6 Interviews

The 19 interviews conducted with youth were base on the premises that this research would evolve around identity development of the Muslim youth in Mombasa. The structure of the interview therefore followed Marcia's assumptions of exploration and commitment in different domains that are relevant for youth (Marcia, 1966). In his original identity interview, identity development was studied by examining the commitments in the domains of work, politics and religion. He, however, further argued that every identity interview can vary from group to group and culture to culture, as long as each domain that is being discussed is relevant for the participants, and represents a domain that they have to make decisions on from time to time (Marcia, 1994). In this case, the following domains were established: 1. parents, 2. siblings, 3. gender, 4. friends, 5. religion, 6. current affairs, 7. ethnicity 8. school. The structure of the interview can be found in Appendix III, and an elaborate elucidation on the different domains can be found in Chapter 4.

All interviews were conducted in English. Considering that English for some of the participants is not even their second but their third language, a cause for concern should be expressed here. However, all students were either in their last year of primary education or further on, and are therefore expected to understand and speak English at a reasonable level: their lectures, tests and exams are all conducted in English. The participants showed hesitation in answering certain questions, but it is impossible to say whether this was a language problem or a different issue all together. During the interviews, I never felt that they did not understand a question, since they always asked for clarification if something was not understood.

Another concern was the interviewees motivations to participate in this study. Since I was introduced to either the Imam or a head teacher of a school, whom I asked if I could interview some of their students: all participants were told by their superiors to participate. Although their rights and anonymity were extensively discussed individually

beforehand, none of them decided against an interview.[13] Whether this was their own will or their obedience towards their elders is hard to tell. An issue strongly related to this is the reluctance of some of the interviewees to answer questions. Rather than expressing that they would not like to answer, long pauses are heard. Out of respect for their privacy, I usually did not press the issue or address what made them reluctant to answer. I did however at times attempt to phrase questions differently, but in the end would rather omit the question than make them feel more uncomfortable with me.

As mentioned before, this research has a interpretative qualitative nature. The interviews therefore were semi-structured and not every question has been asked to all. Of course, all domains have been covered with each interviewee, however, it was for example not until later that I discovered the relevance of siblings as role models, or the occurrence of domestic violence. Some questions arising from matters the interviewees themselves brought to the fore have therefore been incorporated later and have not necessarily been addressed in each interview. Another example of this is that my confidence grew the more interviews I had conducted. Initially, I was hesitant to use the words 'Al Shabaab' and 'jihad', and ask for their opinions on these matters. My phrasing was sometimes evasive, which in turn could often produce evasive answers. As I noted the openness of the youth that I interviewed, I became more confident and started to ask questions about sensitive matters: the answers became more clear and with more depth. The following excerpt is from one of the secondary school kids at the *madrassa*, who was more forward in his answers than I had expected. It was a moment that I realised that the participants were more willing to talk about sensitive issues than I had previously assumed. Aziz (15) below, when he is asked about the shooting of Aboud Rogo Mohamed and other Muslim clerics his answer is that he feels awful when that happens. When he is asked to elaborate on the matter he resumes:

> A: [They are] Muslims, they (the GoK) kill our brothers. So they get to (.) our *Sheikhs*, they kill them (.) so, when they get killed, I feel very bad.

[13] See Appendix IV for the agreement between the interviewer and participants.

M: And what about when the government came into Masjid Mussa[14] [15], how did you feel then?

A: (.) (.) In fact, that day, I should be there. My father urged me to come to *madrassa*. So eh, I went. When I went home, that this (.) government, came to Masjid Mussa, some people got killed (.) so I feel really bad.

M: Yeah, what did you do?

A: I just pray to them.

M: Yeah, have you ever been to Masjid Mussa?

A: Yeah (.)

M: Yeah, what did they tell you there?

A: Eh (.) What they tell, is what's in Qur'an but the government, they understand it different from what is told there. Yes. They believe that they are Al Shabaabs, but nothing like that. They just support (.)

After Aziz mentioned Al Shabaab in the excerpt above, I did not yet feel comfortable asking further about his views on Al Shabaab or jihad. When I transcribed the interview however, I realised that I could have asked for more details, which led me to be more open in consecutive interviews. For example, when I was interviewing Ahmed (19), my questions were more direct when it concerned Al Shabaab or jihad:

M: So who do you think is Al Shabaab then?

[14] Here I refer to the raids of the mosques in 2013 and 2014 (Standard Media 29th November 2014)

[15] Masjid Mussa is a mosque located in the area of Majengo in Mombasa. It was where *Sheikh* Aboud Rogo Mohamed was preaching, and is accused of harbouring radical youth. In addition, clerics affiliated with Masjid Mussa have been accused of recruiting for Al Shabaab and preaching jihad.

A: (.) Al Shabaab is a political organisation. (.) it is eh, you see it is the I think, you see like in Somalia, Somalia was the a great country. If you look at the photo's of Somalia previously. (…)

(… lengthy discussion of the history of Somalia and world politics…)

M: Al Shabaab is purely political

A: It's political

M: What do you think, since we're talking about this anyway, what do you think is the meaning of jihad?

A: You know there are two types of jihad. (…)

(… lengthy discussion of inner and outer jihad …)

M: Yeah, do you think that that is what Al Shabaab is doing? (Referring to outer jihad)

A: No, definitely not, because Islam does not say, kill your fellow in religion. There is a Muslim, or it is any [other] (.) And suicide bombing is completely *haram*. And this is what's happening with all muslim wars. Because if you [commit] suicide according to Islam, you get hellfire, that is certain. So if you do suicide bombing that's your faith. And that's what is happening.

My questions became more focussed here, directly addressing the issues of Al Shabaab, jihad and 'killing for politics', rather than carefully introducing the topic of radicalisation through the raids on the mosques or killings of the *sheikhs*.

This section has elaborated on the structure of the interviews, their limitations and developments over the course of data collection. The interviews were semi-structured, conducted in English. Further, I became more open and experienced as an interviewer over time. The following section will address the issue of *in vivo* topics that were discussed by the participants and the correlation with certain schools/groups.

2.7 Trending Topics - Group Commonalities

In the interviews, there were naturally commonalities overall, but there were some notable similarities per location where the interviews were conducted. This implies that some of the data that has been collected is subject to locality and perhaps even friend groups. One of the most typical examples is the experience of domestic violence by some of the participants. At the integrated school, four out of five interviewees reported domestic violence, whereas this had only been mentioned by one participant previously. Their openness indicates that this was not the first time the subject was discussed with them. Nasir (15):

> M: (…) What do you not like about yourself?
>
> N: Not like, because, maybe I have some (.) Maybe I can say temper. When somebody tries to disturb me, and [I can] be angry very fast, because father even in the same way. So, I just try to make sure that myself, not disturb but, when somebody disturbs me, I feel like hitting him, but my friends tell me not to do that.
>
> M: Can you tell me a bit about your father? Can you give me an example? (…)
>
> N: My father, [he has a] bad temper, my father. When he's alone, with something small, he can even hit us, because of something that we did. We stay outside.
>
> M: Does that happen often, or..
>
> (…)
>
> N: Yes. Hmm, if I don't do something, with my sister, because I have two sisters, when he will go somewhere, he comes back. He hit us. But something small.. We know, we leave it.
>
> M: And you said sometimes you have a bit of a temper yourself,
>
> N: Yes.

M: Could you give me an example of that? When did that happen last?

N: Here in school. When somebody, I tell him something, they say about my parents. When I tell him (.) Like them most, because I'm a prefect. The younger ones in the mosque, the don't know this. But I tell him something, he tells me, who are you! So, just ignore them. But the teachers told us not to beat the small children. Because they are beaten, and hurting somewhere. Which can cost more trouble.

This excerpt exemplifies how participants, in this case Nasir, initiate talking about domestic violence themselves. The question was open, 'what do you not like about yourself' and he continues to elaborate on rather sensitive and particular issues. This demonstrates that he has probably discussed this before, moreover because he explains that his friends but also teachers have instructed him not to hit anybody. The interviews from the integrated school show resemblance on this matter, since four out of five participants told me that they experienced domestic violence and were openly discussing the matter. I have asked in all the consecutive interviews in other locations that I conducted about domestic violence but rarely received confirmation that it was experienced; only two of them reported some form of verbal violence or severe punishments when they were younger. An explanation for this could be that the integrated school had noticed the issue of domestic violence previously among its students, and had discussed the matter with them. This could have made the participants at this location more open about the matter.

Another commonality within a group was associated with peer-pressure and friend groups. At the secondary school I interviewed three classmates who were in their last year and two classmates who were in their second year. The school board had picked these students and I did not have much say in the matter, especially because exams were being conducted and not all classes were available to me. The three classmates and probably friends showed remarkable resemblance in that they would indicate to attempt to guide friends or peers back to the 'right path'. Even though many of the participants also described similar behaviour, the three participants of the secondary school were

particularly keen and would not only advise their own friends but also attempt to guide other peers who in their opinion had fallen off the right path by, for example, using drugs or dressing inappropriately. The reason that these three were so similar and rather unique in their behaviour is probably because they are school friends, and these questions evolved around their dealings with school and friends. Other topics were answered differently by each interviewee, which tells us that these interviews were still rather varied in, for example, socio-economic background as well as upbringing. This is a positive observation, since this thesis aims to present a broad spectrum of the perspectives of the Muslim youth in Mombasa. For an extensive discussion of peer-pressure and staying on the right path, see Chapter 4.

This section has elaborated on some group commonalities that were noticed in the different localities. It is relevant to address these issues in order to be reflective on how representative the collected data is. I have argued that the above issues have not altered the eventual data or its interpretation and analysis, by explaining the commonalities per locality and clarifying their occurrence. The following section will briefly discuss the methodological issues of how similar questions can provoke different answers, within the same interview.

2.8 Same Question, Different Answer

Another methodological issue that arose, was how a single question can have different answers, none of which necessarily good or bad, true or untrue. This is in line with the methodological perspective that this research operates from: the interpretative paradigm. As discussed above, this paradigm operates from the assumption that the researcher and participant influence the creation of research data. This became specifically apparent when the participants were asked what it is like to be a Muslim in Mombasa: various answers were given by the same participant. For example, one would say that it is great, because there are so many mosques in which you can pray and the government takes care of the Muslim community because of the recognition of the Eid holidays. Sharif (21) explains:

M: What is it like for you to be a Muslim at the Coast Province of Kenya, to be a Muslim here in a in Mombasa.

I: To be a Muslim in Mombasa, it's good, you do it well, you find Muslims, you come to mosque. Like most of us, we have five daily prayers. So (.) Five daily prayers, at a mosque. So in Mombasa, after every corner, you find a mosque. And at the university, there is a mosque there. You don't, you don't have a reason to miss a prayer. Here, you find a mosque, you don't have to go to somewhere else.

However, when asked again later on in the interview in a context of marginalisation, responses would often differ from the initial answer. When he is asked about the killings of the *sheikhs* last year and his feelings towards that, he expresses great concerns about the 'shoot-to-kill' policy of the government, and the fear in which many Muslims live these days. Imams and *sheikhs* are targeted, and no justice is done. The following excerpt is also from Sharif, who now expresses concern and fear of wearing a *kofia* or being a Muslim in Mombasa:

Sh: OK that one is hard for me. Some people have been shot, and nobody knows by who. So that person has not been punished. It's really hurting, seeing that the families, they feel hurt. This person, their own person has been killed, and nobody has been punished for that. The government is saying, ok, some some guys came to the *matatu*, they shot him and they have not been found. That thing, it hurt people to see the government is not doing anything about these things. Why don't they fight them? All the *Sheikhs* have been killed and nobody, those who were killed, there is no no suspect being jailed. It hurts them, you see you find that, *Sheikhs* now, Imams are targeted. They've been targeted, they've been killed. Even these teachers, who teach you at the mosque, and nobody will be punished for that. At least if you're coming to, somebody would be punished, like this one has done this thing, and then they would be punished. Yeah, that's what ok. That person would be punished. Yeah. You don't feel great. <u>But now, you get scared. Yeah, you get scared. Even wearing your turban, your *kofia*, look around you get scared. You find that you talk to yourself and you know, that person if he kills you will not be punished. You really get scared.</u>

The underlined section in the excerpt above expresses a different concern about 'being Muslim in Mombasa' than Sharif's earlier response. Instead of describing the official arrangements, he now elaborates on day to day issues that he and the Muslim community face. This is a different answer to a similar question. Methodologically speaking, this does obviously not mean that one answer is right, or one answer is wrong. Rather, it demonstrates that in different contexts, participants may give different answers, exemplifying the subjectivity of humans as well as the fact that there can be multiple perspectives on reality, which are both typical points of departure of the interpretative paradigm. I approached different topics from different angles during the interviews, attempting to contextualise questions, specifically in order to obtain different views and perspectives from the participants.

This section has exemplified the nature of the interpretative paradigm that has been utilised in this research by elaborating on the different and sometimes contradictory answers participants would give to similar questions. It has demonstrated the subjective reality and the influence of both participants as well as the researcher on the collection of data. The following section will elaborate on the relevance and influence of the Garissa Attack which occurred during the field work and describing the influence it has had on the data collection.

2.9 Garissa Attack

On the 2nd of April 2015, gunmen stormed the University of Garissa, killing 147 people and injuring scores more. Garissa is located in the North Eastern province of Kenya, an area repeatedly plagued by terrorists attacks from across the relatively nearby Somali border. The slaughter took place during the period field work was conducted as part of this research and has had some effects on the course this study has taken. In this section I will address the issues that arose before and after the attack, and the significance to this study.

On the 30th of March, I conducted an interview with Mahmoud who I had met through a friend, Aziz. He had agreed to a conversation and was willing to talk. His openness about jihad, Islam, his support for Al Shabaab, his friends who had travelled to

Somalia, his connections with Aboud Rogo Mohamed and his own desire to some day go for jihad, intrigued me. I was capable of conducting the interview, asking accurate questions and most importantly, not argue with him on any of the matters. We agreed to another conversation later on during my stay, after I had transcribed the first, allowing me to come up with new questions.

Three days after this interview the Garissa Attack took place. Shocking and vivid images of the bodies of slaughtered students poured into my email and chat inboxes. My phone would not stop ringing, my contacts urging me to be careful during my research, and asking where I was, what I was doing, concerned about the consequences of the questions I was asking to the Muslim youth of Mombasa.

After the initial shock and grief came the anger. The government's and security forces' actions were reported on by media, both national and international, and triggered a national outrage. Why did so many young promising people die, why did it take so long for the KDF to arrive? Planes that were allocated for exactly these purposes were allegedly used by the Kenya Police Airwing boss's family for a private trip from Mombasa to Nairobi, leaving the security forces waiting for their transport to save lives ("Private Mission," 2015). The conversations that were held among friends and strangers all concerned Garissa and how little was done to prevent it or at least to save lives. Conversations then gradually shifted to the structural problems Kenya, its people and its Government have concerning security, corruption and a general lack of caring.

Mahmoud had throughout this continuously attempted to contact me. In my anger I felt it would not have been right to answer him. I waited for some weeks to let things cool, and more importantly, to let myself cool down. Mahmoud, for example, describes the motivations for killing innocents as follows:

> Mah: Yeah! Here, and then (points at head one side, sprays his hand at the other side) one thing happened. People they take a picture, and spreading the whatsapp.. *Sasa* when you see this. Say ah SHIT! How am I gonna reach to the police and kill police. I don't have a bomb, I don't have a pistol, I don't have, even petrol, nowadays, I go petrol station I don't. Will not be sale. I just have a lot of what's it

M: anger

Mah: Anger! I go anywhere, I keep, put in knife. That's what makes mentality of people now to kill Christian.

(…)

Az: it's a revenge

Mah: Revenge! *Sasa*, he thinks, I don't have any pistol, I don't have any AK[16], I don't have a grenade, I don't have even, I will not be allowed to [buy a] petrol bomb. Ok, now what I'll do, I have to revenge! And I have to revenge the Government of Kenya. No, I have to revenge of the Christian. (…) But [really], he wants to go to the police station or any governmental [buidling] that's (.)

M: you don't have the means to

Mah: yeah yeah, he doesn't have the means, the right thing.

M: and that's why Christians get attacked

Mah: yeahh.. In the church nini anywhere

M: are you behind that, you think that's justified, or whatever.

Mah: yeahhh aeeh for justify.

Az: it's ok, because, if we revenge, they will respect. They will have respect for the other religion. But if you don't revenge, people they make you feel low. And you are human, you have the strength, you have the power. Then you do it. Because if you don't do it, they keep on killing more and more.

M: right yeah

[16] AK is a referral to AK47. Russian built automatic weapon. Also known as Kalashnikov.

Az: so in Islam, you have to revenge.

M: otherwise they will keep coming

Az: yeah.

Mah: ok, let's say, you want to send a message. (.) to Government of Kenya. (.) how can you send a message in Government of Kenya. (.) for revenging, the only thing you can do is to kill. To kill an innocent. (.) That's the mentality.

The underlined section is what almost made me understand at the time what Mahmoud meant, what some of the youth must be going through. However, the police station in Garissa was directly located opposite the university campus, the gunmen most certainly had the capacity to stage an attack, why then were innocent people killed? To send a message? The cowardice of the attack and the conversation I had with Mahmoud made me realise that I would not have been able to do the interview or a follow up interview after the events as well as I had done the first time. I had planned more interviews with some of his friends and himself, but felt it was inappropriate to continue this line of interviewing. In addition, some of these contacts had already cancelled the interviews themselves, possibly fearing that I was part of some intelligence service.

This brings me to the second element of this analysis. By the 2nd of April, I had conducted 12 interviews regarding identity development. In the next school I visited, some of the participants were self-proclaimed fundamentalist muslims, but by no means extremist or favouring Al Shabaab. However, I often noticed the hesitance to speak on topics such as Aboud Rogo Mohamed, radicalisation, crime and Al Shabaab. Being asked about the Garissa attack, they had clear, well-formed and sometimes angry responses, angry with their Government, angry with Al Shabaab.

This process is worth describing, because the effects that an event such as 'Garissa' can have on field work are profound. It can change the course of data collection as well influence the answers participants give and questions the researcher poses. Furthermore, it

can limit the availability of interviewees or their willingness and openness toward a researcher. It demonstrates how a research and the people involved in it, are subjected to social, historical, contemporary and personal contexts. Even though some limitations have already been discussed above, the following section will elaborate on some issues more in depth in order to establish the validity and representativeness of this research.

2.10 Limitations

2.10.1 Interviewer effects

The qualitative interpretative paradigm stresses the aspect of subjectivity in research. Discussions on the issue of power relations in qualitative methodologies is not a new phenomenon. Wolf for example viewed power as an expression of the social categories of age, gender and ethnicity (cited in Kadianaki, 2014, p.359). Whilst I do not wish to elaborate extensively on the academic discussion, which often approaches Wolf's categories as 'static', it is paramount to address these social categories from a critical point of view. Therefore, the interviewer was myself, a 27 year old Dutch, white female. The participants were 15 to 25 year old Kenyan, black males.

Firstly, it is not clear weather cultural differences or differences in ethnicity may have influenced this research. Power relations in qualitative research have been examined by for example Irini Kadianaki (2014). She analysed three instances between a Greek researcher and immigrant participants, which showed that participants introduce power asymmetries in the research communication, due to the meanings these asymmetries carry in the Greek social context. In the Kenyan context, these asymmetries can be assumed to be present as well, considering white or European individuals to be a small minority, who are often visitors to the country. Even though it is hard to suggest any conclusions on the perception of white people in Kenya, experience teaches that an unknown white person is most certainly an 'other'. The use of an 'out-group' interviewer in this research may be of influence, in that the participants may give socially desired answers or may result in the omitting of critique to the 'in-group'. In this research, this may well have been an issue. It is however hard to establish to what extent different answers would have been given to a Kenyan researcher. One of the reasons for uncertainty on the matter is that it may also

have been the case that in some domains *because* I was from such a distinct 'out-group', the participants might have considered me trustworthy: who was I going to tell?

Secondly, the gender of the interviewer may also have been of influence to this research. Breakwell has argued that participants are more likely to talk about themselves when the interviewer looks more like them (cited in Ketner, 2008, p.23). The fact that I am a woman, may therefore have limited the participants willingness to discuss certain topics. However, it is noteworthy that even the shyest of participants were remarkably open about for example gender issues or issues relating to girlfriends (see Chapter 4). It is therefore hard to conclusively discuss the effects my own gender has had on these interviews.

Thirdly, it is also hard to determine the effects that age difference or similarity may have had, especially because my ethnicity and gender already placed me in such an 'out-group'. All in all, it can be said with certainty that there will have been interviewer effects in this research considering how 'other' I was to the participants, however, it is very hard to establish to what extent.

Despite the fact that interviewer 'effects' are, as shown above, hard to establish, it is worth leaving a few remarks on the participants' dealings with the interviewer. Their responses to my presence and questions varied wildly: from animated and inspired monologues, to shy, introverted and simple yes-no answers. Therefore, it can be assumed that the interviewer effects also vary per person. This could depend on their exposure to 'others', as well as their personality and confidence. It could also have partially to do with their level of education and English, however, there was no absolute difference in quality of conversation between primary and further education: some of the primary students were as animated and enthusiastic as some of the ones who had finished tertiary education. Therefore, there are not only interviewer effects, but also interviewee effects: again points of departure for the interpretative paradigm. Lastly, the participants often became more comfortable as the conversation would continue, which could indicate that the participants became more accustomed to the interviewer, perhaps reducing the interviewer effects slowly and slightly.

2.10.2 Participants

Although I have elaborated on the composition of the participant group above, it is worth considering the possible limitations of the group. Although I have attempted to interview a cross-section of Muslim youth in Mombasa (Sunni and Shia, different age groups, different locations, different education levels), this thesis cannot be said to be entirely representative. Most interviewees were attending either primary or secondary school, and it is thought that most problems with drug abuse, crime and radicalisation occur among the so-called unemployed, uneducated 'drop-outs'. I have attempted to map the strategies of largely school going youth in coping with the day-to-day reality of Mombasa. In addition, all participants were male. This is a limitation on this research, not only because of the increasing numbers of women heading to Somalia for example (Dyer, 2015), but most importantly, because girls comprise 50% of the Muslim youth in Mombasa.

2.10.3 Language

As mentioned above, all interviews were conducted in English. English and Kiswahili are the official working languages and are both widely spoken throughout the country. However, most Kenyans also speak their tribal language. Often therefore, English is an individuals third language. However, in Mombasa, Kiswahili is the 'tribal' language and often therefore English is the second language. English is taught from class 1 in primary school, lessons are mostly conducted in Kiswahili, English or a mix, and all exams are conducted in English. Therefore, it was assumed that the participants would indeed master enough English to respond to the questions that were asked.

Although I never felt that the interviewees would not understand what I asked them, some might not have been as comfortable responding as they might have been in Kiswahili. Especially the younger interviewees were less responsive which might have been a result of this. The secondary school and older participants seemed more affluent. This may also have been a result of (age-related) confidence, and it is therefore hard to establish the extent to which language problems may have affected this research.

2.11 Data Analysis

After all the interviews were conducted, I have started to transcribe from the beginning. Whilst doing so, I realised this was a time consuming process considering the time frame I was working with. I therefore decided to start my coding process in the raw audio files rather than coding the transcripts. For this process I have used Atlas.ti version 1.0.23 (93) for Mac.

I started the coding process from the first interview, adding codes as I kept listening and in the meantime making sure that when adding more codes I would listen to earlier interviews in order to add the new coding. A full list of the codes can be found in Appendix 5. Colours were added for the different domains, inductive, deductive and *in vivo* codes.[17] Furthermore, I annotated the codes and quotations with summaries for future reference.

The coding process resulted in 744 quotes. I then started to analyse these quotes as per the topics I was writing on, transcribing the relevant parts. Obviously, I have not been able to use all quotations, but rather decided which quotes were the most representative of the general opinion, representation or phenomenon that I could find throughout the data. All the interviewees have been given pseudonyms.

2.12 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed some methodological considerations in order to establish the validity of this research. It has done so by firstly elaborating on the qualitative interpretative paradigm and its perspective on and benefits for this thesis. Secondly, it has briefly described the process of data collection as well as the participant group and how they were chosen and interviewed. Furthermore, this chapter has elaborated on the interviews and their content as well as the methodological relevance for this thesis. In addition, this chapter has addressed some of the issues that were raised during the interviews and analysis in the sections 'Trending Topics - Group Commonalities' and 'Similar Question, Different Answer'. The Garissa Attack, its relevance and influence have further been discussed as well as any other limitations that

[17] *In vivo* codes are codes that have been derived from the data itself. They have not been established by the researcher but are, for example, terms that have surfaced throughout the research. They are often local names or references.

this research may have encountered such as interviewer effects. Lastly, it has outlined the process of data analysis.

CHAPTER 3: EXPERIENCING SOCIETAL ISSUES

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3.1 Introduction

During the very first interviews that were conducted, as well as during informal ethnographic observations made throughout the research, it became clear that certain issues were particularly prevalent in Mombasa and relevant to the Mombasa youth that were not initially included in the study. Drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation were suggested to be closely related issues. Most interviewees would give examples of drugs and peer-pressure, as well as complain about the marginalisation or unjust treatment of Muslims by the authorities in response to terror attacks by Al Shabaab. The purpose of this chapter is not only to elaborate on these issues and provide some theoretical reflections, but moreover to explore the manner in which the youth discuss these matters. This is particularly useful considering this thesis explores the identity development and coping strategies the youth implement. The various ways that the interviewees would respond to these issues, whether introduced by themselves or the

interviewer, is particularly interesting because it will have implications for their identity development and strategies for prosocial behaviour and self-control.

Firstly, this chapter will introduce the topics of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation as they were presented by the interviewees, whilst reflecting on the manner in which they discuss these issues. Secondly, it will briefly provide some theoretical reflections on the issues. Lastly, this chapter will provide some insights into the relevance of these issues within this thesis.

3.2 Drugs

3.2.1 Introduction

Kenya, and Mombasa specifically, has for many years functioned as a major transit point for illicit drugs. Due to its strategic location, large natural harbour and extensive infrastructure network into the African continent, it has serviced many large drug cartels: "domestic use has soared as international drug cartels have turned east Africa into a major transit route for narcotics from Afghanistan" (Jorgic, 2015). In addition, the weak regulatory climate and lack of judicial controls has encouraged the trade rather than halted it in any way (Deveau et al., 2008, p.96). Even though the authorities claimed to have tightened the net around drug dealers and distributors, these efforts do not seem to be interrupting the flow of drugs.

According to Deveau et al. (2008), drugs were introduced into the Kenyan Coast during the 1980s. Specifically heroin spread rapidly from Mombasa into the various smaller Coastal towns (p.96). Lower impact drugs such as *bhang* and *miraa* have been around for much longer. Studies into drug use in Mombasa are limited. However, a 2013 study into emerging drugs in Mombasa shows that the drug initiation age varies between 5 to 28 years, and 81% of participants were introduced to drugs by their friends. Most common drugs are indeed *bhang*, *miraa* and *kuber* (Kahuthia-Gathu et al., 2013, p.5308).

One of the major contributing factors to the rampant drug use among youth is unemployment and poverty. "'There is an easy market for drugs on the coast,' said Phylis Mwema, who runs a youth rehabilitation organisation in Mombasa. 'Youth are uneducated, idle and jobless, and the only thing they can do is drugs'" (cited in Jorgic,

2015). The recent drop in tourism has resulted in over 30,000 workers in the industry loosing their jobs, which has only contributed to the problem even further. Hoteliers fear these numbers will have rapidly increased by May 2015 (Mwakio, 2015). However, it is not just a poverty related issue: youths from all walks of life deal with the issues of drugs on a daily basis, as I will elaborate on below.

3.2.2 Analysis

During the very first interviews that were conducted it became clear that drugs was an issue on most of the participants' minds and was introduced by themselves. Marwan, the first interviewee, is a 24 year old who has finished tertiary education overseas and is currently working as an accountant. When he is asked about his friends and what they used to do in school, he initiates the topic of weed and smoking, as well as the peer-pressure he has experienced:

> Marw: (.) I have seen the bad side and the good sides of school. Like if you stay with bad friends, let's go skive school and all. Don't go school (.) Maybe some of them smoke weed. So they take you with you. If you don't smoke, they be like naahhaa you're like a girl, you don't smoke weed. And if you do, you'd go to the bad company. And they take you as one of theirs. But that's not right, cause you wouldn't concentrate on school then.

Marwan explains how in school, drugs among his friends were common. Even nowadays, he tells later, his friends still smoke weed, but do not have jobs and when they hang out they ask him for money. He concludes that it could have been easy for him to end up like that as well:

> Marw: (.) If I started smoking, then I wouldn't be the person I am right now. I wouldn't be working where I am. I would be on the streets, maybe walking. Yeah?

With 'walking' he means wondering around the streets. He refers to the many young boys that are walking the streets of Mombasa and find themselves in this position, trying to make some money, either stealing or finding casual work. He depicts how this could have

happened easily had he given in to the peer-pressure to smoke weed or do drugs. I will elaborate on the matters of friends, gender and peer-pressure and how the youth present to cope with them later. Another issue that he raised was the crime that is linked to both drugs but also the Muslim youth:

> Marw: You see in Majengo area? Is very bad nowadays. There's young boys, fourteen, fifteen years old they come to the streets, walking at night, if they see like. They don't go mostly for Muslims, and they are Muslims who are doing that. They just put knives on you [points at his side] poke you with the knife, and get money from you, or phones, whatever you have.

He further elaborates that it is not necessarily drugs that forces these youths into criminal behaviour. He suggests that it is someone older telling them that it is justified to rob or even kill non-Muslims. The observation that it is not predominantly drugs that triggers crime, may also relate to the fact that Marwan himself is not entirely negative towards taking drugs. His friends take drugs on a regular basis, and he might prefer not to blame them for the stabbings and other crimes, or perhaps wishes to contradict the assumed connection. Furthermore, drugs and crime are traditionally linked to the lower-income communities. Marwan, however, comes from a family who has been able to afford to send him overseas for a diploma course in accountancy, indicating a relatively wealthy background. Drugs were and are as prominent in his life as could be expected from the lower income classes, making it a cross-society issue.

Another example of the participant initiating the topic was Said, who is currently in his third year of secondary school, also one of the first interviews conducted. It was at the absolute beginning that he introduced the issue of drugs; I had only asked some introductory questions about where he grew up when he said:

> S: It's a bit challenging. Cause of the (.) And drugs. It's a bit challenging. But, thankfully I'm not (.) A drug user.
>
> M: Ok, can you explain a bit more?

> S: Ehhh. These days, most of the youth they engage in drug using. Most. At about fifty percent. Get in drug using. So (.) Me, so (.) I'm just thankful that I'm not one of them.

Said states that about fifty percent of the youth in the Old Town are currently using drugs. These numbers cannot be verified. However, his perception of the amount of drug users in his neighbourhood is relevant. It also explains the difficulties he must be facing every day, having school friends urging him to try drugs. As well as Marwan, he explains that peer-pressure can be problematic:

> S: Sometimes, when you are with your friends, school friends. Around the neighbourhood, they might just tell you: taste a little bit! But (.) but I didn't, can't.

After initiating the topic, Said was rather reluctant to elaborate on the matter any further. This may have had to do with the fact that this interview was conducted in the *madrassa*, which was attached to a mosque in the Old Town and he was asked by his teacher to participate in the interview. In addition, the fact that I, the interviewer, am a white woman might also to him have been a situation in which he would feel forced to reply the socially accepted line of answering, as discussed in Chapter 2. Since he introduced the topic himself at the beginning and in the same sentence denied ever having taken drugs, after which he is reluctant to say anything else on the matter, it could also mean he was especially nervous about this topic. At least we can derive from this episode that it is on his mind, influencing his decision making and has at least awareness of prosocial and antisocial behaviour.

Furthermore, drugs was an issue all participants had come in touch with at some point or another in their lives. It is worth noting that ethnographic observations have taught that smoking cigarettes is perceived to be the proverbial beginning of the end. Smoking cigarettes leads to smoking *bhang*, smoking *bhang* leads to chewing *miraa*, chewing *miraa* leads to more etc. The reasoning behind this, is that one high leads to anotherand it is hard to be satisfied once you have 'tasted' or experienced it. Therefore, smoking cigarettes has connotations of an individual being uneducated and prone to drug-use. The theme of 'smoking' therefore has different connotations than it may have in

for example European countries, where it is thought to be bad for your health, but generally not a sign of low socio-economic status. An example of one of the interviewees who had these connotations with smoking cigarettes is Rashid, currently in his second year of secondary school, who explained that he used to smoke cigarettes, which was leading him onto the 'wrong path'. He explained that his parents had intervened at some point, directing him to study more and leave his friends who had offered him the cigarettes. The gratefulness that he expressed over this decision implies the risks that these youth perceive to be associated with cigarette smoking and how it can lead to further drug abuse.

The issues described by the interviewees above are closely related to how they decide between good and bad: their identity development and strategies for prosocial behaviour. This is specifically relevant when it concerns friends and peer-pressure, a domain that will be elaborated on in Chapter 4. This section has attempted to not only describe the background to which this research has been conducted, but moreover to depict how the participants in this study introduced the topic, as well as reflected on it. Furthermore, it has given a representation of how the interviewees discuss these matters. The following section will elaborate further on the concept of marginalisation.

3.3 Marginalisation

3.3.1 Introduction

This section will elaborate on the topic of marginalisation. It will firstly discuss the historical and current events that have lead me to include and introduce this topic during the interviews. Secondly, it will outline how and if the participants experienced marginalisation. Consecutively, the topics of anger and revenge will be discussed and lastly, some analytical and theoretical reflections will be offered to place this issue within the larger framework of this study.

3.3.2 Historic Affairs

Historically, the Coast Province was the most developed part of the East Africa region now known as Kenya. It used to be a trading community, in which various hubs

functioned as transit centers between the hinterland and the overseas destinations such as the Middle East and the larger East African Coast (Foeken, Hoorweg, & Obudho, 2000, p. 5). Mombasa eventually developed into the main hub due to its naturally deep port. At the beginning of the colonial period, Mombasa indeed served as the administrative center, however, with the completion of the railroad in 1901, the colonial government moved its headquarters to Nairobi. This was due to the harsh climate and prevalence of malaria on the Coast, neither of which were a problem in the highlands of Nairobi. Foeken et al. (2000) conclude that eventually, "[t]he importance of the Kenya Coast was narrowed to that of Mombasa as a transit point for persons and goods. Broadly speaking, the relative neglect of the Coast continued to present days" (p.5).

Foeken et al. (2000) further point out that development has come to have more connotations than economic per se and adopt Simon's meaning: "a multifaceted process whereby the quality of life and 'personality' of individuals and groups improves" (cited in Foeken et al. p.5). The UNDP in turn defined development as "the broadening of options that people have in order to improve their livelihoods and determine their future" (p.5). This means that development or lack of it has notable implications for humans in any significant region. The fact that the Coast Province of Kenya has been systematically ignored by authorities has had some significant impacts on the people living there. One of the recent developments proving such a hypothesis is the rise of the aforementioned MRC (Chapter 1). Their grievances are chiefly based on land issues, but extend to deeper issues such as educational development and unemployment.

3.3.3 Current Affairs

Generally considered as one of the core issues underlying the radicalisation and drug abuse, the (perceived) marginalisation of the Muslim youth in Mombasa is a hotly debated topic. Consultancy Africa Intelligence[18] has identified "the roots of radicalisation: repeating past mistakes of implementing policies that aggravate the marginalisation of Muslims, or reaching out to bridge the trust deficit caused by unequal and heavy-handed

[18] "CAI is a leading South African research company providing insight into the African continent's political economic, financial and social affairs. Major clients are various embassies and governments, as well as major international players such as Caterpillar, Deloitte and Ernst &Young". www.consultancyafrica.com

policing and discrimination at the hands of security forces" (Forster & Waterman, 2015). Indeed, recent developments such as the discriminative rounding up of Muslims after each Al Shabaab attack have taken place in Mombasa and Nairobi alike:

> Police forces 'swoop,' arriving in droves, riding massive army trucks to 'round up' and 'crack down' on the community's residents in the name of security. The police will rush apartments, brandishing AK-47s, banging on doors, demanding to see national identification cards. Along the way, they trash homes, steal citizens' property, and take bribes. (Sperber, 2015)

In addition, in Mombasa hundreds have been arrested, held without charge according to MUHURI.[19] No one is tried or found guilty, although police comments claim that over a 150 people are awaiting trial. Over the past two years, reports indicate that over 40 people have gone missing or turned up dead within Mombasa (Vogt, 2015).

The recent profiling of Muslims by security agencies, police and government officials is said to have started with increase of terrorist attacks within Kenya after the KDF forces entered Somalia in October 2011, and have worsened after the killing of the prominent imam *sheikh* Aboud Rogo Mohammed in August 2012, which sparked weeks of riots and resulted in the mobs attacking churches in revenge in Mombasa. A year later, the killing of another cleric spurred local youth to torch a Salvation Army base, which left four dead ("Al Shabab Supporter," 2012). Neither of the killings were ever solved, and are believed by many to have been organised by the GoK themselves. In addition, in 2014 various mosques were raided by the police and GSU forces, entering the mosques without taking off their shoes, arresting scores of youths and dispersing the crowds with rubber bullets and tear gas (Akwiri, 2014). Following these events, police continue to harass the Muslim community by organising raids, house arrests and the implementation of an indiscriminate 'shoot-to-kill' policy. Security experts have raised alarm over the approach that the Kenyan authorities have taken, but so far to no avail (Aluanga-Delvaux, 2014).

A full description of the events that might have caused the Muslim youth of Mombasa to feel marginalised is beyond the scope of this section, but I hope to have given

[19] Muslims for Human Rights. An Non-Governmental Organisation based in Mombasa.

an indication of the feelings brewing under the surface of the Muslim society today. Some of these events have also been listed in Appendix II. Furthermore, what is most important is how the participants of this study perceived these issues themselves, and moreover, how they presented their feelings towards this. I will elaborate on these matters in the following section.

3.3.4 Analysis

The topic of marginalisation was presupposed in this research and introduced by the interviewer during the interviews. The reason for this topic to be discussed with the participants was the current events such as raids on mosques by government forces, as described above, as well as the link that has often been made with radicalisation. The topic was introduced by the interviewer by referring to the death of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a Muslim cleric who was accused of recruiting youths to join Al Shabaab in Somalia as well as raising funds for the extremist organisation. He was shot by unknown assassins in August 2012, which sparked weeks of rioting by Muslim youth who demanded justice. The participants were asked to reflect on these events. Furthermore, they were asked what it was like to be a Muslim in Mombasa at the moment. Most of the participants had examples and stories of police arresting innocent people, raiding houses, and condemned the shoot-to-kill policy. This section will elaborate on the experiences of the participants of marginalisation and discrimination.

When Abdul (19), a fourth year secondary school student, was asked about what it is like being a Muslim in Mombasa, he gives an example of being harassed by the police, just because he is a Muslim:

> A: It bothers me because now when you walk in the streets like the way I [dress]. This morning I was harassed by a policeman. Just because I'm wearing this thing. (points at dishdasha)
>
> M: Yeah, what did he do?

A: Like, he's asking for identification, and most of them are corrupt. So, if I have done any[thing wrong] he just asks [for money]. So, I just told him, I'm a student I don't have money. So, when he sees, he looks at me, he checks my bag, he saw my papers. So, he couldn't do anything.

M: Yeah, that happens often?

A: Yeah. It happens often.

M: And just because the way you look?

A: Just because we are Muslims.

Abdul perceives being stopped by the police as harassment. In addition, he feels discriminated because he believes that the police only stops him because he is Muslim. It is also noteworthy that he is convinced that all Muslims suffer from this treatment by authorities: 'just because we are Muslims'. The security has indeed tightened in Mombasa and Kenya as a whole: there are more police checks on the roads and all citizens are expected to carry an identification card at all times. However, Muslims have felt that they have been a victim of these policies more than non-Muslims.

Mahmoud, (25) who has finished secondary school and is currently working, describes a raid in his apartment building:

Mah: When I heard, just for instance, Maria for real. When I heard tdtdtd, the police they had come to the building that I'm living in. The same building, I'm living upstairs. There are many people, many people [living] in the building yeah? The [police comes], and when you come out? Just to have a look? If you have a beard like me, they don't ask! Poof! They shoot.

Mahmoud mentions a little later that he is referring to Omar Faraj, a suspected terrorist who was killed by the police during a house raid in November 2012 (Gogineni, 2012). Interestingly enough, Mahmoud presents this situation with great anger and passion, like it has happened rather recently. He presented this anecdote as an explanation for violent

retributions towards Christians and government institutions. Mahmoud, however, did not provide any other stories or examples of feeling marginalised or discriminated against in Mombasa on a daily basis. Many of his references were to others that had experienced this, or he would complain about the fact that you could not be a 'real' Muslim anymore:

> Mah: *Sasa,* I can say if I become a real Muslim, I can't survive in Kenya. I am a pure Muslim when I'm praying five times [a day]. A pure Muslim, is the one who is praying five times a day, and he's following up the imam.

What is interesting is that Mahmoud expressed sympathies for Al Shabaab and has elaborated on the fact that he used to follow *sheikh* Aboud Rogo as well as believes in 'going for jihad'. He has explained that he used to indeed pray five times a day and follow a strict reading of the Qur'an. He has friends who have gone to Somalia to 'fight jihad' and explained that he wanted to go as well, when he was younger. His ailing mother prevented him from going. However, these days he chews *miraa*, smokes cigarettes, and drinks alcohol from time to time. His concern with the fact that these days one cannot be 'a real Muslim' anymore, seems unnecessary or not relevant to him personally. The fact that he does raise these issues and presents them as troublesome for him, could be interpreted as that he feels victimised and that he feels Muslims in Mombasa are being victimised.[20] Furthermore, it is interesting to note here that he might be describing values that he *aspires* to adhere to, not necessarily the values or moral code he currently lives by. This presentation of and ideal 'self' or reality and what this self stands for is not uncommon among the interviewees, as will become clear later on.

One of the grievances presented by the participants, was the killing of suspected terrorists and the fact that the justice system has been neglected by the security forces and other authorities. As Ahmed (19), who is currently in his fourth and last year of secondary school explains:

[20] For an elaborate discussion of 'victimisation' see section 3.3.6.

A: The innocent people. (.) And what they do they might be supporting Al Shabaab activities, or may not be supporting anything. Just because I'm a Muslim with a beard they might come and kill me any day, how am I supposed to know!

(…)

A: Even here. Because now, we have been forced to things that we don't agree upon. A single person, single person. Forty bullets in his body. (.) here in Mombasa. Forty bullets in his body. What for! He might be guilty, or he might not be guilty. You might be guilty or he might not be guilty. (.) But what is the correct action to be taken? According to Kenya, any terrorist, any person, must be taken to the court. Be judged and be served. Every country is like that! It's (.) It's what the constitution says.

Ahmed describes what he has heard has happened, which seems to instill fear in him. Fear of being shot for being a Muslim. Whether these have been isolated events or have become a consistent problem within Mombasa society is not what is being discussed here. Rather, it is the perception of systematic discrimination and a shoot-to-kill policy perceived to be aimed at Muslims, in the name of 'increased security' that has instilled fear and a marginalised feeling of not belonging, of not having the freedom to be a 'real Muslim' if one would wish to be so.

In addition to stories they have heard either first hand or stories they might have read in the papers, some of the participants expressed concern about the planting of evidence by the authorities, either with individuals or at the mosques. These stories are of a similar fashion as the stories of Muslims being killed, as Ahmed continues:

A: You know, Kenyan government, the KDF, instead of killing the person who is liable for for committing the crime, they kill the innocent people. Just last year, an innocent guy I know, from here, here at Mwembe Tayari[21] (.) I mean, he was killed in his own house. They came with guns, and they told his mother, they tell his mother to say her son is a terrorist. Tell, tell, speak out that your son is a terrorist (.) and after killing him they put the weapons there.

[21] Mwembe Tayari is a central area in Mombasa Town.

The stories that the participants told in this context were rarely first-hand experiences. Rather, they are their perception of the treatment of Muslims by the authorities in Mombasa.

However, Abdallah (25), does feel discriminated against, not only by authorities but also by other civilians when he has to take public transport. For example:

> A: Yeah you know this thing, this Al Shabaab thing, it's really divided us. Yeah, not like before. See like now if I have a bag, and I want to enter *matatu*. Everybody will suspect me. Ah hahaha, what is inside there! Yeah it's true! I'm not lying! Anybody see me, this bag of yours, if I want to take a *matatu* from here to Mtwapa[22] let's say for example. It will be very difficult for me.

Hardly any of the participants expressed to encounter problems like this; most of them complained about the authorities rather than fellow citizens. A reason for this may be that most of the participants were still attending school, where discrimination on such a level might not occur, since classmates and schoolmates will often share a greater level of trust towards one another as opposed to strangers on a bus. Abdallah was a school drop-out currently working as a driver, a job that will bring him in contact with more strangers than the school going participants. This could be an explanation for his experiences. In addition to discrimination from the public, he also elaborates on the increased problems with police, as other participants did as well:

> A: Yeah, before it was very very hard, because like Majengo area, there, every day's a problem. Even now, if I just walk there at night, people (police) they see me, [they] automatically assume: aaahh this is a man, come, pay money, do this, or go inside [the police station]. And it's not like before when we were young when you could just walk [around]. Even at night we had no problem, but nowadays (.) this issue (.) and it's not fun, it's not like before. Yeah. If you want to go somewhere, you have to look for somebody you know. Like, I want to come to your place, how is it there? Can I come? [They could advice:] Ah, today's so many police here, it's not good, or come with a car.

[22] Mtwapa is a large urban settlement north of Mombasa Town

It is interesting that his experiences are personal, rather than stories about others. They are based on personal grievances and day to day problems he encounters. Other participants have had these problems as well with police and authorities, as exemplified by Abdul above.

To conclude, there are different perceptions and experiences of marginalisation among the participants. Some had personal experiences with the police who would arrest and harass them in their opinion, for 'being a Muslim'. Others would tell stories of the indiscriminate killing of Muslims and express grievances over the lack of the judicial system and the shoot-to-kill policy. These stories were most likely not so much personal experiences as stories they have heard from others or read in the papers. One of the participants felt discriminated by the public as well, for looking like a Muslim. What all these stories have in common is a feeling of being marginalised for being a Muslim. Another theme that consequently was raised by the participants was anger and revenge, on which the following section will elaborate.

3.3.5 Anger and Revenge

Another theme that was discussed by the participants was anger and revenge, often following the issues of marginalisation and discrimination. Marwan (24) who has finished tertiary education and is currently working, describes, for example, how his friends talk about Al Shabaab and their feelings of revenge towards the government:

> Marw: They would of course, like, they would favour Al Shabaab and stuff. Cause all the way, the government is killing our leaders. They would be like, let them come and destroy the government, that's what they say. Yeah.

Marwan further says that much of this behaviour is a result of trying to be tough, and showing off towards each other and that it would be very unlikely for them to take any action towards the government or other security authorities themselves. This stems mainly from the fact that they are scared of being arrested or killed:

> Marw: Yeah, they talk, they can't act. Cause acting, leads to death. If you do something, the government will destroy.

Marwan expresses how his friends are scared of the government. They are convinced that the authorities will come and kill you and that there will be no trial. The reason for this is that they have heard stories and perhaps witnessed others who have been killed in house raids (the story of Omar Faraj for example), which has lead them to perceive the shoot-to-kill policy as effective.

Ali (18), who is in his fourth year of secondary school, gives another example of classmates who may talk, but are unlikely to act:

> A: Yeah yeah! They just talk. For example news here, there, a big *Sheikh* has died, for religious conflicts and all that. People come to class, two or three boys, see Islam, Islam people are killing the name of Islam. Yeah, let's go to that mosque, we go and hurt people there, start doing all this. All this, what is it. Instead of calling for peace they want to increase the, the riots and all this. So it's wrong! Totally wrong.

Ali remembers when *Sheikhs* were killed his classmates wanted to go to Masjid Mussa to fight. He condemns these sentiments, explaining that Islam is peace. Ali also believes that much of what his friends say is talk, that there is almost an heroic element speaking from the sentiment of wanting to hurt people, and to increase violence. He further explains about youth wanting to go for jihad:

> A: Ehh, fighting for jihad? Yeah there are some friends who claim, that they want to fight. You see, maybe showing off also, another thing is misconception and showing off may be also another factor. That, look I'm fighting for Islam I'm fighting for Islam, and they are fighting, and they are hurting those who are weak. So, therefore they can't fight those who are strong, or the real people they should fight against. Because, since they want to show off, they want to succeed, only take those who are weak, because they can intimidate. So, maybe misconceptions, maybe showing off.

Ali argues that Islam teaches him that violence is wrong and that therefore his friends' reasoning is flawed. In addition, he believes that they are cowards for only attacking those who are weak. I will elaborate on the function of Islam in decision making processes and moral behaviour extensively in Chapter 4. For now, it suffices to note that some of the participants witnessed peers expressing feelings of revenge, but also noted that this was more about showing off than taking action. They reasoned that this was because they are scared of the authorities arresting or killing them.

Mahmoud, who I interviewed with one of my friends, Aziz, stressed the theme of revenge more prominently. His views were more radical to start with, and violence was motivated by revenge in both their stories:

> Mah: Revenge! *Sasa*, he think, I don't have any pistol, I don't have any AK[23], I don't have a grenade, I don't have even, I will not be allowed to sale petrol bomb. Ok, now what I'll do, I have to revenge! And I have to revenge the Government of Kenya. No, I have to revenge the Christian [in order to send a message to the GoK]. But for real he want to go to police station or any governmental [institution] (.)

> Az: It's ok, because, if we revenge, they will respect. They will have respect for the other religion. But if you don't revenge, people they make you feel low. And you are human, you have the strength, you have the power. Then you do it. Because if you don't do it, they keep on killing more and more.

Firstly, Mahmoud explains why Christians have been attacked. He stresses the importance of revenge for himself, and the fact that one is powerless to attack the government or police. He explains that in order to send the message of revenge, Christians are attacked. Aziz then explains why this is necessary: if you do not take revenge, they (the government or any enemy) will assume weakness, they will 'keep on killing more and more'. Mahmoud summarises:

[23] He refers to an AK 47 or Kalashnikov weapon

> Mah: OK, let's say, you want to send a message. (.) to Government of Kenya. (.) how can you send a message in Government of Kenya. (.) for revenging, the only thing you can do is to kill. To kill an innocent. (.) That's the mentality.

Throughout the interview he portrayed himself as being supportive of Al Shabaab and their actions. However, with the words: 'that's the mentality' he distances himself from his reasoning of revenge and killing as personal convictions. It seems rather unlikely for him to act on these feelings for the same reasons Ali's and Marwan's friends would probably not act on their feelings of revenge. He expresses the same fear of the authorities:

> Mah: If you talk like that one nowadays
>
> Az: You're a suspect.
>
> Mah: One day, not suspect nowadays! You just one day you'll be shot. Now, it's shoot to kill Maria. Shoot to kill. You just talk a little, like now, I'm talking but I'm looking. You'll be here, *wallah*, a car is coming. Fire squat, papapap. You've been taken. You understand?

Mahmoud describes his fear for the shoot-to-kill policy and that even talking will not only lead to one's arrest, but more likely will result in one's death.

What is important to note is that many youth indeed have feelings of revenge. Ahmed (19) explains:

> Ah: Now for example, if my brother is killed, without any justification, will I just shut up? (.) Will I just shut up? Or my wife is killed or my child is killed. Or my father is killed, will I just keep quiet? I must fight them right? And I must be avengeful I must be, abrasive. So that, that's the thing. Now, actually Islam says that (.) For example, the person who has killed your brother, you have to kill the same person who killed him. You're not supposed to kill other people. If there is no issue there. But that's where we go wrong.

Ahmed elaborates why one would feel angry, he understands the sentiment, but disapproves of how some act. He explains that according to him, Islam teaches that

feelings of revenge are allowed but should only be directed towards the one who has hurt you, not to other people. Ahmed is a self-proclaimed fundamentalist, and his interpretation of revenge is unique among the participants.

Most interviewees claimed that anger is sinful, and that it would be better if the law would be imposed, rather than to take revenge, as Imran (23) who has finished his university and has just started a new job explains:

> I: (…) We are taught in our religion, forgiving someone is far more better, or actually is a better thing to do than taking revenge. And, if you are doing something for revenge, for example, I can give you an example. We were taught in our religious classes that our, one of our followers Imam Ali, was in a battle. And eh, he was known to be the strongest fighter. He was in a battle and eh, he was about to defeat the enemy yeah? And, just before he was going to defeat the enemy, the enemy spat on his face. Because of that, he walked away, because now he was going to kill him because of his anger, and not because of defending himself. So he walked away. And did not do anything to him, because if he did any action, he would take it under his anger, and not and not under defending himself. So we are taught, since a child you know, it is better to forgive, than to take revenge.
>
> M: Does that always work in practice?
>
> I: Eh, you see, we humans are very sentimental. And tend to, you know, get back at the person who has done wrong to you. But, I I feel that, well I know that happens. But feel it is better, to punish them by law, rather than taking action on yourself. By yourself. Yeah

Imran mentions the human element within the feelings of revenge and violence, even though Islam has taught him not to be violent at all when angry. What is interesting is his trust in the judicial system to provide justice when one would be wronged. His moderate stance on revenge but also violence and religion might have something to do with the fact that he is one of the only Shia youths that was interviewed as opposed to the Sunni majority. The Shia sect in Kenya often perceives itself as slightly more peaceful, progressive and reformed than their Sunni counterparts (Oded, 2000, p.16). In addition, he has attended tertiary education in London, and showed high levels of exploration. He had

only just returned from overseas and was not so much involved with current affairs in Mombasa. The reason his view has been included here, was to preface the more common sentiment among the interviewees that Islam has taught them that anger is a sin, and should be suppressed, as Hussein (15) explains:

> M: How do you, if you're angry, what do you do about that?
>
> H: (.) That (.) You just keep quiet, because we are taught not to be angry. Yes. But it makes you mad. You can't act.

It is noteworthy that Hussein does state he is angry at times, but claims not to express this anger, because of the way he was taught. It is hard to verify whether he manages to always contain his anger, and what the consequences of such behaviour may be. However, his explanation of anger and subsequent behaviour is relevant in how he tries to cope with sinful feelings and religion.

This section has addressed how the participants of this thesis described and discussed feelings of anger and revenge, often as a result of feeling marginalised by the authorities. Most respondents explained where feelings of revenge and anger would come from but rarely expressed any desire of acting themselves. The most common reason was the fear of being killed, as well as the argument that Islam is peace, and that violence is a sin. The following section will provide some analytical reflections on marginalisation and what repercussions it may have.

3.3.6 Theoretical and Analytical Reflections

Considering the topics that have been discussed with the interviewees in the context of this chapter (drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation), the interconnectedness of these themes should be examined. This section will elaborate on the connection between marginalisation and related potential for subsequent radicalisation. It should be noted, however, that only two of the 19 subjects showed interest in radicalisation or extremist Islam. The others mostly expressed profound conceptions of good and bad, right and wrong, placing the acts of Al Shabaab or any other organisation

following a transnational violent jihadist ideology under 'wrong' and 'bad' categories, the details of which shall be extensively discussed in Chapter 4. Rather, the purpose of this section is to explore the potential risks of their marginalised situation, whether or not perceived, and the thin line that these youths find themselves on when dealing with matters of marginalisation and transnational jihad. However, the two participants Mahmoud and Aziz, did express sympathy for Al Shabaab or jihadist ideology. The theoretical concepts outlined here will be chiefly based on Farhad Khosrokhavar's (2010) theory of marginalisation and the subsequent potential for radicalisation, which will be discussed in order to gain insight in the psychology underlying these issues.

Khosrokhavar's typology of the global jihadist and his or her psychological features is an interesting description. It should be noted here, that Khosrokhavar describes the global jihadist, and not necessarily the factors contributing to radicalisation. However, it is worth identifying similarities between features of global jihadist he notes and some of the concerns and experiences the participants in this study have expressed. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to extensively discuss his categorisations of jihadism. Rather, Khosrokhavar's notion of victimisation should be examined in the light of psychological motivations for violence.

Khosrokhavar (2010) describes the idea of victimisation as "a strong feeling of being robbed of one's dignity due to the illegitimate actions of the Western world" (p.141). In this case, some Muslim youth in Mombasa feel that the GoK is the absolute oppressor and that Islam or Muslims are the absolute victims of the government's intolerance. In addition, according to Khoshrokhavar, the feeling of victimisation can be deeper entrenched when it is built on historical and contemporary facts, as is the case in Mombasa: "the sense of deep hopelessness and the inability to act positively to resolve the situation" (p.142). He continues that among Muslim minorities the feeling of being totally rejected by society, the absolute conceptualisation of 'self' and 'other', is often sociologically wrong: considerable Muslim minorities have achieved middle or upper middle class status. The fact that in Kenya there is a sizeable Muslim middle class as well as a decent representation in parliament, as discussed in the introduction of this thesis, contradicts the sentiment of absolute victimisation, as Khosrokhavar argues: "disenfranchised young people deeply

believe in it, and as such, this perception of the self as being an absolute victim of an inhospitable society in which Muslims are at best unwelcome and at worst repressed is widespread" (p.142). The above descriptions of the participants reflect this sentiment. This in turn may convince some to turn to a jihadist ideology.

Khosrokhavar (2010) continues that absolute victimisation in turn can legitimise violence against the absolute 'other', or even the rest of society who reject Muslims for being Muslims. He further elaborates, that the shift from 'private' violence to 'collective' violence is facilitated by a jihadist ideology, an extremist version of Islam (p.142). As described by the participants of this study, violence in Mombasa, whether this was drug related or not, appears to be targeted more and more against non-Muslims. The interviewees of this research as well as ethnographic experiences in the field have noted that this shift is often facilitated by older peers, telling their younger peers that Islam allows, or even commands the killing of non-Muslims. Furthermore, the participants of this study have expressed to feel the sting of marginalisation themselves, sometimes on a daily basis, sometimes on a more abstract level. Motives of anger and revenge have been expressed as well. As Khosrokhavar states: "the revenge element of resentment that is similar to the notion developed by Nietzsche; it is a reaction rather than an action, based on a feeling of hatred that distorts reality and sees the enemy as depraved" (p.140). Indeed, anger and revenge were only expressed by the participants in the context of marginalisation and victimisation. However, the step towards violence that partly characterises a global jihadist, according to Khosrokhavar, was often said by the interviewees of this study to not be 'according to the Islamic way', and would therefore be condemned. It is therefore worth stressing that indeed only some individuals would allow victimisation to turn violent, most definitely not all.

This section has elaborated on the concept of victimisation and marginalisation and its psychological and practical characteristics. Further, it has described how the participants of this study dealt with the concept of marginalisation, victimisation and the consequential feelings of anger and revenge. Whereas the global jihadist often is characterised by the turn to violence against the absolute 'other', who's creation is the

product of absolute victimisation, most of the participants in this study condemned violence.

3.4 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has elaborated on the issues of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation in order to illustrate part of the societal background to which the participants of this research develop their identity and implement strategies for prosocial and moral behaviour. The relevance of each of the topics has been argued. Firstly, drugs was a topic that was introduced by the interviewees and ethnographic observations. It appeared to have such a prominence in the participants' lives that it has been included in this study. Secondly, marginalisation of Muslims at the Coast has been introduced by the researcher because of the historic and current affairs that have occupied the news. Thirdly, the consecutive themes of anger and revenge have been addressed in the context of marginalisation by the interviewees themselves and have therefore been included in this chapter. Lastly, this chapter has elaborated on Khosrokhavar's concept of victimisation and how it is a characteristic for global jihadism. His description of absolute victimisation and the shift from private to collective violence can be recognised in the description of the interviewees of marginalisation of Muslims in Mombasa. However, the participants of this study rarely expressed willingness to operate or retaliate violently against the absolute 'other'. Rather, they condemned any form of violence, explaining that Islam means peace.

CHAPTER 4: RELIGION, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT & STRATEGIES FOR PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Religion, Prosocial/Moral Behaviour and Self-control

4.2.1 Introduction

4.2.2 Standards

4.2.3 Monitoring

4.2.4 Willpower

4.2.5 Motivations

4.2.6 Religion and Affect

4.2.7 Conclusion

4.3 Domains

4.3.1 Introduction

4.3.2 Parenting

4.3.3 Siblings

4.3.4 Friends

4.3.5 School

4.3.6 Gender

4.3.7 Ethnicity

4.4 Conclusion

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the different strategies that the Muslim youth in Mombasa describe to employ for making moral decisions as well as the implications these may have for identity development. These moral decisions can be about anything: about how to behave around parents, at school, with friends, but more specifically on the issues discussed in the previous chapter, such as drugs, crime and radical or violent thoughts or

actions. With all the interviewees I have discussed eight different domains concerning their lives: parents, siblings, school, gender, religion, friends, current affairs, and ethnicity. The previous chapter has elaborated on the domain of current affairs. This chapter will discuss the other seven social and contextual themes and their influence on the interviewees' prosocial and moral behaviour strategies as well as their identity development. It will do so by firstly discussing the religious domain as framework and strategy for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control throughout the remaining six domains, since the participants all presented religion to be a guiding theme in their lives and indeed the other domains. Furthermore, the remaining domains of parents, siblings, friends, school, gender and ethnicity will be discussed from an academic perspective, after which these theories will be illustrated with the participants' descriptions and responses collected from the field. However, it will not discuss individual processes related to changes in prosocial behaviour, since only single one-hour interviews with each participant have been conducted. Therefore, no basis for establishing the individual processes (which are often related to individual changes over time) underlying the choices the participants make, can be distinguished. Rather, it will give a representation of how the participants discuss these matters and how they present their current strategies and experiences.

Considering the nature of this research, the function of religion that the participants describe regarding prosocial and moral behaviour in the various domains, as well as identity development will be emphasised. This chapter will do so by firstly outlining the various aspects of religion, self-control and prosocial, moral behaviour: the operation of self-control and the role that religion can play within these operations (Zell & Baumeister, 2013) (Schielke, 2013) and the position that this thesis has taken. It will then further elaborate on the six domains that in the context of this thesis have been considered to be of importance within prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control during early adolescence among the Muslim youth in Mombasa, as well as the relevant identity development processes.

4.2 Religion, Prosocial/Moral Behaviour and Self-Control

4.2.1 Introduction

Firstly, for clarification this section will briefly outline the various terms and their definitions this chapter will deal with. The term prosocial behaviour has been coined by social psychologists as an antonym for antisocial behaviour (Batson & Powell, 2003). Dovidio et al. (cited in Schroeder & Graziano, 2014) define prosocial behaviour at its most basic level as "any action that benefits another". This simple definition provides us with some insights: prosocial behaviour is necessarily interpersonal and a social act. Furthermore, it implies that the actors intent is important. Schroeder & Graziano (2014) additionally argue that "any specific behavior is not inherently or universally prosocial—it must be judged within the particular social context within which the act occurs" (p.5). This means that any social or cultural context has its own rules and expectations of what prosocial or moral behaviour is. This chapter will examine these expectations and how the participants deal with them, as well as the presentation of their own prosocial and moral behaviour strategies regarding drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation processes, and the role religion plays in this.

Many definitions of religion have been proposed by various scholars over the years, and it has proven not to be an 'objective thing'. Rather, it is subjective and can have functional or substantive descriptions. This research follows a functional approach and definition of religion, because this thesis attempts to describe the meaning and strategic function religion has for the participants and how they present this. Clifford Geertz (1993) famously defined religion as:

> (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (p.90)

A thorough discussion of this definition is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, its approach to religion as a functional cultural system is in line with Zell & Baumeister's

(2013) theory on the function of religion in self-control and moral behaviour, a function that was often referred to by the participants. Roy Baumeister is a social psychologist whose extensive work has mainly focussed on concepts such as self-control, self-identity, belongingness, self-esteem and free will. In addition, throughout the analysis I will refer to Schielke's (2013) admirable anthropological work and reflections on an Egyptian village, in which he discusses the successfulness of the function of religion in morally upright behaviour among Muslims; is the standard always followed and what happens if one fails?

Culture is comprised of various social rules in order to make a society function and to enable people to live together harmoniously (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.498). These social and moral rules often condemn selfish and impulsive behaviour and encourage acts which are beneficial for a society as a whole. Self-control and morally upright behaviour are therefore considered a cultural necessity, in order to behave virtuously and for example avoid crime (p.499). This also implies that participation in culture requires the individual to override initial impulses and to conform to moral cultural rules. It is self-control that according to Zell & Baumeister "can break the link from impulse to behavior, enabling people to override automatic, selfish, or short-sighted responses and to behave virtuously" (p.499).

Self-control is comprised of four main elements: standards, monitoring, will-power and motivation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The goal of this section is to consider how particular religious beliefs and behaviours may be helpful for people (and in this case the Muslim youth of Mombasa) as a strategy to exercise self-control and prosocial, or moral behaviour. It will do so by firstly elaborating on the four elements and the role that religion may have in these processes.

4.2.2 Standards

The concept of standards dictates that people need a certain conception of what is right and wrong, of what one is ought to do and to give a certain direction to one's actions and self-control (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.500). Religion can indeed provide very clear standards of what is right or wrong. Examples of this are the ten commandments in

Judaism and Christianity and the five pillars of Islam. Often, an exemplar is present, such as the Prophet Muhammed. However, cultural changes may hamper these standards. Zell & Baumeister give two examples: the adoption of the capitalist economy and the elevation of selfhood into a value base (p.503).

The capitalist economy is based on the idea that the individual makes money for him or herself. However, historically or traditionally (i.e. as opposed to individualism, or in collectivist societies), virtue meant that one would sacrifice the self for the greater good, whether that would be the family or the cultural society. In addition, the elevation of selfhood into a value base[24] is also rooted in the concept of individualism, which is in conflict with religious beliefs that one should restrain from self-interested behaviour. As Zell & Baumeister argue: "Both of these cultural changes have contributed to the obscuring of moral standards and the lack of consensus on moral issues, which may pose problems for society" (p.503). Religion is then forced to cope with these changes: it either has to adapt or keep the unwavering moral stance that religion has provided. The benefit of adaptation is that the needs of people in society can be met. However, the downside is that clear moral guidance might be missing for those in need. Keeping a clear moral stance on the other hand, may provide clear moral guidance but people might find it difficult to adhere to it when moral rules of society have changed (p.503-504). Saba Mahmood (2005) and Charles Hirschkind (2001, 2006) have elaborated on the juxtaposition specifically of the Islamic revival in Egypt and the secular liberal views held by a growing number of the populace. They have primarily focussed on the declared aim of religious discipline by individuals, as will this thesis, rather than address the actual outcomes. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on the actual behaviours and potential contradictions. Rather, it will focus on the presentation of moral standards and strategies for desired behaviour, which can bring to the fore the tension between desired behaviour and actual behaviour, as described by the participants.

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[24] Roy Baumeister, in line with Habermas' (1973) argumentation, has posed the theory of the self as a value base. This concept has its roots in Habermas's theory that society needs to have sources of value, such as God's will, or cultural traditions, that are sources of value for other things, rather than deriving their value from another outside source. Baumeister however, has suggested that due to modernisation, a gap emerged where the individual could not derive value from these sources anymore. Therefore, society has turned to itself and elevated it into a value base. This is an elaborate theory attempting to describe the concept of individualism, of the acceptance of the individual to act in the best interest of the self.

This brings us to the accountability of standards, "cultural trends that support the belief that people cannot control, and therefore cannot be held accountable for, their actions may actually detract from people's success at self-control" (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.504). Whether or not one believes in oneself to be able to control oneself, indeed greatly affects how one applies self-control. This is linked to the issues of marginalisation and victimisation that have been mentioned earlier and will be further explored later on. "Research finds that when people perceive themselves to be depleted, they perform worse on subsequent self-control tasks" (p.504). Religion provides a regulatory system by offering concepts such as free will, and the faith that one can control oneself increases the chances of one trying to do so.

4.2.3 Monitoring

Research has shown that self-control is more likely to fail when people are not aware of their own behaviour or are not aware of how their behaviour compares to moral standards (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.500). Religion can provide opportunities for self-examination and reflection in for example moments of prayer or discussion groups. Religion might also function as a reminder that God is watching and therefore monitor behaviour (p.505). Furthermore, the religious community can provide a framework or network for social control, which is in turn strongly related to the religious control and moral standard. These matters of the social contexts and social monitoring will be extensively discussed in the different domains, such as parents and friends.

4.2.4 Willpower

This element comprises the actual operations involved in altering the self and behaviour. Zell & Baumeister (2013) refer to Baumeister's limited resource model which proposes "that operations that alter the self all consume a single resource or energy supply, which is limited but renewable" (p.500). Using self-control then, depletes the energy source which in turn impairs subsequent self-control efforts. However, this resource becomes less depleted when virtuous behaviour becomes a virtuous habit: long term exercise may reduce the vulnerability of the resource becoming depleted (p.501).

Religion may help these self-regulatory resources in two ways: practicing self-control increases self-control capacity, and religion may help to avoid ego depleting conditions.[25] The first can be exemplified by how religion may ask from adherents to practice self-control by encouraging moral behaviour such as to refrain from indulgence and to carry out religious rites and practices such as fasting during Ramadan. These can provide people with better self-control strength. The second way religion may help self-regulatory resources are the limitations that religion may enforce such as the prohibition of alcohol. It takes away the temptation of certain cues by urging adherents to avoid them altogether (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.505).

People have biologically programmed latent motivations. These motivations, even though they are always present, may not always be consciously felt if there is no activating cue or stimulus (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.506). When a cue presents itself, the latent motivation will always be activated. Zell & Baumeister identify three ways in which religion may provide strategies for coping with these latent motivations. Firstly, religion urges the adherents to avoid the activation of the cues altogether: "family and community members can function as helpful spiritual models, raising people's estimations of the level of virtue that is possible for them to attain and increasing their motivations" (p.506). Secondly, religion can modify latent motivations by convincing the individual that he or she does not require certain motivations. However, Zell & Baumeister do note that latent motivations are biological and cannot be entirely overwritten by reasoning (p.507). Lastly, religion can be helpful in handling urges by distracting the individual from the cues. When an individual's attention is taken from a sinful act to the morally right, it is more likely that the cue will not be activated. In addition, construing a task as high level, such as 'this is a test of my willpower', facilitates the self with control.

4.2.5 Motivations

The basic principle of this element is that an individual has to be motivated to reach certain standards of moral behaviour in order for self-control and prosocial behaviour to occur. Religion can help with this in obvious ways such as the ultimate concern, or less

[25] Ego depleting conditions are tempting cues. For example, when one would attempt to quit smoking, having cigarettes around is an ego depleting condition.

obvious ways such as the desire to show gratitude to God. These motivations can help to transcend an immediate stimulus environment and "because religion allows people to base their everyday behavior upon high level principles, it can sanctify and imbue the most mundane of activities with meaning and importance" (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p. 508).

Moreover, individuals or adherents are more motivated to achieve self-control and prosocial behaviour when motivations are autonomous rather than external. Exerting self-control from one's own motivations depletes the resource less then when it is forced upon them. It is therefore a possibility rather than a given that religious beliefs can give people angles for "transforming externally imposed moral rules into intrinsically motivated personal values" (p.508).

4.2.6 Religion and Affect

When an individual finds him or herself in emotional distress, one is inclined to fall back to one's impulses, because internal cues are then easily triggered. One would indeed sacrifice self-control in order to feel better (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). Religion has been found to have the capacity of relieving an individual from these impulses by providing reasons for distress such as the idea that one is being tested by God. In addition, a positive mood induction or distraction can be triggered by religion which would take the internal cue away (Zell & Baumeister, 2013, p.510). An example of this, is the belief in the afterlife, which provides a positive outlook on an individuals current situation. Religion then can sometimes assure people that the coming happiness will compensate for current trouble, which may enable them to endure the present (p.510). Lastly, religion may promote communal living and a sense of belonging, protecting people from social exclusion. Zell & Baumeister further suggest that religious traditions may offer unconditional acceptance which further support self-regulation (p.511).

4.2.7 Conclusion

This section has elaborated on the function that religion may have in prosocial or moral behaviour and self-control. It has expanded on Roy Baumeister's limited resource

model and the general operation of self-control: standards, monitoring, willpower and motivations. It has suggested that religion indeed can be strategically implemented for the establishment of morally upright and prosocial behaviour by setting the standards, providing monitoring devices, regulating the willpower and providing motivation to the religious adherents.

In the following sections, I will elaborate on how the participants reflect on the function of religion where self-control, moral and prosocial behaviour (specifically in the light of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation), are concerned.

4.3 Domains

4.3.1 Introduction

This section will introduce and address the different domains of parents, siblings, friends, school, gender and ethnicity, the reason they have been chosen to be represented in the particular context of this study, some theoretical reflections on identity development, prosocial behaviour and self-control, and the results of this research. The data that will be presented here is a representation of how the participants discuss these issues and their reflections on the role drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation play in their lives, as well as to present strategies the interviewees described for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control in these contexts, and how religion plays a role in all these matters.

The introduction of this study has briefly elaborated on all topics in the above paragraph. I wish to note, before continuing with the analysis and discussion of the domains, that there are various theoretical reflections that will be referred to throughout this section. The first one is extensively described above: how religion can support self-control and prosocial, moral behaviour. The second has been elaborated on in Chapter 1, which concerns Marcia's classification of identity development: diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium and achievement. This classification, as mentioned before, allows us to examine the explorations and commitments of the participants of this study. However, it is not the intention of this thesis to draw irrefutable conclusions on the interviewees identity development processes, especially because identity development is a process which

continues into later life. Instead, it will elaborate on the positions and processes that the participants describe themselves to be in, by analytically observing their presentation of themselves and their lives.

4.3.2 Parenting

4.3.2.1 Introduction & Theoretical Reflections

The establishment or achievement of prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control is a complex process of persons and context interactions. A large part of these interactions are indeed with the family, and in particular the parents or caretakers. Many studies have been conducted into the role of the family in order for the adolescent to 'successfully' achieve a coherent identity. Grotevant & Cooper (cited in Beyers & Goossens, 2008, p.167) have argued that both a secure attachment with the parents and a simultaneous support of individuality are integral to the successful identity formation process.

As noted before, identity construction is a dynamic process of person and context interactions and a large part of these interactions are with the direct family i.e. parents/ caretakers and siblings. Beyers and Goossens (2008) have studied the dynamics between parenting and identity formation in mid to late adolescence and underscore that parents keep being an important source of socialisation throughout their children's identity formation processes.

Bowlby states that exploration in identity can only start from a secure base. More specifically, he has argued that this feeling of security starts at a young age, infancy even and has a great influence in how the young adult may develop his or her identity over time (cited in Beyers & Goossens, 2008, p.166). "The secure base provided by caregivers allows individuals to investigate in their environment with confidence, knowing that they can return to a haven of security during times of threat" (p.167).

Another theory on adolescent-to-parent relationships and identity formation is that of separation-individuation process. This emphasises how identity formation is characterised by independence and emotional separation from parents. According to Blos (1979) it is specifically during adolescence that the ties with parents and the values that the individual has grown up with must be relinquished and make way for self-exploration

and redefinition of the self. When parents understand this need for independence, they are said to be supportive of the adolescent and the young adult can develop his or her identity freely. Various research has shown that clear boundaries between family members and adolescents who are capable of maintaining a sense of self, indeed facilitate the achievement of mature identity and commitments (cited in Beyers & Goossens, 2008, p. 167).

Grotevant & Cooper (cited in Beyers & Goossens, 2008, p.166-167) have combined the two theories above and have shown that both a secure attachment with the parents and a simultaneous support of individuality for the adolescent are integral to the successful identity formation process. "The caregiver encourages independent actions and autonomous behavior of the adolescent, but in the same time is available for the adolescent, so the latter can return to his or her parents in times of stress of failure" (p.167). According to them, the connection and co-existence of individuality and connectedness is crucial for successful adolescent identity development.

Most of the theory on parenting and its influence on the identity development of the adolescent has been based on typically Western contexts, often stressing the benefits of attachment theory whilst expecting a rounded full-fledged individual to have high exploration and high commitment levels, i.e. identity achievement as the ideal outcome (Marcia, 1994, p.75). However, parenting styles differ around the world. In Europe for example, child rearing styles are characterised by authoritative control, which focusses on control through speaking to the child's own feeling of responsibility. Authoritative control is two-dimensional: adults provide information and explanations in order to facilitate the child's own decision making, by pointing to consequences of certain behaviour and forming various agreements with the child. However, not all societies practice this parenting style. Rather, when for example the material dependence on offspring is high and therefore communal affiliation is stressed, emphasis will lie on the familial rather than individualism. "Child rearing in these societies is characterized by authoritarian or restrictive control and by hierarchical relations between primary caretakers and their children" (Buitelaar, 2013, p.246). Communication is one-directional in that parents or caretakers force obedience from their children by threat or punishment.

As mentioned before in this section, secure attachment is integral to the successful development of the individual. Many of the theories combining this attachment with parenting styles go back to Baumrind's (1968) typology in that authoritative styles are assumed to provide high degrees of supportiveness whereas authoritarian styles are affiliated with low degrees of parental support, creating fewer secure attachments. However, recent research has shown that authoritarian styles too can provide warmth and support, implying that not only control, but also support is a factor in the development of children.

The Muslim community in Kenya exhibits rather authoritarian styles of parenting. Buitelaar (2013) notes that the two factors of control and support contribute to different dispositions in children. She takes the view that "selves - let alone cultures - should not be conceived of as either individualist or collectivist, but as animated by tensions between group loyalties and personal ambitions that create a variety of wishes for agency and communion" (p.249). This research will indeed adopt this view by attempting to contextualise representations of the participants' views on parenting and religion, thereby describing the potential consequences for their identity and stance on morality. In addition to Buitelaar's distinction between group loyalties and personal ambitions, it will distinguish between the tensions between a religious standard and reality (Schielke, 2009), as well as elaborate on how the participants strategically value their parents and the religious standard in order to stay morally upright.

4.3.2.2 Analysis

The first topic that was discussed with the interviewees was the role that parents played in their lives. Different aspects of parenting and parents were introduced by the interviewer, and ranged from arguments or fighting, to appreciation and discussions they may have with them. Considering it was the first domain that was discussed, the interviewees might not always have been entirely comfortable with the interviewer yet. One of the reasons that this could be assumed, is that most topics regarding parents were introduced by the interviewer, and that often socially acceptable answers were given. Also, answers often became more sophisticated as the interviews progressed (also see Chapter

2). In the following section, I will elaborate on responses that were given by the participants as well as place these answers in a wider context, both practically as well as theoretically.

Firstly, the answers that were given at this stage of the interview were often short and unwavering. Very few of the participants were keen to elaborate and often might have given socially acceptable answers to questions about arguments with their parents: they would claim to never fight or argue. The main reason that was given for this was that religion teaches them to love their parents. For example, Hasnain (16) introduced the topic of religion when he was asked about how he deals with his parents:

> H: No, [we] never fight. Cause, according to our teachings in Islam, you not supposed to make them angry. If they feel angry, for us, it's like (.) you're angry with God. So it's not good.

Hasnain refers to the teachings in Islam which instruct him and his peers not to antagonise your parents. The religious standard is said to be upheld in responding to inquiries about his dealings with his parents, which teaches him that one should respect his or her parents. The representation of dealings that the participants described, has been theorised by Zell & Baumeister that religion can help in providing a standard to live by. It should be emphasised that it is indeed merely how the interviewees presented this moral standard, rather than their actual dealings, which I will discuss later.

In Kenyan society, the schooling system is based on one-way or authoritarian teaching[26]: the teacher transfers knowledge to the students, who repeat what the teacher has told them. Even though a full analysis of the impact of teaching methodology on identity development and prosocial, moral behaviour strategies is beyond the scope of this thesis, after analysing some of the interviews it can be assumed that the schooling system has a significant effect on how some of the participants presented themselves. Nasir (15) explained:

[26] For a more extensive discussion of the education domain and the Kenyan schooling system see section 4.3.5.

N: No, cause even in here, from school, we are taught, you are not supposed to fight with parents. Or talking to them with a loud voice, it's not good, so [you have to] respect them..

Both the students quoted above attended the integrated school, which is a primary school that teaches both Islam as well as the secular curriculum. This method of teaching, and in particular the Islamic teachings, were manifested throughout the five interviews that were conducted at this location.

In addition, the construction of 'not supposed to' is relevant. As Zell & Baumeister (2013) have argued, the effectiveness of self-control is greatly increased when motivations for self-control or prosocial behaviour, in this case 'not fighting with your parents', are intrinsic rather than external (p.500), represented in the aspects of monitoring, willpower and motivation. In the above quotes and throughout the interviews it became clear that the Islamic standard, as instructed to them by school, parents and the mosque, was of great importance, specifically in the description of their conception of what is morally right. The answers that were given as exemplified above, showed that the interviewees would at least prefer to be able to adhere to the religious standard, which points to high commitment and low exploration levels, indicative of Marcia's state of foreclosure (Marcia, 1994, p.74). Furthermore, the authoritarian rule and peaceful representation of family life underwrites the identity status of foreclosure among most interviewees.

Samuli Schielke (2009), in his analysis of ambivalence, fragmentation and moral self during the month of Ramadan in an Egyptian village, notes that "morality is not a coherent system, but an incoherent and unsystematic conglomerate of different moral registers that exist in parallel and often contradict each other" (p.30). The participants in Mombasa expressed similar 'registers' when it came to dealing with their parents: religious and reality (or religion vs. the emerging secular society, as described by Zell & Baumeister (2013)). Marwan (24) for example, gave more nuanced answers, exemplifying the contradictions one may find between this religious standard and reality. He explained as well that according to the Islamic teachings, one is supposed to respect one's parents:

> Marw: Ehm, if you look according to the Islamic way, like what you're taught in religion, you have to treat your parents good. Cause, if you treat them good, you get good in the hereafter yeh?
>
> M: Yeah.
>
> Marw: Yeh, but if you don't listen to them, or follow your friends, follow your friends like the peer-pressure you get, then you're going to ruin your life.

Marwan describes the friction between peer-pressure and what his parents tell him to do. He realises that the Islamic standard has a function, because if he would not listen to his parents but rather listen to his friends, he could ruin his life. It exemplifies the friction he feels between 'religion and reality'. In addition, the interjection of 'yeh?' mimics the way he is taught about religion, in a question and answer construction. It is a very common mannerism among the youth that were interviewed; when it came to religious teachings they would imitate this by asking for confirmation, or even initiate a question/answer session. What it shows here is that he perhaps describes what he is taught, rather than everyday reality. Indeed, when he is asked whether he always manages to listen to his parents, he answers:

> Marw: Sometimes, same thing, peer-pressure. Friends tell you, let's go out! I'm like: no, my parents are not allowing. They're like: Noooh, we'll have fun! Let's go, let's go. But you're like: no, my parents have refused. I can't. Or sometimes you call your parents: I have to go, I'm going. I can't stay home, I have to go out (.)

The concepts of peer-pressure, parenting, and religion are closely related to the issues of drugs, crime and radicalisation. Although I will elaborate on the concept of peer-pressure later, many of the participants indicated that they appreciated their parents, for they kept them on the 'straight path'. Ali explains how these concepts are interrelated:

A: Sometimes, sometimes they are a bit strict. There's the, freedom, they limit my freedom. At the same time I know that that is right for me, even though I may not feel that. I may feel like they're getting me too much. But, that's part of life. So

M: Sure, yeah, what do they restrict you from doing?

A: (.) For example, being too much context with my friends. Sooo yeah basically this.

M: Yeah, what kind of friends, why, why do you think they do that?

A: To protect me from (.) eh, becoming morally (.) direct, going out from the right path. That is. For example, see, peer-pressure is a lot. Peer-pressure may come to, let's say drugs. To go, divert, drug abuse or something like that.

M: Yeah, is that around?

A: Yeah, it's around there. Bamburi sometimes even my brother. Because of his friends, he sometimes he ended up in the wrong path. But my parents, thank God, they have, they [stepped] in, and eh, he ended up in the right path. Now he is studying.

M: Cause do you feel peer-pressure sometimes? How does that go?

A: At that moment, while you are eh, doing something that your friends told us you may feel that OK (.) but later on you realise that difference, the consequences and you end up regretting. Now parents are there, so that you may not face these consequences in the future. So that is why, they, my parents usually try.

Ali is a 18 year old boy currently attending secondary school, he is in his final year. It has been theorised by for example Coleman (cited in Carlo, Fabes, Laible, & Kupanoff, 1999, p. 134) that during early adolescence the influence of peers gradually takes over the influence of the parents or caretakers. Ali however, (still) greatly appreciates the moral judgment of his parents, rather than his peers, stressing they keep him on the right path and prevent him from taking drugs for example. Zell & Baumeister (2013) argued that monitoring is

one of the aspects of the role that religion can play in self-control, and indeed, the social context is highly influential, as presented above. In addition, his brother has already taken the wrong path at some point, and he therefore appreciates his parents not allowing him to do so.[27] He had also explained earlier that he does not often fight with his parents. Ali explains that within his parents' authoritarian style, they do provide high levels of support as well as control, as I have elaborated on above. Furthermore, he expressed high levels of commitment and low levels of exploration. His brother was the one who had explored, but Ali himself rather followed what was morally and religiously right or prescribed by the religious standard (Zell & Baumeister, 2013), indeed resulting in a state of foreclosure (Marcia, 1994, p.74).

Other interviewees claimed to appreciate the control their parents forced upon them, whilst simultaneously appreciating the support given to them, not only material but also emotional. For example Ahmed explains:

> A: So, you see what the parents, what my parents have done, the upbringing since I was a child, the upbringing they've given, is [representative] to how I am. For example now, if you're a child, your parents can spoil you, your parents can beat you at times. But when like at my age, of course if my parents they beat me I go away. You can't beat me, I'll go. So my point is, if you get an individual when you bring him up, so once you do that, once he grows up he will protect his mind. What he is supposed to be.

Ahmed says that the upbringing his parents have given him, has shaped him into who he is now. Once the individual grows up, the influence of the parents diminishes and his behaviour reflects the upbringing he or she has been given. He later explains the emotional support he is still given by his parents in how he talks to them, and why it is important to converse with his parents in that manner:

> A: Talk about all sorts of things, for example, religion. About the world, how things are going, how is the world going. What is happening.

[27] See section 4.3.2

M: You enjoy that, talking to your parents like that?

A: I enjoy that. You know it is the quality time that I spend with my parents.

M: Sure yeah, and why do you think that is important

A: It's very important because it gives the child an outlook of how the society is changing, how things are going. Yeah, so. It helps with your thinking, with your upbringing.

In line with others in this study, Ahmed considers his parents' role to be strict and controlling, but also says that he feels this is necessary for him to be successful in life. He has also expressed appreciation for the emotional support he continues to receive from them. Other participants too stressed this appreciation for their parents in keeping them on the 'straight path', or steering them back towards it. Rashid for example, who is now in his second year of secondary education, explained how in class eight he used to smoke cigarettes with his friends, which is often seen as morally wrong due to the social connotations it has for later drug abuse, as described in Chapter 3. He elaborated on how his parents had showed him the right way, by urging him to study more and stop seeing his friends from 'outside' (i.e. not from school).

Since many of the participants claimed to never fight with their parents, some possible explanations are warranted. Adolescence is seen as the period of growing autonomy from the family and in which the peer-group gains more importance. It has been argued by for example Collins & Russell (1991) that conflicts between the parents or caretakers and adolescents increase during this time. However, these conflicts are mediated by the expectations each party has about the behaviour of the other: discrepancies between actual and expected behaviour (p.100). Most of the participants in this study claimed not to fight with their parents. One explanation for this may be that they prefer to give socially desired answers, in line with the religious standard they adhere to. Another explanation could be that fighting simply occurs less, since both the parents and the participants adhere to this same standard, creating similar expectations of the other's behaviour; discrepancies between actual and expected behaviour are few, resulting

in fewer fights. Furthermore, the participants all expressed low levels of exploration as well as high levels of commitment, indicating a foreclosed identity. Presenting the family as a "family love affair" (Marcia, 1994, p.74) is part of this identity status.

Another theme that was introduced by the interviewees themselves was the concept of 'providing'. Realising this is closely related to gender issues which will be discussed later, here it suffices to mention the exemplary role the participants described their fathers to have. All participants had a father figure in their lives, whether this was their actual father or an uncle who was now taking care of them, the father-figure as it were, was always present. The role of the father-figure in adolescents lives has been extensively discussed when it concerns radicalisation processes, and I will return to this issue in section 4.3.6.4.

When looking at identity formation processes within the parenting domain, most participants exhibited low exploration and high commitment levels, resulting in what Marcia labelled a foreclosed identity which has been exemplified by the quotes above. This observation is furthermore supported by the appreciation that the participants expressed toward their parents' or caretakers' authoritarian parenting style, in addition to the exemplary role that the father-figure is said to play.

4.3.2.4 Conclusion

To conclude, all participants expressed to greatly appreciate their parents and the moral guidance they are given by them. Moreover, moral guidance was presented by the participants to be closely related to religion and the moral code or standard prescribed by Islam. In addition, Islamic rules and standards were given as reasons for most interviewees not to fight with their parents, mostly because they were not 'supposed to'. Parents were often instrumental for the participants to stay morally upright: parents and the function of the religious standard were seen as a strategy for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control, specifically in the light of drug abuse and peer-pressure. These descriptions of religion being instrumental in the participants' dealings with their parents have been described by Zell & Baumeister (2013). They argued that religion can function for the individual in the establishment of prosocial and moral behaviour as well as self-

control, by providing a standard, providing rules for monitoring as well as provide the individual with the willpower to and right motivations to make these decisions. Furthermore, the role of a father-figure in the participants' lives was stressed; most participants introduced the value of 'providing' as important and exemplary. When examining identity formation processes, the interviewees described their parents' parenting style as authoritarian. Most of the participants expressed low exploration and high commitment levels which are indicative of a presented foreclosed identity. Moreover, the manner in which they spoke about their parents was also exemplary of this identity status.

4.3.3 Siblings

4.3.3.1 Introduction & Theoretical Reflections

As mentioned before in Chapter 1, according to Erikson much of identity development in emerging adolescence occurs within a framework of interpersonal experiences, many of which take place within the home situation and family context (cited in Wong, Branje, VanderValk, Hawk, & Meeus, 2010, p.673). This family context also includes siblings. Wong et al. have studied the effects that siblings can have on the identity formation process by examining implementation of adolescents in various types of sibling contexts and by studying the influence siblings have on changes in participants' identities. They argued that siblings may influence each other's identities through either *sibling identification* or *sibling differentiation* (p.674). How and whether these two processes take place depends on factor such as gender constellation and birth order. They argue that same-sex siblings are more influential in identification than opposite-sex siblings, and that later born siblings are more likely to identify with their earlier-born sibling's behaviour rather than the reverse. In addition, they argue that: "the influence of identification processes appears to become stronger with increased age difference between siblings. Differentiation processes on the other hand, are mostly observed among people who have younger siblings" (p.674).

Other studies have shown that siblings tend to model each other's behaviour (Bard & Rodgers cited in Wong et al., 2013 ; Rodgers, Rowe & Harris cited in Wong et al., 2013)

such as smoking and sexual activity. However, Wong et al. (2013) argue that this modelling behaviour is based on the sibling's awareness of the other's exploration behaviour, rather than his or her commitment. Therefore, it was instrumental to ask the participants about their views, feelings and interpretation of their sibling's roles and behaviour, in their own life and that of the family, especially considering the influence they can have on modelling behaviour of an individual. This in turn is closely related to prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control strategies within a societal context of drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation.

Being aware of the differences between family structures in Western societies and, in this case, Kenya, I would like to give some consideration to whether these sibling behaviour theories can be applied to participants in this study. Victor Cicirelli (1994) has extensively described the cross-cultural differences in sibling relationships, specifically differentiating between industrial and non-industrial countries. Even though his categories could be interpreted as misleading, by for example not accounting for the globalisation, industrialisation and urbanisation many 'non-industrial' countries are going through, his distinction is warranted and relevant. He has stressed, for example, the difference in emphasis given to the custodial functions elder siblings have within a family. In his non-industrialised countries, the role of elder siblings is thought to be an almost institutionalised function, as opposed to the mere supporting role elder siblings may have in industrialised societies. Cicirelli argues that this structure is established out of necessity: parents are allowed to fulfil necessary work, or in case of death or disappearance siblings serve as a back-up system (p.10). In addition, he distinguishes between sibling structures. In industrialised societies sibling structures vary, whereas in non-industrialised societies the structures are institutionalised roles: siblings in certain positions are expected to exhibit certain behaviour (p.13). His further distinctions of age spacing, gender, birth order and age level are in line with the above argumentation, stressing the importance of institutionalised roles of siblings within the family in so-called non-industrialised societies. This thesis will consider these cultural differences when discussing the participants' sibling relations.

4.3.3.2 Analysis

One of the first themes that was introduced by the participants when it would concern their siblings was 'respect'. Cicirelli (1993) notes that cultural roles have been established and that indeed "younger siblings are taught to respect older siblings and to obey them as they would a parent, with this authority continuing into adulthood" (p.15). For example, Sharif (21) when talking about his cousins, who he lives with and considers to be his siblings, explained:

> Sh: I appreciate (.) They are (.) They're respectful. They are very respectful. They do respect me, when I ask for their help. Mostly I do my things myself. Sometimes they help me (indistinct) Even I call them out when I have to send them for errand, I send. I'm ok, I appreciate.

This appreciation of the respect his younger cousins show him derives from the hierarchal or patriarchal family structure which is prominent within Kenyan society. Younger people are expected to show respect for their elders. Additionally, this is closely related to what Cicirelli has suggested, that roles of the elder sibling are rather fixed, as Sharif describes in his dealings with his cousins. Also, he says that his younger cousins run errands for him, which makes him feel 'OK', indicating that this is what they are supposed to do. In addition to respect and the convenience of having younger siblings run errands for them, Nasir (15) elaborates on the exemplary and often custodial role he fulfils:

> N: Hmmm, when you are together, you feel happy. But, when you are alone sometimes, when you are sick, because you know, as a brother I can help sometimes. Because parents they will not be at home. They leave us alone, because we are now big, so you are told to look after your brothers. It is good.
>
> (…)
>
> N: Siblings. (.) I like them because they respect me. And I love them. So when they respect me then I feel happy. When they have any problem, so, I can help them!

M: Yeah sure, and their characters, their characteristics that you like about them?

N: About them (.) Hmm. They're behaving well. When I tell them something, they [listen]. They follow what I tell them. I tell them, it's not good, now it's time for study. You must not play. Don't follow these people, I know their characteristics. So, they respect me.

Nasir indeed explains how he does not only fulfil custodial roles, but also takes the place of his parents, a role that they have consciously given to him. In addition, when referring to his younger siblings, he first elaborates that he likes them because they respect him. When pressed further on the matter, he again stresses the importance of respect, that they listen to him, and that they follow his example. He fulfils an exemplary and advisory role to them, in both study and play, and which people to 'follow'. This exemplary role is not always easy:

N: Yes. Because, when my parents tell me something, I cannot refuse, so they think: now, our elder brother follows. Why would we not follow? So they, they look up. Cause when I [as] the older [son], I'm not listening, then they say: Why does our elder brother not do this, and [then we] will not do it either. So when, when I do good things, then they will follow.

This quote shows that he feels that he sometimes has to fulfil his parents model of right and wrong. Nasir, Sharif and the other participants who were the oldest siblings, often described sibling differentiation, which is exemplified by their attempts to enliven the moral standard for prosocial behaviour (whether religious or parental) in front of their younger siblings. An explanation for this could be due to the moral climate that many of the youth find themselves in as exemplified in the previous chapter on drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. The participants find that they would drastically increase the likelihood of their siblings staying on the right path if they give 'the right example': sibling differentiation is used as a strategy for prosocial and moral behaviour.

In addition, as discussed in the previous section, parents are perceived to live by religious moral standards, which is often positively reflected on. This religious aspect of the moral standard for prosocial behaviour and self-control can be implied to play a

significant role in these youths being convinced this standard should be upheld in front of their younger, vulnerable siblings, as has also been described by Zell & Baumeister (2013). They stressed the importance of the motivational aspect as well as how religion can provide the moral standard through which self-control and moral behaviour could be achieved. They also stressed the significance of the community in that it can help avoiding cues and ego depleting conditions. In addition, cultural norms that exist within what Cicirelli (1993) names non-industrial societies, such as the custodial role and the prominence of the value of respect contribute to the exemplary role elder siblings fulfil.

From the other point of view, Said (17) who is in his third year of secondary school, explains what it is like being the youngest of many brothers, expressing identification with his elders:

> S: My brothers, they really commit, because they're you see, they are older to me. So they have that experience. If they see that this something is bad. They see it, then they tell me. Please don't do this. I've tried it a bit. It's bad. So it's (.) So that (.) they give me some proportions[28].
>
> M: What sort of things would they have tried, and
>
> S: Example. Eeh. Just like me, they might have (been) smoking. They've done that. Say, this is drugs. It's got many effects. So if I just leave it.
>
> M: So they are an example for you?
>
> S: Of course, because they've also experienced many things, because they are older than me. And some ehh maybe, education to know this, (indistinct) I can follow one of them, please teach me this. This, brother teach me, what is right and wrong. Just, my parents too.

Said says that his brothers are most definitely an example to him, 'because they are older than me', implying a role that is assumed for elder brothers. In addition, he describes how they give him moral standards, they commit to being an example to him as well. When he

[28] He means 'perspective'.

is asked why he believes his brothers and does not explore his curiosity about for example drugs himself, he answers:

> S: Because, everything I can see. Because many people have suffered. (.) Really, in this neighbourhood. (.) So I can see the difference. Of certain things. Those running in school. Also here, I just (indistinct). So since they've tried it, they know.

The influence of seeing bad things such as drugs on a daily basis, in addition to his brothers' advice and explanations on why certain things are bad, convince Said to stay on the right path, to follow a moral standard. He connects these two elements by saying that he sees it on the street, plus his brothers have tried, he can see the difference in what is right and wrong and therefore not be tempted. What is noteworthy here, is whereas Wong et al. (2013) argued that siblings may often model their behaviour after their siblings', usually because of the awareness of exploration, Said explains that he would rather follow his elder brothers' commitments. He explains that he is not curious himself because he sees the bad sides of drugs within his neighbourhood in addition to his brothers who have tried it and advise him against experimentation. In this case, sibling identification (as opposed to differentiation described above) is also used as a strategy for morally upright behaviour. However, this combination of low exploration and high commitment was common among the interviewees, which is again an indication of a foreclosed identity status (Marcia, 1994, p.74). This could be explained by the fact that individualism and the development of the self are less important among the Muslims of Mombasa than in Western societies. Said might feel that there is no benefit for him or others if he would explore on his own: it is more important to be a morally upright member of society than to indulge in his own latent motivations (Zell & Baumeister, 2013).

Another example of a younger sibling was Hasnain, who explained that his brother is an example to him, chiefly for religious reasons and moral standards. He proposes that his brother teaches him how to live and how to follow Islam and the Qur'an. This reflection on how siblings are an example not only in life, but also in how to follow religion featured in about half of the interviews. However, in line with what Wong et al. (2013) have proposed in their study, in this thesis all younger siblings in this study thought

their elder brothers were indeed an example to them (*sibling identification* with *same sex* and *earlier-born)*. This is also in line with Cicirelli's (1993) assumptions of the custodial and exemplary roles that the elder siblings are expected to fulfil. Both the younger and elder siblings showed high levels of commitment (Marcia, 1994) towards their siblings, as exemplified above. These commitments were chiefly made due to the exemplary role they saw their siblings or themselves in. These exemplary roles are in turn rooted in the religious moral standard they wished to adhere to. Furthermore, as Cicirelli argued, the elder siblings often have to fulfil custodial roles, taking the place of the parents leading to a feeling of responsibility and therefore low exploration.

4.3.3.3 Conclusion

Many of the participants either showed high levels of sibling identification with same-sex earlier born siblings, or expressed high responsibility levels in wanting to be the perfect moral example for their younger siblings. In the last case, gender would not necessarily play a role. Firstly, although later-born brothers would indeed identify with their earlier-born brothers, the modelling of behaviour was based on commitments rather than explorations. Secondly, when the participant was the first-born, he would express high levels of responsibility felt towards his younger siblings. They would express the desire to care for them and show them the right way, rather than 'wanting to be different'. An explanation for this could be the perceived dangers the participants witness in society, and the appreciation for the religious moral standard their parents would imbue on them (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). This could be rooted in the fact that individuals are expected to fulfil roles within society and community that are not based on the individual. Rather, the roles are designed to be a part of the community and to uphold the (often religious) moral standard in order to stay on the right path. Within this religious code, in both sibling identification and differentiation, siblings were often presented as a strategy for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control. Furthermore, emphasis lies on the custodial and exemplary role the elder sibling is expected to fulfil within non-industrialised societies. These observations concluded that the participants wished to present low exploration and high commitments toward their siblings, indicative of a foreclosed identity.

4.3.4 Friends and Peer-Pressure

4.3.4.1 Introduction and Theoretical Reflections

As Erikson and Marcia have elaborated, the development of a personal identity is initiated in the late teens and early adulthood years. Marcia specifically identified two processes of identity development: self-exploration and identity commitment (Marcia, 1994, p.72). In the first, individuals consider different identity related options such as career, values, relationships and roles, and in the latter in which individuals commit to an over-arching personality. Dumas et al. (2012) argue that: "ideally adolescents move toward a mature adult identity (…) by either experiencing a period of uncommitted, active identity exploration and then committing to well-explored identity options or by re-analyzing and re-integrating early identity commitments or identifications with others into a well-explored personal identity" (Dumas, Ellis, & Wolfe, 2012, p.918). According to Toder & Marcia (1973), identity committed young adults tend to conform less to peer response than less-identity developed individuals (p.289). On the other hand, individuals who are low in identity exploration and commitment tend to be more likely to conform to peer pressure. Dumas et al. conclude:

> Both identity exploration and commitment reflect motivation toward developing an independent set of self-relevant beliefs, values and goals and youth who have made strides toward identity construction may be less swayed by feelings of peer pressure, which may deviate from adolescents' developing personal values and belief systems. (p.919)

In addition, classic attachment theory links identity and attachment processes. Erikson argues that in order for one to develop attachments, the individual should first develop a sense of identity, whereas Dyk and Adams have noted that identity and intimacy are closely linked, and may not conform to an ordered formation (cited in Galliher, 2012, p.1410). This also relates to the level of security a developing individual may or may not feel. How and when he or she has developed attachments with friends or even romantic relationships may indicate ones level of identity construction and development.

4.3.4.2 Analysis

These assumptions do not necessarily hold true when commitment is high, but exploration low. According to Toder and Marcia (1973), these youths (in their case college women) would be more likely to conform to peer-pressure than others (p.287-294). However, the participants interviewed for this thesis tended to be high in commitment, low in exploration (foreclosure (Marcia, 1994, p.74)), yet some of them were actively resisting peer-pressure on a daily basis, making conscious decisions about self-control and moral behaviour. One of the main themes that was raised by the interviewees when friendships were discussed was 'following the right path'. Nasir (15) for example explains:

> M: Yeah, yeah, what do you do together, you say you play football, what else do you do?
>
> N: Football, we study together, when you have a problem, when, if there is something, you console them. Cheer them, when you see him, he is not following the right path, you sit with him, you tell him, what you are doing is not good. (…)
>
> M: Can you give an example?
>
> N: You see, like when you see, your friend, maybe sitting in bad places. Because there are places where you if you (.) To pass, you see people smoking, one day if you see [that], you call him. What were you doing there! That's not good, you get things, and even you can be caught! Then how will your parents [feel], so you are the one to help your parents. You say your parents have helped you until now, so, it is your turn, to to help them. Firstly.

Nasir describes a situation in which one of his friends may be following the wrong people, and how he would actively address this issue with his friend. What is interesting, is that the motivations that he gives for convincing his friend to stop this behaviour is the fear of 'getting caught', as well as to remind his friend that he should be the one to help his parents, rather than to throw his life away. Interestingly, the standard that is referred to here is not religious, rather, he refers to his teachers and parents as being the motivation for morally upright behaviour (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). These boys at the integrated

school were all 15 or 16 years old, which is still rather young to have such convictions about taking care of one's own parents, since they are still in school and for example have no financial means to do so.

As mentioned before, Nasir does not consciously or specifically refer to a religious standard. However, one of his classmates Hussein, describes a similar situation and does refer to the religious or Godly standard:

> H: Sometimes we misunderstand, so we have to discuss. What is our religion, what are the facts. What is good, and bad. Also, to watch over each other, to keep right. Yes (.)
>
> M: Yeah, what do they say?
>
> H: Ah, they (his friends) don't trust me. They just keep doing their ways. (indistinct)
>
> M: Sorry?
>
> H: Sometimes they behave bad, but I have to keep them right. God has told us how to. But they don't listen.

Hussein (15) explains how he struggles at times to keep his friends on the right path. He tries to provide his friends with the religious standard as well as to socially monitor their behaviour and exemplify the reasons that willpower should be imbued (Zell & Baumeister, 2013): he wishes to implement the strategy of peer-pressure, friendship and the religious code to keep his friends morally upright. However, he often fails to succeed. Earlier in the conversation, he explained how many of his friends were arrested earlier that year for stealing and drug abuse. He misses them and explained how they would still be together, whilst recognising the fact that he is on a better path now, even monitoring some of his friends behaviour, discussing the ways of God when they are exhibiting antisocial or morally wrong behaviour.

Often, the interviewees referred to religious standards and beliefs as motivations to reverse this process of negative peer-pressure, and use their potential influence as a

strategy to convince their friends to follow the right path or 'Islamic way'. They referenced both drug-use and radicalisation as topics they would talk to their friends about in the hope to reverse antisocial behaviour. Zell & Baumeister (2013) categorise this strategy as religion providing the motivations for morally upright behaviour, whether this is by divine order or socially constructed value systems. However, as stated before, the exploration levels of the interviewed youth were relatively low, as shown in previous sections on dealings with parents and siblings, as well as religious convictions. Omar (17) for example said he would talk about religion with his friends and family, and remind each other about God, and the final day:

> O: Kind of discussions (.)(.) Maybe, sometimes we do wrong things (…) So (.) we just, correct them. I teach them what the existence of God means. Sometimes I remind them about God. So (.) there must be something for that day, when it comes.

As Zell & Baumeister (2013) argued, religion can be functional in self-control by providing motivations for prosocial behaviour, such as the prospect of a negative outcome after death, and by providing a desire to promote one's religion to others. Omar explains as well that sometimes one cannot always do the right thing. Religion helps him to remind himself but also his peers what the right path is. Again, we can see the friction that is sometimes felt between the religious standard and reality. Omar presents the religious code and morals as a strategy for him and his friends to stay on the right path.

Many of the participants thought a good friend had to be religious. Ahmed (18), who is currently in his last year of secondary school, narrates that true friends are the ones who advise you about Islam, who you practice Islam with:

> A: (.) You see. According to Islam, first, you might have friends, you might [be] friendly with them. You have, you might have those particular friends. (.) Who stand by you times you need them. And you stand by them, at times they need you. You do your religious duties together. (.) You advise each other on what is right and what is wrong. Right? You practice, you do work together, you do constructive development. Now those according to Islam are the real things. You might be friendly with everyone! Even the person you are just passing in

> the hallway, is your friend. Those friends who advise you and you advise them, and you do your duties together. Those are the true friends, the real friends.

Ahmed believes that the religious standard also provides guidance on how to choose your friends, on what a good friend is and what duties should be done together. He explains, as did many others, that 'real' friends advise each other in life but also on religious matters. Religion in that sense, as Zell & Baumeister (2013) have also described, can be useful in the avoidance of activating cues. Family and community members can be useful in being a moral model, raising people's estimations of the level of virtue (p.506): many of the participants described themselves and their friends to fulfil those roles for each other. Sharif (21) presented this process rather simplistically:

> S: A bad friend, you see (.) his moral values, are not part of yours. So (.) he does, things that are wrong in religion. So we don't agree, so he must not taken to be a friend. Because, he make you go astray also.
>
> M: Yeah (.) How do you decide who is a good friend and a bad friend?
>
> S: I differentiate in them. I say ah! This one has good religious values. So (.) I cannot, when I'm with him, I cannot go astray. But he, his religious values are really bad. So he can make me go astray. He can make me do sins, I cannot do sins. Maybe my friend, he may change me on things also.

What is interesting about this view on friendship and friend making, is that the standard for choosing friends is whether he himself would also adhere to this same (religious) standard. Sharif believes that peer-pressure is a threat to him, and is convinced that in order to not go astray, he and his friends should adhere to the religious standard, to keep each other on the right path. It can be assumed that one of the strategies for prosocial behaviour is that he prefers to surround himself with religious and in his view morally upright people who share the same standard in order to avoid cues that might lead to sinful behaviour (p.506). Furthermore, Marcia (1994) noted that in a foreclosed identity status, because there is little to no exploration, relationships with friends tend to be

conventional and stereotypic (p.74), as exemplified above. However, it should be noted that again, it may be possible that Sharif presents what friend making *should* look like, rather than his actual strategies: he may present the religious or moral code he wishes to adhere to.

Another, rather unique and slightly different example of a participant who wished to surround himself with morally upright people as well as to encourage others to stay on the right path is Abdul (19), a self-declared fundamentalist who has taken it upon himself to change not only his friends, but also society for the better:

> A: With friends it's just (.) we talk about the, how to change the life in Mombasa. How (.) we have to live. For example you see somebody doing wrong, we discuss how we can stop that thing. So then, after discussion we go, we talk to them, to the person who is doing wrong.
>
> M: You say you want to change life in Mombasa, what do you mean by that?
>
> A: As I said earlier, there is a lot of vices going on in Mombasa, so, with all these organisations coming up, we are trying to pinpoint the leaders who are the causes of this stuff. Who are trying to lead people astray. Trying to bring them to the right path.

This particular form of positive peer-pressure was unique. Abdul explains that he is going to the troublesome neighbourhoods such as Majengo on a regular basis, to talk to the leaders, drug users as well as young Muslims who are attending so-called 'radical' mosques and sermons. He explained how he is active in many youth groups who are attempting to tackle societal issues on a grass root level. He also elaborated on his youth, and that he has attended an Islamic school for a year between his primary and secondary education. Although he was still relatively young in terms of identity formation processes (19), he was entirely committed to his religion, the spread of in his eyes correct information regarding Islam (e.g. Islam is peace, killing is wrong, rules regarding fasting, prayers, his interpretation of Qur'an etc.) as well as the implementation of the right religious moral standard in Mombasa. Even though Abdul was a rather unique case, most of the other participants also mentioned that they teach each other about religion and the religious

standard that they ought to live by: religion, friends and peer-pressure are used as a strategy for aiming for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control, especially in light of drugs and radicalisation processes.

Ahmed (18) who was slightly less fundamentalist, but still considers himself to be very religious, also described his feelings towards these 'radical' and 'wrong' interpretations that some Muslims share in Mombasa:

> A: As I said, wrong friends, eh, lure you to do bad things they are also friends who might tell you: this guy is bad, don't go with him! He is not Muslim so you have to kill him! It's there! It is there. It is not that it's not like that. You have to, you have to advise them, you have to tell them that, no! What you're telling is not right, it's wrong.

A more specific example is Marwan (24), who elaborates on his own friends claiming that non-Muslims are allowed to be killed:

> Marw: I don't find it right. I tell them, they not doing right, cause they're Muslims you're not allowed to kill anyone just like that. Without any reason. It's like you killing the whole humanity, if you kill one person without any reason. And nobody has the right to kill except God has. To take away someone.

It is interesting to note that Marwan has integrated a religious standard as his own moral code, rather than presenting the more common structure of 'Islam tells us so and so' as we have seen in previous sections. His statements above are clear and his own and presented as his own convictions rather than a quote from a code. Zell & Baumeister (2013) argued that an intrinsic standard is far more effective than an external one, in supporting self-control and prosocial, moral behaviour. Throughout the interview, Marwan indeed explained that his belief system and moral standard was chiefly based in his religion, however, he also presented himself as not being very religious, merely attempting to be a good Muslim whilst not always succeeding. The integration of a moral code within his identity, as exemplified above, could be the result of his (compared to other participants)

rather high exploration levels and the commitments he was creating at the time of the interview, indicating a state of, in Marcia's terms, moratorium (Marcia, 1994, p.74-75).

In addition to the radical thoughts and actions that the interviewees thought were related to peer-pressure, drugs were introduced as another issue influenced by the same. The effects of peer-pressure on drug abuse have been extensively studied world wide. Although I will not concern myself with the risks or actual behaviour of the participants, their views on friends and what constitutes a 'good friend' as well as a 'bad friend' was in line with the 'good' and 'bad' when it came to radicalisation, and drugs were placed in the 'bad' category:

> M: When, when do you call somebody a friend?
>
> Sh: (.) A friend, who I want to call a friend is somebody who is leading you the good way. Who is uplifting my situation, my lifestyle. Who is kind, who is present. That when I need him, he is there. Also, that he accept my help. When he help me, I also accept. A friend is honest and also respectful. Not a friend who is dishonest, who lies to you sometimes. Who might disrespect you in front of your other. It must be someone who is respectful, who is respected by others also.
>
> (…)
>
> Sh: Yeah, a good friend they are mostly [morally] upright. Not one who steals, will not shout at people. You will not see him talking bad things. He will be on the right side. He will not skip classes. You know bad friends, (indistinct) they will also pick fights with people. When they see somebody they will start fighting and (.) They are those ones who are also taking some, things like a cigarette. Yeah, they are taking *miraa*, chewing *miraa*. Others are, taking some drugs. Those ones according to me are bad.

Sharif (21) describes a rather simplistic situation of who is a good friend and who is a bad friend. He is a 21 year old boy who is currently attending tertiary education in Mombasa and expressed solid religious commitments: he was the oldest boy still attending *madrassa* during the interviews, and was rather conservative in that he said he did not wish to

explore options that would imply to break the religious code. He expressed great affection for his family and appreciation for the opportunities he had been given. His parents had a low socio-economic status but the family had managed to pay the school fees, since he was the eldest at home. His views on right and wrong friends may therefore be sincere and not only a socially desired answer. Furthermore, the choice of friends as being similar to the participant is an indication of a foreclosed identity status, in which low exploration and high commitment levels are achieved (Marcia, 1994, p.74).

Marwan however, had a slightly more nuanced view on friends:

> Marw: Yeah I loved going to school, school was fun. (.) Cause with the friends and all that. But again, peer pressure there too, if you follow friends, you can't study.
>
> M: Can you give an example? Have you ever done that, or?
>
> Marw: Ehm yes, yes I have done that. I have seen the bad side and the good sides of school. Like if you stay with bad friends, let's go skive school and all that. Don't go school (.) Maybe some of them smoke weed. So they take you with you. If you don't smoke, they be like naahhaa you're like a girl, you don't smoke weed. And if you do, you go to the bad company. And they take you as one of theirs. (…) I do still see them. Actually, we meet sometimes, talk to each other almost every day like. See my friends. The bad ones, and the good ones. We sit and talk, and they do what they normally do, but they don't have money to do that,

Marwan says that indeed the friends who smoke weed are 'bad' friends but also says he still sees them. He further explains that if he would have followed them to where they are now, he would not have become the man he is. He is 24 and rather aware of his position as an accountant. Furthermore, it was hard to discover the strategies that Marwan employed when he was younger in order not to succumb to peer-pressure and try drugs. He did however tell me that his parents had played a large part in his upbringing, teaching him Islam and raising him in an authoritarian manner.

4.3.4.3 Conclusion

The interviewees indicated that and how they deal with peer-pressure when it concerns drugs, crime and radicalisation. What is interesting to note is that the majority of the participants described that they would practice a form of positive peer-pressure, a strategy in which they attempt to surround themselves with friends who share the same standard for prosocial behaviour, in order to avoid cues and to remind each other of the motivations religion provides for prosocial behaviour (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). Many of the participants presented to have low levels of exploration, and thought that high commitment to the religious and moral standard was best, also when choosing friends: they mostly appeared to be in a state of foreclosure (Marcia, 1994).

4.3.5 Education

4.3.5.1 Introduction and Theoretical Reflections

In Erikson's terms, identity is considered to be an interplay between the individual and society. Identity denotes the personal and the communal and is thought to be a product of its context. In this sense, identity is an integrative concept connecting the self and the world; it incorporates past, present and future. Identity is anchored in 'being a part of' (Flum & Kaplan, 2012, p.240). Gee (cited in Flum & Kaplan, 2012) described people as being free to choose and author their own identities in modern western society.

> People cannot rely anymore on traditional authority and institutions to underwrite their identity (…) People engage in 'making sense of' or in an interpretive effort, and construct and sustain identities through discourse and dialogue, rather than expect to derive their identity directly from 'official' institutions. (p.241)

Relational processes have been key in many identity theories (e.g. Erikson, 1968; Kroger, 1996): identity formation is an interpersonal process. In addition, this identity then has to be recognised by and affirmed by others who are in dialogue with them.

Education and schooling play a fundamental role in identity formation and development of prosocial or moral behaviour, not in the least because during adolescence, identity formation and processes are at its peak. Social contexts and indeed schools can

carry pivotal meaning in the individual's life. This is due to the adolescent's developing emotional and cognitive abilities which elevates the ability of self-reflection and therefore the development of identity. "Being engaged in identity construction involves learning, and learning implies becoming a different person" (Lave & Wenger cited in Flum & Kaplan, 2012, p.241). The school indeed provides the social web, the context in which identity develops: schools are the social context of learning: "they are expected to provide a community of learners with the means to realize this objective" (p.242).

Erikson further argued the importance of career-identity in identity formation (Erikson, 1968). How the individual views his or her future is highly dependent on the education system he or she is in, as well as choices that are made in aid of this future perspective. "Considering the domain of career in young people's lives broadens our view of identity and education considerably" (Flum & Kaplan, 2012, p.243). In addition, looking to the future is often marked by points of transition. Especially towards the end of secondary school, students tend to make decisions geared towards the future.

Cote and Levine describe the deficient guiding structures in educational settings (and society in general). They made a distinction between two responses: 'passive compliance' and 'active adaptation'. As the terms suggest, the ones who passively complied follow the institutional guidelines and are unreflective towards their own identity. Self-constructed identity in these cases is rare. However, active adaptation indicates that the individual follows a more developmental route in life by actively exploring his or her identity and demonstrating personal growth and agency (cited in Flum & Kaplan, 2012, p.243).

Education is not always available when growing up in Kenya. The current education system allows for children to enjoy free primary education only. However, secondary education is too expensive for most. Therefore in Kenya, education levels are highly dependent on a family's socio-economic status. Poverty may restrict students from attending secondary or higher education. Especially in the Coast Province education levels are notoriously low when compared to the rest of the country (see Chapter 1).

Despite the considerations above, this research has chiefly focussed on school going adolescents in Mombasa, due to limitations concerning language skills and security when

interviewing the the so-called drop-outs. Therefore, the consequences of not attending school for the construction of identity and career plans has not been examined. However, this section will focus on the perception of the importance of school. Additionally, it will address the consequences these perspectives have on prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control as well as what strategic role education can play in upholding a moral or religious standard. Furthermore, it will elaborate on the interviewees' career plans and future perspectives in order to explore their identity development and provide implications for potential disenfranchisement when these goals can not be achieved.

4.3.5.2 Analysis

First of all, many participants thought that education was important, not only for obtaining knowledge, but also for socialising. As Flum & Kaplan (2012) described: the educational setting provides the backdrop for interactions and practice of identity (p.242). For example, Ali (18) explained:

> Al: School is very important, very much important, because eh (.) knowledge is not only about secular knowledge. You do not only get secular knowledge, but you also get to socialise, to get to learn through other people's mistakes. The same time, the moral lessons the moral studies, what the teachers say is impossible. So school is important, yes. Because, we can't learn everything from our parents. The knowledge everything, from parents, it must be (put into practice). School provides the site for all these experiences.

Ali describes that school is where you can put into practice what your parents have taught you. Only learning the theory of the moral or religious standard is not enough, one has to experience and make mistakes: the moral studies are impossible to understand without practice. Ali means that school provides the context in which individuals can integrate the moral code into their personalities (Zell & Baumeister, 2013).

Furthermore, many students expressed the feeling of education playing a pivotal role in the construction of their future. Education is seen as the only way to obtain a job and to build a future. As Nasir (15), a primary school student explains:

> N: Life outside, my parents tell me. Because when you want to learn, life outside is too difficult. Nowadays, there are no jobs, even if you have big certificates, no jobs. So, you need to learn. And do work inside here (points to head) because Kenya nowadays, theft is crazy. So, you must work hard, and ensure that you go out and learn more. So that you can get a good job, and help them, our parents.

What is interesting to note, is his awareness of the job market and unemployment rates in Kenya. The consequences of this are theft and crime and he suggests that the only way to overcome these issues is to attend school and work hard. In addition, he explains that the purpose of building a steady future is not necessarily for himself to stay out of trouble, but most importantly to help his parents in the future. Nasir was the only participant to discuss this particular issue.

In addition, most participants thought that attending school was key for them in order to stay on the right path. Closely related to parenting, most interviewees described that their parents were strict by keeping them in school and often after secular school hours, attending the *madrassa* would be imposed. One of the main reasons is when parents would let their children have too much free time, risks of antisocial behaviour such as drug abuse and attending 'radical mosques' would increase. In this sense, education and school were used as strategies for staying on the right path. For example:

> N: Of course. Important, because, you cannot acquire knowledge outside. Because outside you will see people smoking, so that's the work of outside, but when you come to school, you'll know better and then, if who knows, you'll know, what you're doing is not good. So you are advised. To support and to learn.

Nasir stresses that the 'outside' is bad, and school is good. There was little nuance especially in the answers that were given by the younger participants who were still attending primary school. They were often convinced that school would provide a future for them, that if you learn and obtain a degree, a job might be possible later on in life. This is a message that is spread via schools and parents alike in Kenya. The primary school children that were interviewed, repeated the mantra over and over. The secondary school

students had more nuanced answers, as was shown above where some of them indicated that the social aspect of school is indeed very important for other reasons too. What both the primary and secondary school participants had in common, was that they were convinced that school is a great socialising factor in their lives, whether it does so by providing the social context in which one can practice the moral or religious standard, or by keeping the students off the streets providing a cue-avoiding environment (Zell & Baumeister, 2013).

However, these views contrast with how some of the other interviewees have elaborated on peer-pressure in school, where friends would lure them into taking drugs or throwing stones when riots would break out. Different students then, stressed different aspects, beneficial or detrimental, of school. This could be an example of what school is supposed to be (according to a moral code, or a socially desired answer), and how reality often differs from this. This is supported by the fact that the older students often had a more nuanced view than the younger students, indicating discrepancies between the standard and reality (Schielke, 2009).

As elaborated on above, Erikson (1968) has argued the importance of career-identity in identity development, which is part of the educational domain. According to Erikson, how the adolescent sees his or her future is highly dependent on the educational system he or she is in, as well as the choices that are made in aid of this future perspective (cited in Flum & Kaplan, 2012, p.243). Erikson has argued that especially toward the end of secondary school, choices are geared towards the future, a view that was narrated by the secondary school interviewees: all had pretty clear ideas of what would happen after secondary school, what course or college to follow and what career that would provide for them. As opposed to the students that were still in early secondary or late primary school, they often had changed their career plans once or twice, now contemplating and motivating their choices.

Ahmed (19) for example, now wants to become a doctor and go to medical school next year. However:

A: Eh, at one point in my life when I was younger obviously I wanted to become a pilot. It's what young boys want to be. And there was a point that I wanted to become an architect.

M: OK yeah, and what made you change your mind?

A: You see, (.) the environment that I live in, it's all sort of medical and all that. My brother is a doctor, my sister is a a doctor, so.

Ahmed explains that his environment influenced his choices for his future; his parents and siblings are also doctors, steering him towards the same career path. It is possible that this line of career within his family is seen as successful, and therefore he is advised by his siblings as well as his parents to consider a medical degree. For Ahmed however, changing his socio-economic environment is not necessarily a motivation: he mentioned before that they were rather well off and that medical school would not be a problem for his parents to finance. Cote and Levine (cited in Flum & Kaplan, 2012) describe two responses by adolescents to educational settings: 'passive compliance' and 'active adaptation'. As the terms suggest, those individuals who show 'passive compliance' are unreflective of their own identity and a self-constructed identity in these cases is rare. Active adaptation on the other hand refers to adolescents who follow a more developmental route, actively exploring identity and personal growth (p.243).

The fact that Ahmed, and others with him, expressed relative passive compliance with career choices often made by peers or family, points towards somewhat low identity development on these matters, in that they expose low exploration and high commitment, again indicators of a foreclosed identity (Marcia, 1994, p.74). The reason for this may be the hierarchal and authoritarian family relations, as well as the authoritarian education system which especially in primary school, is one-directional and not geared towards individual thought and development. All these are according to Marcia indicators of foreclosed identity status (p.74).

In addition, among the secondary school interviewees, it was common to have aspirations to go overseas after they would finish. Ali (18) for example, explains:

> A: For the past few years my parents insisted that I study in Kenya, Nairobi. University of Nairobi. But a few weeks ago, my uncle, my parents have been talking, and have decided that if it's possible I go to Karachi, Aga Khan University. (…) Even my brothers emphasized that I should study abroad, because I get to interact with other people.

Even though he does not seem to have much say in the matter, Ali does appreciate the reasoning behind going. Generally, education overseas is valued higher than university education within Kenya. All five students that were interviewed at the secondary school said they wanted to go overseas, at least for their studies (some wanted to stay there, others preferred to come back to Kenya afterwards). A reason for this clear distinction between one school and the rest of the interviewees, is that there may have been one or two of the interviewees who indeed had a realistic chance of attending university abroad. Classmates might have looked up to this social status, and therefore expressed their own desires to me, the interviewer from Europe (see Methodology and interviewer effects/ power relations), to go overseas as well. Amir (18) for example was adamant that he would go overseas after his secondary school but was not sure where, and neither did he know how to fund this.

The primary school and *madrassa* students expressed no desires of wanting to go abroad. All of the students came from a rather low socio-economic background and the concept of going overseas might simply not be a possibility, nor is it seen as such. Furthermore, university is still a long way away for them, even attending secondary school might already be a step too far financially. However, the younger students did have high aspirations for their future, stating jobs such as pilot, engineer and doctor. Nasir (15) who has always wanted to become an engineer for example explains:

> N: (…) When I finish my college, I'll study for work. When I finish studying, then I will apply for a job. Then, then when I've seen more, when I get my salary, you start small, very small, you must try. Because in this world, when you use all of your money, sometime you will need it, but then you will not have it. So must, must keep some. Then you help your family.

Nasir's plans for his future are not as clear as the secondary school students who knew what sort of university they might go to, or how to practically reach their goals. The primary school interviewees were a lot more focussed on being able to provide for their families when they would grow up, a more abstract goal than planning the steps to take in order to achieve that: picking a university, finding funds etc. Their career choices were also rather 'big' jobs, such as engineer, doctor and pilot. These careers were most likely chosen because they would provide a relatively high salary, giving them the opportunity to change their socio-economic status even though these plans might be unrealistic. Whether their future plans and goals will change drastically is hard to tell, but it can be assumed that some of their career choices will have to either undergo passive compliance or active adaptation.

The above analysis of the participants' career plans and ideas about their future is closely related to what would happen if these plans would fail. Juergensmeyer (2003) has argued that feelings of failure and consecutive feelings of being humiliated and powerless may create conditions for a need for empowerment, which are often expressed violently, since no other option is available (p.198). Two major elements that have been discussed in the previous chapter come to the fore here: the marginalisation of Muslims in Mombasa and the high unemployment rates in the Coast province. Khosrokhavar (2010) (also see Chapter 3) has argued that a victimised community may, according to socio-economic records, not be marginalised per se: unemployment rates may be as high for their Christian counterparts in the region. However, when the feelings of marginalisation on other fronts in day to day life, such as the police harassment and killing of Muslims, is taken into account, unemployment will also be interpreted as the marginalisation of the Muslim community. When these youth then are disenfranchised by society, in that they are not able to find jobs and provide for their families, their anger could grow, and since there are no appropriate channels in place to express their anger such as democratic or bureaucratic systems, needs for empowerment may often be expressed violently. Furthermore, when one is disenfranchised by his or her own society or government, and having lived a 'morally upright' life has not proven to inherently make one successful, one may become more vulnerable to the influence of radical organisations which offer not only

financial means, but also a new ideological perspective geared against the same society or government that has betrayed or failed the individual. Again, this is not to say that these phenomena are causally linked. Rather, it shows the fluctuations and social and economic factors that are at play within Mombasa and the potential consequences for radicalisation.

I have briefly touched on the matter of the education system above, but wish to elaborate on it further here. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address all the details of the influence of educational systems on identity development, it is worth noting that the public Kenyan educational system is often described as one-directional and authoritarian, with teachers transferring knowledge by repetition and recital, with teachers paying little attention to pupil understanding (Pontefract & Hardman, 2005). They argue that "such an emphasis on directive forms of teaching in Kenyan primary classrooms goes against the widely accepted social constructivist theory of learning" (p. 100). Research has indicated that the constructivist approach of dialogue and interaction is far more effective; students are forced to play an active part in their learning processes. Even though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine each participant's school and teaching method, all participants were following the public 8-4-4 system.[29] In addition, from Pontefract & Hardman's observation that "pupils are mainly expected to be passive and to recall, when asked, what they have learned and to report other people's thinking" (p.101), we can assume that a schooling system as has been practiced in Kenya for decades, has its influence not only on academic performance but also on the social development of the individual. When a 'thinking for yourself' attitude is not encouraged and you are forced to recite what is given to you, it can be assumed that this has its reflections on self-development and decision making practices.[30] This too may be a cause for low exploration and high commitment levels resulting in a foreclosed identity, as described by Marcia (1994).

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[29] The 8-4-4 system was introduced by President Daniel Arap Moi in the 90s. It is based on 8 years of primary school, 4 years of secondary school and 4 years of tertiary education.

[30] For illustration see Ahmed's quote under the section 'gender' in this chapter, in which he mimics the pedagogical style that he is used to: he asks a question to which a single word is expected to be answered.

Furthermore, all public schools both primary and secondary in Kenya offer Religious Education, either Islamic or Christian (IRE, CRE respectively). Some schools only provide one or the other, some provide both. What was interesting to note, is that only one out of all the participants mentioned religion in the context of school:

> N: Yes. It's important, very important. It's (.) it's a command also, a command to pursue education. Commanded by Allah, God. To look for knowledge. So I think it is very important to me. (…) It's good! To be knowledgable about something. You know how these somethings are useful. You know many things as well. And just sitting at home doing nothing.

Nasir states his reason for attending school is religious, as commanded by Allah. Again, he was the only interviewee to relate religion or rather the religious standard, to education, even though religion is taught as a subject in most schools. Furthermore, none of the participants thought questions about education might also relate to the *madrassa*, all made a link directly to their secular education. Considering that religion plays a large part in all the other domains that the interviewees have been questioned about, it is worth asking why education is seen as detached from religion. It could be that the participants consider their school to be a potential field of exploration about things outside religion, an environment in which they meet different people, tribes and religions, are taught different subjects, pushing the relevance of Islam in their day to day lives at school to the background.

4.3.5.3 Conclusion

To conclude, most students thought education to be of great importance in their current lives and pivotal for their future. It was sometimes referred to as a strategy to keep one 'on the straight path': if you attend school and study hard, there is less time and opportunity to explore interests or activating cues outside the school grounds. These strategies were often encouraged by parents and friends. Whereas the primary school students mainly focussed on future goals rather than methods to achieve these goals, the secondary school students elaborated more on their actual plans after finishing secondary school. Most of the chosen career paths were 'big' jobs, such as engineer, doctor or pilot.

Secondary school students were more likely to have changed their plans than the primary students. Reasons for choosing jobs like this may be the socio-economic status that is associated with them. Furthermore, the failure of achieving these career goals could lead to anger and disenfranchisement of the youth, which in turn could lead to vulnerability to radical groups who might not only provide financial means but also ideologies geared against the society and government that failed the individual in the first place. This section has also suggested that the foreclosed identities that were demonstrated by the participants in their limited choices or motivations for those choices in for example their careers, could be partially the result of the authoritarian teaching methodology in Kenya public schools. Religion was hardly mentioned in the context of education, perhaps because students would see their school as a field for exploration, outside of the religious boundaries.

4.3.6 Gender

4.3.6.1 Introduction and Theoretical Reflections

Among all the identities or domains that have been listed here, gender is one of the most fundamental. Steensma et al. (2013) aptly summarise: "gender identity refers to the extent to which a person experiences oneself to be like others of one gender. One's sense of being male or female largely determines how people view themselves and provides an important basis for their interaction with others" (Steensma, Kreukels, de Vries, & Cohen-Kettenis, 2013, p.289). Academic literature distinguishes in gender roles and gender identity, in which gender identity is the private manifestation of gender role, and gender role the public manifestation of gender identity (Money cited in Steensma et al., 2013, p. 289). In Kenya, where gender roles are assumed to be more fixed then in, for example, Western societies, due to a traditional patriarchal system, and in a Muslim society where women are perceived to have less freedoms than men, recent developments and feminist movements have shifted the balance: emancipation has given women a higher social status, and has sometimes left men with a lack of self-esteem in their failure to provide for families (Silberschmidt, 2001, p.657). Juergensmeyer (2003) too, argues that feelings of failure and consecutive feelings of being humiliated and powerless *can* create conditions

for a need for empowerment, which are often expressed violently, since no other option is available (p.198) (also see section 4.3.5.2 on career plans above). I will of course elaborate on this issues in depth in the course of this section.

Being fully aware of the complexities of gender studies, I wish to note here that I will not extensively elaborate on the external influences on gender such as family, friends, religion, ethnicity, culture and many more. This section will only address the themes that were brought forward by the participants in order to present the influence gender perception has on their identity development and vice versa: identity development might influence gender perception.

The domain of gender in this study proved to be rather closely related with the standard for self-control and moral behaviour, or prosocial behaviour that the participants followed. This standard, as elaborated on before, is for all interviewees chiefly based in their religious beliefs, which contains models for gender roles as well. Firstly, I will give examples of how the interviewees viewed gender roles mostly according to their religious standard and the patriarchal system, and secondly I will elaborate on their perception of themselves as 'being a boy'. Furthermore, marriage and girlfriends were topics that are not only related to gender studies but also were enthusiastically elaborated on by the participants. Thirdly, I will elaborate on potential risks and consequences of the perception of gender when it concerns marginalisation and radicalisation. Lastly, I will explore the function of a father figure.

4.3.6.2 Islam, Gender Roles and Gender Identity

A rather lengthy quote from Ahmed (19) explains how he sees the connection between Islam and the perception of gender, and gender roles as such. He describes the connection between gender roles and gender identity, exemplifying the standard to which roles adhere, and the identity he derives from this standard:

> A: (.) You see a guy (.) There are many, eh, responsibilities. (.) That's I'm telling you according to my culture, according to Islam, according to all sorts. You see people might say, Islam is a religion, which denounces women, or it degrades women. But if you look in a perspective,

Islam upgrades, in fact eehh, it gives them their view the view of women what they are supposed to be. (…) So, if you look in the bible it says that, Eve came from?

M: Adams rib.

A: Adams rib. Right? And if, I take something, I take this chair and I hit in my rib, it is the most painful part right? And how is the rib? It is sculpted, right? The rib is not straight. It is curbed. So if you straighten it, it will break. You see, in that sense (.) A rib, Eve came from the rib, that's where the woman came from and the rib, is here, so you must be? Protective! You must be protective of the women. Of course, and if I ask you you may say, they they, guard themselves. Or if I ask you this question, where is the diamond from?

(…)

M: In the ground

A: Are they on the surface?

M: No.

A: They are very deep inside, right? So the same point we apply here. You see? Because, a women is a jewel. It's a diamond, so it must be?

M: Protected

A: It must be protected. So that's understood. Now, being a man, like even inheritance, if you look at inheritance, we are given twice (…) that [what a woman is given]. Now you might argue why are we, are we men given twice of that. In case that woman, gets a divorce from her husband. (…) She's got every right to come to you. And that money, that inheritance money, he has, will now be shared with you. But you, will have to take are of her. You have to take care of the whole family. You get a higher inheritance than the women, so there is a rationale behind everything. (…) So, in Islam, a man has responsibility. He should look for family, he should look for the. For the household, for his children. For his parents. Like especially in our community we never throw our parents in old age homes. We don't do that.

M: You take care.

A: We must take care.

M: Yeah, and you feel proud then, to be a guy, be a man?

A: Of course.

A few things can be noted from Ahmed's explanation. First, he stresses the issues of men and responsibility. This was a common theme among the participants: men have to take responsibility, have to take care of the family, a theme that was also addressed in the discussion of their future and career plans. Furthermore, he feels that he has to defend the convictions in Islam about women and explain to the 'outside', 'non-Muslim' world that it is rather the opposite than what 'they' might think. He believes that women are upgraded, and should be protected like one's rib or diamonds in the ground and argues that because of the role and function that a man has to fulfil within the family, men and women are treated differently. Interestingly, Ahmed applies a method of explanation similar to the pedagogical methodology he has received, the methodology he has heard to understand how these gender roles are prescribed by the religious standard (see the section on education above as well).

Most participants would indeed agree on gender roles according to this standard, whether they specified the Islamic motivations for them or not. In addition, most participants also agreed on 'traditional' gender roles where the woman would stay at home and raise the children, and the man would provide for his family, often making them feel proud to be a man. As noted before, the religious standard was not always referenced when discussing gender:

N: Being a boy, I'm feeling happy! Because I'll be the one to look after my family. Yess. (…) Eh. I'll teach my children, about life. From where I've come, till now. I'll advise them to do this and this, because even I eh? I have taken that path. I feel happy.

As Nasir (15) explains, the value of taking care and being responsible, the value of providing[31] is paramount when they look at themselves (and their fathers) as male. All participants felt proud to be male. Some of the participants, especially from primary education, also had clear and at times simple views on gender, such as that women give birth and take care of the children:

> A: Yes. Girls they give birth. Boys do not. When they give birth they take care of the children. Boys, they don't.

The concepts of masculinity and femininity are not universal givens, but rather socially and culturally constructed concepts. Marriage and sexuality are seen as integral part of gender identity and are at the same time cultural constructs (Silberschmid, 2001, p.659). Silberschmid further explains that in Kenyan society, the patriarchal system is imbued often in both men and women, which does not always mean that all men are always successful patriarchs. She has noted during her fieldwork in both rural and urban Kenya and Tanzania that the roles that the men in a family claim themselves to have, are not always reenacted in real life, such as failure to provide for the family or alcohol abuse for example. The view on women that participants derived from the religious (Islamic) standard and which they all shared is roughly in line with patriarchal views on gender:

> A: Being a man has many privileges. (.) Like, in Islam we are told men are one step ahead than women. Because men are supposed to be the protectors of women. Soo, being a man, it is like my duty to protect all the Muslim women (.) around me. So, it's a duty.
>
> M: Yeah, how do you do that?
>
> A: Well, that is done by (.) having a regular check on them. For example, when they want to go out, so I have to know where they're going. And, in Islam, women aren't supposed to go out without one of the family members. So that's how we can check on them. To prevent them from going astray.

[31] See Silberschmid for an elucidation on the development of the 'provider' ideology in Kenya (Silberschmid, 2001, p. 661).

M: Yeah, is there any other things you protect them from?

A: This like, in school, when it's a mixed school, this is a mixed school but there is gender separation, so there is not much work to do. In the other school that I was, there we were mixed, we were mixed in class. So we have to take care, Muslim girls, non-Muslim boys. We have to take care that there is nothing funny that goes on there.

M: yeah, sure yeah. But to have to do this with your peers, is that difficult sometimes? Did they always, do what you say?

A: It's not always that they would, they would say it's my life, but I tell them that, it's your life, but I'm the one who is not to be questioned, cause I'm a man, you're a woman.

Even though the outcomes are similar, the emphasis here is more on protecting women rather than providing for the family. Abdul (19) above, similar to how he said he dealt with his peers, explains that he feels that he has to protect every Muslim woman which in turn relates back to the patriarchal expression of responsibility.

Some of the participants however, thought of men and women having different roles, but valued these roles as equal. Marwan (24) for example outlines his views on gender as follows:

Marw: Basically, there are no differences between men and women. Everyone has equal rights to live. Yeah? But the man, cause he's the one who works. From my side, I can't allow my wife to work. Cause I'm the man, I would work and feed them yeah? But the wife also has the equal rights cause she has to look after the children, house. So there are equal rights to work.

M: But the roles can be a bit different?

Marw: The roles would be different hmm. She has a very big part with the children, she has to look after the children. If she doesn't, and the children fall into the wrong hands, the children will be led to the wrong path. Yeah ?

This view on gender, that roles may be different but one is not necessarily better than the other, was more common among the participants, even though not all of them could express themselves so well. In addition, some of the classmates from the secondary school had more fundamental views on gender roles, as have been described above by Abdul and Ahmed. These roles in the secondary school seem to be rooted in the religious standard, whilst some of the other participants' views might have derived more from the patriarchal system.

4.3.6.3 Girlfriends and Marriage

When the participants were asked about girlfriends, it was interesting to see that most of them said that they were not allowed to have girlfriends, that Islam would forbid this. However, when they were asked if they had ever had a girlfriend, most of them replied affirmative. Ahmed (19) for example, who throughout the interview attempted to lecture me on Islam and the standard that he tries to adhere to, had the following to say about the matter:

> A: I have both friends, friends who are boys, friends who are girls. But the way I relate to the boys is different.
>
> M: Can you explain that you think?
>
> A: (.) Like eh, you see, in Islam (.) you are not supposed to. Like eh, for example. If someone is not your sister, is not your eh, blood relationship. You're not married, so you must act differently like obviously, you have to be careful with a girl and all that. So that's the difference.
>
> M: Sure, do you have a girlfriend?
>
> A: Me? You know, it is a stage which comes and goes. It's a stage every individual (.) In today's society, it's extremely bad. If you have a girlfriend and you realise you know.

M: Why is it bad you think?

A: Because it's actually, breaks down the actual role (.) from (.) Because if you have a girlfriend obviously, and you know you will not marry her. So you just spoil her life. Ok you are a boy, you might be having a girlfriend, and continue with your life, you don't give a shit. But you spoil the girls life. Because you know (.)

M: Have you had a girlfriend in the past?

A: You know, a girl has a soft heart, she can easily spoil her life.

M: Yeah have you had a girlfriend in the past maybe?

A: Yeah once.

M: Once yeah, what was she like?

A: Beg your pardon?

M: What was she like? Like character

I: OK, her character was good, but you know as aah, fake relationship, just infiltration. So it did not last long.

I tried to ask further about Ahmed's previous girlfriend, but as demonstrated above as well, the first two times he is asked about whether he has or has had a girlfriend, he tries to avoid answering this question. Throughout the interview, Ahmed rarely spoke of himself or personal experiences when it concerned religion or the religious standard. He rather explained what that standard is, according to him. The discrepancies between the religious standard to which he wishes to adhere and reality (Schielke, 2009) are clearly shown in the above, that he has indeed had a girlfriend in the past. There were many others who showed the same pattern of firstly explaining the religious standard and that 'we are not supposed to' have a girlfriend, whilst then 'admitting' that they either would

have had a girlfriend in the past or currently be seeing someone as well. As could be expected, they would behave rather secretive when discussing their girlfriends or even girls they admire. Sharif (21) for example describes the girl he was in love with:

> S: Yes, definitely. I'm closer to some of them. Much. I'm closer to one of them. I'm close to all, but. Somebody's more closer to me than [others].
>
> M: Yeah sure, and why is that?
>
> S: That's because, that's I'm always more closer to (.) I think. I'm not [supposed] to say, but I really like. Her, really like him or her. She or he, you like them, mostly. He give you stories. In fact, it's a girl. When she come from her classes, she tell you about how her teachers go. How the lessons are doing. How she's happy, always .. I'm closer to her more than, I really appreciate her (he smiles throughout this last answer).

Initially, Sharif refers to 'him or her', which tells us his hesitance to be honest about this person. This vulnerability and honesty are common when it comes to girlfriends. It seemed to be one of the few topics the interviewees would admit on breaking the religious or moral standard.

Schielke (2009) notes: "while people may present their identity, aims, and trajectory as clear and coherent at a given moment, they routinely shift between conflicting self-representations, and are regularly torn between conflicting self-ideals and aims" (p.S26). Schielke argues that there are different moral registers at play, two of which are religion and romance. For example, Hussein (15) explains how he does not even discuss his girlfriend with his friends:

> M: Do you talk about girls with your friends?
>
> H: No. We don't. Never. It's not allowed. You know people they cannot be trusted. If they know, someone else might know.
>
> M: Yeah, what would happen if people would find out?

H: Ah. It would be bad. I would get hurt. It's better I don't tell. So this is just between us (smiles).

M: Sure, it's a secret

A: Yess.

M: Does she make you happy?

A: Yes!

M: Your parents, they do not know about her?

A: No (.) It is a secret anyway.

Hussein expresses fear for other people finding out. His fear might stem from the fact that he is attending an integrated school which is attached to a mosque. He would most likely be punished by his teachers or Imam if they would find out that he would not adhere the religious standard that the students are taught. It is worth noting that the participants were not necessarily scared of, or concerned with, God, or the ultimate concern. Rather, they expressed fear of punishment from their parents and teachers. This is another indication that the religious code has not been internalised as such, and may not be as effective in achieving actual moral behaviour and self-control (Zell & Baumeister, 2013). However, this is the one topic that some of the rather 'foreclosed' participants in the other domains suddenly did show exploration levels and low commitment. The distinction between these so-called 'registers' of religion and love that are all of the sudden at play are rarely seen or admitted by the participants in other domains. Schielke recognises at least six of these registers (p.S30) among his participants, it is hard to define how many there are for the participant group of this study.

Another topic that was discussed within the gender domain was marriage and what that would look like. A common answer would be that in Islam, one has to get married because marriage brings you halfway to paradise:

> H: (.) Because, Muslims must marry, because the prophet also got married. Because marriage is half way to paradise, that's why we must marry.

As Zell & Baumeister (2013) argued, religion can be the ultimate motivation to adhere to a certain standard. However, Hussein seems to explain what ought to be done, rather than elaborate on his own intrinsic motivations for marriage. Most participants thought that they were too young for marriage, and had faith in their parents to arrange this for them when the time would come. Even though some had girlfriends or had had girlfriends in the past, they did not think that they would ever marry these girls, being aware of the forbidden nature of these relationships, again coming back to low exploration and high commitment levels that are common in a foreclosed identity (Marcia, 1994, p.74). An explanation for the inconsistency in the foreclosed identity statuses of most respondents in 'breaking the code' and showing exploration in having a girlfriend, is hard to speculate on and requires further research.[32] [33]

Marriage was thought to be something of the future, 'when I'm finished with my studies' and 'when I'll be capable of taking care of my family/parents'. In addition, many participants thought that 'being married' also meant being able to take care of his family. Hassan (15) for example explains when he is asked what he think marriage will look like:

> H: I will be able to first learn, and get good work. So that I can take my children to be as I am. So that I can feed them and take them to school, and get them good performance.

---

[32] The exception (that when it concerns sexuality the religious or moral code is broken), could derive from a Freudian notion of sexuality and identity. Lichtenstein (1961) for example questions this link between the biological and psychological function of sexual gratification, and looks into the psychoanalysis of pleasure and procreation. Although wildly interesting, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate on these matters in depth.

[33] Another or additional explanation for the admittance of 'breaking the code' when it would concern sexuality, is that there is no obvious strategy to avoid these cues present in their lives. Sexuality is still a taboo within the Muslim community of Mombasa and is rarely spoken of. Therefore, even though clear theoretical rules have been established in religious code, which have been remembered by the participants of this study, no day to day solutions have been presented, no practical code has been offered to them.

Again the value of providing is mentioned and is seen by many of the interviewees as paramount to being able to marry, almost to be successful in their lives. One must go to school, then find a job in order to provide for his family.

Nasir (15) who is currently in his last year of primary school, does not even want to think about marriage before he is able to provide:

> H: Hmmm (.) First, I must, I must learn. And help my parents, so I make sure that my family (is ok) first. So, right. And all these things, that they don't have any problems. Then later, I'll see what I can do, if I marry or not.

For Nasir it is a necessity to provide for his parents before he can think of starting a family of his own. As explained above as well, these concerns for providing were still quite vague, the plans to fulfil these wishes did not materialise any further than 'first I must study, then find a job' among the interviewees from the primary school. The participants from secondary schools and tertiary education had similar views on marriage, but had a slightly more elaborated plan to do so: first I will finish university then my parents will know what is best for me.

Without wanting to be presumptuous on the course that the participants' lives will take, these expectations on marriage and life in general have been theorised by Juergensmeyer (2003) in his commendable work *Terror in the Mind of God*, and contextualised in radicalisation processes, especially when disappointed in these expectations:

> In the cultures of violence that have led to religious terrorism, the anxieties of all young men - concerns over careers, social location, and sexual relationships - have been exacerbated. (…) without jobs, which is usually a prerequisite to searching for a wife in traditional societies, they cannot marry. Without marriage, in strict religious cultures (…) they cannot have sex. (p. 194)

When one fails in life with respect to these core values of being able to provide, as described by the participants, whether this is due to marginalisation or economic deprivation, this can leave an deep and fundamental feeling of humiliation. "Most important is the intimacy with which the humiliation is experienced and the degree to which it is regarded as a threat to one's personal honor and respectability" (p.198). Juergensmeyer argues that these feelings of failure and consecutive feelings of being humiliated and powerless may create conditions for a need for empowerment, which are often expressed violently, since no other option is available.

When jobs cannot be obtained, marriage is often perceived as not possible, leading to sexual humiliation and failure. In addition, as Silberschmid (2001) has argued, the rise of feminism in Kenya and Tanzania leading to the empowerment of women has often left men behind feeling powerless and insufficient in providing for their families. This may result in domestic violence, or when it concerns public social roles, public violence. Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that "terrorist acts, then, can be forms of symbolic empowerment for men whose traditional sexual roles - their very manhood - is perceived to be at stake" (p.199). Even though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to extensively speculate on the function of masculinity and humiliation in radicalisation processes in Mombasa and among the participants of this study, it is worth noting the emphasis the interviewees all put on the aspect of being a man, and being able to provide before venturing into marriage. Furthermore, when one fails in career and masculinity, the combination with whether or not perceived marginalisation and consecutive victimisation can be detrimental (Khosrokhavar, 2010) (see chapter 3 and the section on career above).

Even though it is impossible to predict the future of the interviewees and their relative success regarding these issues. The socio-economic situation in Mombasa is far from ideal, even leaving students who have followed tertiary education jobless. These issues make all of the participants vulnerable to these forms of humiliation and failure. Juergensmeyer obviously does not conclusively state that anyone failing in career, marriage and masculinity would necessarily express these feelings publicly and violently. However, he does point out that these issues contribute to the problem and can pose as

risk factors. Indeed, in agreement, I argue for the individual processes and stories that may or may not cause one to radicalise or rather, express him or herself violently.

4.3.6.4 Father Figure

The role of the family, and more specifically parents, is thought to be one of the strongest socialising agents in the child's youth and the transferral of (religious) standard. According to Greenberg (cited in Botha, 2014b), the adult opinions and behaviour can be directly retraced to the upbringing of the child "the child is father to the man" (p.897), which basically means that the child is growing up in the framework of his or her family. Botha, in her in depth study of radicalisation and political socialisation processes in Kenya, notes the importance of a father figure within this framework. Considering that all of the participants stressed the appreciation they felt for their father and the authority that he would stand for, I wish to elaborate on this issue briefly.

Botha (2014b) interviewed 95 individuals associated with Al Shabaab, as well as 46 relatives of these individuals. These participants were asked about their parents' presence as well as parental roles in for example punishment and rule making and found that 18 percent grew up without a father and 16 percent grew up without a mother, and often experienced this loss between early adolescence and early adulthood (p.897). Botha notes that the majority of participants had both father and mother figures in their lives and stresses that it is through individual life stories and motivations that we can discover the role that these caregivers may play in radicalisation or socialisation processes, which I will do below.

Considering the emphasis the participants in this study placed on their fathers, I will now briefly discuss their stories. When Said (17) is asked whether his parents are an example to him, he answers:

> S: Yes (.) Parents, especially my father really works hard. To provide for us. Because, we are about, seven brothers. Total. Seven brothers.
>
> M: That's a lot

> S: It's a bit challenging to him. But, at times he's best at providing for our needs. So our teachings, he also teaches us that one must work, provide for one's family. So he is an example.

Said explains how his father is an example to him because he provides for him and his six brothers, and that his father also teaches him the value of providing and working hard. Again, as also seen above in the participants' views on marriage and their future, the masculine values are stressed. As Juergensmeyer (2003) theorised, the potential of failure within these capacities during the participants' transition into adulthood, may impose a higher risk to the youth of turning to authoritarian figures who may offer, besides financial means, an including or welcoming community for disenfranchised youth.

Furthermore, the participants' reference to these core values in marriage but also in their appreciation of their father was often rooted in the patriarchal culture as described above, but moreover also in the religious standard. This standard was thought to be taught by their fathers: they saw their fathers as the example to live by. This embodiment of the religious and moral standard is a highly socialising factor in the adolescent's life. Botha discovered that in 100 percent of the cases in Kenya that she interviewed, the father or another male authoritarian figure would set the rules in the house (Botha, 2014b, p.898) as well as almost exclusively be responsible for the punishment, indicating that the father-figure clearly has a more prominent role than the mother in socialising the child in Kenya.

As with the issues on marriage and masculinity, I hesitate to speculate on the implications of what could happen, or how risks might increase for individuals if a father-figure is not present. It will suffice to conclude here that the participants in this study greatly appreciated the socialising role their father played in their lives as well as provide for them as they would want to provide themselves for their family in the future. Indeed, I do not argue for any causal connection between failing masculinity and radicalisation, rather, I wish to point out the emphasis put on masculine values and the commonalities that have been theorised by Juergensmeyer (2003) if one should fail to succeed in providing and marriage, as depicted by one's father.

4.3.6.5 Conclusion

To conclude, this section has elaborated on the participants' interpretation and views on gender roles and gender identity. It has done so by firstly addressing some of the theoretical issues. The interviewees perception of gender is closely related to their standard for prosocial or moral behaviour and is chiefly rooted in the religious standard as well as the patriarchal system. Furthermore, this section as given a description of how the interviewees addressed gender roles as well as their views on having a girlfriend and future marriage. It was noteworthy that girlfriends were the only instance in which the participants would indicate to break the religious standard. This section has also provided some reflections on Juergenmeyer's (2003) theory on failing masculinity, both in the context of marriage but also in the context of being able to provide for one's family. The participants stressed that these goals for the future were of great importance to them.

4.3.7 Ethnicity

4.3.7.1 Introduction & Theoretical Reflections

Before the start of this research, ethnicity was considered as one of the domains, due to Kenya's long history of ethnic diversity and at times, ethnic conflict within its borders. Africanists seem to agree that, while pre-colonial ethnicities were fluid and negotiable, during the colonial period ethnic identities became increasingly more rigid. Lynch (2013) for example argued that "as a result of colonial administrative and economic practice, ethnic groups were categorised and labeled, and a colonial view of tribal Africa was imposed, invented or imagined" (p.49). This however, does not mean that since colonial rule and subsequent independence these ethnic identities have remained unchanged. Their size, composition, content and allies are constantly in a state of flux, as Waller describes that ethnicities "are in an endless process of transformation" (cited in Lynch, 2013, p.49). From this it logically follows that ethnic identity or an ethnic community is hard to define. As with religious identity, not one definition or formula exists of what constitutes a group or individual as being ethnically related or not. There are a number of common characteristics though: linguistic and cultural similarity, geographic concentration or 'home' area, an idea of blood ties, a shared past (whether factually true or

not), common history of descent: "An ethnic history cannot simply be invented from thin air' it must draw, however selectively, on memory and on histories, both written and oral" (p.50).

Recent acts by the Government in response to various 'terrorist' attacks claimed by Al Shabaab, have marginalised certain ethnic and religious groups of Kenyan society. Examples include the ethnic round ups in Nairobi in April 2014, the mosque raids in Mombasa during 2014, and various other ethnically and religiously motivated actions. The people that were targeted by the round ups and arrests complained how they felt unlawfully treated by the security forces of Kenya. These constructions on both sides of the cultural self and other are instrumental for the feeling of marginalisation to take root. The more the GoK aggressively arrests and unlawfully rounds up 'suspects' on ethnic and religious basis only, the more these vulnerable groups may feel inclined to retaliate. It was therefore instrumental to explore the ethnic and religious affiliations that young individuals may or may not feel, their stance on temporal and historic political events, and to explore their construction of what they perceive to be the cultural other, in order to draw preliminary conclusions on the role of identity formation in radicalisation processes.

The fact that no formula exists to describe ethnic identity, requires us to examine the subjects individually, by questioning perceptions on family, religion, politics, community, group boundaries, membership etc. Self-definition has become increasingly important. Considering the ethnic and political history and contemporary political nature of the Kenyan Coast, one might even expect individuals to not even identify as Digo, Swahili, or Mijikenda, but rather as Coastal or Kenyan. One should question ethnicity along the lines of a shared linguistic, historic and geographic background to establish the individual's ethnic identity.

As a last remark, research has shown that among radicalising youth a more transnational identity has been assumed (Mandeville cited in Lynch, 2013, p.244). Lynch mentions that in these studies identity is loosely interchanged with loyalty and she therefore warns for the binary consequences these assumptions have (a young individual is 'good' or 'bad' depending on their loyalty). This warning should not be taken lightly, not only in the context of a transnational ideology or religion an individual may identify

with, but also when one is considering the general construction of self and other, and therefore almost inherently of good and evil.

As discussed in the introduction, the Muslim community in Mombasa consists of various tribes, the largest of which is the Swahili who are comprised of descendants from Middle Eastern traders who intermarried with the local ethnic groups. The second largest Muslim group is comprised of Arabs, some of which are descendants from the Omanis who came to Kenya in the late 17th century up to Middle Eastern migrants who came to Kenya as late as the early 20th century. An overwhelming majority of Kenya Muslims are from various ethnic tribes throughout the country, who refer to themselves as African Muslims. Lastly, colonial rule had encouraged many Asians to migrate to East Africa. In this study, nine participants were Arab, three Asian and five from various other tribes such as Swahili or other Mijikenda background.

4.3.7.2 Analysis

First of all, none of the participants initiated talking about ethnic or tribal identifications or affiliations. All participants were asked about their ethnic identity at the end of the interview; none of the interviewees would mention the topic themselves earlier on. Most of the youth thought that tribe is important on a personal level, it would teach them history and patriarchal lineage. Some would express a feeling of pride, or happiness. Rashid (17), who's family is from Lamu (North Coast) explains the difference: tribe is important on a personal level, but not on an interpersonal level:

M: Hm, what tribe are you from?

R: [indistinct, but from Lamu, one of the Bantu tribes presumably since it is not Arab or Swahili].

M: Ok, is it important to you?

R: [nods]

M: yeah, how is it important?

R: It's the culture we share, Lamu. (.) Much has not been done. (.) people are still in the analog world.

M: Sorry?

R: people are still in the analog world, not digital. Which is, it's nice! It's nice to be.

(…)

M: Do you ever discuss your tribe?

R: Sometimes but, not no (.) rarely.

M: Is it important to you for your friends to be from the same tribe or,

R: No, they're all the same.

This sentiment, that it would teach one patriarchal lines and tradition was common. However, Rashid also thinks it is nice that in Lamu one still lives in the analog world, which also means he does not affiliate with that heritage himself much, nor that he identifies with the way of life practiced in his 'homeland' of Lamu. Furthermore, he says that for his friends it does not matter which tribe they are from, nor that they discuss tribalism or ethnicity.

Nasir (15) explains how patriarchal lineage is important in identifying as one or the other:

N: I'm Arab. Because tradition, you follow the tribe of your father. But my mother is Swahili, my father is an Arab, so I follow the tribe of my father.

M: Yeah, is It important to you?

N: Hmmm? I don't see it's important, but (.) Of course, when you come out, and you try and talk to them, so that is only identifying, you can say. Which tribe are you, asking someone, but I don't feel, very strong about it.

M: Yeah sure, you've got friends from any tribe

N: Yeah.

Nasir explains that sometimes you can identify with one another on a more interpersonal level by asking which tribe someone is from. Indeed, as I have witnessed many times, it can be a common identifier when two people meet, and when from the same tribe, great enthusiasm is sometimes expressed: the tribal language is spoken, one may ask one other questions about family and villages, and an effort is made to find common family or acquaintances. However, at the Coast where I have spent most of my time, I have never noticed resentment for other tribes as such. Indeed as both interviewees notice above, it is not important in making friends.

Said (17) explains how his tribe is not important to him, he does not speak the language and the meaning has faded. In addition, he indicates that it is rather religion than tribe which one identifies with:

M: Is tribe important to you then?

S: Tribe? First I think for most people it is religion. It's my religion. Tribe I just see, any other. It's just normal.

M: Your friends, they are from different tribes then, as well

S: Yes. They are from. Arabs, all tribes.

Said explains that he rather identifies as being Kenyan, and moreover, identifies as a Muslim. Religion more important in their identity than tribe. Ali (18) explains this concept

more in depth. Here we can see how the religious standard is invoked to provide guidance for identity formation and prosocial behaviour: the acceptance of 'others'.

> A: Basically in our religion, we consider, first we consider religion as a main aspect, then tribe. Because, according to the Qur'an God made different tribes, races and all this. So that we may associate freely, we may associate. Because now for example, eeh, eeh, I'm an Indian there's another Indian, Indian, Indian, everything permanent. You just see ones that is Indians. Let's say the Indian and a Kenyan, we have a what's it called, Tanzanian, there may be time to, they may have the will to associate with one another. Therefore yeah, it's important, the cultural aspect, but at the same time, first thing comes religion. Because now once religion has come, ehm, Muslim Kenyan, Muslim Indian, they consider themselves as Muslims, but at the same time they are from different religions, eh, from different cultures. So culture is important, but first religion comes, then culture comes.
>
> M: Yeah, does it matter to you? The tribe someone is from?
>
> A: Nonono, usually I'm very open. I don't see, these are Africans, Asians, Europe, no. Because one did not choose, I want to be this, I want to be white. It's through God. So, if you fight against that person, you basically fight against God.

As the participants describe above, religion is seen as more important than tribe. Even Botha (2014b) notes that Kenyan nationals turning against their own countrymen means that those who are radicalised identify with something other than being 'Kenyan' or 'Swahili' for example (p.896). This affiliation with religion rather than tribe does of course not have an entirely causal relation to radicalisation, it only describes that tribe or nationality is simply not an issue or heavy identity marker for the Muslim youth in general, whether radicalised or not. Indeed, the whole process of socialisation has been described by the participants as to adhere to the religious standard that is prescribed by their parents, school, siblings, friends and the mosque. "An individual's frame of reference can be defined as the 'glasses' through which he/she sees or perceives the world around them" (p.897). The fact that for the participants of this study the frame of reference would always include adherence to the religious standard, implies that indeed ethnic or tribal

identity are not prominent. In addition, as described in the previous chapter on marginalisation, the participants only felt discriminated on the basis of their religion, not tribe or ethnic descent. This common response further underlines the participants' identities as chiefly being religious rather than tribal or ethnic.

4.3.7.3 Conclusion

To conclude, tribe or ethnicity was marked by the participants as relevant in a personal context, but interpersonally all 19 participants explicitly said that for for example making friends, it did not matter what tribe someone was from. Moreover, some of the interviewees thought that religion is more important: first one is a Muslim, then one can be from a different tribe. What was noteworthy is that often the religious standard was invoked when this argument was made: a guide to prosocial behaviour.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated on the various domains within identity development and the role that religion plays in developing strategies for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control as described by the participants of this research. It has done so by firstly elaborating on the role of religion within prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control as theorised by Zell & Baumeister (2013). They argued that there are four main elements to support self-control and moral behaviour. Firstly, religion can provide standards which adherents can live by, a conception of what is right and wrong, a standard to give direction to self-control efforts. Problems can arise when one has conflicting standards, or different registers that Schielke (2009) has described. Secondly, people must be able to monitor their own behaviour, and how this compares to their religious standard. Social constructs can be instrumental, but also the religious convictions can contribute to monitoring. Thirdly, willpower is referred to as instrumental to monitoring. It includes the actual operations of changing the self. The last element of self-control and moral behaviour is motivation. Religion provides an array of compelling reasons for moral conduct, such a the ultimate concern (p.500-508). This chapter has attempted to discover these elements in the various domains, as well as link the domains and the participants' responses to the issues of drugs,

crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. In addition, it has referred to Marcia's model of identity development throughout the discussion of the domains and concluded that most participants presented themselves to be in a state of foreclosure, a presentation that was closely linked to the religious and moral standards that the participants attempted to adhere to.

Firstly, from the answers given by the participants it can be concluded that they have mostly been raised in an authoritarian environment. In addition, the role that parents played in the participants' lives was often seen as a strategy to stay on the right path: the interviewees greatly appreciated the religious standard that parents often imposed on them, explaining that it would keep them on the right path, especially when in relation to peer-pressure regarding drug use. Most participants wished to present adherence to their parents' standard as favourable, which indicated low exploration and high commitment, indicative of a foreclosed identity status. Besides the element of providing a moral or religious standard, the participants also expressed their parents to be instrumental in the monitoring of their behaviour, and convincing them of the correct, often religious, motivations.

Secondly, it concluded that the participants' siblings were seen as either an example if older, or the participants presented themselves to be an example for their younger siblings, often to the extent of fulfiling a custodial role. These sibling differentiations and identifications showed little exploration and high commitments from the participants toward their siblings, indicating a foreclosed identity. The sibling differentiations and identifications were also referred to in a religious context: the participants often felt responsible for their younger siblings, and that they had to imbue the code that was taught by their parents as well as the mosque and Qur'an. In this sense, siblings provided one another with the religious standard and monitored behaviour, as well as helped each other to avoid cues, especially when it would concern drug use. Again, siblings then, were also utilised as a strategy, either through identification or differentiation, to stay morally upright.

Thirdly, in the domain of 'friends', peer-pressure was thought to be an issue, especially when it would concern drugs or radicalisation processes. Most participants

stated that surrounding oneself with friends who would adhere to the same religious standard would prevent negative peer-pressure. In this sense, they reminded each other of the motivations for prosocial and moral behaviour, as well as self-control with regards to drugs. In addition, friends would function as spiritual models, enforcing willpower upon each other: some would even venture out to neighbourhoods to attempt to exert peer-pressure on radical youth. Lastly, friends were thought to be instrumental in avoiding cues, by distracting one another from latent motivations, from which it can be derived that for the participants, friends were often used as a strategy for staying on the right path. These identifications with similar friends are indicative of a foreclosed identity status.

Fourthly, the participants thought education was an important factor in their lives. It would insulate one from negative influences from 'outside', as well as provide a social context in which one could develop. This section addressed the influence of the authoritarian education system which in Kenya supports low exploration and high commitments, also potentially resulting in a foreclosed identity. It has also discussed how the participants, by attending school, avoided the cues and thereby enabling their willpower to adhere to the religious standard, especially when it would concern drugs or radicalisation, indeed showing that school often had a strategic function in establishing moral behaviour. Furthermore, this section elaborated on the participants' career plans and implications these plans had for their identity development, as well as discussed the implications of failing career plans, and failing to provide (Juergensmeyer, 2010). It has addressed the issues of failing masculinity and the link with marginalisation and the potential for violent retributions.

Fifthly, the identity domain of gender is elaborated on and specifically touches upon gender roles, girlfriends and marriage, the role of the father figure and the implications of failing masculinity. It has noted that most participants viewed gender roles as different, but that they valued men and women equally. In addition, it was worth noting that most of the participants 'admitted' to breaking the moral or religious code, of which they said they adhered to in all the other domains. Most of them had indeed had girlfriends, even though this was considered forbidden. Moreover, the motivations for adhering to the standard when it would concern girlfriends were mostly earthly (fear of punishment from

the imam or parents), instead of related to religious beliefs, which means that the standard has not been internalised, and may not be as effective for self-control and moral behaviour as an internalised standard. Furthermore, this section has elaborated on the implications of failing masculinity for radicalisation. When one fails to obtain a job, one cannot marry, and when one cannot marry, frustrations may become violent (Juergensmeyer, 2010; Silberschmid, 2001; Schielke, 2009).

Lastly, this chapter examined the effects of ethnicity or tribe on the interviewees' identity development and concluded that religion is the paramount identity marker. The religious standard was often invoked when this argument was made: it guided them in not being discriminative toward other tribes but to unite as Muslims.

Throughout the interviews, the participants stated that they intend to adhere to the religious standard for their prosocial and moral behaviour, as well as to exert self-control. This in turn meant that they preferred to present low levels of exploration and high levels of commitment, indicating a foreclosed identity, according to Marcia (1994). It has also implicated that these presentations do not necessarily reflect behaviour, as Schielke (2009) has discussed, and that the standard and reality may conflict. The following chapter will conclude this thesis and address the implications that a foreclosed identity status may have, as well as propose recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1 This Research Concludes
5.2 Some Concluding Notes on Identity Development
5.3 Some Questions and Recommendations
5.5 To Conclude

5.1 This Research Concludes

This thesis has attempted to illustrate how the Muslim youth of Mombasa discuss and cope with various societal issues as well as explored their identity development and prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control strategies and how the youth present the role of religion throughout these processes.

It has done so by firstly describing the current position that Muslim youth find themselves in, due to historical and contemporary events. Historically, the Coast Province has been marginalised and neglected by the GoK, leading to low education and high unemployment rates. In addition, recent terror attacks by Al Shabaab have forced the security forces to react strongly, leading to discrimination against Muslims, examples of which are unwarranted arrests, house raids and a shoot-to-kill policy. The participants of this study elaborated on these matters extensively, describing both personal experiences as well as the effect the general policy has on their perception of the GoK and their own marginalisation. Moreover, the concept of victimisation and the potential for violent expressions of discontent have been discussed in the light of the (perceived) marginalisation of Muslims in Kenya (Khosrokahvar, 2010). Khosrokhavar describes how marginalisation and its subsequent feelings of victimisation *may* lead to reactionary violence, without implying a causal connection. Furthermore, this thesis has elaborated on the role that drugs play in the participants' lives. Drugs have been prevalent in Kenya since the 1960s, as Mombasa functions as a transit point for distribution worldwide.

Various studies have shown that Mombasa has a high rate of illicit substance abuse, and the participants all had come into contact with drugs one way or the other. They described drugs to be around at schools and in their neighbourhoods and elaborated on the difficulties of peer-pressure.

Secondly, this thesis has elaborated on the function of religion in prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control strategies as well as identity development. Zell & Baumeister (2013) describe four major elements: religion can provide a religious standard to which individuals may adhere, religion can be a monitoring factor in the adherent's life, religion provides support for the willpower necessary to adhere to a standard, and finally, religion can provide the appropriate motivation to exhibit prosocial and moral behaviour, as well as to exert self-control. When this thesis discussed the elements of identity development it referred to Marcia's (1994) model. The individual can either be in a state of Diffusion, Foreclosure, Moratorium, or Achievement, depending on their levels of exploration and commitment. The level of freedom an individual is given by society influences the manner in which he or she can explore new possibilities. He also notes that when such freedom is limited or non-existent, in for example a patriarchal or authoritarian tradition, a permanent state of foreclosure may be the result. The following section will discuss some conclusions that can be drawn from the research that has been conducted.

First of all, the participants all described the religious standard they attempted to adhere to, to be of paramount influence on their day to day lives and their strategies for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control, especially when it would concern drugs, crime, marginalisation and radicalisation. In all the domains, the participants presented religion to play a central role: the religious standard was often described to be their moral standard. In Zell & Baumeister's terms, religion can indeed provide this moral code. Furthermore, social and religious monitoring was presented to be present in their lives. For example, parents were thought to be a positive influence in keeping them on the straight or right path. In addition, friends would often exercise a form of 'positive peer-pressure', guiding each other and discussing the details of the religious code they would attempt to adhere to. Also, when it would concern siblings and friends alike, the participants often described their roles as a spiritual model, exerting willpower to

overcome certain cues. From these observations, it can be concluded that parents, siblings, friends and school were often used as strategies for prosocial, moral behaviour and self-control, in which the religious standard played the central role and provided the framework and ideal for the participants to adhere to. However, when certain issues were discussed, such as gender, it often became clear that this religious standard was not an internalised one. Rather, it was a standard to which the youth were 'supposed' to adhere. According to Zell & Baumeister (2013), an internalised standard is far more effective and likely to be adhered to than an external one. What was noteworthy, is that when the discussions would concern drugs and radicalisation, all participants referred to the religious code and claimed to never be involved in either. However, when it would concern girlfriends or marginalisation and the expression of anger, moral or religious codes were sometimes not as strictly followed.

Secondly, some implications on the potential for radicalisation and violence have been made. Juergensmeyer (2010) specifically, has argued that the failure of masculinity can provide the context for public violent reactions. When career plans and marriage were discussed by the participants, the issue of providing was a prominent theme. Juergensmeyer (2010) and Silberschmid (2001) have elaborated that when jobs are not obtained, one can often not marry in a (Kenyan) patriarchal society. This leads to feelings of being powerless due to the inability to provide for their families. This could result in domestic violence, or when it would concern public social roles, public violence. Juergensmeyer (2010) additionally argues, that when traditional sex-roles are challenged, it can be perceived that the individual's very manhood is at stake. This form of humiliation can create conditions for a need of empowerment, which is often expressed violently. This thesis has not claimed to be able to look into the future and speculate on the potential or failure of the participants. However, the current socio-economic climate in Mombasa does indicate high unemployment, and in combination with the feelings of the Muslim community of being marginalised, these issues could have consequences. The topic of masculinity and providing were extensively discussed by the participants in the context of career and gender, and therefore the consequences of failing in these regards in combination with the feelings of marginalisation have been discussed, as above. The

following section will separately discuss the concluding notes on identity development that have come forward throughout this thesis.

5.2 Some Concluding Notes on Identity Development

As most of the participants in this study presented rather foreclosed identities, some final notes are warranted. Marcia's (1994) characteristics of a foreclosed identity status can be discovered throughout the interviews: the interviews seem neat and well-directed, mostly live near or with their parents and under an authoritarian rule, the interviewees set very high goals for themselves, generally present themselves to be obedient, they report a great deal of closeness and warmth within the family, and iterate the importance of family values (p.74).

Marcia theorised that a permanent status of a foreclosed identity can cause less nuanced commitments, especially when the individual is discontented with his or her situation. When we relate this to the feeling of marginalisation and discrimination that the participants of this study expressed, one could indeed see risk factors emerging, such as the adverse effects of the GoK's security policy, potentially driving the Muslim youth into the arms of radicalisation. It is premature however, to draw conclusions on the correlation between a foreclosed identity and radicalisation, especially because it is not a given that the participants of this research have reached their 'final destination' in their identity development. For now it suffices to point out the existence of the two factors though, and refer to the potential for future research.

Furthermore, if these correlations were to be found, Marcia (1994) has presented us with options for intervention (p.78) on societal, educational and psychotherapeutic levels. It could be further examined what sort of interventions could be effective in the identity development of Muslim youth and to what extent the identity status of identity achievement would be preferable over the generally foreclosed identities, specifically in prevention of radicalisation. However, these remarks have not been addressed in this thesis and only serve to point the reader to the potential for future research.

5.3 Some Questions and Recommendations

The issues of revenge and anger were addressed, but few of the participants expressed willingness to act violently upon these feelings. What would push an individual to violence? When would the code be broken? What is the ultimate motivation? Of course, these matters are personal, but considering that for example many of the participants explained that much of the impulse to fight is 'only talk', more factors should be examined. Anneli Botha (2013) has done so and has brought together many contributing factors for 'radicalisation', such as socio-economic status. These other factors have not been addressed in this thesis. Rather, it has examined the world the respondents are living in, and most importantly, how they experience it.

Secondly, this research, for reasons mentioned in the methodology chapter, has focussed chiefly on school going youth. It would be interesting to see for future research how for example girls or the drug using community in Mombasa would deal with the issues that have been discussed in this thesis, what are their stories and experiences? How do they develop their identity and how do they make choices in prosocial and moral behaviour? What are their motivations and what is their experience with religion for example? The same could be addressed for a radicalised group of participants, or returnees from Somalia. Indeed, the issues that have been discussed affect many individuals and future research should examine this further. How any individual copes with realities and discusses them would be enlightening for the academic and social conception of the youth in Mombasa society.

This thesis has described how some of the Muslim youth of Mombasa present their views and experiences concerning various domains in their lives. However, it has not addressed nor examined their actual behaviour. This raises the question that Schielke (2009) indeed has posed so eloquently, what happens when the code is broken? What happens when the religious and moral standard is not adhered to? This thesis has scratched the surface of these issues in for example the section on gender, where some participants would 'admit' to break the standard when discussing their girlfriends. How does this work with other issues? What is the difference between their actual and

presented behaviour? How many and what kind of the so-called registers that Schielke exemplifies do the participants of this study struggle with?

Each of the domains is relevant in the psychology of the youth in Mombasa, and each of them has some unanswered questions. Parents themselves have for example not been included in this research. What would they have to say about their own parenting methods and their children? What sort of influence do parenting strategies have on the development of the participants? Only suggestions have been made in this thesis, and it calls for further examination. The same questions could and have been asked about the education system: what is the effect of the educational or pedagogical system on the development of individuals identities for example in the Kenyan public school system?

Friends and peer-pressure have been discussed extensively in the light of drugs for example. What was noteworthy is that some of the participants perceived school as preventing them from taking drugs, whilst others thought that peer-pressure at school posed a threat to them. It would be interesting to examine these different perceptions further. Furthermore, many of the interviewees explained that they practiced positive peer-pressure. It would be interesting to elaborate whether or not these efforts are effective and the reasons behind it. How does an individual respond to a peer teaching him or her how to live? Is that accepted behaviour? If so, what are its functions and effects, and if not, why is it practiced anyway?

The domain of gender has raised many questions, but has only managed to answer some. For example, how do radicalised youth in Mombasa experience masculinity? What is the relation between masculinity and perceived success? How do women experience gender differences? What are the effects of globalisation on the perception of gender in a society such as Mombasa? How does religion (in this case Islam) cope with these changes? I am indeed aware of the extent of gender studies and have in no way attempted to be conclusive. Rather, I have introduced a broad range of possibly contributing and complicating factors.

5.4 To Conclude

As the above shows, this study has not been conclusive, which makes any attempt at a 'conclusion' almost impossible. However, I do wish to leave a few final remarks here. If there is anything that this thesis has shown, it would be how infinite the complexities, contextual elements and contributing factors are on influencing the identity development and prosocial behaviour strategies of the individual. This thesis has attempted to bring the elements that were and are prominent in the participants' lives together and has tried to present a balanced account of the experiences and stories the interviewees had to tell. It has furthermore taken an analytical stance within the academic debate concerning identity development and at times radicalisation theories without assuming or speculating on the participants' future or decision making processes as a whole.

This thesis has addressed the relevance of identity theory within a complicated and often threatening society in Sub-Saharan Africa, a geographic area almost unexplored in this field. It has left us with some interesting thoughts and suggestions for future research, regarding identity development, radicalisation processes, the influence of marginalisation, moral and religious standards and the influence of society on the individual.

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APPENDIX I: ISLAMIC SECTS IN KENYA

Sunni Shafi'i

The sect distinctions are more specifically distributed among ethnic lines: Swahili, Arabs, Somalis, African Muslims and Asians. The Swahili have a rich history on the East African Coast. Most of the Swahili are Sunni Shafi'i and it is estimated that there are around 130,000 Swahili's in Kenya (Kenya Census 2009). Not everyone who speaks Kiswahili is a Swahili though, a somewhat loose definition handled is someone who is born at the Coast, or whose parents were born there, who is a Muslim and whose first language is Kiswahili (Oded, 2000, p.12). Traditionally, the Swahili in the Mombasa area are divided into a loose confederation of twelve groups, which are further subdivided into two sections: nine groups who live north of Mombasa, and the remaining three groups living south of the island. Each group is headed by a leader or *tamim* and who is assisted by his council of *wazee* (elders).

Among the Swahili there are some minor religious disputes which I shall not present. During the colonial period however, the British rule considered the Swahili people as black Africans, as opposed to the Arabs who enjoyed preferential treatment. The Swahili people however saw themselves as racially distinct from the black African ethnic groups and wanted to be treated as such. At independence, many Swahili's therefore supported the Coastal claims for independence.

The number of Arabs in Kenya is estimated at 40,750 in 2009 (Kenya Census, 2009). Some of them are descendants from the Omanis who ruled the region in the 18th and 19th century after defeating the Portuguese rulers at the time. Even after intermarriage with local Bantu tribes, they kept referring to themselves as Arab. Some of the Arabs came from the Hadramaut (Southern Arabian Peninsula), others came after the Omani conquest. As mentioned in the history section above, it was these traders that followed the earlier routes that were responsible for much of the spreading of Islam into the interior.

The majority of Kenya's Muslims are members of different ethnic groups, scattered throughout the country. They are predominantly found in the urban areas of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru etc, most of which are indeed from the Sunni Shafi'i school.

Lastly, there are a considerable population of Kenyan Asians who follow Islam. Having been brought to Kenya originally to build the railway in the early 20th century, many of them have stayed after independence. They usually enjoy a superior position compared to other Kenyans, and therefore tend to stay away from politics. Although most of the Asians are Hindu, there is a considerable number who follow the Sunni Shafi'i school as well as some who follow different Shia sects.

Shia and Other Sects

According to the PewForum report, 8% of all Kenyan Muslims indicate to identify with the Shia school. These sects are mostly followed by the Asian Muslims and are divided in: Ismailis, Ithna'ashiriya and Bohra. Since this research will be primarily conducted among the Sunni Shafi'i population of Mombasa, I will not concern myself with their ideological differences here. For a more complete overview on their ideology and history, please see Arya Oded (2000).

In addition, the Ahmadiya sect, followed by about 4% of all Kenyan Muslims according to the PewForum survey (2012), has a more missionary character. They are originally from Pakistan and have made a name for themselves by translating the Qur'an into Kiswahili. They have been criticized for this by other schools of Islam (Oded, 2000, p. 18).

Salafi/Wahabi

Violent extremist Islam largely has its foundations within the Salafi and Wahabi sects of Islam. It is thought to be the 'fundamental' or 'austere' form of Islam and is a branch of the Sunni sect. The full extent of the convictions and theological reasonings of these sects is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, considering the influence of Islamist extremism in the region, a section within the introduction Chapter of this thesis has elaborated on extremism in East Africa and how these convictions have spread to Kenya.

APPENDIX II: TIMELINE

This appendix is a summary of violent attacks in Kenya after the KDF invaded Somalia in October 2011. Sources have been provided. Some of the attacks that have been listed by some I could not verify with other news sources and have therefore not been included in this list.

2011

24th October	Nairobi - two separate grenade attacks. One on a bar (one dead, at least 20 hurt) and the second on a bus stop (5 dead, 69 hurt).
27th October	Mandera - four killed by RPG and machine guns.
4th November	Shaba - Two killed by gunmen on safari vehicle
7th November	Garissa - Grenade attack on a church kills two, injures 3
15th November	Dadaab - Two injured after grenade explosion hits police car
November	Twin attack: Garissa - Grenade attack on Holiday Inn Garissa - Grenades thrown at hotel and shop Leaving three dead and at least 27 injured

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Unknown Author. (November 15, 2011). Two wounded in blast near Kenya refugee camp. *Al Jazeera.* Retrieved June 17, 2015, from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111115194447107150.html

Unknown Author. (November 25, 2011). Kenya: deadly grenade attack near Somalia border. *BBC*. Retrieved June 17, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-15883256.

2012

January	Three reported attacks. Killing of officials and police officers.
10th March	Nairobi - grenade attack on a bus station, killing 6 injuring 60
31st March	Mombasa, Mtwapa - Twin blasts leave one dead, several injured.
29th April	Nairobi - Attack on a church. One person died, fifteen injured.
15th May	Mombasa - Grenade attack on night club. Killing one, five injured.
28th May	Nairobi - blast in a boutique. 27 injured.
24th June	Mombasa - Grenade attack on a bar. Killing three, injuring 30.
1st July	Garrissa - two church attacks killing 15, injuring 50.
18th July	Wajir - Grenade attack leaving four injured
3rd August	Nairobi - IED exploded in suicide attack in Eastleigh, leaving one dead, six injured.
28th August	Mombasa - Unknown number killed in riots following the killing of *Sheikh* Aboud Rogo Mohammed
15th September	Mandera - two police officers injured after vehicle hits land mine.
30th September	Nairobi - grenade attack on church leaving one dead.
30th September	Garrissa - Two police officers shot dead
27th October	Hagdera (Dadaab) - CID officer shot and killed.
1st November	Garissa - One police officer shot dead, one more injured
4th November	Garissa - Attack on a church, One police officer killed and eleven injured.
18th November	Nairobi - Explosive on a matatu in Eastleigh kills 10, leaves 25 seriously injured. After the attack, Somali shops are looted and homes destroyed.

20th November	Garissa - KDF burn down market and shoot at protesters, illing one, injuring 45.
5th December	Nairobi - explosion caused by roadside bomb in Eastleigh kills one and leaves six injured.
7th December	Nairobi - explosion near mosque in Eastleigh kills five and leaves eight injured.
16th December	Nairobi - explosion near the same mosque injures six.
19th December	Nairobi - two blasts next to a mosque in Eastleigh injure two people.
20th December	Garissa - three people shot dead and one person injured.
27th December	Mandera - One police officer shot dead

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2013

4th January	Garissa - grenade attack on a hang out kills two and injures seven. (Kawira, 2014).
5th January	Dadaab - Two killed, seven injured in refugee camp
7th January	Garissa - Grenade hurled into a police vehicle kills one, leaves 8 injured. (Kawira, 2014).
16th January	Garissa - five people shot dead, three people injured in a restaurant.
31st January	Dadaab - Blast injures three policemen in their vehicle. (Kawira, 2014)
2nd February	Wajir - KDF soldier killed in a grenade attack. (Kawira, 2014).
28th March	Malindi - Seven people shot dead by MRC gunmen.
18th April	Garissa - Six people shot dead and ten others seriously wounded in shooting in a hotel. (Kawira, 2014).
9th June	Twin attack: Nairobi - Eastleigh & Mombasa - Likoni Leaving 15 injured. (Kawira, 2014).
21st September	Nairobi - Westgate Shopping Mall attack, gunmen enter the shopping mall killing 67 and injuring over 175.
26th September	Mandera - two police officers killed and three injured.
5th December	Mombasa - Muslim Cleric Hassan Mwayuyu shot dead by unknown gunmen.
13th December	Wajir - Double blasts kill one, injure three
14th December	Nairobi - Eastleigh. Grenade attack on matatu kills four, injures 36.

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2014

1st January 2014	Mombasa - 10 injured in beach bar grenade attack.
2nd February	Mombasa - at least one killed after police storm mosque where Al Shabaab flag was raised.
14th March	Mombasa - Two suspects arrested carrying two IED's
15th March	Mandera - One shot dead, one dead after grenade attack
23rd March	Mombasa - Likoni. Gunmen enter church killing six people.
31st March	Nairobi - Two explosions kill six people wounding several in Eastleigh. Over 200 people are arrested. (Kawira, 2014).
1st April	Nairobi - Eastleigh three bombs explode and kill six, leaving dozens injured.
1st April	Mombasa - Muslim cleric Abubakar Shariff shot dead
2nd April	Authorities claim to have arrested over 650 suspects.
23rd April	Nairobi - Car explodes killing four in Eastleigh (Kawira, 2014).
3rd May	Mombasa - Twin attacks kill three people, injuring several.
4th May	Nairobi - Two IED's explode, killing three people injuring at least 62.
16th May	Nairobi - Gikomba Market. Twin explosions kill over 10 people, injuring many more.
23rd May	Mombasa - grenade attack on police vehicle injures two

15th - 17th June	Mpeketoni - 48 people are killed in a raid on the town by gunmen. Majembeni and Poromoko - at least 15 people are killed in raid on villages, houses are set on fire.
24th June	Taa village, Mpeketoni - Another five are killed by attackers
6th July	Hindi and Gamba town - 29 people are killed by gunmen overnight.
19th July	Witu - At least seven killed in attack on a bus
21st July	Mombasa - at least four killed in shooting rampage in 'retribution for Mpeketoni'.
17th November	Mombasa - police kill one and arrest over 200 in Mosque raids.
22nd November	Mandera - 28 bus passengers killed by gunmen.
1st December	Wajir - Grenade attack on a nightclub kills one, injures twelve.
2nd December	Mandera - 36 people shot dead in a quarry.

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2015

18th March 2015	Wajir - Four people killed in grenade attack on a shop
2nd April	Garissa - Garissa University attack, killing 147 and injuring hundreds more.
26th May	Yumbis, Garissa - 25 policemen are killed in an ambush north of town.

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APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Family - Parents

- What is your situation at home, who takes care of you?
- What was it like growing up? (socio economic as well)
- How do you deal with your parents/caretakers?
- Do you ever fight or are there things that annoy you?
- What do you appreciate in your parents?
- Are your parents and example for you? Would you do anything different?
- What do you talk about with your parents? What do you not talk about with them?
- Are there things that they do not know about you?
- Is there a difference between your mother and your father (if that's the case)?

2. Family - Siblings

- Do you have siblings? If so, how many? Or are there members of your family living with you who you consider siblings?
- How was it growing up with them?
- Do you ever fight? What about?
- What do you appreciate in your siblings? Are there things that annoy you?
- Are your siblings an example to you? Do you feel that you might be an example to them? Do you want to be?
- Do you discuss things with your siblings? What do you not talk about?
- Are there things they do not know about you?
- Is there a difference between your siblings, are you closer to one than the other? If so, why is that?

3. Education - Future Work - Hobbies

- If currently at school:
    - How do you like it at school?

- How is it going at school, do you consider yourself a good student?
- Do you find school important, why?
- What do you plan to do after you finish school?
- What do you want to do when you grow up? Have you always felt that way, or have these ideas changed?
- What do you do in your spare time? Do you have any hobbies?
- Do you ever feel bored? If so, what does that feel like?
- What would you change in your life? What would you keep the same?
- Do your parents interfere with school? Are they interested?

- If currently working:
  - What kind of job do you have?
  - Do you enjoy working? Why did you pick this job?
  - Who is dependent on your salary?
  - Was this the job that you always wanted to do? If not, what is your dream job?
  - What do you do in your spare time? Do you have any hobbies?
  - How do you see your future? What is your dream? What is realistic?
  - Do you ever feel bored? If so, can you describe what that feels like?
  - What would you change in your life? What would you keep the same?
  - Do your parents interfere with your job? Are they interested in what you do?
- If currently unemployed:
  - What does an ordinary day look like for you?
  - Did you enjoy going to school?
  - Do you want to continue your education if you could? What would you do?
  - What is your dream future? What is realistic?
  - Do you ever feel bored? If so, can you describe what that feels like?
  - Do you have any hobbies? What do you do in your spare time?
  - What would you change in your life? What would you keep the same?

4. Gender

- What do you think about the way you look?

- Are you interested in your looks? Do you spend a lot of time taking care of your looks?
- What do you think of your character? What are your good and your bad qualities?
- How do you feel about being a boy/girl?
- Is there a difference according to you, and do you feel there should be one?
- What do you think are roles for boys/girls? Do you fit those role? Do you want to fit?
- Have you ever had a boyfriend/girlfriend? Can you tell me a bit more about that?
- Do you want to get married later? When would that be you think?
- What is important in your future partner?
- Do you talk about boys/girls with your friends? And about getting married? What about with your parents/siblings?

5. Religion

- What does your religion mean to you? When is it important?
- What do you want to know about Islam/Christianity, how would you do that?
- Do you ever have discussions about your religion? With who? How does that go?
- When do you call someone a Muslim? What is a Muslim?
- Do you ever hang out with people from another religion? What do you think about other religions?
- What is it like to be a Muslim in Kenya or at the Coast?

6. Friends - Peer Pressure - Social Media

- Who are your friends? When do you see them?
- What do you do together?
- What do you talk about with your friends? What do you not talk about?
- Are your friends from a certain tribe, or religion? Does it matter?
- Is there a difference according to you between a friendship between boys and girls?
- When do you call someone a friend? What is important in friendship?
- Can you have 'wrong' friends you think? What would that mean? Could you give an example?

- Do you have a facebook or twitter account? If so, how often do you use it? What do you use it for? Do you ever have discussions on Facebook? What are they about?
- What is a Facebook friend? Is that different than a 'real' friend? Why or why not?

7. Current Affairs

- What do you think of the raids at the mosques, and the killings of their leaders?
- Who do you think is behind this and why?
- What do you think of Al Shabaab?
- Is it a common topic of discussion between you and your friends? How does that go?
- This research tries to map 'radicalisation' at the Coast, what do you think is radical?
- Do you notice it around you? If so, how?
- Do you think it is related to Islam, or is it Christian or perhaps tribal too?
- What are concerns that you have about 'politics'?
- Sometimes there are cases of violence both from the Government as well as from 'radical' groups, why do you think this happens? How do you feel about that when you hear about violent actions?

8. Ethnicity

- What tribe are you?
- Is your tribe important to you? And your friends/family?
- What does it mean to you?
- Do you ever have discussions about tribalism? With who? How does that go?
- Do you ever hang out with people from another tribe? What do you think about other tribes?
- What does tribalism mean in Kenya do you think?

APPENDIX IV: AGREEMENTS BETWEEN RESEARCHER & INTERVIEWEE

1. Recording

I will record our conversation, so that during the interview I can listen to what you have to say. According to the rules of the University, I have to keep these recordings as proof that I did not make up the results of my research myself. Only the people involved with this project (me, assistants that might type out the recordings and the science committee) are allowed to listen to these recordings, but not copy them. These recordings will stay in my possession and will not be shared with third parties or published on the internet.

2. Anonymity

All the data will be processed anonymously. You will get a name (of you own choosing if you like) and any details that might reveal your identity will be changed. This is also the case for any people that you might tell me about during the interview. When you tell me about other people, I do not care about their names or who they are, but only what kind of role they play in your story.

3. Information to third parties

I do NOT give any information to third parties about people that I have spoken to in this research, so also not to other people that are participating.

4. Permission to use the interview for this research

The interviewee (you) gives permission to me as a researcher to use the material from the interview for the research. Until a week after the interview you can come to me and decide whether or not you want this interview to be part of my research. After that, the interview will be written down and prepared and added to the database. If you prefer, I can send you a copy of the typed out interview later on.

5. Representation of the perspective.

Because I hope to speak to a lot of people and will compare many different personal stories, it may happen that I will quote from the interview in a broader context. This may not only represent your voice but function as an example for shared ideas or experiences. I may summarise this around your citation in my own words. I will try my best to represent your vision in my interpretation.

6. Change of contact details

If there is a change in phone number or (email)address, I would like to get an update so I can keep you informed about how my research is going, and about the possible publication of a book.

Date:

Signature of interviewee for agreement with the above:

…….

Name of the interviewee:

…….

APPENDIX V: LIST of CODES

Al Shabaab
Anger
Anti-Western Feelings
Aspirations Overseas
Being a Guy
Boredom
Brainwashing
Career Choices
Change Life
Character
Children
Choice
Christian Muslim
Conversion
Corruption
Crime
Dad
Decisions
Discussion
Domestic Violence
Dream Future
Drugs
Education Importance
Example
Exploration
Fighting
Fitting Gender
Football
Friends
Friends Discussion
Fundamentalism
Future
Gender
Gender Pride
Gender Roles
Girlfriend
Going Out
GoK
Good Bad
Good Muslim
High ID Development
Honesty
ID Development
Importance of Family
Islam = Peace
Islamic State
Islamic Way
Jihad
Justice
Kidnap
Killing
Lack of Education Imams
Looks

Love
Low Exploration
Majengo
Marginalisation
Marriage
Masjid Mussa
Miraa
Muslim - non-Muslim
Muslim = Terrorism
Muslim Mombasa
Parents
Parents Appreciation
Parents Difference
Parents Don't Talk
Parents Example
Parents Expectations
Parents Fighting
Parents Talking
Peer Pressure
Police
Poverty
Providing
Religion
Religion Strategy
Religious Talk
Responsibilities
Revenge
Right Path
Right Wrong
School
Sheikh
Siblings
Siblings Appreciation
Siblings Difference
Siblings Discussion
Siblings Example
Siblings Fighting
Smoking
Social Media
Spare Time
Sports
Stealing
Strategies Right Path
Strategy Eyewitness
Strategy Friends
Strategy Parents
Strategy Siblings
Strict Parenting
Study
Study Strategy
Terrorism not Religion
Traditional Gender
Tribe
Tribe Not Important
University
Walking
Woman Takes care of Children
Wrong Friends